DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE Local Politics and Public Management Issues in Indonesia DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE Local Politics and Public Management Issues in Indonesia Editors: Dyah Mutiarin Ridho Al-Hamdi Isnaini Muallidin Queeny Pearl Tomaro Published By: Jusuf Kalla Scholl of Government (JKSG) Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY) Jurusan Ilmu Pemerintahan (IP) / Department of Government Affairs and Administration UMY Magister Ilmu Pemerintahan / Master of Government Affairs and Administration UMY and Buku Litera DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE Local Politics and Public Management Issues in Indonesia First Edition, 2018 220 pages (viii+ 200 pages) and 155 x235 mm ISBN: 978-602-5681-01-1 Authors: David Efendi Zuly Qodir Suranto Tunjung Sulaksono Awang Darumurti Muhammad Yusuf Suranto Rendra Setyadiharja Arif Zainudin Sri Sutjiatmi Dyah Mutiarin Rahmat Dedi Saputra Ridho Al-Hamdi Muchamad Zaenuri Isnaini Muallidin Erni Zuhriyanti Editor: Dyah Mutiarin Ridho Al-Hamdi Isnaini Muallidin Queeny Pearl Tomaro Cover: Ibnu Lay Out: Ibnu Special Copies, January 2018 Printed in Yogyakarta ISBN: Published By: Jusuf Kalla Scholl of Government (JKSG) Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY) Jurusan Ilmu Pemerintahan (IP) / Department of Government Affairs and Administration UMY Magister Ilmu Pemerintahan / Master of Government Affairs and Administration UMY and Buku Litera Preface The emerging trends and challenges of today’s world especially in Indonesia have been the main reasons on why this book came into being. The book is a compilation of excellent and handpicked researches of my colleagues in the Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY), scholars from other universities and students and alumni of UMY. In my lengthy years of being an educator, I have found the need to not only do research but to share my research to young and old scholars as it is through this that knowledge is enhanced and ideas are sharpened. It is through this book that researches are exposed into wider audiences and could find more potential to be used for further research and other educational purposes it may serve. It is the calling of an educator to find avenue for knowledge sharing to continually be ignited through the quest of doing research and publishing researches. It is through this that the social world is more questioned, analyzed, and more understood, but more to that, it is an intergenerational responsibility to the youth and the students to provide them an array of excellent and relevant works that could be food for their thoughts and could feed their cognitive and analytical appetite. I hope that this book could find its use in the academic sphere and could inspire more researches and more minds as there are more phenomena that needs to be analyzed and more issues to be delved in. v vi Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... v Contents......................................................................................................vii Introduction: Is Indonesia Moving toward Democratic Governance? .................................ix Part One: Local Politics and Election .................................................... 1 Chapter 1 From Riots to Revolution: Seeing Democratization in Indonesia and Malaysia David Efendi ............................................................................. 3 Chapter 2 The Voice of Islamic Party tn Indonesia: The Case Of The Indonesia’s 2014 General Election Zuly Qodir ............................................................................... 35 Chapter 3 The Factors Determining Voter’s Participation in Bantul Regency Elections Suranto, Tunjung Sulaksono and Awang Darumurti ............ 57 Chapter 4 Resistance to Forest Management Policies: A Study on Orang Rimba in Jambi Province Muhammad Yusuf and Zuly Qodir ...................................... 71 Part Two: Public Service Reform .......................................................... 95 Chapter 5 Analysis of Community Satisfaction Index on Integrated Licensing Service Agency of Tegal Regency of Central Java Province, Indonesia Suranto, Rendra Setyadiharja, Arif Zainudin and Sri Sutjiatmi ..................................................................... 97 Chapter 6 The Implementation of Minimum Service Standards in the Field of Health in Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD): A Case Study of SPM Referral Services in Baubau City Regional Hospital Suranto, Dyah Mutiarin, and Rahmat Dedi Saputra ....... 109 vii Part Three: Governance and Leadership ........................................... 131 Chapter 7 How Do Islam and Good Governance Address Public Issues? A Comparative View in The Case Of Poverty and Corruption Ridho Al-Hamdi .................................................................. 133 Chapter 8 Build Collaborative Governance Model to Sustainable Tourism Development: Learning from the Disaster Management-Tourism Merapi Volcano Tour in Sleman Regency Muchamad Zaenuri ............................................................. 157 Chapter 9 Transformational Leadership in Public Sector: The Case Study of Hery Zudianto Era in Yogyakarta City Isnaini Muallidin and Erni Zuhriyanti............................... 187 About Editors.......................................................................................... 199 viii Introduction: Is Indonesia Moving toward Democratic Governance? Dyah Mutiarin and Queeny Pearl Tomaro Indonesia is the third largest democratic state in this planet after India and America. Today, it is nearly reaching two decades of its democratization wave since 1998. Applying Huntington’s (1991) theory on the democratization stage, Indonesia has passed the authoritarian regime and the installation of a democratic regime. Most scholars concur that the development of democratization in Indonesia today is going to move slowly towardconsolidation. It is deduced that it has a lot of progresses, but it is still fraught with many weaknesses (Hefner,2000; Abuza,2007; Abdulbaki,2008; Bünte and Ufen, 2009; Ufen,2009; Hefner, 2009a, 2009b; Mujani and Liddle, 2009; Hilmy,2010; Aspinall,2010; Liddle, 2013; Aspinall,2013; Liddle and Mujani,2013;Winters,2013; Suseno, 2013; Mietzner;2014).Other scholars gave different labels to Indonesia: “a normal country” (Ragame, 2007), “oscillating between a defective and an embedded democracy” (Hadiwinata and Schuck, 2007), “domain democracy” (Merkel, 2007), “low-quality democracy” (Mietzner, 2009) and “democratic state” in 2010 and “semi-democratic” in 2014 (Freedom House). These distinctive epithets denote to the fact that democracy in Indonesia is in the scenario of stability (Merkel and Croissant, 2004: 207-211) where it is unlikely to suffer a regression or rollback, but its developments have slow paces towardan embedded democracy for years to come. Nevertheless, Freedom House in 2010 already called Indonesia as the most consolidated democracy in Southeast Asia. In 2014, Indonesia is still a leading state for political rights category in Southeast Asia. In accordance with this, the political system within the country and its public management play a vital responsibility in underpinning governance processes. ix This book attempts to explain the development and dynamics of democratic governance in contemporary Indonesia whether in the national or local levels. In the national context, some articles elaborate on distinctive issues related with election, political parties, comparative democracy, disaster management and religious perspective in addressing public issues. Meanwhile, public management issues such as health, licensing, forest management, mayoral leadership, investment and e-procurement are also provided in this book and, of course, they are really appealing to be read and criticized further. The writers have great ability in presenting indepth analysis and precise methods in different areas. In Java, the acticles also presented local cases in Bantul Regency, Yogyakarta City and Tegal Regency. In the eastern Indonesia, one article can provided a local case in Baubau, a city in Southeast Sulawesi. In short, this book can represent national and local governance from different parts of Indonesia. More specifically, there are three main parts that are provided in this book. First is portraying the local politics and election. Second is explaining public service reform. Third is depicting on governance and leadership. All of the articles which are presented in this book are based on in-depth research with distinctive methodologies. Most of them are dominated by field researches. The writers are from academic environments. They are Indonesian citizens particularly lecturers and graduate students in Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY), STISIPOL Nurdin Hamzah Jambi, STISIPOL Raja Haji Tanjungpinang Kepulauan Riau Province, Raja Ali Haji Maritime University Kepulauan Riau Province and Pancasakti University Tegal. The part one has four articles which analyze national and local politics in Indonesia. The explanation in this part is started by David Efendi with his article title on “From Riots to Revolution: Seeing Democratization in Indonesia and Malaysia”. The article depicts the development of the democratization wave in Indonesia and Malaysia where revolution and riots are still high within these two countries. It is important to note that Indonesia is politically developed, but economically less developed. Meanwhile, Malaysia has a growing economy, but political freedom and democracy are less developed. Moreover, Zuly Qodir through his article, “The Voice of Islamic Party in Indonesia: The Case of the Indonesia’s 2014 General Election”, heexplained the resurgence of political Islam in the x 2014 election. Nevertheless, the power of political Islam in Indonesia is dependent on two largest Muslim organizations namely Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama (NU). As a matter of fact, these two organizations have outstanding resources to counter any kinds of radicalism and extremism movements. Furthermore, two others articles portray the local politics. In their joint article “The Factors Determining the Voter’s Participation in Bantul Regency Elections”, Suranto, Tunjung Sulaksonoand Awang Darumurti depict the driving factors why people vote for their candidate in the Bantul Regency Elections. The study’s findings demonstrate that the level of participation in Bantul is always high. There are five factors that determine the high level of participation, and these are: the political affiliation of closest relations, participation stimulus, tight social control, voter’s mobilization and the concern of societal institution. Meanwhile, the factors that hamper voter’s participation arefive-fold: (1) the saturation of voters toward elections, (2) less-frequent, (3) lessinnovative socialization, (4)less-accurate voter data gathering, (5) the lack of social bond and control and pragmatism. The last article of the first part of this book is “Resistance to Forest Management Policies: A Study on Orang Rimba in Jambi Province” written by Muhammad Yusuf et al. This article attempted to find out two things: The reasons why Orang Rimba, one of Jambi’s tribe, show resistance toward the policy on forest management and the response of the local government with Orang Rimba’s resistance. There are two main finding of the study. Firstly, the study found out that there are five reasons of Orang Rimba’s resistance: 1) There is a disappointment towardthe government policy because it was made unilaterally by the government, 2)The downfall of Orang Rimba’s customary law, which makes the law itself not working 3)There is a cooperation and influence from Orang Terang, 4)There is a competion in forest resources management between Orang Rimba and Orang Terang,5)The increase of living cost makes Orang Rimba take risks either in hidden or open resistance. Meanwhile, the way the government responds to Orang Rimba’s resistance is by socializing, cooperating intersectorally, monitoring and security, and empowering the village economy. Nonetheless, the policy has no positive impactsbecause Orang Rimba still resiststhe policy of forest management. xi The part two has two interesting articles. Using the case study method, the part two seeks to analyze the reformation of public services such as health insurance and licensing . The first article is on “The Implementation of Minimum Service Standards in the Field of Health in Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD): A Case Study of SPM Referral Services in Baubau City Regional Hospital”. This article investigated the implementation of the minimum service standards in the areas of health reference in the RSUD and determined the factors which affect the minimum service standards in the field of health reference in the RSUD. The finding shows that the implementation of the minimum service standards in the field of health reference in the RSUD is already good.A minor lack of SPM implementation in the field of health exist and this is traced in the amount of human resources required.The factors which affect the implementation of minimum service standard in the field of health reference in the RSUD are communication, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. In Java Islands, Rendra Setyadiharjaet.al. wrote “Analysis of Community Satisfaction Index on Integrated Licensing Service Agency of Tegal Regency of Central Java Province” which exploredthe index of community satisfaction on Tegal’s Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) in 2014 and the expectation of local people within the regency about the services provided by Tegal’s BP2T.The result demonstrates that the sevice quality can be considered to be in a good grade. Nonetheless, the government has to improve particularly in the aspects of procedures and service time within the BP2T. For the last part, this book is going to elaborate four appealing articles related togovernance and leadership. Two articles are discussing about governance issues and the rest is correlated with leadership issues. In the next featured study, Ridho Al-Hamdi wrote “How Do Islam and Good Governance Address Public Issues? A Comparative View in the Case of Poverty and Corruption”. The article scrutinizedthe compatibility of Islam and good governance in addressing two main public issues namely poverty and corruption. To explain their compatibility, this article explored the policy, agenda and strategy of Islam and good governance. The result demonstrates that Islam and good governance (as the western perspective) have similar concept, policies, agenda and strategies in handling poverty and corruption issues. Principally, poverty and corruption are the roots xii of backwardness and foolishness. Thus, they should be diminished from societal life in order to gain better prosperity in life. Proceeding to the next article, Muchamad Zaenuri wrote “Building Collaborative Governance Model to Sustainable Tourism Development: Learning from Disaster Management-Tourism Merapi Volcano Tour in Sleman Regency”. The article argues that collaborative governance is appropriate to be used in the disaster-tourism management of Sleman. This methodgives the roles to non government powers to participate intourism management. The collaborative governance model has a long term and high-level correlation, where non government powers and the government work together by sharing resources and risks. The last and final article is by Isnaini Muallidin and Erni Zuhriyantientitled, “Transformational Leadership in Public Sector: The Case Study of Herry Zudianto Era in Yogyakarta City”. The article aimed to explain the practices of Herry Zudianto’s leadership as the mayor of Yogyakarta Municipality. The result shows thattransformational leadership has been implemented during Zudianto’s leadership through, the type of influence, extreme idealism, inspirited extended motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individual consideration. To sum up, the executive summary of ten articles are presented above. These articles share a common thead which shows that the ripeness of democracy and governance in Indonesia are moving toward a positive path. It should therefore be appreciated. Nevertheless, an extra-ordinary effort from all stakeholders is extremely needed because Indonesia does not belong to a tiny group of people, or a certain tribe, or a certain religionor just a few elites. Indonesia needs togetherness and involvement from various stakeholdersin inventing an ideal democracy that is clean, employs good governance, and commited in reforming the bureaucracy and so on and so forth. The Editor Team, Dyah Mutiarin Ridho Al-Hamdi Isnaini Muallidin Queeny Pearl Tomaro xiii xiv Part One: Local Politics and Election 1 2 FROM RIOTS TO REVOLUTION: SEEING DEMOCRATIZATION IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA David Efendi Lecturer, Department of Government Affairs and Administration Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta E-mail: defendi83@gmail.com Abstract This paper aims to compare popular revolutions and riot movements in Malaysia and Indonesia as well as their impact on democracy in each of these countries. While revolutions in these countries have been the subject of the research in the social and political sciences, no study has measured how the intensity of resistance affects the prospects for democracy. With all other factors being constant, this article argues that social movements and resistance efforts have their own social impacts. A variety of popular resistance movements occurred in Malaysia, which was colonized by Great Britain, and in Indonesia, which was colonized by the Dutch. These states created different models of control that influenced society directly and indirectly. As what was seen, a lot of radical movements in the Indonesian society existed during the colonial and post-revolution eras, continuing to the current day. Meanwhile, in Malaysia, as examined by Scott, everyday forms of resistance have tended to act individually and symbolically. In addition, this article will discuss why certain countries experience democratization quickly while others do not, and why certain countries experience better economic development rather than political development and vice versa. For example, Indonesia is considered politically developed but economically, not as developed. Meanwhile, Malaysia, a post-British colony, is argued to experience the opposite; it has developed its economy rapidly but, at the same time, political freedom and democracy are less developed. Freedom of the press, human rights enforcement,a multi-party system, and group opposition are indicators of democracy that are easy to find in Indonesia but not in Malaysia. Keywords: Rebellion, civil resistance, democracy, colonial legacy, civil society 3 Part One: Local Politics and Election INTRODUCTION There seems to be no end to the many scholars who discuss and explain rebellions and revolutions in the colonial era (Sartono Kartodirjo, 1977) and today they put much attention to the phenomena of social movements, collective action and everyday forms of resistance (Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, 2009; James Scott, 1985). On the broader topic of revolution, Theda Skocpol (1979) and Barrington Moore (1966) have found a pattern of revolution in Western and Eastern societies. Other political scientists pay more attention in the small thing, and the massive and unorganized ones; to name a few, Scott examined the everyday resistance and Kerkvliet examined the everyday politics. Scott worked on cases in Malaysia, and Kerkvliet has generally examined Vietnam and the Philippines. Other works will be discussed below to compare the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia. This study aims to compare cases of popular rebellions and the intensity of everyday forms of resistance between Malaysia and Indonesia, and the impact of such movements toward democratization. To this author’s knowledge, there has been no study to compare these two countries in terms of how forms of resistance have or have not significantly affected democratization. Assuming other factors are constant, this article will argue that various kinds of popular resistance can have social impacts. This is necessary to be studied because when different forms of popular resistance happened, both in Malaysia and Indonesia, both countries were representing different colonizing states, as Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch and Malaysia by Great Britain. These states created different model of control that influenced their societies directly and indirectly. As can be seen, a number of radical movements that arose in Indonesian society during the colonial and post-revolution eras have continued in the recent politics during the post-Suharto period. Meanwhile, in Malaysia, as stated by Scott, the form of everyday resistance tends to be in the forms of individual and symbolic resistance. This article is can contribute to the discussion why certain countries experience rapid democratization and why others do not, and why certain countries achieve better economic development rather than in politics and vice versa. Indonesia has undergone comparatively rapid political development and institutional change 4 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... but relatively less economic development. Meanwhile, Malaysia, as a post-British colony has experienced the opposite; it has developed its economy and has made less progress in political development and democracy. Press freedom, multi-party politics, and opposition are observed to be higher in Indonesia but not in Malaysia in general. The reasons why I am comparing these two countries are because (1) Indonesia and Malaysia have similar agrarian societies; (2) they are Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia; (3)they contain the same ethnicity, so-called Malay; (4) historically, they have somewhat similar histories of nation-state building in the colonial period under Dutch, British, and Japanese colonizers. The Dutch started colonizing Indonesia in 1595 and the British colonized Malay in 1786 under the rule of the British East India Company. Both the Dutch and British had their own nature as colonizers, which entailed corresponding consequences. The Dutch were considered as instituting direct rule rather than the British in Malaysia who adopted indirect rule (Bhatatacharjee, 1976). Moreover, the Dutch generated plenty of resistance during its rule in Indonesia but not the British in Malaysia. Further explanations will be discussed in the next parts of the paper. In addition, this paper explains the relationship between the intensity of the collective action to the democratization both in Indonesia and Malaysia. This debate is rarely compared among postcolonial countries because of various reasons and factors. First, in some countries it is assumed that democracy is more important than economic development, as has been the case for Indonesia which has paid much attention to political development in the Sukarno Era, and post-authoritarian Suharto. Meanwhile, Malaysia and Singapore think the opposite and have put economic development as apriority rather than western or liberal democracy. However, comparing Indonesia and Malaysia can help us to understand how people value democracy and how the type of regime can influence the prospects for democracy. So the questions will be asked here are (1) how did social turbulence (rebellion, confrontation, resistance and riots) as the form of collective action during the colonial and post-colonial eras shape democratization in both Malaysia and Indonesia; (2) what are the conditions that make democratization likely to succeed regarding the culture and the Democratic Governance| 5 Part One: Local Politics and Election colonial state; (3) how are both countries strongly influenced by Islamic values and the similarly shared ethnicity; and, finally, (3) why is there a considerable gap for “democracy” between Malaysia and Indonesia. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Rebellion, to some extent, can be defined as one form of resistance. One also may use a definition that follows Robert and Garton (2009), who distinguishes resistance from rebellion. According to the two, resistance is a type of political action that relies on the use of non-violent methods; meanwhile rebellion often uses violence (Adam Robert and Timothy Garton, 2009).Rebellion likely happens in both democratic and undemocratic states, and can be understood as the possible result of rebellion or revolution. One of this article’s arguments is to contribute to the debate about the process of democratization in the post-colonial era. A wide array of literature had discussed the role of civil society (Muthiah Alagappa, 2004) and voluntary organizations, but such studies often do not account for the role of popular rebellion, anti-colonial movements, or even everyday forms of resistance. The thesis of this paper is,first, that the intensity of resistance establishes democratic values such as liberty, tolerance, and constitutional government, and second that the emergence of civil resistance creates conditions conducive toward democracy such as negotiation, nonviolence movements, and voluntary organizations, which then lead to democratization. The process itself may also naturally begin from the everyday life within the society. According to western democratic values, participation and freedom are emphasized, and civil resistance embeds such values for rebels, anti-colonial groups, and protesters. I will follow several different theories in understanding the concept of civil resistance based on Malaysian and Indonesian comparative politics. Without neglecting the Tocquevillian role of society, this article attempts to examine the specific cases of the neighboring countries. Some scholars have worked on the dynamics of peasant movements in countries across Asia, Southeast Asia and Europe. Peasant revolutions are generally never successful, though some strongly argue that peasant revolutions can lead to the emergence of a ‘democratic state’ in the indigenous sense (in contrast to democracy in the Western sense). 6 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... Barrington Moore contends that in peasant revolutions, it is the peasantry that abolishes the traditional elite and not the revolutionary bourgeoisie, which clears the way for modernization. Moore’s social class analysis emphasizes class conflict, such as that between landlords and peasants, as the main cause of social revolutions, with recognition of the other factors in certain circumstances (Barrington Moore, 1966). Related to Moore’s notion on revolution, Skocpol strongly criticizes this view in his own work State and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis France, Russia, and China. In reviewing the literature, he challenges Moore by asserting that class analysis is unable to see the revolution in different places. In my opinion, however, Moore’s idea is relevant to the subject at hand because he relates the revolution with the emergence of democracy in a communist society. Like Huntington (1968), Moore emphasizes the relation between democracy and development, or modernization. In many places, Skocpol has different views with Moore; for instance, Moore argued that the role of the peasant was more important than that of the worker in revolutionary movements. Still, Moore is well-known for his position of, “No bourgeoisie, No democracy.” Moreover, he assumes that commercialization leads to industrialization and, for several reasons, it has different outcomes for political institutions. Meanwhile, Eric Wolf aptly emphasizes the role of external leadership in strengthening the role of peasants in collective movements. Peasant rebellions, he argues, never succeed without the existence of local and strong leadership (Eric Wolf 1966). Taking a different view, Migdal distinguishes between two types of peasant societies: the first type is a peasant society in intense contact with an external society, which tends to participate in revolutionary movements. In contrast, the second type is a peasant society that is isolated from other societies, which would be reluctant to join in revolutions (Migdal, 1974). From such arguments, we can see that there are various approaches to analyze peasant or social revolutions. Some strongly use Marxist theory while others adopt anthropological or sociological analysis. According to Kartodirjo, Moore, Wolf, and Migdal, one should especially take note of the unsettling conditions associated with the introduction of commercialized agriculture. In the context of Malaysia and Indonesia, or broadly in Southeast Asia, several important studies relate to peasant rebellions and Democratic Governance| 7 Part One: Local Politics and Election resistance movements, including those by Sartono Kartodirjo, James Scott, and Ben Kerkvliet. Kartodirjo has worked on agrarian rebellions in Java and Banten with focus on the significant role of peasants toward the colonial state at that time. He highlights the ordinary people’s role rather than the role of the elites (Kartodirjo,1966;Claire Holt, 1972; Anderson and Siegel).This is a different approach from that of Wolf and Migdal, and much more resembling the class analysis of Moore. Meanwhile, James Scott has engaged in serious research for years in Malaysia with an interest in the different kinds of collective action that emerge without explicit organization. He calls this an ‘everyday form of resistance’ which, in his view, does not require collective action, but is carried out instead privately in the course of daily life. In other words, citizens may resist individually by using their own ways such as compliance and sabotage, and they, in general, avoid confrontation (Scott, 1985). Lastly, Kerkvliet works on both rebellion and everyday politics in Vietnam. He categorizes political behavior into three realms i.e. official politics, advocacy politics, and everyday politics. Official politics is often understood as the politics of the state or government, and advocacy related to an NGO or private organization that has a state-society relationship. Both official and advocacy politics are forms of conventional politics. Meanwhile, everyday politics “involves people embracing, complying with, adjusting, and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources and doing so in quite, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organized or direct (Kerkvliet, 2009). In addition, the different meanings of rebellion, revolution, and resistance are somewhat difficult to separate, because some cases show that they are overlapping with one another. Nonetheless, perhaps they can simply be distinguished by using measurements such as social and political structural changes, as well as social and institutional changes, as metrics of their impact. Some argue that rebellions do not entail structural change, while revolutions do. Rebellion, as Webster defines it, is “organized, armed, open resistance to the authority or government in power,” while revolution is a “movement that brings about a drastic change in society.” Both nineteenth century writers and modern historians invariably refer to this conflict as a rebellion, an insurrection, 8 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... or a rising, implying that the violence was aimed at a certain legitimate authority (Locard, 1978). Furthermore, everyday forms of resistance and everyday politics as alternative forms of revolution, a so-called “small revolution”, do exist. Small resistance movements can be unorganized yet effective at influencing public policy or authority holders. Nevertheless, it needs to be examined carefully. Adding to this, we should also recognize why people rebel and why others do not. Many have argued that economic inequality breeds political conflict. Societies with a more unequal distribution of income and wealth are often thought to be more prone to such phenomena as revolution, rebellion, civil war, terrorism, demonstrations, and coups de etat. The lineage of this idea runs from Aristotle and Plato, to de Tocqueville, Marx, and Madison, through Lipset, Dahl, and Huntington.1 Some, like Weber and Schultz, introduce the “in order to motive” and “because motive.”2Many political scientists emphasize the intentionality of resistance for economic, political or cultural identity. For instance, domination in the colonial era created various kinds of anti-colonial rebellions, mostly in Third World countries. For Aristotle, the reason why revolution happened was a struggle for equality (McKeon, 1941) or in other words, on Marxist terms, rebellion for class struggle. But sometimes it is difficult to claim whether these rebellions are rational choices or the mere result of inequality (Lichbach, 1990), the question is, under what conditions, if any, will inequality among rational actors lead Have-Nots to coerce resources from the Haves through political dissent, protest, and violence? Politically, if everyone in a group has the same interests, then they will act collectively to achieve it. This argument was supported by Dowding Keith, who describes a situation in which active and passive supporters would all benefit from a certain action, although they have to pay individually. The rational choice is then to undertake this as a collective action to minimize the cost per capita (Dowding, 1996). Conversely, Mancur Olson argues that the larger collective action may grant smaller shared benefits for its participants, simply because the 1 2 See, Aristotle on Political Man and the Condition of the Democratic Order; S.M. Lipset on his Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics; Marx on his Communist Manifesto; Dahl’s On Democracy; De Tacquiville on Democracy in America; and, finally, the controversial work of Huntington on his Clash of Civilization. See Fatchan and Basrowi in Pembelotan Kaum Pesantren dan Petani Jawa. Democratic Governance| 9 Part One: Local Politics and Election minority can dominate the majority (Olson, 1971).In addition, motivation might be stemmed from pragmatic and spontaneous sources rather than systematic intention, particularly for unorganized movements such as riots. It also depends on the type of rebellion or resistance movement, which I categorize into two models: “resistance to change”3 and anti-statusquo resistance. Concerning democratization, one often connects this process with economic development and the rise of the middle class (Huntington, Lipset, Fukuyama, Moore, etc. and political institutions) (Reynolds, 2002).Dahl, Horowitz, Lijphart, Linz, Nohlen, Sartori, Huntington, Fukuyama, civil society (Tocqueville, Putnam), equality in the sense of ‘associationalism’ (Tocqueville, Putnam, and Dahl) or civic culture (Almond and Verba), egalitarian, historical continuity and consideration to the role of social revolution (Moore, Skocpol, and Tilly), electoral politics (Dahl, Diamond), literacy/education, and degrees of freedom (Sen, Emerson, and Lipset, 1959), but such views do not account for the clear role of rebellion and revolution in reshaping democracy and setting the grounds for democratization. One may contend that the wealthy and middle class significantly influence democratic development, as Moore states in his popular jargon “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” and, in the case of America, based on Moore, egalitarian and voluntary associations play the biggest role in shaping democracy. In the context of Malaysia and Singapore, the middle class, economic development, or literacy might have nothing to do with democracy per se due to the persistence of traditional authority in Malaysia and the Singapore’s soft authoritarianism. However, such a claim requires more detailed explanation and multiple perspectives. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS Context and Historical Background Seeing that Malaysia and Indonesia cannot be separated from peasant society, with its own pre- and post-colonial moral economy (Scott,1976), these nations built their own rationalities, which considerably differ from those of the Western thought. For instance, 3 Resistance to change is the action taken by individuals and groups when they perceive that a change that is occurring as a threat to them. 10 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... in these nations, relationships are established informally to feed a family as an alternative to commercialization.This has led to a society that enjoyed harmony without any central domination and peripheral resistance, until Western colonialism dominated such cultures. In brief, this session will set forth a comparison of the intensity of rebellion and resistance for Indonesia and Malaysia. Firstly, the historical facts regarding rebellion and revolution in Indonesia are numerous revolutionary movements. To mention a few, there are many different forms of civil disobedience, revolution, and resistance, having different motivations, such as resistance against the Dutch government, resistance against the authoritarian state, resistance for democracy, and finally people’s resistance against ‘democracy’ in the name of identity. Several related studies include, for instance, Kartodirjo (1966) under the title The Peasant’s Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel. This study discussed the farmers’ rebellion in Banten and their fight against Dutch colonial rule. In this opposition movement, farmers were led by the Ulama (Moslem religious leaders) of Banten and the Tubagus, or nobles, in Banten. Before and after the rebellion of 1888, there were many civilian resistance movements in Indonesia. Kartodirjo stated that each revolt was a continuation of the other; Kuntowijoyo (2002) covered this same topic in his book Radikalisasi Petani. Other form of rebellions are introduced by Kahin (1999) in his book Rebellion to Integration, West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity and also in a book entitled The Resistance of Santri and Peasants in Java (Pembelotan Kaun Pesantren dan Petani Jawa) by Basrowi published in 2004, and a few scholars wrote Islamic groups movement under the banner the Komando Jihad (Holy War), which is a resistance against the single ideology of Pancasila in the New Order Suharto era.4 The author described a local case in which Islamic leaders influenced the peasants in the 1990s in East Java to resist peacefully against green revolution projects. Historically, the Yogyakartans engaged in popular rebellion movements against the Dutch, led by Diponegoro Prince in the 1825-1830, and a peoples’ rebellion led by General Sudirman 4 Holy war was common manifesto during the colonial era promoted by many Islamic leader so-called sufi or tarekat. For detail see Kartodirjo on Banten Rebllion 1880. Democratic Governance| 11 Part One: Local Politics and Election in the revolutionary period, 1949. Since the reform era in Indonesia, several peoples’ resistance movements have rallied against the progress of modernism, including the “reformasi total” of 1998 that was directed against the authoritarian Suharto. People’s movements, in such examples, reject industrialization and planned development in the regions. Lastly, there have also been cultural movements in Yogyakarta resisting the gubernatorial election. The ideologies of communism and Islam were deemed as significant influences on the emergence of social consciousness and class struggle among peasant society. The rise of Islamic leaders nationwide linked up to both what is going on in Middle East (Arab) and European Communist (Azra, 1998).There is no better explanation for such social movements than to relate them to the ideology and culture. Sukarno realized the reality that Indonesia is inhabitanted by a communist-marhainism society and believers in Islam. That is why he tried to impose a new ideology under the banner “Nasakom” (Nationalist, Islamism, and Communism). This form of social and religious leadership is somewhat different from what Malaysia has. Another argument stresses the characteristics of coastal society, an aggressive society in Indonesia. The Banten and central Java rebellions against the Dutch are the best examples to support this argument. In short, the preconditions for collective action in agrarian societies in Indonesia were much better than in Malaysian society, such as charismatic-religiousleaders, social capital (collectivism), and natural resources (good soil, water, and so forth). Secondly, the “rebellion” in Malaysia under the British colonial was quite minor (see the table on page 9-10). Compared to Indonesia, the revolutionary movement in Malaysia was almost absent in its history except for several instances of riots, social uprisings, and ethnic conflict. In other parts of Southeast Asia, like Vietnam and the Philippines, there were revolutionary movements, as has been argued by Ben Kerkvliet in his book The Huk Rebellion in Vietnam in the early twentieth century. However, several historical cases could be considered as rebellions, uprisings, or riots. The first such social unrest was the so-called “Chinese Rebellion” of 1857 in Sarawak (Locard, 1978), and the second was the May 13 riots in 1969 (Locard,1978), three days after the election. The May 13 riots of 1969, according to official reports, led to a death toll of only 196, but independent 12 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... reporters and other observers estimated up to ten times as many people had died. Three quarters of the casualties were Chinese Malaysians, and 6000 people were left homeless after the resulting fires (Soong, 2007). Related to these riots, in 1964, it also happened that Singapore was in the process of gaining independence from Malaysia. Most scholars tend to analyze these cases by paying attention to the ethnic conflicts and social class warfare between the ‘bumiputera’ (privileged and poor) and the Chinese groups (wealthy minority). In addition, Malaysia had its own forms of resistance, what James Scott calls everyday forms of resistance. To sum up the Malaysian cases, they are examples of what Scott indirectly refers to as “hidden resistance.” Why didn’t Malaysians rebel? Some reasons help us understand this. There are internal and external factor should be taken into account. External factors include (1) the influence of the British colonial style, which did not interfere in religious and indigenous people’s traditions (adat) such as the sultanate. This factor is not significant, because in India under British there were plenty of rebellions and resistances (Dhanagare, 1983); (2) unlike the Dutch in Indonesia, the British maintained the existence of sultanate in order to gain its goals; (3) the concept of commonwealth was quite amenable to Malaysian politics—focusing on the economy, people were reluctant to rebel and resist openly—and, as Kuntowijoyo mentions, social movements are considerably influenced by the availability of economic resources (Kuntowijoyo,1993); and (4) the British type of government was deeply instituted in Malaysia by mixing monarchy and the constitutional system as a so-called ‘federal constitutional monarchy.’ External factors, meanwhile, include (1) the sultanate as a traditional institution that was apt to unify people in order instead of making social unrest; (2) in Malaya proper, communalism was so weak (Rosenthal, 1965), as compared to Indonesia, which meant that communism in Malaysia was not as strong as in Indonesia; (3) Islamism among the sultanate and people was a strong hindrance to the outbreak of communism; and lastly (4) fragmentation of power holders. Political power was in Malay hands, but economic power in those of the Chinese and the British (Rosenthal). These two powers were separated, and that is why rebellion was too small to emerge. Democratic Governance| 13 Part One: Local Politics and Election The Intention of Rebellions and Resistances Popular resistance does not emerge in vacuum. In general, a populace will fight against domination such as colonial, cultural hegemony, state authority, modernization, globalization, democracy, and so forth. Many cases have shown that people respond to the radical changes imposed by ‘alien’ powers. In doing so, they use ideology or class to regain confidence, self-esteem, collective identity, and selfgovernance, though at a high cost (Crooke, 2009). We might point out studies such as those of Scott5and Kerkvliet, who examined everyday forms of resistance, which were ubiquitous. Another case in point pertains to the popular revolutionary Zapatista Movement in Mexico in 1911 and 1994. This case in Mexico is similar to that of Yogyakarta; local people also want freedom to use their own traditional governance systems at the local level, as opposed to standard elections. As for federal elections, the votes of people in Chiapas may have been controlled and influenced in favor of the ruling party for decades because of their isolation (Snyder and Harrington, 1998). Considering this, the present study will adopt a comparative approach in the broad sense of different cases, comparing the Malaysian and Indonesian contexts. When we discuss motive, we should be specific about the type of intention. Following Fatchan and Basrowi (2004), we could categorize motives into two types, that is, an “in order to motive” and a “because motive.” Fatchan and Basrowi adopted this categorization from (Weber and Schultz, 1972).Weber stresses intention, while Schultz emphasizes reasons for people to resist, such as social, normative, and historical backgrounds. In short, the ‘in order to motive’ is rational and comprised of individual actions committed by people with pragmatic goals that are supported by their cultures or their backgrounds. In other words, their motives are to obtain something rather than protecting something. In contrast, the ‘because motive means that people are involved in collective action or resistance, caused by historical backgrounds or values (Fatchan and Basrowi, 2004).For instance, perhaps a superior authority undermined and oppressed them economically and politically. Yet, we should be careful when analyzing the motives of rebellion and resistance, because 5 See Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1990); The Art of Not Being Governed (2009); and Weapon of the Weak (1985); Kerkvleits’s Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South-East Asia (1986). 14 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... it is not easy to examine in light of the complexity of society—including multiculturalism, tradition, norm, Islamic majority and its values, colonial state influences, and so forth—which cannot be excluded. The table below summarizes these various types of resistance and the rebellion during the courses of Malaysian and Indonesian history. The various motives for collective action will be examined. See table 1 (Indonesia), and followed by table 2 (Malaysia). Of course, the table presents only selected examples.6 Table 1.1.Motive and Intention Rebellion Peasant rebellion in 1888 (Banten, anti-colonial struggle). “In order to motive”/ intention “Because motive” To gain the freedom, prosperity in equality as human beings Colonial state was too powerful Agrarian rebellion in Central Java 6 Colonial domination (Capitalism, labor in plantation) Dipenegoro’s Rebellion in Yogyakarta, 1925-1930 (Java War) To return the sultanate’s dignity instead of cooperation with the Dutch Islamic values were undermined by the Dutch Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation, 1870-1979(Stoler, 1985, 1995) social, economic, and political motives Conflict between capital and labor; antiimperialist movements; responses to imperialism and capitalism bythe traditional populations Rebellion to integration in West Sumatra( Kahin,1999) To protect local values and culture; bargaining politics postindependence Indonesia The domination of the central government, centered in Jakarta-Java. Communist rebellion 1926 (Java) and 1927 (Sumatra) Land reform; to enlarge members Anti-colonial domination; capitalism Postindependence rebellions (PRRI, Permesta, DI TII-Regional rebellion). Political bargaining among the local leaders and nationalists; nationalist-Islamist clash The domination of the central government. Pemberontakan G30S PKI (Communist Rebellion in the revolution era) To gain central power; The bourgeois’s internalize the communist domination in the political ideology; agrarian reform realm; class struggle Free Aceh Movement (GAM) 1976-20056 Seeking independence for the Aceh regions; economic preference The domination of the central government GAM or Free Aceh Movement costing over 15,000 lives. Democratic Governance| 15 Part One: Local Politics and Election Resistance “In order to motive”/ intention “Because motive” Pembelotan Kaum Pesantren dan Petani di Jawa. (The resistance of Islamic leaders and peasants against the government) To protect the environment, local knowledge The domination of the central government in agricultural policy; ‘green revolution’ The resistance against the institutional change in Yogyakarta, 2010- To protect the local value and identity as sultanate provinces The different values of democracy; the centralized authority in the regionalist sense The Samin Movement (the late 19th and early 20th centuries) (Benda and Castle, 1969) (a) Manifestation of indigenous socialism; (b) patriotic resistance to colonialism; (c) peasant virtues To survive from the oppressors due to the bitterness of colonialism Riots “In order to motive”/ intention “Because motive” “Reformasi Total” 1998. (revolution, regime change) To change the regime; economy and politics interest among elite by using mass unrest. Agendas: transparency, anti-corruption, more freedom of press, regime changes; democratization. The centralized power in one hand (authoritarian); militarism; corruption; public distrust; economy crisis. Anti-China Riot 1965, 71,72,75(Mackie, 1976) Religious reason; to banish the communism influence Political tension, ideology issue Anti-China Riot 1997-8 Pragmatic reason in order to get property; misdirect the military to use a power Regime change, economy crisis; uncertainty politics Ethnic riots/communal conflict post Reform (Ambon, Malacca, North Sulawesi, Kalimantan) Economic prosperity; political transition Religious, ethnic sentiment/“primordialism” and political reason. Table 1.2.Motive and Intention in Malaysia Types of riots/rebellion/ Resistance The Chinese Rebellion in Serawak, 1857 16 |Democratic Governance “In order to motive”/ intention Political and economic motives. “Because motive” The personal conflict between local elite such as James Brooke, Chinese, and Rajah of Serawak. David Efendi. From Riots to... Types of riots/rebellion/ Resistance “In order to motive”/ intention “Because motive” Matt Saleh Rebellion Resistance to social and economic change Tobacco industry built by the foreign company May 13 Riots, 1969 Economic and political motives related to affirmative action policies Ethnic conflict; ‘class struggle’; social sentiments Resistance to the Zakat (Islamic Tithe). (Scott,1987) To continue their life from The sultanate’s king is difficult situation too wealthy, whereas the peasants are very poor; anti-capitalism Social and political uprisings (rebellion, resistance, and riots) can be motivated by various factors. In Indonesian history, we must recognize at least five types of social disturbance. First is anti-colonial rebellion, which occurred during a period that is well-understood as a struggle for survival under the Dutch rule, followed by the nationalist movement to gain the independence state of Indonesia. Every single instance of social and political turbulence has had its own consequences, both negative (crisis and social disorder) and positive (freedom, equality, democracy), a topic we will return to later. According to Kartodirjo, anti-colonial struggles were ongoing among peasant societies across the archipelago. However, the significance of the role of peasants or common people in this period is debatable. Some scholars stress the role of leadership or alternatively the middle class (merchant, Islamic-intellectual leader, etc). Second is the role of class struggle, in the Marxist view. Shortly after gaining independence, many Indonesian elites divided society into three large groups, namely, the nationalists (multi-ethnic and various religions), Islamic religious groups, and communists. The communist group mobilized people to redistribute the holdings of land owners and to shift the state ideology by using the communist manifesto. This movement failed in 1965 in bloody tragedies which killed millions of people.7 Third is the anti-status-quo movement, which happened at the end of the twentieth century during the 1998 “revolution”. Fourth are the riots and ethnic-based wars that had occurred, during the colonial rule and 7 See Ben Anderson, Exit Suharto: Obituary for a Mediocre Tyrant, New Left Review 50, March-April, 2008, and John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’Etat in Indonesia, University of Wisconsin Press. Democratic Governance| 17 Part One: Local Politics and Election are continuing to today. Last is the resistance to change. In the modern phase of state development, the middle class considerably determined the revolution.When the inequality, misery, and repression inherent in the development process happen simultaneously, it provokes a middle class to react to the state, even by confrontation (Anderson, 1978). Thiswas exactly how the 1998 reform movement in Indonesia began. In summary, the data discussed above show that, at least in Indonesia, to date there have been 9 large-scalev rebellions, and more than 8 riots nationwide, since the Dutch arrived, as well as several incidents of non-violent resistance. Meanwhile, Malaysia only has one rebellion across the country, and a series of soft resistances that are difficult to be measured. The role of communism and Islamism cannot be estimated here, as they succeeded in linking up many groups with different backgrounds in order to fight against foreign domination. A report mentions: “…of the 900 communist leaders exiled as a result of the 1926 rebellion, 25 percent were government employees, 20 percent were workers of Western company, 40 percent were merchants and members of the indigenous middle class, while only 15 percent were peasants. Of the leaders, only 6 percent were nobility, 6 percent had made a Hajj to Mecca, and 70 percent were educated people (Schrieke, 1929). If we compare this to other Southeast Asia countries, Malaysia is the case that shows the smallest degree of collective action. The reason behind that small degree of collective action is still being examined. Possible factors might include the different characteristics of Dutch and British rule, the relatively weak penetration of communism in the Malay Peninsula as compared to in Indonesia in which communism and religion-Islam could work hand in hand in facing the colonizer. Educated and illiterate people worked together under the backdrop of anti-colonial war or holy war. This phenomena did not emerge in Malay, even though the society was divided into three ethnic groups: Indian, Chinese, and Malay. Chinese were identified with communism and Malay with Islam, and thus they were in tension with one another. An anti-China movement dominated political issues rather than an anti-British movement. 18 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... Based on the data provided, the different characteristics of rebellion and its intensity between Malaysia and Indonesia can therefore be seen as quite obvious and, even though the basic social and cultural characteristics of these two areas are almost the same to one another, the density of ethnic groups such as Malay and Chinese, or “pribumi” and “bumiputera,”8were about the same. It means that there was a majority and minority within the society, but this dichotomy does not always mean that the majority is always in a superior position. It depends heavily on the political and economic situation, which is determined by political will of the elites. Rebellion might come from both sides, or either from a minority or a majority, but the rebellion might also come up from the subordinate groups against the superior one. The Outcomes of Social Uprisings for Democracy There is no simple correspondence between rebellion and democracy, but it can be traced by looking at the historical background and how people joined and participated in political movements. Rebellion or riots can, but are not always, followed by massive social and political change under the banner of revolution. One may argue that revolution and rebellion are not meant to support democracy, but that they do nonetheless in some cases. As has been discussed above, people have different motivations to join or not to join in protest movements. Many approaches have been proposed for this problem, such as those of game theory which asks who gets what and how, or those concerning the logic of collective action as discussed by Olson, whereby people reluctantly join social movements because they have counted social incentive and rational behavior. Thus, the more people participate, the fewer benefits they can obtain (Olson,1965). Actually, democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia is quite similar, as these two nations have the same basic social structure, agricultural society, though many factors contributed to different results concerning the adoption of Western democratic values. This is unsurprising; even the democratic values of Great Britain and America are somewhat different, because the British (and Malaysia) 8 Pribumi often used in Indonesia to refers the native people and bumiputera means native people in Malay. Democratic Governance| 19 Part One: Local Politics and Election are “parliamentary democracies” while America (and Indonesia) are “presidential democracies.” According to a report by Freedom House, Indonesia is considered as a Free State, but Malaysia is still categorized as only Partly Free (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template. cfm?page=363&year=2010&country=7841). In addition, based on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2010 Democracy Index, Indonesia places in 61 ranks and Malaysia in 71 of 167 countries.Such indicators measure political rights, civil rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of media, but they have nothing to do with historical continuity, state formation, persistence of anti-colonial movements, or colonial legacies as components of the indicator. The present study focuses on the impacts and outcomes of popular rebellion both in Indonesia and Malaysia, regardless of whether the context is the rural countryside or urban areas. Connecting rebellion to prospects for democracy is somewhat difficult, but we can trace it to other scholar’s work, such as Barringtone Moore in his book, Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern World. He discusses about the preconditions for democracy, including the existence of a bourgeoisie class. His main focus is on economic classes and their interaction, both with each other and with the state. Briefly, his general conclusion is that there are three routes to modernization. One is the road followed by Britain, the United States and France, achieving capitalism and democracy after a bloody, bourgeois revolution. The second road, travelled by Germany and Japan, leads to capitalism without revolution, by way of an authoritarian regime that promotes the interests of landlords and industrialists. The culmination of this road is fascism. The third road, followed by Russia and China, begins with a peasant revolution that destroys the landlords, and then leads to a communist dictatorship, which produces an industrialized but non-democratic society (Femia, 1972). In the same vein, Kartodirdjo is quite optimistic concerning the role of common peasants in shaping institutional political change, particularly in the independence process (Kartodirjo, 1972; Anderson and Siegel). He criticizes why most of political scientists had only focused on to the macro level of politics, such as constitutional reform, government institutions, 20 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... organizational conflict, and policy-making at the national level. To some degree these are what Ben Kerkvliet calls “conventional politics” instead of micro-level politics. Relating to the prerequisites for democratic government, some, like S. M. Lipset, Almond, and Verba, would strongly emphasize the cultural values embedded in a certain society (Lipset, 1981). They believe that the emergence of democracy will be influenced by collective behavior to support the institutional changes. Other scholars stress economic development,as implemented in Singapore and Malaysia. Similar to Kishore Mahbubani’s statements regarding Asian values,9 I also strongly believe that the clash of democratic values between Eastern society and Western ideology can be a major source of conflict. As a result, if Western forces are to install such ideologies in non-Western cultures, it can easily lead to a tremendous disaster. The next question, then, is whether Malaysians and Indonesians value ‘Western democracy’ differently? The answer to this question will help to show why Indonesian has developed a Western democracy much better than Malaysia has. Malaysia Talking about the colonial legacy in Malay, of course we could not underestimate the influence of the British, who were the main actor in shaping and reshaping the politics even in modern Malaysia. The Sultan and the British had their own interests and, based on that, they worked together. The British had plenty of economic resources, while the sultanate could maintain its traditional authority. Communism was hindered from gaining power, as communist movements always faced very violent reactions from both the British and the Sultanate. We can see this from the communist rebellion in 1857 in Serawak. One may argue that this rebellion should be categorized as merely an ethnic war. Another ‘small’ rebellion was the so-called Mat Saleh rebellion, but unfortunately there is no adequate data to examine this rebellion. Even Islamic groups and youth organizations in Malaysia were less radical than in Indonesia (Adam, 2004). The problems they faced focused too heavily on issues of ethnicity and indigenous privilege. It can be 9 Asian value is generaly believed that in the Asia society accept a single rule party; a social harmony; communalism; loyalty and respect towards forms of authority; collectivism; and accept easily the authoritarian government such as Mahathir Mohammad (Malaysia), Suharto (Indonesia), and Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore). See also, Kishore Mahbubani, (1997), Can Asian Think. Democratic Governance| 21 Part One: Local Politics and Election understood that, according to some scholars, Malay people are well known as a culture with high loyalty to a figure of authority (King) as a traditional character since long before the British Empire came to the peninsula (Adam,2004). KMM (Kesatuan Melayu Muda), some say, was a radical movement against the British, while many other people say the opposite. The immediate effect of the May riots in Malaysia included, first, the expulsion of Malay nationalist Mahathir Mohamad from the UMNO (United Malay National Organization10which propelled him to write his seminal work The Malay Dilemma, in which he posited a solution to Malaysia’s racial tensions based on aiding the Malays economically through an affirmative action program. Second, Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned as Prime Minister in the ensuing UMNO power struggle, and the new ‘Malay-ultra’ faction that dominated the government swiftly moved to placate Malays with the Malaysian New Economic Policy (NEP), enshrining affirmative action policies for the bumiputera.11 Many of Malaysia’s draconian press laws, originally targeting racial incitement, also date from this period. Third, the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 named Articles 152, 153, and 181, and also Part III of the Constitution as specially protected, permitting Parliament to pass legislation that would limit dissent with regard to these provisions pertaining to the social contract (The social contract is essentially a quid pro quo agreement between the Malay and non-Malay citizens of Malaysia, whereby in return for granting the non-Malays citizenship at independence, symbols of Malay authority such as the Malay monarchy became national symbols, and the Malays were granted special economic privileges). With this new power, Parliament then amended the Sedition Act accordingly. The new restrictions also applied to the Members of Parliament, overruling Parliamentary Immunity; at the same time, Article 159, which governs Constitutional amendments, was amended to entrench the”sensitive” Constitutional provisions. Thus, in addition to the consent of Parliament, any changes to the “sensitive” portions of the Constitution would now have to pass the Conference of 10 11 UMNO is Malaysia’s largest political party; a founding member of the National Front coalition, which has played a dominant role in Malaysian politics since independence. The UMNO emphasizes protecting Malay culture and Islamic values and supporting pro-business policies. Malays and other indigenous Malaysians 22 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... Rulers, a body comprising the monarchs of the Malay states. At the same time, the Internal Security Act, which permits detention without trial, was also amended to stress “inter-communal harmony.” The effectiveness of everyday forms of resistance as examined by James Scoot for Malaysia and compliance without resistance by Ben Kerkvliet concerning Vietnam are really insightful. Clearly, even everyday politics without resistance movements, as Kerkvliet states, have been very effective in influencing public policy making relating to collective farming in Vietnam, where the national government shifted its policy from collective farming to family-based farming (Kerkvliet, 2005). Scott strongly argues the role of everyday forms of resistance cannot be underestimated in Malaysia. The difficulty is how to measure private resistance during the British colonial in Malaysia. Scott did not talk too much about the effectiveness and outcome of hidden resistance in peasant society in Malaysia. He heavily emphasizes the discourse of power relations, domination and hegemony. According to Scott, people are not silent under domination and hegemony but rather they perpetually rebel indirectly by using language and ways of behavior and thought. Political development and economic progress are separated from one another in the contexts of Indonesia and Malaysia. In Malaysia, the British policies were structured in order to avoid war by imposing the government white paper of January 1946, preparing for the constitution. Moreover, many polices are approved by the sultan for the same reason, as war or ‘revolution’ had very high costs both politically and socially (Kennedy, 1962). Historically, the British administration began in 1874 in Malaysia,12and it generally advocated only economy policies. The British intervention in Malaysia, however, had influenced major political changes within the country as early as 1870, as many favorable conditions led to the British intervention such as radical changes in trade patterns, increases in commercial interest in the Malayan Paninsula, the disintegration of local Malay authority, and the need for British settlement to build security and trade. (Cowan, 1961) Meanwhile, the Dutch colonial period in Malaysia (1602-1825) (Dennis De, 1941) did not play a significant role in forming Malaysia’s economic policies. 12 Democratic Governance| 23 Part One: Local Politics and Election The May 13 uprising in Malaysia forced the Prime Minister,Tunku Abdul Rahman, to step down, allowing for the emergence of a democratic government. In contrast, after Tun Abdul Rozak, the authoritarian regime under the power of Mahathir Muhammad and his supported and sympathizers ignored Western’s democratic values. What Mahathir did was to build the economy superiority over the other neighboring countries. Even though he only created the “ersatz capitalism (Yoshihara, 1988) in Malaysia, many people believe that he succeeded in developing Malaysia’s economy through the New Economy Policy (NEP). In 1972, the discourse of democratization in Malaysia had been started by reformist to forces a local authority/council election. They argued that it will avoid the violence and public unrest in the near future. People did not express their discontent and grievances but the government should know that. The federal government worries too much when facing the opposition alliance to take over the power (Siang, Lim Kit, 1978). In response to the May 13 riots, the government imposed Rukunegara (1971), namely, the principles of Belief in God, Loyalty to King and country, Upholding the constitution, rule of law, Good behavior and Morality (Means, 1991). This states clearly that loyalty to the King is a part of constitution, and thus we can contend that the constitution itself is not really a democratic institution; at most, it is partly democratic. Thus, the riots only advocated democratic mechanisms for limited groups. In short, the constitution does not allow for a transition from an undemocratic regime to a full democracy; it only transforms traditional authoritarianism to semi-authoritarianism, or from monarchy to constitutional monarchy as in Britain. Unsurprisingly, Malaysia has therefore been categorized as only a partly free and semidemocratic state. Indonesia Indonesia under Dutch rule had a higher degree of anti-colonial tension as it adopted modern organization and encountered various forms of propaganda, both by Islamic groups and communist syndicate. Finding a common enemy, these unified agrarian communities to join in protest and rebellion, stemming from the strongly exploitative 24 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... practices of the Dutch, which were significantly different from those of the British in Malay, where traditional authority was used to maintain the colonial regime. This explanation can be traced from the historical background of rebellion, revolution, and riots in Indonesia during the colonial period and following independence. According to Kuntowijoyo, there are three points necessary to understand why Indonesia experienced such a high degree of rebellion and resistance (Kuntowijoyo, 2002). The first approach is Marxist, which emphasizes social radicalization in agrarian society, caused by the class gap between haves and have-nots. The second approach stresses so-called cultural tension between the Islam-santri and Islam-abangan, and one may argue that Paderi war and Communist rebellion in Java 1926 are results of such dynamics. Lastly, Indonesia can be understood as a complex problem involving both social and cultural tensions, which led to a tremendous anti-colonial rebellion, followed by a horizontal conflict across society after independence. In contrast to Malaysia, in Indonesia, since the Sukarno era Indonesian elites have paid closer attention to political development, whether as a constitutional democracy or a widely recognized form of liberal democracy or what Liddlecalls a ‘secular democracy.’ Meanwhile, during the Suharto regime the central government shifted the characteristics of the state from ideology to subjectively and rationally planned development. After the collapse of Suharto’s regime, following attacks on student movements, the elites had returned with different actors, but with essentially the same ideas to democratize the state’s post-authoritarian regime by imposing a law on autonomy (UU no.25, 1999, and UU no.22, 1999). According to Kimura, Hadizand Savirani (Kimura, 2006), this period saw the liberalization of politics in Indonesia, during what many political scientists have called “the big bang of decentralization (Bubandt, 2006) in response to the centralized government during the New Order Suharto era. Furthermore, such decentralization has been followed by direct and free competition in general elections since 2004, and in 2009 Indonesia became the largest democratic country in Southeast Asia. Indonesia was, apparently, a “failed” state when reformation took place in 1998, following Indonesia’s monetary crisis, which led to social Democratic Governance| 25 Part One: Local Politics and Election and political unrest (Klinken, 2007). When crisis happens, as in wartime, people do not obey the law, and they reject government institutions directly or indirectly.13 As a result, conflicts were a daily occurrence at that time. Thus, the nation-state “failed” in so much as it was consumed by internal violence and ceased delivering positive political value to its inhabitants. Governments lose credibility if a particular nation-state itself becomes questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens (Rotberg, 2004). To date, religious and ethnic conflicts have continued, while the number of citizens in poverty has increased to 39 million (Indonesia National Statistic Bureau, 2010). It seems that the crisis, then, is still going on. In this case, the government had failed to feed its citizens. In other words, the national government had lost its food sovereignty. Nevertheless, if electoral democracy indicators are to be used in assessing the failure or success of the state, on the one hand, Indonesia should be classified as a success, because it conducted general elections peacefully from 1999 to 2009. On the other hand, although Freedom House in 2010 reported progress in law enforcement in Indonesia, it should also be noted that press freedom is still hampered by violence, either physical or non-physical, and the rule of law is still enforced in a discriminatory fashion. National security essentially means the state of the health of the nation, within which citizens enjoy life, liberty, protection of property and participation in the productive life of society. Political stability, economic well-being and equitable distribution of resources are essential preconditions. If any society has a high incidence of death, violence, crime, murder, or kidnapping, whatever the causes, the citizens living there cannot feel safe. Indonesia itself has tried to create national security in dealing with political conflicts across the national and local levels, as well as social conflicts. In so doing, Indonesia 13 From 1997 to 2010, ‘wars’ between ethnic and religious groups occurred as many as a dozen times, with casualties of more than 10,000 people (Klinken, 2007:4-5). This can be roughly broken down as including (among others) the conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, as well as the conflict between Islam vs. Christianity, etc. Those conflicts have caused thousands people to suffer. From 2008 to 2010, more than 400 cases of religion violence occurred (Tempo, 2009), and hundreds of people died because of both ethnic and religious conflict in Indonesia. Gerry Van Klinken (2007) wrote that the main causes of conflict are the distribution of income, political gaps between central and local entities, and economic inequality. When the state was weakened by certain interest groups it was as Barbara Harris-White has pointed out trapped in a ‘black economy.’ 26 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... followed the system of decentralization called ‘Otonomi Daerah.’ According to the Law No. 22/1999 and the Law No. 25/ 1999, each region has its own autonomy to manage natural resources and tackle its own problems. Clearly, under this system, Indonesia is trying to democratize its government by local and civil engagement as much as possible. International funding has come to Indonesia to help make democracy work by implementing concepts like clean governance projects. Meanwhile, Nordholt (2003) has argued that “a shift from a centralized to a decentralized government is not synonymously implying a shift from authoritarian to a democratic rule.” Therefore, the state and society should work together to address this issue in order to avoid the return of old powerful elites who could bring dictatorship back in the new “democratic society.” Obviously, the nature of rebellion created the class and associational consciousness in which the civil society organization arose dramatically since the colonial era. As Klinken and Barker noted, “civil society was supposed to be an essential element in democracy (Klinken and Barker, 2009). Clearly, the agenda for democracy that lay behind such rebellion and resistance as existed in Indonesian history allowed for the emergence of main values for democracy, including liberty/freedom, modern voluntary organization, transparency and so forth, and eventually it has also promoted regime change. In this case, functionalists would say that civil war created peace, while in the European context civil war created civil society organizations, and even formed new and modern states. Plenty of countries were built by civil war and revolution during the course of history in Western countries, Africa, America, and Asia. As Shiraishi notes, under the Dutch, pribumi14 were introduced to various modern organizations, ideology, which contributed to rallies, demonstration and political parties. Such events were unheard of before the colonial regime. It was in the course of the pergerakan15 that all of these words, which signified new form of politics, become rooted in Malaysia and Indonesia. By the next generation it is then considered as the capital of democracy (Shiraishi, 1990). 14 15 Native people. Pergerakan means social movement e.g. Budi Oetomo, Sarikat Islam, Sarikat Dagang Islam, Indische Party, BTI and so forth. Democratic Governance| 27 Part One: Local Politics and Election To sum up, the effects of both revolution and resistance can be easily measured by the structural change, policy formation during the collective action, and everyday politics as acted out by the populace. For, instance during the period of rebellion, across Indonesia new terms were established for nationalism movements, agrarian-communist movements, and religious movements, and each of these formed the roots of national consciousness in the struggle for freedom and independence. Clearly, in Indonesia, its people gained a Free State by bloody struggle that lasted for centuries. Within a brief period of time, the revolution that followed independence supported regime change into a more democratic government, despite Liddle’s criticism that Indonesia’s democracy is not well-consolidated (Reynolds, 2002). In the Old Order, constitutional democracy and the multiparty system were imposed across the country, which led to “guided democracy.” Shortly after, these were followed by mass protests, and communist rebellions in some areas led Sukarno to be toppled softly by Suharto, who practiced a new authoritarian state. As can be seen after the reforms in 1998, with riots and social unrest as the consequences of regime collapse, including regional confrontations such as in East Timor, Papua and the Free Aceh Movement, which together created new political institutions, namely, decentralization and multiparty systems that were implemented peacefully. All of this has caused Indonesia to become the biggest democratic state in Southeast Asia. However, in Malaysia, the structural changes in political structure were relatively minor, even after the May 13 riots, as although there was regime change, in fact the state and the economic and political elites stayed in tact as democratization was undermined by economic development programs like the so-called NEP under the banner of NICs. CONCLUSION Although not many political scientists have considered the role of common people in political development in Indonesia or Southeast Asia, I strongly believe that ordinary people’s rebellions, regardless of their motives, can contribute to the value of democracy directly and or indirectly. This is simply because the forms of rebellion and resistance call for more freedom and equality, which are the central and most substantial of democratic 28 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... notions in the modern sense. Provocatively, the more intensive rebellion and resistance within state-society relation or society vs. the authoritative agency, the more democratic society will be. The big bang of democratization in Indonesia was caused by (1) progressive Muslim communities; (2) the penetration of democratic values from Western ideologies; and (3) the style of the Dutch colonial rule. Meanwhile, in Malaysia, feudalism and British influence together hampered democratization according to a Western model, as it only implemented economic policies instead of political developments. It is clearly understood, then, why people were reluctant to resist or rebel openly in Malaysia. A massive revolution like what happened in France, England, and America, as well as in Indonesia, can grow from small roots and lead to open rebellion. Similarly, what is going on in the Middle East today is a perfect example of how revolutions spread. Rebellion itself can be followed by more revolution, once the social prerequisites are completed, as is the case when there are significant changes in social or political structures. In the case of Indonesia, waves of rebellion eventually resulted in radical revolution, leading to a transfer of power from the Dutch to the Indonesian. Civil society was considered strong under colonialism and after independence,as communism and Islam contributed to the creation of modern and progressive voluntary organizations. The role of leadership during the colonial and revolution eras was supposed to be taken into account. As can be seen, democratization considerably developed since post-independence. Indonesia once faced regional rebellion, as it has tried to impose decentralization and create special laws, particularly in Aceh, Papua, and East Timor.16 It is not the case that Indonesia blossomed into a full democracy via a so-called big bang of democracy. Only after a long period of revolution did Indonesia pass into this phase, as it experienced the second and third wave of democratization, and the shift in 1998 could even be considered as a“fourth wave” of democratization in Indonesia. Meanwhile, in Malaysia, there was no rebellion to gain independence. Just after the communist rebellion and the May 13 riots, the central government continued to maintain traditional authority under the sultan 16 Law No. 44/1999 Concerning Privileges of the Special Province of Aceh, Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province (special members of parliament), and Law No. 29/2007 on the Capital Region of Jakarta as the Capital of the Republic of Indonesia. East Timor got its free since 1999. Democratic Governance| 29 Part One: Local Politics and Election (elective monarchy) according to “Rukunegara” and a discriminative policy based on ethnicity was even insitutionalized.Conflict among ethnic groups still remains as a threat to society at this time. Based on several reports, Malaysia has so far remained partly free as a quasi-democratic state. In the case of Malaysia, the emergence of a middle class and economic development has had little to do with democratization. Instead there has been what Yoshihara Kunio calls “ersatz capitalism,” in which the bourgeoisie does not really want to implement democracy, and society lacks any real rebellion or revolution (only ethnic conflicts). As a result, the emergence of civil society as a mechanism of checks and balances between society and state never materialized. This yields the conclusion that Malaysia’s democracy has not yet been fully implemented. Concerning the limits of this study, I realized that the above explanations are not really adequate to theorize or generalize this finding to other nations. This article nonetheless invites further intellectual discussion due to the necessity of study in the field of popular resistance in Southeast Asia. The uniqueness of each society is one of the problems for generalization in this study. Although we might agree upon some similarities in the nature of rebellion, such as motives for class struggle, domination, the role of colonial legacy, and religious movements, to some degree, they are also significantly different. What is needed most, to continue this line of inquiry, is to establish specific patternsfor analysis for each type of popular resistance. REFERENCES Andrey Reynolds. 2002.ed. The Architecture of Democracy; Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Basrowi, Ach Fatchan. 2002.Pembelotan Kaum Pesantren Dan Petani Di Jawa. Jakarta: Yayasan Kampusina. Brooker, P. 2000. Non-Democratic Regimes, Theory, Government and Politics. New York, NY: St Martin’s Press. Dahl, Robert A. 1956.A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. ____. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven & Landon: Yale University Press. 30 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... Diamond, L. 2008.The Democratic Rollback, the Resurgance of the Predatory State. From foreign affairs, March/April 2008. Evans, Peter B, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. Bringing the state back in. Cambridge Cambridgeshire, New York: Cambridge University Press. Feith, Herbert. 2006. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Jakarta & Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing. Hadiz, VediR.2010. Localizing Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective, Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific. Stanford: Stanford: Stanford University Press Harrington, Nathan. 1998.The Zapatista Movement. Retrieved from http://www.angelfire.com/pe/revolutionarybeats/zapatista.html Hobsbawm, E. J. 1959. Primitive Rebels, Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries. New York,: W. W. Norton. Kerkvliet, Benedict J. 2009. Everyday Politics in Peasant Societies (and ours).The Journal of Peasant Studiesol. 36, No. 1, January 2009, 227–243. _______. 2005. The Power of Everyday Politics, How Vietnamese Peasants Transformed National Policy. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. _______. 1977. The Huk Rebellion, A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press. Klinken Gerry V. 2007.Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia, SmallTown Wars. New York. Routdledge Contemporary Southeast Asia. Kahin, Audrey. 2000. Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity, 1926-1998. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Kartodirdjo, Sartono. 1973. Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. Singapore, etc.: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. _______. 1972. Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development (pp.71-125). In Claire Holt (ed), Benedict R. O’G. Anderson & James Siegel, Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press. Democratic Governance| 31 Part One: Local Politics and Election Kimura, Ehito. 2005. Proliferating Provinces: Territorial Politics in PostSuharto Indonesia. South East Asia Research, 18, 3, pp 415–449 Kumar, Girish.2006. Local Democracy in India: Interpreting Decentralization. New Delhi; Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Kunio, Yoshihara, 1988. The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South-East Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press. King, Stephen J.2003. Liberalization Against Democracy: The Local Politics of Economic Reform in Tunisia. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press. Kirby, Andrew. 1993. Power/Resistance: Local Politics and the Chaotic State. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kuntowijoyo. 2002. Radikalisasi Petani: Esai-esai Sejarah. Yogyakarta: YayasanBentangBudaya. Lane, Max. 2008. Unifinished Nation, Indonesia Before and After Suharto. London & New York: Verso Li, Jieli. 2002. State Fragmentation: Toward A Theoretical Understanding of the Territorial Power of the State. Sociological Theory 20(2): 139-156. Lijphart, Arend. 1999. The Pattern of Democracy, Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. McAdam, Doug. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McKeon, R (ed).,Jowett, B. (tran). 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House. Migdal, Joel S. 2001. State in Society Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. New York: Cambridge University Press. Meyer, David S., and Sidney G. Tarrow. 1998. The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century. Lanham, Md. ; Oxford: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers. Nordholt Hank S. 2003. Renegotiating Boundaries; Access, Agency, and Identity in Post Soeharto Indonesia. Leiden: Bijdragen tot de Tall-, Land-en Volkenkunde 159, no. 4, 550-589. 32 |Democratic Governance David Efendi. From Riots to... Parming, Tönu. 1975. The Collapse of Liberal Democracy and the Rise of Authoritarianism in Estonia. London; Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. Pennock, J. Roland. 1950. Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects. New York: Rinehart. Piven, Frances Fox., and Richard A. Cloward. 1977. Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Pantheon Books. Putnam, Robert D, Robert Leonardi, and RaffaellaNanetti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Schaffer, F. Charles . 2000. Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture (Wilder House Series in Politics, History, and Culture). Cornell University Press. Schmitter, Philippe. C., Karl, T. Lynn. 1991. What Democracy Is…and Is Not. Journal of Democracy (summer 1991), pp. 67-73. Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press. _______. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. Scott, James C., and Asian Studies Association of Australia.Malaysia Society. 1987 Resistance without protest: peasant opposition to the Zakat in Malaysia and to the tithe in France: the Fourth James C. Jackson Memorial Lecture, 1986. Townsville, Qld., Australia: Malaysia Society. Shiraishi, Takashi. 1990. An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926.Ithaca: Cornell University Press. S.M Lipset. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.The American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no.1 March, 69-110. Stoler, Ann Laura. 1985. Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870-1979. Michigan: the University of Michigan Press. Summerhill, Thomas, and James C. Scott. 2004. Transatlantic Rebels: Agrarian Radicalism in Comparative Context. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. Democratic Governance| 33 Part One: Local Politics and Election Tarrow, Sidney G. 1994. Power in Movement Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tocqueville, Alexis De. 2005. Democracy in America. New York: Barnes & Noble. 34 |Democratic Governance THE VOICE OF ISLAMIC PARTY IN INDONESIA: THE CASE OF THE INDONESIA’S 2014 GENERAL ELECTION Zuly Qodir Master of Government Affairs and Administration. Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta E-mail: zuly_qodir@yahoo.com Abstract The Islamist phenomenon causes the gaps of economic and political situation for islamic communities in Indonesia and political euphoria or democracy in Indonesia. That it is raison islamic politics resurgent on the 2014 general election. The real phenomenon is that the Islamic future in Indonesia depends on Muhammadiyah and NU, two Islamic organizations, than to the activist progressive muslim for responses and economic, political and cultural facts against the Islamist movement. Responses from activist and Islamic organization like Muhammadiyah and NU concretely answers economic problems. The future of Indonesia and its Islamic capture depends on Muhammadiyah and NU for creating activities and supporting the efforts to civil Islam and civil society. Muhammadiyah and NU movements create activities that develops trust and popular understanding of Islam. Muhammadiyah and NU having culture and social capital for survival and sustainability for being a long time social force in the community has worked to counter the Islamic radicalism phenomenon in Indonesia after the 11 September 2001 tragedy. Keywords: Islamic parties, Islamism, revivalism, the 2014 election 35 Part One: Local Politics and Election INTRODUCTION Before the general election of 2014 was held, there were some survey institutions doing surveys about the possibility of the electability and the winning of the Islamic parties. From the surveys done, most of it say that the electability of the Islamic party would be decreased drastically, and even predicted the lost in the general election of 2014. Some survey results were taken by LSI (The Institution of Indonesian Survey), for example. In March of 2013, it showed that none of the Islamic party was included for the big four of the voter’s choice. The Development Union Party (PPP), the Nation Resurgence Party (PKB), the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the Welfare and Justice Party (PKS) as the Islamic parties or based on the Islam mass which were validated as the participant political parties of the 2014 general election, just obtained under 5 percent of the voters. As informed by National Survey Institution and Indonesian Survey Circle or Saiful Mujani Research Consultant (SMRC), the electability of PKB was 4.5 percent, PPP was 4 percent, PAN was 4 percent, and PKS was 3.7 percent. Degree of the electability of the Islamic party and party based on the Islamic mass was far behind the nationalism party. Whereas, the nationalism party or the party not based on the religion, is seen to take the significant vote. It was said, Golkar Party had increased its support of vote by 22 percent, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle got 18.8 percent, Democrat party got 11.7 percent, and Gerindra Party got 7.3 percent. Even Nasdem, as the new party, had the same electability with PKB. Survey institution of LSI Network held survey in 33 provinces in Indonesia with 1,200 respondents, and using a method of multy-stage random sampling, with a margin of error estimation about 2.9 percent. The result of the survey found the interesting fact that none of the figures from the Islamic party was included in the big three. Four of the strongest president candidates were dominated by the nationalist figures. They were Megawati Soekarno Putri with 20.7 percent support, Aburizal Bakrie with 20.3 percent support, Prabowo Subianto got 19.2 percent, and Wiranto with 8.2 percent of support. Meanwhile, the figures from the Islamic party were just in the fifth position and so on. The figure of the Islamic party was viewed to have less prestige than the nationalist figures. 36 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... While Hatta Rajasa, for example, the general chief of National Mandate party (PAN) just obtained 6.4 percent. Suryadharma Ali, as the general chief of the Development Union Party (PPP) got 1.9 percent, Anis Matta, the President of Welfare and Justice Party (PKS) achieved 1.1 percent. Whereas, Muhaimin Iskandar, the General Chief of the Nation Resurgence Party (PKB) just earned about 1.6 percent of support. Before, result survey of LSI Network on 1-8 October of 2012, with 1,200 respondents and using multistage sampling and also 2.9 margin of error, it also showed the prestige of the Islamic party to have gone vague. Voice of the Islamic party tends to decrease from era to the era. In the first general election of 1955, vote obtained of the Islamic party was 43.5 percent. In the general election of 1999, vote account of the Islamic party got down to 36.8 percent. But it never got stronger in the general election of 2004 with 38.1 percent vote. However, in the general election of 2009, the voice obtained of all the Islamic party decreased drastically with 23.1 percent. At the time, support for the figures from the Islamic party was viewed to have decreased significantly. Popularity of the leader of the Islamic party also becoming the ministers of Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s Cabinet, such as Hatta Rajasa (PAN), Muhaimin Iskandar (PKB), and Suryadharma Ali (PPP), was still under 60 percent. In another side, the popularity of the national figures such as Aburizal Bakrie, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and Prabowo Subianto had been 60 percent above. A vague destiny is seen to be faced by presidential candidate coming or nominated by the Islamic party. Majority voice of the voters addressed toward the figures from the nationalist party got the support of above 15 percent averagely. THE VOICE OF ISLAMIC PARTIES IN THE 2014 GENERAL ELECTION The descending of the vote of the Islamic party and the Islamic figures, such as explained above, was caused, at least, by three factors. According to LSI researcher, Adjie Alfaraby, there were three factors causing the figure of the Islamic party not to have significant support on the presidential candidate based on the survey result held in 2013. Democratic Governance| 37 Part One: Local Politics and Election First, less publication from the figures of the Islamic party. It’s said by LSI researcher, “If they had publication, the public expose would increase popularity and pleasure toward the figures,” Adjie said, in his paper, in LSI office, Jakarta, Sunday, on March 17th of 2013. Based on the facts found by LSI, it was just below 30 percent of the public always watched advertisement, activity news, and visiting the figure of the Islamic party. Whereas, the second factor, funding of the Islamic party was less which couldn’t support the socialization and campaign activities maximally. Third, figure from the nationalist party was seen to be able to accommodate the interest of the Islamic community. At least, about 6.1 percent of the public believed that the nationalist figures could accommodate the interest of the Islamic community. The support weakness of the Islamic party figure was not just at the position of the presidential candidate, but also at the vice presidential candidate. Of the four strongest vice presidential candidate, there was just one figure from the Islamic party. It can be seen from the support toward the presidential candidate nominated as the following: Joko Widodo or Jokowi with 35.2 percent, Jusuf Kalla with 21.2 percent, Hatta Rajasa with 17.1 percent and Mahfud MD with 15.1 percent. The other leaders of the political party were just 5 percent below. However, the result of the 2014 general election said different or contrary from the prediction of some survey institutions and analysts, even some got increased. This made some people startled in analyzing the writhe of the political Islam in Indonesia, because the voice of the Islamic party, if PKB is included as the Islamic party, the voice of the Islamic party was stagnant, it was not decreased but also not increased significantly. However the activists of the Islamic party claimed that the Islamic party had increased voice, such as said by the politician from PAN, Drajat Wibowo, Fahri Hamzah, and Mahfud Sidiq from PKS. We can see that the voice of the Islamic party remaining besides PPP got increased even by just two percent (6.53 percent), PKS 6.79 percent, Pan 7.59 percent, whereas PKB increased one hundred percent becoming 9.84 percent. In another side, PBB just obtained 1.46 percent. So, if those were combined, the voice getting of the Islamic party (based on Islam such as PPP, PKS, and PPP), including PKB and PAN, the voice of the Islamic party was 31 percent. They could nominate running-mate 38 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... candidate for president and vice president. But it’s a little difficult like what was said by Amien Rais, Muhaimin Iskandar, Suryadharma Ali, so the decision to make a coalition with the other political parties. PAN and PPP adopt its approach from Gerindra whereas PKB together with Nasdem chooses to make a coalition with PDI P. Let’s see the vote of the parliament in the General Election of 2014 between the Islamic party and nationalist party. The Islamic parties are represented by PPP, PKS, and PBB, added by the parties based on Pancasila but their main base supporters are Muhammadiyah, namely PAN, and NU, that’s Nation Resurgence Party (PKB). Tabel1.3.The Vote of the Parliament in the General Election of 2014 No Party Name 1 Nasdem 2 PKB 3 PKS 4 PDI PERJUANGAN 5 Partai GOLKAR 6 Gerindra 7 Partai Demokrat 8 PAN 9 PPP 10 Hanura 11 PBB 12 PKPI Vote Getting 8.402.812 11. 298.957 8.480.204 23.681.471 18.423.312 14.160.311 12.728.913 9.481.621 8.157.488 6.579.498 1.825.750 1.143.094 Percentage (%) 6.72 9.04 6.79 18.95 14.15 11.81 10.19 7.59 6.53 5.26 1.46 0.91 Source:KPU, 24 August 2014. Based on the voices obtained of the 2014 legislative election (parliament), it can be said that the parties based on Islam mass decreased or remained stagnant, but some view that the vote getting of the Islamic parties increased because PPP and PKB got significant votes from the analyst’s prediction saying that the voice of the Islamic party would descend rapidly. But one thing that is always forgotten is that the target decided by the Islamic party was not reached. Like what is Democratic Governance| 39 Part One: Local Politics and Election already known, that PKS’s target was 15 percent, PAN’s was 20 percent, PKB’s was 15 percent, and PPP’s was also 15 percent. However, none of the mentioned parties obtained their targets. This shows that the voice of the Islamic party, even though was not smashed, remained at its first position due to PKB and PPP factor, because both of the parties accommodated NU mass. After the 2014 general election where there was no single majority voice, the idea of the coalition became compulsory to be able to nominate a running mate for president and vice president. PDIP, as the winning party, chose to make coalition with Nasdem, PKB, which has NUbackground. Whereas, Gerindra, as the the third winning party, then chose to have coalition with PAN and some PPP elites under Suryadharma Ali’s leadership, because some cadres of PPP didn’t choose to have coalition with Gerindra. In another side, Golkar, Democrat, Hanura and PKS haven’t decided which party to make a coalition with, even though Golkar gives a clear indication to make a coalition with PDIP. By that condition, the idea of Islamic Party Coalition to nominate the candidate from them failed. Coalition of the Middle Axis II failed before it even matured. The idea from M. Din Syamsuddin, Makruf Amin, and MS Ka’ban didn’t have positive response from the elites of the Muslim politic. So, this is the end of the Islamic party to nominate its own running candidate for president and vice president, even though the Islamic party got 31 percent voice if PAN, PKB, PPP, PKS, and PBB are combined. RESURGENCE OF INDONESIAN POLITICAL ISLAM Voice getting of the Islamic party reached 31 percent then triggered the willingness from some Muslim elites to build axis of the political Islam like what was done in the era of Abdurrahman Wahid with the name of the Middle Axis II, such as said by M. Din Syamsuddin from Muhammadiyah, Makruf Amin (NU), Zulkifli Halim and Jawahir Thontowi (HMI), but that idea was rejected by Amien Rais who have once triggered the idea of the Middle Axis I, Fahri Hamzah and Mahfud Sidiq (PKS), Muhaimin (PKB) and Suryadharma Ali (PPP). By that situation, the idea of the Middle Axis II was not brought to reality even though the power of Islam, seemingly, became the decisive factor in the 2014 General Election in Indonesia, because its voices was significant enough. 40 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... In the difficult situation for the Muslim people to have role in the political practice of the Islamic party because the voice remained on the middle level of value. There was the idea from the elites of the Islamic Association of University Students (HMI) and Alumnus Family of the Islamic Association of University Students (KAHMI) to support Moh. Mahfud MD, who is the figure from NU, former Chief of Constitutional Court (MK) to be the vice president as the couple of the winning party of the 2014 General Election, either PDI P or Golkar. Another name that was proposed was Jusuf Kalla, who was also the activist of HMI from Makassar, and also one of the figures of NU and was the vice president (2004-2009). Jusuf Kalla is known well in the ummah (followers) of NU, Muhammadiyah, or bureaucrat due to his smartness and his braveness to take any policy in leading such as what he done when becoming the vice president from SBY. By the time this paper is being written, Jusuf Kalla is the General Chief of the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) and Council of Indonesian Mosque. Beside Mahfud MD and Jusuf Kalla, the young generation and figures of HMI nominate Rector of Paramadina University, Anies Baswedan, the Arabic descendent and the activist of HMI from Yogyakarta Branch. Anies Baswedan is also one of the presidential candidates from Democrat party through the way of the Democrat Party Convention. In some surveys, name of Anies Baswedan is compared to Jusuf Kalla and Mahfud MD to be the couple (vice president) of the presidential candidate from the winning party, either Jokowi from PDIP or to be nominated as the presidential candidate from the noncoalition parties; those are Democrat, Hanura, and PBB. Irrespective of all of them, there are some reasons why the Islamic party remains in Indonesia even though it’s little difficult to be termed as the ‘strong one’. Some of the reasons are: first, theological reason saying that within the religious services (syariah), politics can’t be separated but can be chosen or differentiated. This one had been the religious argumentation since the prophet hood era until the era of khulafaurrasyidin. The other reasons are: first, as the way for the political elites of the Muslim to convey their political aspiration that was repressed for years by the regime of the New Order, except for the ones who became part of PPP or Golkar, not the Islam-based party. In Democratic Governance| 41 Part One: Local Politics and Election other words, it is a form of the syariah formalization in Indonesia and it made syariah substantial as the idea triggered by Nurcholish Madjid. In such as that position, Abdurrahman Wahid as the figure of NU who was known inclusively also took initiative of forming the new party, PKB, and then becoming the first Chief of Syurah Council. Second, it is to move the house of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual and Abangan Intellectual. If the Muslim intellectuals were ashamed or were not apparent to play the political role in the New Order regime, so since the reformation era of 1998, the Muslim and Abangan intellectuals have played the political role in practice in the political party that they built by themselves. These identified parties are PAN and PKB, the political parties accommodating most the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual, either from Muhammadiyah or from the alumnus of Masyumi activist of the Old Order. There is Amien Rais, who was the General Chief of PAN then becomes the Chief of Consideration Council of PAN. Meanwhile, at PBB, there is Yuzril Ihza Mahendra, who was the intellectual. Third, it’s the house of the activist of the political Islam and the Islamic movement of campus. We know that in the reformation era there has been PKS, besides PBB which we know as the party belonging to the activist of the Islamic movement, such as religious proselytizing movement of the Islamiyah Religious Proselytizing Council of Indonesia (DDII). DDII, at first, was built by the figure of Masyumi, Moh.Natsir, and after Natsir, DDII was led by Anwar Harjono, then Hartono Mardjono and Husein Umar. While PKS is the place of Islamic campus activist, the studying religious activist of campus and campus religious proselytizing institution (LDK), besides the activist of Movement Union of Indonesian Muslim Student (KAMMI), such as Fahri Hamzah, Rama Pratama, who are then active at PKS. And some other Islamic activists supporting Islamic movement through politics, they are Imadudin Abdurrahim, Fuad Amsyari, and Ahmad Muflih Saefuddin (AM. Saefuddin) being active at PPP. Fourth, it’s to move the articulation house of Islamic politician who were active in the religious party of the fusion result, namely PPP and Golkar. Most of them were the activists of the organizations of extra campus like HMI having background of the moderate Muhammadiyah 42 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... and NU, the Islamic Student Movement of Indonesia (PMII), the activist of NU and Association of Muhammadiyah Student (IMM), and the the activist of Muhammadiyah. Student activists after becoming the alumni of HMI, PMII, IMM are then associated to the political parties based on Islam or at least the political parties having affiliation to the Islam such as PKB, PAN, and Ummah Resurgence Party (led by Deliar Noer), PKNU by Syukron Makmun, Nahdatul Ulama Party led by Sholahuddin Wahid, and new Masyumi or PSI 1911 led by the Cokroaminoto Son and Amrullah Ahmad. Beside the internal factors above, the appearance and the survival of the Islamic party or the movement of the political Islam are caused by the factors beyond the Islam of Indonesia. Of those factors are the winning of the parties based on Islam in the region of Africa, Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The victory of PAS in Aljazeera, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the victory of Bath Party in Iraq, Ahmadinejad winning in Iran, the victory of the Islamic party of Morocco, Sudan, and the winning of Serantau Islam Party (PAS) in Malaysia give motivation and belief of the activist of the Islamic party to support continuously the birth and the development of the Islamic party in Indonesia. Related to the survey result developing in facing the legislative presidential election and, there were some responses from the Islamic politician such as from PKS done by Hidayat Nurwahid, Anis Matta and Romahurmuhzy from PPP saying their optimism about the Islamic party in the 2014 General Election. We can see their comments to be slightly blaming the survey institutions of the 2014 legislative election as following. In responding the survey result of Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) Network, Fraction Chief of Welfare and Justice Party (PKS), Hidayat Nurwahid said that the destiny of the Islamic political party was not decided by the survey result. It was said by the former chief of People’s Consultative Council of Indonesia: “As a democracy communication, please tell the result of your study,” Nurwahid said. However, it’s clarified by the survey institution always becoming the reference that the election had not been done that day. For the Islamic political party, the survey result was the whip to work harder. Besides that, people’s Democratic Governance| 43 Part One: Local Politics and Election sovereignty is people’s right, it can’t be represented by the survey institution. By asking, Hidayat Nurwahid also said “Does the people’s sovereignty end by this survey?” he said. With a slight indifference, Hidayat Nurwahid disagreed that there was an ideology contestation between Islam versus nationalism, because, according to him, there was no said dichotomy of nationalist or Islamic. All of them right now have Islamic wing, such as PDIP having Baitul Muslim where its chief is the young generation of NU. Golkar previously has had an Islamic community of Al Hidayah Islamic Studying. In another side, Democrat has Majlis Dzikir. While the survey result saying that non-islamic party can represent Islamic society. It means that there is the contribution of the success of the Islamic political party. It’s important also to remind that national party has Islamic organization as the wings. “If we say that there is ideology contestation, it’s misleading,” he said. Further, it was said by Hidayat that by that survey result, it was important for the Islamic parties to evaluate themselves. However, PKS never worries about the survey result. This political party has understood survey result well even though that survey would be seen as the developing critic. “We don’t prohibit anyone to make survey, but the survey institution must be fair. The election is not done today,” he said. In another side, the same comment was also delivered by the Secretary-General of Development Union Party (PPP), M Romahurmuziy saying that the Islamic political party will not be gloomy (dark). He believes that the Islamic political party will always have place in Indonesian politics. According to Romy, nick name of Romahurmuziy, not all the factors explored by LSI influences the Islamic political party. The leader of the Islamic political party is, indeed, less popular than the leader of the nationalist party because the leaders of the nationalist party have had longer years to play politics in Indonesian political stage. Besides that, Romy said, nationalist party has more funding. After receiving the vote result of the 2014 legislative election, many responses appeared from Islam in order for the power of Islam to move continuously and in unity as one support to Islam as the 44 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... political movement. They suggest ignoring the total vote of the Islamic political parties in this survey which was about 15 percent, far behind the result of the 2009 general election (29.1), 2004 (38.3 percent), and 1999 general election (36.5 percent). Not only is the political party, but also the politician of the Islamic parties received no public support to be a presidential candidate of 2014. If the election is held by the time this research was conducted, the respondents to choose Hidayat Nurwahid will be 4.6 percent, Hatta Rajasa will be 3.9 percent, Yuzril Ihzamahendra will be 3.2 percent, Muhaimin Iskandar will be 2 percent, and Suryadharma Ali will be 0.9 percent. Those are under the vote obtained by the nationalist figures, namely Megawati Soekarno Putri (18 percent), Prabowo Subianto (17.4 percent), Aburizal Bakrie (17.1 percent), and Wiranto (10.2 percent). The Secretary-General of Bulan Bintang Party (Moon and Star Party/ PBB) RM Wibowo said that actually all the political parties have a problem of decreasing their electability. It was said by the General Secretary of PBB that not just the Islamic political party have decreased vote. The other political parties have the same thing. All the political parties, but some will remain well and maybe the new parties will get attention from the public, he said at PBB office. He added that, indeed, society is disappointed with the work of the political party. In relation to this, PBB intends not to repeat the failure of the 2009 general election because it failed to pass the electoral threshold. Even though it was no exaggeration, PBB had targetted 5-7 percent vote of the 2014 general election, however the final result was just 1.46 percent, far enough from the target. Wibowo said that PBB must work hard to fight and to survive. In another side, Chief of Nation Resurgence Party (PKB), Muhaimin Iskandar, said that he doesn’t worry about the result of the survey saying that the electability of the political parties based on Islam mass is threatened in 2014 general election. Muhaimin said for sure that the survey result doesn’t represent the true situation. Such as quoted from kompas.com, Muhaimin reminded the survey result before the general election of 2009 where it was said that the electability of PBM was just 1 percent. But the reality, PKB obtained voice about five percent. According to him, it happened because the surveyor didn’t reach mass communities of PKB in the village. According to the Democratic Governance| 45 Part One: Local Politics and Election Abdurrahman Wahid’s nephew, the survey didn’t reach our constituent. That survey can be received but we don’t need to worry because it was just sampling, it was said by Muhaimin Iskandar or Cak Imin. It’s not far different from PKB, Secretary-General of PPP Romahurmuzy clarified that the use of the survey results now days to predict the voice getting of the 2014 general election is the big mistake. The Secretary-General of PPP, usually called Romi, said that the survey is like the thermometer which is just able to predict by the time sampling held. Even, the survey can be invalid in a week when there is another factor influencing the general election. Romi explained that there are four factors influencing the vote of the political party, those are the characteristic figures, rooted structure, massif maneuver, and sufficient logistic. The survey of LSI is just able to portrait figure and logistic factors. Whereas the second and third factors are just the operational by the time the election is held so it’s always forgotten by the surveyor to include in the analysis, like what was said by the younger sister of the former Chief of PBNU, Mohammad Fajrul Falaakh, in Jakarta. Meanwhile,the secretary-general of the Islamic Follower Forum (FUI) KHMuhammad Al Khaththath suggested to the Islamic political parties to not believe the survey result released by some survey institutions related to the electability of the political party of Islam. He also gave suggestion, at the same time for the Islamic political party to increase its electability. Al Khatat said, “I suggest in order for the Islamic political party to carry Syariah Presidential Candidate, God Willing, the support from the Islamic society will come,” said by Ustadz Al Khaththath when he was asked for his argument about the survey result of LSI Network showing continuously the decrease of the electability of the Islamic political party. The idea of the Syariah Presidential Candidate is in the frame of the State Union of Indonesian Republic of syariah. It’s now campaigned massively by Islamic Follower Forum (FUI) together with the social organization of Islam. Even the volunteer of the syariah presidential candidate moving in the grassroots has been formed. It’s said that FUI and FPI have thousand of members, Ustadz Al Khaththah said further so the chance to win the Islamic political party is big enough. At the 46 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... same time, Ustadz Al Khaththath recommended to the Islamic political party to show the ideological identity and the clear the line of its struggle, namely for the State Union of Indonesian Republic of syariah. He also asked for the Islamic political party to not believe the theory saying that the voters tend to be moderate. Said Al Khatat, “the Islamic party may not make bluer its ideology; the ideology and the struggle must be explicit (clear). Because if all are moderate, what is the Islamic political for?”. SUPPORTING FACTOR OF THE RESURGENCE OF THE POLITICAL ISLAM Delving into the less Islamic figure and loss of electability of them than the secular figures, Ustadz Al Khaththath can understand it well. It’s because, so far, the media just raises and promotes the secular figures. Besides that, the existence of the survey institution is designed to give advantage of the secular figures. Al Khaththath said that actually we have many figures having the capacity to be the president. One of them, now discussed massively, is Habib Rizieq Syihab, the General Chief of Front of Islamic Protector. The resurgence of Islam seemingly gets support directly from Habib Rizieq’s suggestion for the Islamic party. The General Chief of FPI, Habib Rizieq Syihab, in his book Hancurkan Liberalism, Tegakkan Syariat Islam, gives some suggestions for the Islamic parties. Here is quoted by Habib Rizieq. “It’s explained that in the General Election of 1955, the voice of the Islamic party represented by Masyumi and NU Party obtained, each, 57 and 47 chairs from 257 chairs totally in the Parliament, or each of them obtained 20percent and 18.4 percent of the total vote. And in the next elections, the combination voice of the Islamic party never obtains better than the vote obtained in the 1955 election. Even the vote of the Islamic politic gets less and less. The small voice of the Islamic party in each election in Indonesia could be caused by the violation (injustice) in holding election by the New Order regime, where it has been the general understanding of the society. However, it could be also that the Islamic party was not interested, so the electability of the Islamic party was very low.” Democratic Governance| 47 Part One: Local Politics and Election Even if there is, lately, a kind of “motion not to believe” from the people toward the Islamic politic, so there is the push to build the Islamic party which becomes the really Islamic politics. However, if it’s viewed well, the main factor making Islamic society (ummah) disappointed is in the gap of the different understanding and mindset between the political party and Islamic society in the grassroots. The political party focuses more on “law” (political ijtihad) whereas the people in the grassroots concern more on the “ethic.” What is the difference between law and ethic? As an illustration, if the Ulama (Islamic Scholars) with his attribute as the scholar of Islam has safari (religious travelling) in Ramadhan then had lunch in a restaurant, he, based on law, is not guilty because the musafir (traveler) may not fast, but ethically, it’s difficult to receive because the scholar of Islam is the pattern. Many kinds of attitude and movement of the Islamic political party witnessed by society in the grassroots have made restiveness in the middle of the society’s life as the biggest voters of the Islamic party. The restiveness as the reflection of the different interpretation of the law and ethics between the political party and society in the grassroots in some events, as following: First, when some Islamic mass organizations and Islamic political parties are fighting to return Jakarta Charter in the Parliament, there are, in the contrary, Islamic parties trying to cut it with the argument of fighting for Madinah Charter. And some elites of the other Islamic political parties gave statements that Jakarta Charter is the part of the past, and the others saying that the amendment of the basic Law of 1945 has been final. As the political ijtihad, it doesn’t have any problem but ethically it makes society confused. Second, when some Islamic parties have agreed to make an Islamic fraction in the House of Representatives/People’s Consultative Council of Indonesia as the representation of the brotherhood and unity, suddenly there is the Islamic party preferring to make coalition with the other political party by the reason of reformation. From the political ijtihad, it can be explained but ethically it makes society in the grassroots shocked. 48 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... Third, some Islamic political parties, when they campaigned, shouted to prohibit the president from the woman, but when they must have overthrown the man president by the consequence the woman president took the position, they did it with the argument of the “dangerous” situation. Whereas they had alternatives to struggle for the general election again, but, in fact, there was no formulation of struggle for that alternative. They were even involved in the power sharing with a woman president whom they prohibited before. As the political ijtihad, it could be understood, but ethically it was so difficult to be received by the society in the grassroots. Fourth, some Islamic political parties, when they campaigned, made commitment that they would just propose the Muslim legislative candidate, but the reality they nominated non-Muslim legislative candidate in some regions by the reason that there was no choice because of the non-Muslim majority in that region, while there were some Muslim that could be nominated in the region. As the political ijtihad, it could be discussed, but ethically it was so difficult to be received by the society in the grassroots. Fifth, there is senior woman politician from the Islamic political party who never wears muslimah clothing as should be, it’s enough for her to wear kebaya and veil, her argument is that Islam may not be forced and it needs process in implementing it. The most important thing is politeness. As the political ijtihad, it’s debatable, but ethically it was so difficult to be understood by the society in the grassroots. Sixth, there is the elite of the Islamic political party whose wife doesn’t wear veil and it’s exposed in public. The reason is in the process of asking for Islam (dakwah). As the political ijtihad, it can be understood as long as asking for Islam runs always, but ethically it was so difficult to be understood by the society in the grassroots. Seventh, when some Islamic mass organizations and Islamic political parties fought for dispersal of Ahmadiyah, some Islamic political parties appeared not having spirit for that, but just giving statement in the social media, or sending letter to the President silently, without having real concrete action. There was even an Islamic political party which didn’t participate in the action of one million people for Democratic Governance| 49 Part One: Local Politics and Election dispersal of Ahmadiyah, but were just showing flag and banner and also giving pamphlets. Ironically, there was leader of the Islamic political party who defended Ahmadiyah from the dispersal. As the political ijtihad, it could be understood as the strategy, but ethically it hurt Muslim community (ummah). Eighth, when some Islamic mass organizations which were not pro with Ahmadiyah and pro with the Draft of Law of APP faced openly with Nationhood Alliance for the Freedom of Belief and Having Religion (AKKBB) which was pro with Ahmadiyah and not with the Draft of Law of APP, there was even an Islamic party giving appreciation for some figures of AKKBB. Ninth, when there is the interest of the political party which was made to suffer a financial loss or there is the political party agenda which must be promoted, there will be the Islamic political party doing a demonstration with hundred thousands of people, however when there is the people’s interest or the important agenda of the ummah (people) which must be promoted, the political party, even, is reluctant to mobilize its mass with the reason that it is not its agenda. As the political ijtihad, it can be understood because there are political norms, but ethically it’s disappointing for the people in the grassroots. Tenth, when some Islamic mass organizations need to deliver their aspiration through the House of Representative, occasionally they have difficulty to meet their friends from the Islamic political party, even any of the Islamic political party doesn’t want to meet due to assumption that they are not “part of them”. Whereas, the Islamic mass organizations are the biggest voice suppliers of the Islamic political parties in the general election. This is not the only thing which can’t be received by Muslim society. Besides that, it’s added by some behaviors of the politicians from the Islamic political parties suspected of doing corruption, pornography, sexual case, and the like. Habib Rizieq said: “I ask all the elites of the Islamic political parties to see ‘people’s understanding’ which is unadorned and opened about ‘Islamic political ethics’ in order, in the future, the Islamic party can put its self as the container of the Muslim political aspiration.” The 50 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... ten points that I explored above are just the small part of the problem involving some Islamic political parties. There are many problems in the ground which need to be seen accurately and we need to find solution for the development of the Islamic party optimally in order to get victory maximally. There must be a synergy among the Islamic party, and it will be better if they can be united in the future so there will be just one Islamic political party. The Islamic mass organization may vary, but not for the Islamic political party because Islamic mass organization is just focused on social activity without touching the power, whereas the Islamic political party involves in the politics of power. The Islamic mass organization doesn’t join the elections, but the Islamic political party joins. By that way, Muslim society is not burdened to choose the Islamic mass organization, but they are burdened to choose the Islamic party. Even if the Islamic political parties can’t be united, at least they can build just one Islamic Fraction in Parliament accommodating all the Islamic party. If they remain disunited, they, at least, can make synergy among the Islamic parties. The point, the variations of the Islamic political party may not be the reason of the dissension of the politic of Islam, but it must be the part of the role description and task in reaching the political victory for the Islamic people. And the Islamic mass organizations should cooperate together for the empowerment and increased winnability of the Islamic political party. And I believe, Islamic mass organizations cooperation will be done sincerely if the Islamic political party can play its role as the true Islamic political party and consistent in the way for God. Remember, the true Islamic political party just tries to find God’s blessing, so chairpersonship and power is not the aim. It’s just the way to reach God’s blessing. May God, Allah SWT, unites the Muslim people in upholding His law, and gives power for the strugglers of His religion, and always blesses them with the real victory. Now, the legislative election has been held with the permanent vote result won by the party which is not based on the certain religion, even though it’s difficult to say that, in Indonesia, there is no victory for the Islamic party. What we can see is the victory of the political party based Democratic Governance| 51 Part One: Local Politics and Election on Islamic mass because all battled for vote of Islam whose popularity is about 88,7% of the Indonesian popularity. Either PDIP, Democrat Party, Golkar, Nasdem, Gerindra, Hanura, or PAN and PKBeven PKS, PPPand PKS. All battled for the mass named Indonesian Islamic citizens. THE FUTURE OF INDONESIAN ISLAM If we believe the existance of the Islamic movement which I have described above, there will be a dialogue/dialectic in Islam in Indonesia. Who will get the proper ’place’ in Indonesia are those who can present Islam suitable to the Indonesian context. The way of being Islam which can give response fairly in the theology, politics, economy, and cultural sectors will be part of the Islamic people of Indonesia. Nowadays, indeed, we see the extreme community being glorious because the governing regime doesn’t make explicit boundaries of the existance of the Islamic community where in its own origin state is forbidden, such as Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia, also the other Islamic community preferring coertion in running its activity to get the target of Islam. If the positive law is upheld seriously, social imbalances related to unfairness, stupidity and human rights violations are erased. I think that there is no place anymore for the extremely islamic community because the mainstreaming of the Indonesian Islam is the moderate Islam which we see from Muhammadiyah and NU. So, it’s important for us to support both of these two organizations to move continuously in the form of its moderation, not the fundamental one. If this one can be done by NU and Muhammadiyah, I hope that the Islam of Indonesia will have a polite and humble face, and has vision of humanity and rahmatan lil alamin. Some islamic formats existing in Indonesia really give contribution of explaining for us, the Islamic people of Indonesia, Christian, and on other religions in Indonesia, even the Muslim people in the world have various islamic formats existing. If referring to Jurgen Hubermas, those are the groups competing about the public space of sphere becoming the space of quarrel among the people in Indonesia and in the world. All offer something in the public sphere with some manners and all 52 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... battle for winning the quarrel. All decorate in their own languages and agendas. So, it’s right if Hubermas, then, said that the public spehre is the very tightly contestation area of many interests, including the interest of the religions, of course beside the political interest. The interest of the religions and politic is always angular because religion and politics, actually, can be distinguished but both can’t be separated. Secularization is the most contemporary formulation to tell the importance of distinguishing which one is the religious business and which one is the political business, but in the religion and also in the politics there are always acts of slicing, not separating. This one is always understood wrongly by most of people that secularization is exactly the same as omitting religion in the public sphere. It’s not like that at all because wherever it is, the public sphere will always have relations with the values and one of them is the religion. So, actually Indonesia has been in the position, in my opinion, where none of the religion is the political basis or philosophy but the religious value, in this case Islam and the big religions, gives positive and substantial contribution of the statehood. It political public sphere is clearly different from the construction understood so far that religion and state are separated of their role, so it’s the same as “omitting religion from the State”. Actually, what happens is overtaking substantial values of the religion and giving these as contribution for the sake of the changes in the economic, politics, law and cultural system in a state. If, in this state, it must be forced to implement one of the religions developing and dominant, it’s possible for Indonesia to be torn to pieces by the political interest of the religious people. The religious people will make the dominant religion as the ‘forcer of the other religions’, so what will happen is, I call it, the deviation of the God’s destiny of Indonesia which is pluralist and not the religious state, but religious society have been running for hundred years, since the archipelago had not been called Indonesia and have given freedom to the young generation, Soekarno-Hatta and Sutan Syahrir together with the other young generations. In the context of the public sphere contestation in Indonesia by the religious community (Islamic) in Indonesia right now, it will be easy and clear for us to find the Islamic group trying to offer some variety Democratic Governance| 53 Part One: Local Politics and Election of Islam as I explored before. Even, lately, variety of the popular Islam decorated in Islam of the movie model, the religious proselytizing through the television by presenting ‘carbide’ clergy (Islamic scholar) and celebrity is the real form of serious competition with the militant and progressive Islamic. Variety of the popular Islam seemingly gets serious support from the media of television and celebrity Islamic scholar created by the media, whereas the variety of the progressive Islam doesn’t get significant support from the media. Even though, if we may say, the variety of the popular Islam is the kind of the Islamic narrowing and hypnotizing of the young generation of the Muslim so the Muslim people are ‘lazy’, they don’t embrace Islam in prophetic tradition understanding and fighting for the weak people (mustadafin). Who will win the competition in the public sphere of Indonesia in offering Islamic color? In my opinion, it depends on how they get public support (such as the Islamic society, Islamic Boarding School, Mass organization of the Moderate Islam may not be forgotten). The media support to receive their interest more than the interest of the Islamic society. However, the media has central position in promoting Islam in Indonesia. We will witness the development of the dynamically Islamic format of Indonesia in the future. CONCLUSION Seeing the development of the contemporary Indonesian Islam such as that I have explained earlier, we see that Islam of Indonesia is very pluralist in its model (configuration). So, it is difficult to say the homogeneous form of the Islam in Indonesia. Islam of Indonesia is the plurality and the unique Islam, it’s said by John L. Esposito, the Islamist from Georgetown University of America, when he visited Indonesia in the late of 2010. So, the plurality of the configuration of the Indonesian Islam which can be traced and is asked, why does it happen? Some experts such as William Shepartz say that the plurality of the configuration of the Indonesian Islam is caused by the background influencing someone in embracing Islam. The background of education, reading accessed, friendship, history, and even one’s psychology will have influence on the configuration of Islam embraced. 54 |Democratic Governance Zuly Qodir. The Voice of... Of course, it can be the longer series again about Islamic conjuration of Indonesia, but as the “picture” some Islamic configuration of Indonesia can explain that Indonesian political Islam has many significant changes. There are many influencing factors on the national politics in general. On which kind of Islam will be the sect (madzhab) in Indonesia will be decided by the social, political, economic, cultural, and psychological condition of the Islamic society of Indonesia. Beside those external factors, such as the resurgence of Islam in the other states such as Middle East, specifically, and Europe and America in general, give new energy of the Indonesian Islam to develop. Besides that, considering the internal factor of the Indonesian Islam can give precise description to see the configuration of Islam in Indonesia in the future. Political Islam is different from the cultural Islamic movement, even though the cultural Islamic movement has influence on the national political condition, even the international world. From the brief explanation above, there is the note that I want to convey that the Islamism phenomenon of the Islamic movement resulted due to the imbalance of the social, economic, and political conditions of the Islamic community, beside the political euphoria of the autonomy faced by this state. So, I think the future of the Islamic society of Indonesia, indeed, depends on the moderate Islamic movement, including the liberal activist of Islam in order to be polite in interviewing or having rhetoric toward the public, by prioritizing more the real problems faced by the Islamic society of Indonesia than presenting the abstract problems, which can’t be reached by people. In such as that situation, the Islamic society needs Islam that can answer the real problem in Indonesia. In the future, Islam in Indonesia is the burden for Muhammadiyah and NU as the most popular Islamic civil organization and believed by the society. Muhammadiyah and NU have culture and assets which can survive continuously in facing the threat of radicalism wave happening in some states, including in the Indonesian Islam. As the big religious mass organization, it is deserved if the Islamic people, even the non-Muslim hope much for Muhammadiyah and NU. This indicates that most of the citizen still believe religious mass Democratic Governance| 55 Part One: Local Politics and Election organization (Islam) and don’t believe the organization beyond the religious mass organization. Most of the members of the society don’t believe political parties or parliament. Shortly, religious organization still have place in the heart of the society. Why does the society have much hope on Muhammadiyah and NU? That question, indirectly, becomes the “moral burden” for Muhammadiyah and NU, but clearly both of these organizations have credibility in front of the society. REFERENCES Abdullah, M. Amin. 2006. Dinamika Islam Kultural, Mizan, Bandung Azra, Azyumardi. 2001. Pergolakan Politik Islam, Paramadina, Jakarta ----------------------. 2004. Islam Substantif, Mizan, Bandung 2004 ----------------------, 2007.Islam, Democracy and Civil Society, ICIP Jakarta Effendy, Djohan. 2010.Pembaruan tanpa Menabrak Tradisi, Kompas. ---------------------. 2008A Renewal without Breaking Tradition, Interfidei, Yogyakarta Hardiman, F Budi. 2010, Ruang Publik, Kanisius, Jogjakarta Shepartz, William.2007. Islamic Formulation in Twenty Century, IB. Tardis, India, Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2008. Islamku, Islam Anda dan Islam Kita, The Wahid Institute, Jakarta Qodir, Zuly, 2006. Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam, Pustaka Pelajar. Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. 1987. Islam dan Masalah Tata Negara, LP3ES, Jakarta --------------------------. 2009.Islam Keindonesiaan dan Kemanusiaan, Mizan, Bandung Safi, Omit. 2008. Progresive Muslim, Pusat Bahasa Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 56 |Democratic Governance THE FACTORS DETERMINING VOTER’S PARTICIPATION IN BANTUL REGENCY ELECTIONS Suranto*, Tunjung Sulaksono and Awang Darumurti** * Master of Government Affairs and Administration **Lecturer, Department of Government Affairs and Administration Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta E-mail: mas_tunjung@yahoo.com Abstract Election is an important element of democracy. As a consequence of a democracy, post-New Order Indonesia held four legislative elections regularly that were held in 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 and presidential elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. In order to strengthen the legitimacy of local government head, Indonesia also held direct local executive election since 2005 onward. World have nevertheless admitted that the first Post-New Order 1999 was a peaceful, fair and free election, and had met the global democracy standards with an impressive voter’s participation, reaching 92.7 percent of voter’s turnout. The subsequent elections also performed alike, strengthen assumption that of Indonesia has remarkably succeeded in making a democratic leap(Soebagio, 2008). Unfortunately, election in Indonesia still faces challenges to tackle, which one of those is the decline in voter’s participation. But in the middle of national trend, Bantul booked an anomaly. Participation level in Bantul also always higher compared to the national average. Nevertheless Bantul still face a problem of participation discrepancy. For instance, Triwidadi village booked 87.7 percent voter’s turn out in 2014 legislative election, but in Banguntapan village only booked 74.3 percent of participation within the election. Considering the fact, it is important to figure out factors influencing electoral participation among the Bantulese. By identifying the factors we might draw a certain pattern that could be a recommendation to the Bantul electoral commission to develop a right policy. The factors determining high level of voter’s participation in Bantul Regency are as follows: (1) political affiliation of closest relations; (2) participation stimulus; (3) tight social control; (4) voter’s mobilization; (5) The concern of societal institution. Meanwhile the factors hamper voter’s participation are as follows: (1) The saturation of voters toward elections; (2) Less-frequent and lessinnovative socialization; (3) less-accurate voter data gathering; (4) the lack of social bond and control; (5) pragmatism. Keywords: Voter participation, Bantul Regency, determinant factors, election local 57 Part One: Local Politics and Election INTRODUCTION Election is one of the most important elements of democracy. Regarding democratic theories, election is the main indicator to measure the quality of democracy (Dahl, 1971:3; Schumpeter, 1976:260; Nielsen, 1991:5). As a consequence of democracy adopted by Indonesia, after New Order, there were four times of general election of legislative branches of government that had been conducted regularly every five years those were in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. Furthermore, to emphasize and strengthen the presidential system, Indonesia also introduced presidential elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014. For the similar excuse, direct election to choose governors and regents had also been conducted since 2005 onward. Even though there were facts concerning weaknesses of those political events, the majority of international communities recognized and admired that Indonesian election in 1999, as the first election in reform period, was praised as honest, fair, and peaceful election with the high numbers of political participants reaching 92.7 percent, and had met the requirements of global democratic standards. Subsequent elections also booked similar achievements. Based on those facts, it could be summarized that Indonesia has been switched significantly from authoritarianism to democratic political system (Soebagio, 2008). Perceived from historical perspective, actually participation in the whole of Indonesian electoral history hid many obstacles in terms of the fact that there is an indication of voter’s turn out decrease, remembering that election is the key factor of people sovereignty. When there are more voters in the election, there is an indication that people really aware and acknowledge their rights. On the contrary, if less people participate in an election, it indicated that people are less appreciative and less supportive to governmental and political issues. Voter’s participation in Indonesia since 1999 election to 2014 election moved fluctuatively. In legislative elections, voter’s turnout decreased about 10 percent consistently until 2009 election. Meanwhile in 2014 election voter’s turnout increased by 5 percent. In presidential elections, 2014 election booked fewer voters turn out compared to legislative election, which were the first time in history. 58 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Tunjung S., Awang D. The Factors Determining... Although participation level in those elections measured by voter’s turnout in Bantul booked an increase, actually there was a problem of discrepancies between one district and another. As an example, in the Triwidadi Village, the District of Pajangan, its voter’s turn out booked 87.7 percent while in the Banguntapan Village, the District of Banguntapan and voter’s turnout only reached 74.3 percent. Discrepancies also can be found between villages within a district. Based on those facts, it is important to conduct a research concerning factors influencing participation of the people in elections in Bantul Regency, therefore from the research findings it could be drawn a certain pattern that could be a recommendation for Bantul electoral committee to formulate a policy enhancing public participation ino election. By considering the problem setting mentioned earlier, the research question is what factors influence voter’s participation in Bantul elections? THEORICAL FRAMEWORK Election and Democracy Election is an important feature of people sovereignty, therefore almost impossible to find a democratic entity without a regular, fair, and systematic election. Based on that postulate, election also assumed to be the most important indicator within democracy. The quality of an election held by a democracy determines the quality of democracy itself (Hendrik, 2010). Election in democracies is one of the means to peacefully rotate power based on the constitutional arrangements. Some principal values of election which meet constitutional arrangements are a government that based on people sovereignty that mean every citizen have rights to actively involved in a decision-making process, public policy, and determining their political as well as public officers. Election is both an institutional and a political practice as well, enabling a manifestation of a representative government. By taking a part in election, people as individuals have rights to choose or to be chosen as political leader or his or her representatives. Election is an ideal portrait of a democratic government in modern ages. In Indonesia, election is a political mechanism held regularly in every five years to choose legislative members and the executives. There are four kinds of elected legislatives to be chosen through party candidacy; those Democratic Governance| 59 Part One: Local Politics and Election are for regency/city level called DPRD Kabupaten/Kota, for provincial level called DPRD Provinsi, and for national level called DPR RI. Beside the house of representative members, Indonesians also vote for their 34 provincial representative members called DPD as a consequence of bicameralism in Indonesia parliamentary system. Furthermore, since 2004 Indonesians also directly vote for their Presidents as well as for their local leader in regency/ city (regent/mayor) and provincial leader (governor). Those vast rights of the people to determine their own leaders and representatives cannot be separated from Indonesian reform in 1998 following the Soeharto’s regime dismissal. It was an impressive and significant chance and achievement remembering how the regime marginalized and obviously limited public rights and participation into political realms. Public participation was limited and just took a form of mass mobilization for the sake of sustaining the power (Hendrik, 2010). Political Participation According to Ramlan Surbakti, political participation is an ordinary phenomenon of citizen’s taking part in determining decisions influencing his or her life. Meanwhile Michael Rush and Philip Althof suggested that political participation is an organized attempt by citizens to choose their leaders and to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy. Political participation as a manifestation of people’s sovereignty is a fundamental element of democracy and determines how the democratic wheels move on regularly. If more people participate, the political development of that political entity will be running well. In the contrary, if less people participate, the political development of that political entity will be disrupted. Public participation is essential within the democratic political system. That’s why the degree of political participation by the people within an election is an important thing to elaborate. Political participation in democracies is actually the rights of its people. Anyway, to be positioned as a right political participation opens an opportunity to be neglected by the citizens for many reasons. Some scholars suggested there are factors influencing people to participate or not within political process, as well as in an election. Those factors are: 1. Social and economical status Social status is somebody’s position within social stratification determined by his or her blood, education, and occupation, meanwhile 60 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Tunjung S., Awang D. The Factors Determining... economic status is somebody’s position within societal stratification based on his or her wealth. Surbakti suggested that the more high somebody’s position in those stratification, the more high somebody’s concern and interest toward politics (Surbakti, 1992). 2. Political situation Ramlan Surbakti also suggested that political situation also influences participation. Political situation refers to a circumstance which influences directly political actors such as weather, family, spatial condition, group condition, and threat. A relatively conducive situation will encourage actor to participate (Surbakti, 1992). 3. Political affiliation of closest relatives Affiliations mean that somebody has joined into a certain group or a collectivity. Political affiliation could be formulated as somebody’s membership done by individual or groups involved in certain political streams or ideology. Political affiliation encourages people to grow their political maturity and awareness in using their rights freely but responsible by their political activity such as to be a member of political party, in government, and in a decision making process and policy implementation (Surbakti, 1992). Political Awareness Being aware of their rights and obligations as a citizen in a democratic regime will affect somebody to participate. The awareness includes his or her knowledge on political and social environment, and regarding somebody’s concern toward those environments where he or she lives (Hendrik, 2010). Participation Stimulant Media role in socializing elections is a crucial factor that influences people to participate (Hendrik, 2010). Parallel with media role is of course electoral committee’s role in socializing technical and substantive issues toward future voters. Well-informed voters will of course enhance the quantity and the quality of an election. Beside those actors, informal activity concerning politics through discussion about the track record of candidates will contribute positively toward public participation. Democratic Governance| 61 Part One: Local Politics and Election RESEARCH METHODS Research Design This research was conducted in a qualitative design. Qualitative approach is a process of examining and understanding based on methodology investigating social phenomena and problems. In this design researcher made a complex picture, examined words, detailed report of respondent’s perception and studied the occurred situation (Creswell, 1998:15). Meanwhile Bogdan and Taylor (Moleong, 2007:3) suggested that qualitative method is a research procedure resulting to descriptive data manifested in written words or orally spoken from people and observed behaviour.To comprehend the degree of participation in Bantul elections, researchers needed to deeply analyze the phenomenon. Researchers needed to identify how high as the participation degree and then elaborate what factors constituted the founded facts based on theoretical framework. Collecting Data Methods This research used three methods of data collecting included interview, documentary report and focused group discussion. Interview was used in this research to re check the information gained. The interview technic employed in this research was indepth interview, a process of obtaining information based on research goals by a face to face meeting between interviewer and informants by using an interview guide. Informants of this research are people in the research location that had been identified as having ability to answers the questions and having relatively broad knowledge about the research questions. As a huge number of data is codified into documentary reports, especially related to participation percentage and distribution of votes, this research also employed documentary data collecting. There were reports and notes concerning those issues that had been checked and studied. Finally, to cross check the preliminary research findings, researchers also held a focused group discussion, by inviting electoral stakeholders in Bantul regency and relevant actors perceived to be contributive confirm research findings. RESULT AND DISCUSSION The location of this research is Bantul Regency, with a rationale that has already been discussed earlier. Bantul which is consisted of 62 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Tunjung S., Awang D. The Factors Determining... 17 districts and 75 villages is classified into three specified area: urban, hilly (mountaineous), and coastal areas. For that reason there are three districts involved in this research. The first is Banguntapan district. Banguntapan represented an urban type of district in Bantul. It recorded the lowest degree of participation in legislative election 2014 compared to other districts. There are two villages in Banguntapan included in this research to represent highest and lowest participation level, those are Banguntapan village which represents lowest level of participation and Jambidan Village which represents the highest level in the district. The second district is Sanden. Sanden represented the coastal districts of Bantul. Two villages in the district involved in this research are Gadingsari which represented the lowest level of participation meanwhile Gadingharjo represented the highest level of participation in the district. Imogiri is the third. Imogiri represented a hilly district in Bantul. Villages taken into account of this district are Sriharjo which represented the lowest level of participation and Imogiri village which represented the highest level of participation of the district. Factors Determining the Low Level of Participation Banguntapan village is a village with the highest popular density in whole Bantul. Because of its demographic density, there are a lot of ballot booths in the village that gave excess loads to local electoral committees to act their role in socializing electoral events. This issue also limited their span of control and spans of socialization that in turn producing less informed voters. Banguntapan village was also characterized by a high degree of popular mobility since there are migrants from surrounding regions. Majority of its population are not natives of the district which produces a more heterogeneous community. It also characterized by many of them who work outside the district or even outside the Bantul regency. Those demographic characteristics affect the nature of social relations and engagements between its inhabitants. There were less social bonds that created a communal mechanism to participate. Moreover, in the matter of candidate proximity, it results in less popular or less acknowledged candidates by the population. It also produces a less social and emotional engagement between the population and the Democratic Governance| 63 Part One: Local Politics and Election candidates. Less social bonds were also manifested in Gadingsari. As a fisherman’s village, they rarely got opportunity to meet in social forums and events because almost their whole day was spent off shore. This relatively weak social bond amongst Gadingsari villagers discourage them from developing a social mechanism potential to remind each other for attending and participating in elections. There is no “social punishment” when someone did not go to the voting booth. As a village with a high level of education of its inhabitants, Banguntapan village is considered to be an example of rational voters, giving them a relatively high ability to access quality of candidates running for election. But in reality, it resulted in low level of participation as an impact of public distrust to too much promises from the candidates. Rationality also created such saturation to Banguntapan villagers toward so many elections that they should to be involved in. It was the effect of less benefitting elections to the villagers. They evaluated that there were no meaningful advantages in participating to the elections. As a consequence, many of them opted to stay in their workplaces rather than casting their votes in ballot booths, turning their rationality to pragmatism. Such a problem of pragmatism was also manifested in Gadingsari village, district of Sanden, which many of its habitants are fishermen. They calculated and compared the benefit of casting vote with their daily wage. Since they could not find the benefit of elections for their life they chose to stay at the sea rather than cast their votes, something they perceive more promising for their life. As well as in Gadingsari, the kind of calculation was also found in Sriharjo. The villagers perceived elections as merely a matter of economic advantage and disadvantage. Since they are rarely able to find benefit from elections for their social and economical life, they frequently choose to work, in spite of attending elections. Added by less innovative methods of socialization and less frequent socialization delivered by electoral committees, less people were attracted to cast their votes in Sriharjo. As an exaggerating factor, there was a problem of electoral administration data adjustment in the Banguntapan village also. Since there was a highly dynamic demographic record, voter’s data in the village is susceptible of maladministration issues affecting low level of voter’s 64 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Tunjung S., Awang D. The Factors Determining... turn out in elections. Its population high mobility also complicated local electoral committee to hold a more frequent meeting to socialize electoral events toward Banguntapanese. Less frequent socialization also happened in Gadingsari. As many of its inhabitants are fishermen, it took their whole day off shore. This popular characteristic disabled them to frequently meet one another or to be gathered in social meetings. Because of this occupational characteristic, electoral committee failed to reach them for massive electoral socializations that in turn created less informative and relatively apathetical voters. The kind of issue also found in Sriharjo, although it was not caused by a demographic dynamics as well as in Banguntapan. The issue is more of an effect of less technical skill of local electoral ad hoc committees rather than demographic problems. As a result, voter’s data determining who has and has not a right to vote was not arranged in a proper way. This had in turn prevented somebody who should have a right to attending the elections. Factors Determining High Level of Participation Contrary to its counterpart Banguntapan village, Jambidan village booked the highest level of participation in the district of Banguntapan. The demographics data shows that its dynamics is not as high as its counterpart. There are more natives in Jambidan compared to Banguntapan village. Those characteristics produced a relatively high proximity between Jambidan people with some candidates; it motivated more voters to cast their votes compared to Banguntapan village. Moreover, one of the candidates ran for legislative election was their former chief, which added more villagers to cast their votes. As a homogeneous community and less mobile people, there develops a high social bond between its inhabitants, which resulted to a tight social control amongst them. Someone who opted to cast his or her votes would be considered as “abnormal” or at least “unusual” by others. Since there is a social bond, political affiliation of closest relatives and neighbors also influence someone’s perception toward elections. What had been decided and became the political choice of its local leader might have influenced people’s decision to attend the elections. Furthermore, local leaders’ party sometimes becomes a reference for people to choose for the same party. Related to social bonds manifested, one specific research finding in Jambidan is about people’s perception Democratic Governance| 65 Part One: Local Politics and Election toward elections. Jambidanese perceived participating in elections as an obligation rather than a right, affecting its high percentage of voter’s turn out compared to its counterpart, Banguntapan. As less mobile communities, it opened more opportunities for its residences to hold many social events in Jambidan as well as in Imogiri and Gadingharjo. When they gathered in regular or irregular, formal or informal meetings, they also gave opportunity to local electoral committees to join and be involved in socializing election to the villagers. Because of this relatively intensive socialization, more voters in those three villages understood specific issues in elections and were more informed about candidates that are going to represent them. Involvement of local leaders of the community groups such as RT and Dukuh within local electoral committees influenced more people to participate in elections. In turn, this will affect the degree of voters turn out in those three villages compared to their counterparts in a positive manner. Population density in hilly and coastal districts such as Imogiri and Sanden gives a specific advantage toward participation. There were more little number of ballot booths compared to a high density district such as Banguntapan. This influences the manageability of elections Imogiri and Sanden since the local electoral committees were able to perform better and reach their responsibility more deeply. More intensiveness and more intensity of socialization contributed to more voters in those districts. Participation stimulants still also played a significant role as incentives in participation. Issues of money politics still became a hot issue in Bantul for general. As a homogenous community, it opens an opportunity to organize Jambidan people in a collective political pragmatism. Head of community groups such as the Dukuh and the Head of RT mobilized people under their supervision to cast their votes for a certain candidates, affecting high degree of participation in general. As a trade off, certain candidates provided those communities public or social infrastructures. More advantage of being less mobile was also met by Imogiri and Gadingharjo villagers in a matter of high participation degree. Since they were rarely mobile to another region, there developed a simpler demographic dynamics compared to the urban characteristics of villages such as Banguntapan. Moreover, just few migrants enter these villages. This simple demographic profile resulted in a relatively simplified sustainable 66 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Tunjung S., Awang D. The Factors Determining... data correction that should be applied by local electoral committees. Because of this circumstance, there were just a few problems stemming from the demographic matters and resulted to a more accurate voter’s data. This accuracy had in turn produced a higher voter’s turnout. The whole research findings, discussing factors that discourage and encourage participation in Bantul could be summarized into a table as follows. Tabel 1.4.Research Findings District Village Determinant Factors Banguntapan (Low Level of Participation) 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) Jambidan (High Level of Participation) 1) Majorityof population perceived elections as an obligation, not a rights as it should be 2) Less mobile inhabitants 3) Political affiliation of closest relative Gadingsari (Low Level of Participation) 1) High mobility of its inhabitants 2) Pragmatic people 3) The intensity of socialization is less because citizens are not easy to collect 4) Less social bonds Gadingharjo (High Level of Participation) 1) High intensity and innovative electoral socialization 2) Less mobile inhabitants 3) Political affiliation of closest relative Imogiri (Low Level of Participation) 1) Saturation of inhabitants toward so many elections 2) Elections perceived as less benefit 3) Problem in data adjustment related tonlow quality of local electoral committees 4) Less innovative and less frequent electoral socialization 5) Pragmatic people Sriharjo (High Level of Participation) 1) Voter mobilisation by local electoral committees 2) High involvement of local community leaders within electoral committee. 3) Less number of ballot booth 4) Political affiliation of closest relative Bangun-tapan Sanden Imogiri Highly mobile inhabitants Majority of them are migrants Less popular candidates Pragmatic people Problem in data adjustment Less social bonds Democratic Governance| 67 Part One: Local Politics and Election CONCLUSION In onclusion drawn from the research, the findings are as follow. Firstly, factors determining high level of participation amongst Bantulese are: (a) Political affiliation of closest relative ; (b) participation stimulants; (c) tight social control; (d) political pragmatism of society manifested in organized collective transactional arrangement between inhabitants and candidates by local leaders; (e) societal institution awareness and concern toward elections. Secondly, factors determining low level of participation are: (a) Saturation and less direct benefit of elections for society; (b) Limited, less innovative and less frequent socialization discourage people to vote; (c) Poor performance of electoral committees in adjusting voter’s data especially in a highly mobile, dense population and vast areas; (d) Weak social bond and social control; (f) Society pragmatism that perceived elections is less benefit for their life. Based on those research findings, it is highly recommended to design an innovative socialization method that attract more people to come and discuss about electoral regulations and issues to create more informed and rational voters that in turn will be contributive toward enhancing voter participation as well as development of the quality of election. On the other side, administrative issues related to voter data should be organized in a more systematic and integrated method to encourage more people to participate. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1. DPRRI (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia): National House of Representatives 2. DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah): Local House of Representatives 3. DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah): Senate 4. DPRD Provinsi: Local House of Representatives for Provincial level 5. DPRD Kabupaten/Kota: Local House of Representatives for Regency/City level 68 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Tunjung S., Awang D. The Factors Determining... REFERENCES Budiardjo, Miriam. 1982. Partisipasi dan Partai Politik, Jakarta: PT.Gramedia. Dahl, Robert A. 1971.Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press. Hendrik, Doni. 2010. Variabel-variabel yang Mempengaruhi Rendahnya Partisipasi Huntington, Samuel P & Joan Nelson. 1994. Partisipasi Politik di Negara Berkembang. Jakarta: Rineka Cipta Rush, Michael and Phillip Althof, 2000.Pengantar Sosiologi Politik. Jakarta: Rajawali Press. Schumpeter, Joseph. 1947.Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper. Simangunsong, Bonar. 2004. Negara. Demokrasi dan Berpolitik Yang Profesional. Jakarta: Gramedia Soebagio, 2008. Implikasi Golongan Putih dalam Perspektif Pembangunan Demokrasi di Indonesia, Jurnal Makara, Vol. 12 No. 2, Desember Surbakti, Ramlan. 1992. Memahami Ilmu Politik. Jakarta: Gramedia Democratic Governance| 69 Part One: Local Politics and Election 70 |Democratic Governance RESISTANCE TO FOREST MANAGEMENT POLICIES: A STUDY ON ORANG RIMBA IN JAMBI PROVINCE Muhammad Yusuf Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik (STISIP) Nurdin Hamzah Jambi Zuly Qodir Master of Government Affairs and Administration. Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta E-mail: zuly_qodir@yahoo.com Abstract Orang Rimba, a name of tribe in Jambi Province of Indonesia, who settles and live by hunting and gathering plants at Bukit Duabelas National Park (TNBD), face at least three major mainstreams. Politically, they are treated discriminatively through forest extension and protection. Economically, they no longer have free access to the existing forest resources. Socio culturally, they can hardly face the challenges. TNBD Center has issued a policy about TNDB’s maintaining system which is against Orang Rimba’s concerns. Orang Rimba that have been living for a long time resist the policy in various ways.The purpose of this research is to find out the reasons why Orang Rimba’s resistance against the TNDB’s policy still continues and to find out the TNDB’s response as a government representative in dealing with Orang Rimba’s resistance. Using case study and ethnography approaches, this kind of research is a descriptive-qualitative research. The primary data are obtained through interview and observation, while the secondary data are gained from primary documents and secondary documents. The findings of this research show the reasons why Orang Rimba’s resistance persists: 1). There is a disappointment in TNDB’s policy because it is made unilaterally by the government, 2). The downfall of Orang Rimba’s customary law makes the law itself to not work anymore, 3). There is a cooperation and influence from Orang Terang 4). There is a competion in forest resources management between Orang Rimba and Orang Terang (clear land people), and 5). The increase of living cost makes Orang Rimba take risks either in hidden or open resistance. The TNBD Center responds Orang Rimba’s resistance by socializing, cooperating intersectorally, 71 Part One: Local Politics and Election monitoring and security, and empowering the village economy. That policy does not show positive results because Orang Rimba’s resistance continues to happen. They remain resistant towards the policy about the forest management. Keywords: Resistance, policy and response of the forest management INTRODUCTION Orang Rimba who settle by hunting and gathering plants at TNBD (National Forest of Bukit Duabelas) face at least three big mainstreams related to politics, economics, and social culture (Naim, 2007:4). In the aspect of politics, they are recognized constitutionally, but are still treated discriminatively from the common people (Orang Terang). The discrimination can be seen in the area forest expansion through the policy of TNBD management regarding the establishment of zoning such as core zone, jungle zone, utilization zone, rehabilitation zone, traditional zone, and etc. Based on the regulation, core zone is an area which is restricted, inaccessible, and should not be used by the people, including Orang Rimba. In addition, concerning the jungle zone and rehabilitation zone, Orang Rimba who have been living there for a long time and relying their life in Bukit Duabelas area are only allowed to stay and do their economic activities and traditions in the traditional zone at the edge of TNBD are (BKSD, 2004:63-66). In the economic aspect, the land occupied by Orang Rimba is basically comprised of abundant forest resources, but their ulayat (communal) right is being taken away without compensations. Various forest resources that are managed and used by Orang Rimba to fulfill their family’s daily needs cannot be accessed anymore. Concerning the social and cultural life, Orang Rimba faces socio-cultural and intercultural changes. Local wisdom which serves as their greatness symbol eventually erodes. The policy of national forest management changes the social structure of Orang Rimba. According to Weintre (2003:8), Orang Rimba’s social structure is fragmented into three sub-groups. The first group consists of traditional people who have the least changes and still follow the ancestors’ culture. The second group consists of those who live in the outskirts of traditional areas, who are less able to adopt all characteristics of post-traditional life, but there are already several 72 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... types of post-traditional people. The third group consists of those who are unable to have self-focus and self-orientation to fulfill their primary needs without merging with the outsiders. According to Lobja (2003: 4), the pattern of forest management and utilization by local people is so far done based on the concept of local values and cultures. So, things that do not support the environment utilization are considered castration against customary laws. The policy of TNBD management which triggers resistance as an effort to maintain and preserve the TNBD is called “daily resistance” (Scott, 1993: 277). The study on Orang Rimba resistance cannot be separated from the involvement of individual or collective actors, ideology, and actions that show their existence as people who are afflicted with various pressures. These kinds of resistance, according to Brectian in Scott (1993: 271), are means to help oneself to typically avoid confrontation with the ruler or elite norms. Based on the problems above, the problem formulation of this research is: How does Orang Rimba’s resist the policy of national forest management? And why does Orang Rimba’s resistance against the policy of national forest management continue to happen? THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Resistance Theory Resistance study is a part of social movement and action in many aspects of social life. Social action is considered an action against a country and a country’s policy. Struggle or grass-root politics for the sake of human interest involves actors and participants (Sing, 2010: 130-132). Social movement is understood as a set of beliefs and actions that are not institutionalized, done by a group of people to promote or hinder changes in a society (Mirsel, 2006: 6). Social movement consists of collective behaviours, mobs, and mass, which are oriented to values and anti-systemic in forms and symbols (Gaus and Kukathas, 2012: 610-611). Referring to Sunarto’s view in Hiareic (2004, ed., et al: 168-169), movement is manifested in mobs, taking form in a riot done by a certain group which is organized and will end only if the goal is achieved. Riots, which take a slightly different form, are defined as a commotion done by a group of people without directed-goal and will end when they run out of energy. Democratic Governance| 73 Part One: Local Politics and Election The root word of resistance, referring to Oxford Dictionary, is an action taken to survive, oppose, and resist (Hornby, 1995: 998). Based on the action, historians define resistance as a collective activity (Praeger, 1993: 27 in Ross, 2006: 5). According to Scott, there are two types of resistance – open and hidden. Furthermore, he states that “the nature of resistance is greatly influenced by the existing forms of labor, control, and beliefs about the probability and severity of retaliation” (Scott, 1985: 34). Resistance strategy is considered as the goal to change social structures and systems of domination (Horowitz, 2005: 2107 in Cote and Cliche, 2011: 128). In the case that happened in Malaysia, farmers used daily resistance method such as slandering, theft, burning and excessive claim against the ruling elites. This method is marked with a small plan that they need, and while they avoid direct confrontation, their function is as self-helpers for the doers. According to Oommen in Sing (2010: 302) there are at least five kinds of protest: 1) Organized, collective violences, 2) Organized, collective non-violent actions, 3) Non-violent and violent organized micro-mobilisation, 4) Temporary and unorganized micro-mobilisation, and 5) Individual protests. As suggested by Scott (1990) in Wiratmoko et al (2004: 222), resistance is grouped into two categories. First, public transcript: It is an open resistance, like a theater performer who lives in two worlds – real world and fake world on stage. Second, hidden transcript: It is a resistance which is done secretly or behind people’s back. Resisters pretend to be nice in front of their opponents, but behind their back they talk about them with gossips, slander, curses, and so on. Oommen in Sing (2010: 303) maps resistance expressions into two versions – regulated and unregulated, each of which is executed in accordance with the situation. Furthermore, Eksein in Nurudin (ed) et al (2006:10) states that there are two factors that trigger resistances: first, resistance happens due to intolerable injustice and oppression that trigger risk-taking attitudes by making a direct confrontation with the hegemony of the country. Second, demands that cannot be fulfilled. Furthermore it is affirmed by Scott as explained by Nurudin (ed) et al (2006:10) that 74 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... resistance happens due to the state’s vast role in the transformation of village through green revolution. Indigeneous people’s resistance can be traced in Regpala’s writing in Ghee and Gomes (1993: 178) about a case study of native people’s resistance in Cordilerra against invasion and the changes enforced by the outsiders. It is explained that since 1571, the Igorot people (the native people) had known about Spanish colonialism during the gold searching in Cordillera, and they fought openly and secretly.That fight was able to eradicate the invading Spanish forces in the jungle who were trying to conquer the Igorot people. The fight ended with the Igorot’s victory and the Spanish’s defeat. Concerning indigenoues people’s resistance, Cote and Cliche in Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance to Oil Palm Plantations in Borneo (2011: 121) compared indigenous people’s resistance in Malaysia and in Indonesia. Furthermore, it is explained that indigeneous people’s resistance in Serawak, Malaysia used two strategies – legal action and staging a blockade, while the resistance of indigeous people in Kalimantan tended to use violent strategies such as destroying palm trees, buildings, and seizing machines. Theories of conflict According to Tourine in Sing (2010: 152), social movement is understood as a particular type of social conflict. In a conflict, there are actors who contradict and compete to get resources. Furthermore, conflict through stakes are considered valuable and desired by two or more conflicting parties which involves a group of organized actors, betting value, and competition to get what is at stake. In Oxford Dictionary, it means serious disagreement, serious difference of opinion between one party with another party (Hornby: 1995, 241). According to Pruitt and Rubin (2004: 9), conflict is a perceived divergence of interesrs or a trust that the aspirations of the conflicting parties are not achieved simultaneously. According to Dahrendrof in Veeger (1990: 214), analysis on people is based on a conflict of point of view, which starts from the facts that the members are grouped into two categories, namely the ruling and the ruled. This dualism includes in the interest structure of every interest Democratic Governance| 75 Part One: Local Politics and Election in life which results in different interests which are conflicting. In turn, interest differentiation can trigger conflicting groups. Dahrendrof divides three groups of interest: 1) Power, 2). Interest, and 3). Conflict group. By its type, conflict is divided into two - vertical conflict, which is a conflict between people and their leaders, and horizontal conflict, which is inter-ethnic conflict, cultural and religious followers, and inter-social groups (Nugroho, 2012: 448). Conflicts haunt almost every developing country, and they are either created intentionally or are allowed to happen. According to Dahrendrof in After (1977: 626), in a functional structure, there is an assumption that every society is relatively firm, and is a very integrated element structure, and has a function to give support to its maintenance as a system in a social structure which still functions based on the members’ consensus. In theory of conflict, on the other hand, it depends on very different assumptions: Every society in every case is subject to various changes, in which social changes can happen. a). Every society in every case generates disputes and conflicts: social conflicts can happen in all cases. b.) Every society cannot avoid forces done by some people to the others (Dahrendrof in After, 1977: 626). According to Pruit and Rubin (2004:143-146), there are five transformations which happenned during the escalation of conflicts, although not all happen in a conflict. They are: A.Mild to Severe: Efforts to get something in a competitive trade are usually started with lighter efforts: ingratiation, gamesmanship, persuasive argumentation, and promises. In many cases, these soft tactics are finally replaced by the severe ones, such as threat and commitment that cannot be undone. b. Small to big: When conflicts escalate, there is a tendency that the existing issues proliferate. Each party tends to be absorbed into conflicts and agrees to give resources to win them. c. Specific to general: In an escalating conflict, specific issues tend to change to be the general ones, from small and concrete concerns to becoming big and involving all positions, not to mention the intolerance towards other parties. d. Manage to hurt others: In the beginning, many conflicts are caused by 76 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... trying to get their own interests, without paying attention to the good or bad results gotten by others. e. Few to many: Conflicts which arise from agitation done by few people often become collective actions when one of the parties fail to win them. According to Pruitt and Rubin (2004: 200-214), conflict escalation is observed through three models of approach: First: Agressor-defender model, which draws a line between the two parties that are in a conflict. One of the aggressors is considered to have a goal that make him/her involved in a conflict with other parties, the defender, Second: spiralconflict model, in which conflicts escalation is the results of a vicious cycle between actions and reactions. In a retaliatory spiral, every party gives punishment to the other parties that are unpleasant, and Third: Structural change model, in which conflict residues are in the form of changes that happen among the conflicting parties and in the place where they live. These residues support further quarrelling behavior with the same level or higher, and reduce efforts to find conflicts. After conflicts escalate, they will deescalate. According to Pruitt and Rubin (2004: 292-295), conflict de-escalation happens due to a.having no action, b. yielding, in which one party gives in to the other party, c. withdrawing, or not continuing the conflict, d. problem solving. Public Policies According to Dye in Indiahono (2009: 17), public policy is: “whatever governments choose to do or not to”. It means that whatever the government does whether explicitly or implicitly is a policy. Dye’s perception on policy, as stated above, can be interpreted as two important things: first, policy should be done by the government agency, and second, that policy should contain choices chosen or not chosen by the government. Furthermore, Anderson in Indiahono (2009: 17) defines policy as the behavior of a number of actors (officials, groups, government institutes) or a group of actors in a certain field. In addition, policy is closely related to inter-group interests either in the government level or society in general. According to Marzali (2012: 20), policy is a tool or an instrument to manage people from up to below, by giving rewards and sanctions. So, policy is intentionally arranged and designed to make people’s Democratic Governance| 77 Part One: Local Politics and Election behavior (the targeted group) become patterned and in accordance with the statements and formulation of that policy. Those who violate the policy will get sanctions or punishments. According to Dunn (2000: 25), the policies in policy making for some years consists of: agenda arrangement, policy adoption, policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy assessment/evaluation. Those policy stages are explained further by Winarno (2012: 36-37) as follows: in agenda arrangement, elected officials put issues into the policy agenda. In the formulation stage, policies are defined, discussed, and given alternatives. In adoption, the stage policies are adopted with dominant support from the legislative and consensus among institute directors. Implementation stage is done by administration agencies and government agencies at lower levels. In evaluation stage, the policies which have been implemented are assessed and evaluated to the extent that the policies are made to solve problems. According to Nugroho (2012: 131), there are two kinds of public policies. First, public statements are statements that are addressed in an official forum and quoted by mass media, and spreaded to a wide society. Statements which are addressed in private rooms are not categorized as public statements. Second, public statements are manifested in the form of legislation which is codified legally and formally. Every policy from the central government to local government belongs to public policy, because they are public officials who are paid with public money through state tax and incomes, and legally they are responsible to the public. RESEARCH METHODS This is a descriptive qualitative research using case study approach, and the questions are related to How and Why. To help understand Orang Rimba’s social setting, economic, and political system, this research employs ethnography method, and describes a certain culture as the main goal. This research uses data resources from: a) Primary data, which are obtained from structured and unstructured interviews, observation and ethnography, and b) Secondary data, which are obtained from the previous studies (undergraduate thesis, thesis, and dissertation), journals, bulletins, magazines, books, newspapers, internet and other supporting sources. Information and data needed 78 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... in this research are acquired through two ways, namely (1) selecting the key person and (2) snowball sampling. There were 5 informants from TNBD Center who were interviewed, 12 Orang Rimba, 2 people from KKI Warsi, 2 people from Jambi Enviromental Forum (WALHI), and 12 villagers from Sei Ruan Ulu, Tanah Garo, and Pematang Kabau. The obtained data were analyzed as follows: a) data reduction, b). Data presentation, and c). Conclusion and verification. RESULT AND DISCUSSION Orang Rimba’s Everyday Form of Resistance The embryos of Orang Rimba’s resistance towards the policy of forest management in Bukit Duabelas National Forest through the Written Reference of the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture Number 258/Kpts-II/2000 have existed since the process of formulation. Rejection efforts are manifested in the rejection movement against the zoning system and regulations that are applied in the controversial areas of customary laws, which are potential to threaten Orang Rimba’s future. The resistance movement has reached a joint-decision between the national forest officials and Orang Rimba, assisted by KKI Warsi NGO, Sokola Rimba, and Jambi Enviromental Forum. After the joint-decision about the zoning system of the national forest management in December 2009, Orang Rimba’s everyday form of resistance continued to happen and evolved from one form of resistance into a new form. Several years later, protest and resistance movement declined, because the movements after the joint-decision are reactive and responsive towards the disruption of their interests. They did not build movement frameworks that are compehensive, systematic, and reactive, and they easily made coalition but then dissolved it. The forms of Orang Rimba’s resistance are the following: Hidden Resistance Hidden resistance is done routinely by individuals and groups along with temenggung, or by making a coallition with other groups. Their awareness about resistance is not done with organized common purposes, so they play around individually and collectively and are not well-organized. The efforts of Orang Rimba’s resistance are done as follows: Democratic Governance| 79 Part One: Local Politics and Election Clearing land in the area: Bukit Duabelas National Forest has strategic social, economic, and ecological meanings. The writer identifies that almost all Orang Rimba in Makekal Ulu, Tengah and Ilir clear land, as well as those who are in Kejasung Besar, Kejasung Kecil and in Durian River. Similarly, those who live in Air Panas, Ujung Kutai, Singosari, and Bukit Suban also do the same. Although they have been living with Orang Terang, they have not got a permanent job, and they still rely their life on the protected forest. This passive resistance annoys the forest officials. Therefore, they launch a policy which limits Orang Rimba to clear land, because an area as large as 60.500 ha which is assumed as a former biosphere preserve, has left ± 30% undamaged. The scale limitation of land clearing up to 2 hectares for Orang Rimba has violated their economic rights, access rights, and is against their ancestors’ rules. The national forest management should not intervene on this. Orang Rimba do not expect the limitation of land clearing, although there are rules about limited land clearing which is intensively organized. Selling forest products: The sale of forest products, particularly timbers in the form of serpehan from the area is very intensive recently. Timbers that have high economic values such as tembesu, kulim, meranti and others become the target of illegal Any activities in the 60.500 ha national forest cannot be easily monitored by as many as 16 forest rangers. This condition is used by Orang Rimba and Orang Terang in the buffer zone from outside of Tebo Regency, Sarolangun Regency, and Batanghari Regency to compete in timber processing in that area. Based on the data obtained by Bukit Duabelas National Forest Center and confirmed with the result of interviewing Ngadap, there are some farms owned by Orang Terang in the forest area which are purchased from their fellows and they cleared the land by themselves or using other ways. The following data describe the land ownership in the area of Bukit Duabelas National Forest: 80 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... Table 1.5. The Data of Orang Terang’s Land Ownership in the Area of Bukit Duabelas National Forest No Village Number of farm owners Estimated farm area The average farm area per person Crops 1 Bukit Suban 155 people ± 196,8 Ha ± 1,27 Ha Rubber and palm 2 Pematang Kabau 253 people ± 478,25 Ha ± 1,89 Ha Rubber and palm 3 Lubuk Jering 266 people ± 825,50 Ha ± 3,10 Ha Rubber, durian, dogfruit, and lanzones 4 Semurung Village 110 people ± 299,75 Ha ± 2,725Ha Rubber, durian, dogfruit, and lanzones 5 Jernih Village 163 people ± 322,25 Ha ± 1,98 Ha Rubber, durian, dogfruit, and lanzones 6 Baru Village 63 people ± 126,5 Ha ± 2,00 Ha Rubber, durian, dogfruit, and lanzones Source: Bukit Duabelas National Forest Center (data have been processed). Based on the data above, the areas in Bukit Suban and Pematang Kabau are identified as transmigrants’ village whose residents are mostly from other tribes (Javanese, Padangnese, and Bataknese). They got farms in the outside area when they joined transmigration (got a business land). Farm ownership in the national forest area is generally gotten by purchasing from Anak Dalam society (SAD), or they have Anak Dalam people open the area to be farms, then they pay them or share the profit with them. Lubuk Jering Village, Semurung Village, Jernih Village, and Baru Village are native villages which are dominated by native Malay of Jambi known as Orang Dusun. In general, they have farms inside or outside the national forest by clearing land, or inheriting from their ancestors. Based on the data above, as many as 1010 (one thousand ten) villagers have farms in the national forest area approximately ± 2.249,05 ha in total (National Forest of Bukit Duabelas Center). Protests shown by gossiping the forest officials in or outside the forest area continue due to the unclear pattern of the national forest Democratic Governance| 81 Part One: Local Politics and Election management. Orang Rimba who are not in line with the forest officials feel that their interests are disturbed, so they launch various issues to look for the weaknesses of the forest officials. The national forest legality is sued by declaring that Bukit Duabelas is their ancestors’ land, and they also blur the boundaries of the forest with the buffer zones. Orang Rimba’s economic and political interests on the forest resources are disturbed when vertical conflicts between Orang Rimba and the national forest officials arise. Orang Rimba who have no mass power and social capital prefer withdrawing themselves to arguing with them. Those who are against the forest officials, according to Ngadap: Those who sold the forest resources were in dispute with the forest officials, because the official knew who they are. They would avoid the officials, if necessary, they would run away because they were afraid of them (Ngadap, 22 February 2014). The interview above shows that they withdraw themselves and avoid the national forest officials. They have no enough power to directly face the officials when they completely have no weapons to use to attack them. Therefore, they prefer avoiding them. Pretending to be fool is Orang Rimba’s strategy to make others think that they do not know about the laws applied in Bukit Duabelas area and the national positive laws. They take advantage on this condition by selling forest products and farms. One of the ways to be a fool is by refusing to have ID card by arguing that it is not in line with their customs. The farm transaction among them or with Orang Terang does not use bills, nor witness. It is only done by the seller and the buyer. Open Resistance Hidden resistance becomes open resistance when there are internal or external disturbances. Orang Rimba’s conflictual resistance is triggered by the obstacles faced by the forest officials who try to counter that movement. A more reactive resistance began with a strong focus, life invasion, and limited access for Orang Rimba to use forest resources which is manifested in protection and becomes offensive. Based on the primary and secondary data from the field, the open resistance done by Orang Rimba is explained as follows: 82 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... Preventing the forest officials of TNBD from entering the area: Orang Rimba prevents the forest officials from entering the area as it is one form of resistance based on customary law. The effort to prevent the officials from entering the area is stated by Surono, an official from Community Partner of Forest Rangers (MMP): In 2013, forest officials (10 forest rangers and 5 MMP officials) intended to enter the forest. They had previously asked for temenggung’s permission to check which land belongs to Javanese and which one belongs to Orang Rimba, then when we were about to enter, many Orang Rimba blocked us on the bridge. We told them we only wanted to check. We cancelled and went home. ‘Why should be checked? It is not gone,’ they said. At that time, Orang Dalam waited in Meranti sections, and they were provocated by outsiders. They said we wanted to catch a tauke. When a tauke is caught, they cannot sell rubber latex. In short, people who often come to that area cooperate with internal people from SPE, Limau Manis (interview, 27 January 2014). Orang Rimba’s resistance on the national forest continues to happen. They prevent the forest officials’ patrol from entering the pranokan land. When the officials want to do a raid passing the pranokan land and at the same time a woman is giving a birth, it becomes a taboo for Orang Rimba to pass that area. Open debate and discussion either individually or collectively: It has started from the establisment of United Community of Makekal (KMB) in the late 2008 by Pengendum and friends, whose members consist of young people from Makekal river (Makekal Hilir, Makekal Tengah dan Makekal Ulu). KMB raise funds from Orang Rimba youth throughout the area of Bukit Duabelas National Forest. Resistance and conflicts between Orang Rimba and the forest officials continued in the end of 2012. Jambi police officers did a joint raid and burned the house of a land owner located in the forest area. The land owner protested, stating that he did not want to get loss because he had spent a lot of money for that farm. Then, he mobilized Orang Rimba and Lubuk Bumbun people to protest the Sei Jernih resort in Muara Tabir Sub-district. They came in group with more or less a hundred people consisting of Orang Rimba and Lubuk Bumbun people. The resort officials who became the target of the attack were Pak Sayon Kelana and Pak Ahdiyat. They were threatened using kecepek pointed to Pak Sayon Kelana. Democratic Governance| 83 Part One: Local Politics and Election Everyday form of resistance done by Orang Rimba, both hidden and open resistances, is categorized into incidental resistance. This is because the resistances are not well-organized and systematic, and they tend to be individualized although there are collective actions. However, they are not revolutionary, nor are they aimed at destroying the dominance of TNBD Center. Their resistances are merely done with the purpose of maintaning their access to the forest resources that have long been used for generations. In the beginning the resistance is latent, but then they evolve to be manifestation because they face challenges and obstacles. The Resistance Actors Orang Rimba’s response towards the policy of forest management is divided into three groups, first: the group who supports the national forest policy that is consists of common Orang Rimba and those who stay outside – the Ngadap people who dominate Makekal Ilir, Tengah, and Sungkai, and those who live in Aerbehan. Second: the group who is against the national forest policy consisting of those who obviously refuse the policy of the forest management. This group is consists of people who live in Air Panas area, Singosari, and Jelita ketemenggungan in Kejasung and SP 5, KMB youth led by Pengendum whose authorities cover Makekal Ulu, Makekal Tengah, and Makekal Hilir. Third: those who do not give full support consisting of Temenggung Rahman who live in Singosari, Pembubar (the former temenggung of Makekal Hulu), and Temenggung Celetai who replaces Pembubar ketemenggungan and Temenggung Jelitai in Batanghari. This group does not want to be involved much in any activities done by the forest center. It is difficult to classify which group that supports the policy of the national forest and which group that does not, because the Orang Rimba is a community which is dynamic in determining an attitude. If the policy of the forest management gives them benefit, they will support it, but if it threatens their economic condition, they will disobey it with various reasons and demands. Based on the data in the field, the three groups are categorized in the following table: 84 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... Table 1.6.Factors Based on Group, Region, and Goal No Actor and Region Goal 1 The supporting group: Ngadap group in Sungai, Makekal Ilir and Tengah and the Aerbehan group. They want to preserve the forest to be managed intensively, and depend their life on the forest resources. 2 The opposing group: The group of Air Panas, Jelitai in Kejasung region and SP 5, Pengendum, and KMB members of Makekal. This group tends to have latent conflicts with the supporting group of TNBD policy. This opposing group demands economic access (farming, selling land, serpehan, and other forest products), and change the policy of zoning system in TNBD. The not-completely supporting group: Temenggung Rahman in Singosari, Pembubar in Makekal Ulu and Jelitai in Kejasung Batang Hari, and the group in Makekal Tengah and Ilir. This group tends to be passive towards the national forest policy. If the policy gives them benefit, they will support it. On the other hand, they will refuse it if it gives them disadvantages. 3 Source: Collected from interviews and observations. That grouping is made based on Orang Rimba’s attitude. If a policy gives them advantages, they will support the national forest center. On the other hand, if the policy gives them advantages, they will refuse it, although they do not show it in front of the forest officials. This ambiguous attitude makes it difficult to identify which group is pro or against the policy. Reasons of Orang Rimba’s Continuing Resistance The data obtained in the field show that there are several factors that make Orang Rimba oppose the policy of the national forest management. They are as follows: a. The disappointment over the policy which is made unilaterally Orang Rimba’s resistance actually had happened since the forest was managed by the Forest Resources Conservation Center (BKSDA), then in the end of 2007 the authority was transferred to TNBD Center. Consciously or not, actually BKSDA had transmitted conflicts between the forest officials and Orang Rimba. Orang Rimba’s hatred on BKSDA dominance as the state’s representative turns to TNBD Center. Therefore, TNBD Center only inherits the problems from the previous management. In this context, resistance is understood as a latent and open conflict between Orang Rimba and TNBD Center. This resistance is Democratic Governance| 85 Part One: Local Politics and Election not merely done for subsistence reasons that they want free access to the national forest but it is also a form of revenge to the national forest officials who are repressive to them. On the other side, the officials’ treatment to Orang Rimba personally and institutionally arises conflicts which continue to escalate. In the planning phase of the national forest management, the forest officials try to adjust customary land claims to be in accordance with Orang Rimba. Therefore, zones based on the customary zone of Orang Rimba are made. Such policy generates Orang Rimba’s disappointment towards the national forest officials. The RPTND policy by implementing the zoning system is considered to be against the customary law of Orang Rimba which claims that the TNBD forest is the inherited land from the ancestors that must be preserved based on the boundary and the land that have been determined. b. The downfall of Orang Rimba’s Customs The downfall of Jenang Waris - Orang Rimba in the past occupied a forest territory laid between Tanah Garo as the base point and Sungai Serengan (Paku Aji) as the end region. The Jenang Waris relationship has been maintained until the era of Forest Tenure Rights (HPH), Forest Product Harvesting Rights (HPHH), Production Forest (HP), and Protected Peat Forest (HLG). After the establishment of the area to be a national forest, the jenang waris relations was subsided. During the era of bebalok (illegal logging), Jenang Untung Abdullah knew a lot of Orang Rimba, so he was appointed as jenang in Sei Lingkar who dominated the authority in Batang Hari, especially the economic authority of Orang Rimba in the area which is in contact with Maro Sebo Ulu region. Now he is the chief of Se i Lingkar village. Since 2011 the relationship between Orang Rimba and Jenang Untung has started to be broken. It is because he is busy with the village activities and he does not enter the forest anymore. Since the downfall of Air Hitam perjenangan, Orang Rimba started to handle their own matters. This condition makes them weak in facing the social reality. The downfall of jenang waris relation with Orang Rimba is due to the massive forest clearing done by PT Sawit and other companies since the 1970s. Beside the forest clearing done since the 1970s, the roles of NGO such as KKI Warsi, Sokola Rima, Kopsad, Jambi Walhi, AMAN, Jambi 86 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... Farmers Association (PPJ), and Indonesian Legal Aid Association (PBHI) of West Sumatra have contributions to give a new understanding about the national forest management. The involvement of NGOs eventually replaces the role of jenang waris that used to be dominant but now starts to be weak. Orang Rimba no longer depend completely on jenang waris, but they start to turn to various parties that affiliate with them. Those who are living in the East still preserve their custom by questioning anyone who violates the custom law. There are efforts to avoid outsiders to enter by blocking them not to enter the protected forest. In 2012, there was a customary consensus among temenggung in the form of a written rule about land transaction between Orang Rimba and Orang Terang. That rule states that those who sell land will get customary penalty. However, that customary law is not imperative because it has no deterrent effects. Then, a new resistance emerges, that is the land selling is done massively, and the money is used to pay the penalty. The detachment of jenang waris confines is due to the culture assimilation between Orang Rimba and Orang Terang, so that there is no one who is dituokan whose advices are obeyed. c. The influence and cooperation with Orang Terang They know transaction systems and the life of the outsiders, and they live side by side as well as exchange information related to the forest management. During the interaction between Orang Rimba and Orang Terang, there is a transactional relation in which they fulfill their daily needs. There is a cooperation between Orang Rimba and Orang Terang in land transaction and land clearing. In this case, the position of Orang Rimba is described as those who are dijinakkan, while Orang Terang has economical interests in the area, so they try to build a relationship called bedulur. d. The competition in the forest resources management The horizontal conflicts among Orang Rimba happen among ketemenggungan, temenggung Ngadap who replaced temenggung Ngukir because they are often involved in land transaction and serpehan. At first, they denied their involvement in land transaction by arguing in every customary trial in regard with the people’s protest. Customary penalty should had been charged to Temenggung Ngukir for his carelessness, but he Democratic Governance| 87 Part One: Local Politics and Election always denied by arguing, during the customary trial in which he questioned his role in defending Ngelembu who was attacked by villagers on March 19, 2011. The competition in using the forest resources also happens between Orang Rimba and Orang Terang. The pattern of forest utilization by Orang Rimba and Orang Terang is summarized in the following table: Table1.7. The Utilization Pattern of Forest and Forest Products by Orang Rimba andOrang Terang Aspect of Interest Forest products Plantations Woods Orang Rimba Orang Terang Getting an advantage by becoming the workers who transport the forest products. The employer or tauke of Orang Rimba who sell the forest products. Land clearing, purchase, and cultivating wage from Orang Terang. Land clearing and purchase, cooperating with Orang Rimba in land cultivation. Economic needs, cutting down woods for plantations. Economic needs, housing need, household furniture, and trade. Source: Collectedfrom interviews with Orang Rimba and the villagers. The competition in land clearing between Orang Rimba and Orang Terang is not fair because Orang Terang have capital, production tools, and good coordination. The speed of economic growth among Orang Terang supported with big capital triggers them to clear vast land or new land that has not been cultivated. e. Reasons of economic demand Orang Rimba’s resistance is because of their high economic demand. The Jelitai case who has ketemenggungan authority in Kejasung rarely returns to Kejasung Besar and Kecil. Based on the information from Kitmir, Jelitai has sold his Orang Rimba’s efforts to improve their life quality and to drive them to be more competitive in economics. It is measured with the life of Orang Terang who has motorcycles, communication tools (hand phones), televisions, houses, and other primary and secondary needs. They also try to live in the same level with Orang Terang by the culture and religion assimilation. Some of them embraced Islam and Christianity. Pak H Tarib, Pak Rahman, 88 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... Pak Betaring and others who have embraced Islam usually have lived together with the Malays and the transmigrants. Not all Orang Rimba sell land to fulfil their daily needs. For them, the 60.500 ha forest is a vast, never depleted area. That presumption drives them to sell part of the land. The Intensity of Orang Rimba’s Conflict and Resistance The intensity of Orang Rimba’s resistance towards the management policy of Bukit Duabelas National Forest is rather difficult to identify. That difficulty is caused by the changes in form and motive of resistance. Resistance is triggered by various factors which are related and have different intensity. Based on the data from the field, the intensity of Orang Rimba’s resistance is caused by three aspects. First, Orang Rimba’s economic aspects. They will become very resistant if their access to the national forest is hindered by the national forest officials. Latent resistance is started with continuous land clearing as the sources to meet their daily needs. Orang Rimba’s resistance then evolves from one form to another form. They clear land to meet their daily needs, plant potatoes, herbs, fruit, rubber, and palm. That resistance continues by selling the forest products such as tapped rubber, rattan, hunted animals, and other resources. Orang Rimba’s resistance escalates when they sell land and serpehan, but they are prevented by the forest officials. That condition triggers Orang Rimba’s open resistance through violence and debate. The intensity of the resistance can be described as follows: Figure 1.1.Orang Rimba’s Resistance Intensity Based on Economic Aspects II Selling forest products (rubber, rattan, hunted animals,etc) IV Selling land and serpehan I Land clearing III Competition in forest resources management Second, Orang Rimba’s political aspects. The policy of the national forest management results in the limitation of Orang Rimba’s authority towards the national forest and eventually the elimination of access to the forest. In addition, the different pattern of management based on Democratic Governance| 89 Part One: Local Politics and Election the state, which is top down, is against Orang Rimba’s customs which is communal. The complex factors are the involvement of some state apparatus who cooperate with Orang Rimba to get access to the national forest resources. They collaborate with Orang Rimba and Orang Terang. Orang Rimba need their help, and reciprocally Orang Terang and the apparatus also need Orang Rimba to protect them. That resistance intensity can be described in the following figure: Figure 1.2. The Intensity of Orang Rimba’s Resistance Based on Political Aspects II The limitation of Orang Rimba’s access through zoning systems IV The cooperation of Orang Rimba with the villagers and the capital owners I The intervention of TNBD on Orang Rimba’s life and the loss power of Orang Rimba on TNBD III The involvement of some state apparatus and the different concept in forest management Third are the cultural aspects. Orang Rimba’s resistance began with Orang Rimba’s cultural assimilation with Orang Terang. In that opportunity, Orang Rimba get provocative suggestions from Orang Terang. The next process is Orang Terang’s influence to weaken the roles and functions of jenang-waris and ketemenggungan. The policy in the national forest management is potential to eliminate Orang Rimba’s claims on their communal land that have been maintained. The factor that triggers resistance is the law and customs that are no longer applied. Orang Rimba no longer understand their own customary laws. Also, they intentionally deny the laws they have made. The intensity of conflict and resistance from the cultural aspects is described as follows: Figure 1.3.The Intensity of Orang Rimba’s Resistance Based on the Cultural Aspects II The shift in the social structure of Orang Rimba and the loss of Orang Rimba’s communal land IV The downfall of Orang Rimba’s customary laws I Cultural assimilation of Orang Rimba and Orang Terang III The weakening functions of jenang waris and ketemenggungan 90 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... Based on the research, Orang Rimba’s resistance is caused by three factors which are very dominant, these factors are: 1) The cooperation between Orang Rimba and Orang Terang, and the involvement of some apparatus, 2) The ruining of Orang Rimba’s customary laws, and 3). The demand of Orang Rimba’s needs that make them take a risk by doing open and hidden resistance. CONCLUSION Orang Rimba’s continuing resistance in the form of land clearing, selling serpehan and land, doing demonstration, having an open debate with the TNBD officials, and collective violence, are done due to several factors. The resistance evolves in its form, so there is not only one form of continuing resistance. It continues to be done in different form, in the same or different times. Factors that trigger resistance are: 1. Their dissapointment to the national forest policy that does not involve Orang Rimba from the formulation until the establisment of the policy. They are only involved during the establisment of the zoning systemn and its socialization. 2. The downfall of their customs marked by the shift in Jenang waris’ roles. Jenang waris used to be a mediator in conflict settlements between Orang Rimba and the outsiders, but now it does not function optimally. On the other side, Orang Rimba who used to uphold the customary laws strongly, start to neglect them. 3. The cooperation between some apparatus and the villagers through pasang badan system, in which Orang Rimba protect Orang Terang, which is started from the pressure and influence of Orang Terang to Orang Rimba. In the competition of forest management, Orang Rimba who has a dynamic life competes with Orang Terang or with their fellows to have a continous access to the forest resources. 4. Orang Rimba whose life is consumptive have to live side by side with Ornag Terang although they are still unable to live in the same way as Orang Terang. Democratic Governance| 91 Part One: Local Politics and Election REFERENCES After, David E. 1977.Pengantar Analisa Politik,Trans: Tim Penerjemah Yasogama, Jakarta, Rajawali Pers. BTNBD.2010. Statistik Balai Taman Nasional Bukit Duabelas, Year 2010. Cote, Denis dan Cliché, Laura.2011.Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance to Oil Palm Plantations in Borneo. Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies. Dunn, William N, 2003. Pengantar Analisis Kebijakan Publik, Second Edition, the 5th publication, Yogyakarta, Gadjah Mada University Press. Gaus, Gerald F dan Chandran Kukathas. 2013. Handbook Teori Politik,Cet. II Terj: Derta Sri widowatie, Bandung: Nusa Media. Ghee, Lim Teck dan Alberto G Gomes. 1993.Suku Asli dan Pembangunan di Asia Tenggara, terj: YOI, Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia. Hiareic, Erick, et., al (ed). 2004.Politik Transisi Pasca Soeharto, Yogyakarta: Fisipol UGM. Holmes, George. 2007.Protection, Politics and Protest: Understanding Resistance to Conservation, Conservation and Society, Pages 184–201, Volume 5, No. 2,. Hornby, A.S. 1995. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Oxford University Press. Indiahono, Dwiyanto. 2009. Kebijakan Publik Berbasis Dynamic Policy Analysis, Yogyakarta, Gava Media. Lobja, Erick. 2003.Menyelematkan hutan dan Hak adat Masyarakat Kei,Yogyakarta: Debut Press. Marzali, Amri. 2012.Antropologi dan Kebijakan Publik, Jakarta: Kencana. Mirsel, Robert.Teori Pergerakan Sosial, Kilasan Sejarah dan Catatan Bibliografis, Yogyakarta: Resist Book, 2006 Nugroho, Riant. 2012. Public Policy, Jakarta: Elex Media Komputindo. Naim, Moctar. 2007.Masyarakat Adat terpencil di Asia, Makalah disampaikan pada ”Realisasi Perlindungan Masyarakat Hukum Adat”, Kerjasama Mahkamah Konstitusi RI, Depos RI, KOMNAS HAM, Setnas Masyarakat Hukum Adat, ILO, UNDP Jakarta, 1011 Desember di Gedung Mahkamah Konstitusi. 92 |Democratic Governance Muhammad Yusuf & Zuly Qodir. Resistance to Forest... Nurudin (ed) et., al. 2006. Kebijakan Elitis Politik Indonesia, Yogyakarta: Pustaka pelajar and Fisip UMM. Novri dan Sukaremi.2012. Orang Rimba tak Luput dari Konflik Lahan, Alam Sumatera, edition Pruitt, Dean G dan Rubin. 2004.Teori Konflik Sosial, cet ke-I, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar. Ross, Cynthia. 2006.Before The Blaze, The Sforest: The Nature Of Armed Resistance And Its Motivations In World War II. Thesis, Washington State University. Scott, James C. 1985.Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Scott, James C. 1993.Perlawanan Kaum Tani, terj: Budi Kusworo et., al, Jakarta: Yayasan obor Indonesia. Sing, Rajendra. 2010.Gerakan Sosial Baru, terj: Eko P. Darmawan, Resist Book: Yogyakarta. Veeger, K.J. 1990. Realitas Sosial, Reflekasi Filsafat sosial atas hubungan individu-masyarakat dalam cakrawala sejarah sosiologi,cet ke-iii, Jakarta: PT Gramedia. Wiratmoko, Nick T, et., al, (Penyunting). 2004.Yang Pusat dan Yang Lokal, Antara Dominasi, Resistensi dan Akomodasi Politik di Tingkat Lokal, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar dan Pustaka Percik. Winarmo, Budi. 2012.Kebijakan Publik (Teori, Proses, dan Studi Kasus), Newest Edition, Yogyakarta, CAPS. Democratic Governance| 93 94 Part Two Public Service Reform 95 96 ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY SATISFACTION INDEX ON INTEGRATED LICENSING SERVICE AGENCY OF TEGAL REGENCY OF CENTRAL JAVA PROVINCE, INDONESIA Suranto*, Rendra Setyadiharja**, Arif Zainudin & Sri Sutjiatmi*** *Lecturer, Graduate Program of Governmental Affairs and Administration Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta Email: suranto_umy@yahoo.com **STISIPOL Raja Haji Tanjungpinang Kepulauan Riau Province E-mail: rendra_tanjungpinang@yahoo.co.id ***Lecturers, Govermental Studies Pancasakti University Tegal E-mail: arif_zainudin88@yahoo.com Abstract This study aims to explore the Community Satisfaction Index on Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) of Tegal in 2014, and wants to know people’s expectations about the services provided by the Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) of Tegal in analyzing community service index (CSI) on Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) of Tegal, researchers used research indicators listed in Permenpan No. 16 Year 2014 on Guidelines for the Implementation of Societies Satisfaction Survey of Public Service. Based on the results of questionnaires and interviews with respondents of 100 BP2T Tegal service users, it was obtained that CSI valued 80.08 percent that was converted into service quality classified as “good” or “B”. The result increased from the previous year by 2 percent. Then to determine the gap between expectation and service reality, researchers used Cartesian diagram analysis or Importance Performance Analysis with the result that the elements belonging to the quadrant A which were Top Priority to optimize included service procedures, and service time, and which belong to the elements of the quadrant B which had to be maintained included service requirements, cost/tariffs, product specifications, executor’s competency, executor’s behavior, service edict, complaint or suggestion handling, and service input.B 97 Part Two: Public Service Reform ased on the results of research that had been conducted, the researchers provide recommendations for serviceimprovement in the procedures and service time which can get special attention for the process reform in the service business in BP2T Tegal. Keywords: Community service, Community Satisfaction Index, BP2T Tegal INTRODUCTION The United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1997) defines the concept of governance as “the use of the authority of economics, politics and administration to manage state affairs at all levels”. Governance includes all the mechanisms, processes and institutions where citizens and community groups express interests or all of their needs by using the legal right. In addition, the word good governance means good government in the process of management in the provision of community rights. The right of people, one of which is set out in the constitutional, is getting optimal care from the government. Indonesian government, in optimizing public services, imposes a regional autonomy system which is local independence-oriented, efficient and effective, as the mandate of Act 23 of 2014 on Regional Government. In the era of regional autonomy, public service function becomes one of attention foci in improving the performance of local government. The spirit of decentralization requires the best services to the public, more oriented to all needs of the community, so that automatically various public service facilities can be brought closer so that it is accessible to the public. With the Act No. 32 of 2014 concerning local government, the field which needs to be empowered is public service. That service is the basic one that must be provided by the government to the public. Local government as the service provider and the service arranger has big authority to fulfill the basic needs of the public service. In accordance with the mandate of Act No. 25 of 2009 on public services, local government is required to provide basic services to the community. The Act No. 25 of 2009 on public service divides the scope of the services as public goods services, public services, and administrative services. 98 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Rendra S., Arif Z. & Sri S. Analysis of Community... As the effort to create good local governance, Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) of Tegal commits to improve the quality of public services. Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) is a mandate from the Regulation of the Minister of the Internal Affairs No. 24 of 2006 on Guidelines of One Stop Integrated Licensing Service Implementation. With such regulation, the local government is required to make a government agency that specifically deals with public administrative services such as licensing and non-licensing services. In the evaluation of the quality of public services in BP2T Tegal, the researchers refer to the Decision of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform Minister No. 16 2014 Guideline of Community Satisfaction Index. Satisfaction Index is an assessment of the community on the services rendered. Evaluation of public services executed by BP2T Tegalis conducted in every year, considering the acquisition of CSI in 2013 which amounted to 79. The results of the CSI in 2013 or the previous year arethe references to the increases quality of public services. On a scale of one measurement period,will CSI in 2014 increase? In order to find it out, it is necessary to do an analysis of the Community Satisfaction Index of Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) of Tegal. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK Public Service In its nature, public service is a major task in the administration of the State carried out by the State apparatus. Development emerging in a number of countries in the field of public service indicates a shift more towards the implementation of the principle of market orientation in the provision of services (Osborn and Gaebler, 1999). In this case, it means that the services provided by the government should give priority to society. The Act No. 25 of 2009, about the service, defines the public service as an activity or series of activities in order to meet the needs of the service in accordance with the laws and regulations for every citizen and resident in the goods, services, and / or administrative services provided by the public service provider who is the government. Democratic Governance| 99 Part Two: Public Service Reform In other words, the services are the main tasks and functions of local government. This relates to three (3) government functions namely, (AtikSepti&Ratminto, 2012): (1) Servicing function The presence of the government in its function of servicing to meet the needs of the community is not discriminatory and not burdensome. Government provides services and treats all people with equal rights: the right to be served, the right to be respected and recognized. (2) Regulating Function A policy should be made more dynamically that governs public life and minimizes state intervention in their lives. So, the government function is to regulate and provide protection to the public in living their life as citizens. Government services can be classified into the administration and construction services (Hoesein, 1995). But, based on the function of the government in public service, there are 3 service functions. The first is the Environmental Service. This includes the provision of facilities and infrastructure such as the ones in the fields of education, health, religion, spatial planning, etc. The second service function isthe Developmental Service. This service has the characteristics of enabling and facilitating. This can also bein the forms of infrastructure that can support the increase of economic growth, including those like administrative services concerning legalizing possession or presence of an individual in the community in the forms of license services, ID cards, birth certificates, etc. The third service is Protective Service. This kind of service is the provision of security and protection service conducted by the civil service police, the military, the police, etc. Nurcholis Hanif (2007) divides the functions of public service into the ones in relation to Education, Health, Religious, Environment, Recreation, Social, Residence, Cemetery, Civil Registration, Drinking Water, and Legality of the document. Measurement of Community Satisfaction Index The quality of service has become one of the important issues in the provision of public services in Indonesia. Therefore, all providers’ of public services periodically improve the service quality. The first step to improve public services is conducting an evaluation of the public service, so that 100 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Rendra S., Arif Z. & Sri S. Analysis of Community... the elements to be optimized can be found out. This evaluation can be also done to see the response of public satisfaction on the service. MENPAN Regulation No. 16 of 2014 on Guidelines for Measuring Public Satisfaction Index is used to measure the level of public satisfaction on public services. There are nine relevant, valid and reliable elements that must be evaluated in the public service. The elements are as follows. 1. Requirements. These are terms which must be fulfilled in the execution of a type of service, both technical and administrative ones. 2. Procedure. It is a standardized procedure of services for providers and customers of services, including service of complaints. 3. Service Time. It is the length of time needed to complete the whole process of service of each type of service. 4. Cost/Rates. It is the cost charged to the customers of services. The cost is determined through an agreement between the executors and the public 5. Product Specifications Service Type. It is the service provided and accepted in accordance with the conditions set. This service product is the result of any type of service specifications. 6. Executor’s Competence. This is the ability to be possessed by the executors, including knowledge, expertise, skills and experience. 7. Executor’s Behavior. It is the official’s behavior in providing public services. 8. Service Notice. This is a statement of capability and obligation of the executors to carry out the service based on the service standard. 9. Handling of Complaints, Suggestions and Feedbacks. This is a procedure for handling and following-up of the various opinions that are conveyed by society. RESEARCH METHODS The analysis of the research of community satisfaction index and analysis of people’s expectations about public services usedthe approach of mix methodology by combining the methods of quantitative and qualitative data analysis. (Creswell, 2012: 99) The IKM was analysed by the guidelines on PERMENPAN No. 16 of 2014 on guidelines for measuring IKM by setting 9 elements used as a parameter to assess the level of community satisfaction towards public services. Then to see all slack between the expectations and values of community satisfaction index, the researcher uses the Cartesian diagram. Democratic Governance| 101 Part Two: Public Service Reform RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) Tegal is a body established to deal with matters of administration services. What is meant by public service is the service of licensing and non-licensing. Type of licensing services handled by BP2T is totaling 49 types of licensing and 6 types of non-licensing. Service activities from year 2009 - 2014 BP2T Tegal has realized a number of 4300 documents as shown in Figure 2.6. Figure 2.6.A Number of Licensing and Non-Licesing Documents Source : Reseacher data analysis 2015. The Respondent Characteristics The sample communities to assess the IKM BP2T Tegal are users or consumers of BP2T Tegal by the number of 100 respondents. Based on the respondent’s age, group is dominated by > 41 years reaching 58 percent, then the age group of 31-40 years is 23 percent, age group 21-30 years is 18 percent, and the remaining 1 percent is the age group of 17-20 years. The graph of age characteristics is presented below. Figure. 2.7. Age-based Respondent Chararteristic Source : Reseacher data analysis 2015 102 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Rendra S., Arif Z. & Sri S. Analysis of Community... People who enjoy services of BP2T Tegal are dominated by the private employees by the amount of 41 percent, entrepreneur/ businessman by 38 percent, Civil Servant/force/police by 11 percent and the remaining 10 percent of others. The graph of work-based respondent characteristic can be seen in the following chart. Figure. 2.8. Work-based Respondent Characteristic Source: Researcher data analysis 2015. Respondents in the IKM analysis of BP2T Tegal are mostly educated persons of senior high school/equal by 42 percent, S1 (undergraduate) by 36 percent, Junior high school/equal by 13 percent, elementary school (SD) by 5 percent, and diploma by 2.7 percentas seen in the chart below. Figure. 2.9. Education-based Respondent characteristic Source: Researcher data analysis, 2015. Democratic Governance| 103 Part Two: Public Service Reform The study says that the respondents in the IKM analysis of BP2T Tegal majority of respondents using the services is dominated by male by 77 percent and female by 23 percent as can be seen in the following chart. Figure. 2.10. Gender-based Respondent Characteristic Source: Researcher data analysis, 2015. IKM Analysis of BP2T Tegal Analysis of Community Satisfaction Index (IKM) in the Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) Tegal is based on the PERMENPAN RB No. 16 of 2014 on Community Satisfaction Index measurement guidelines with utilizing 9 elements as a parameter for assessing the level of IKM. The elements are requirements, procedures, service time, cost/rates, product specification type of service, executor’s competence, executor’s behavior, service notice, handling of complaints, suggestions and feedback. The calculation result of the level of community satisfaction on services of Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) Tegal 2014 becomes a base evaluation of the process of service to the public. In the calculation of the IKM of BP2T Tegal, the given equal weight to IKM of BP2T Tegal overall index is the average achieved by each service element. Recapitulation IKM value and quality service in each service element can be seen in the following table. Table 2.13.IKM per Element of BP2T Kota Tegal IKM Per Element Conversion score of IKM Requirements 3,22 80,5 B Procedures 3,08 77 B Time Service 3,29 82,37 A Cost/Rate 3,26 81,73 A product specification type of service 3,15 78,78 B Executor’s Competence 3,40 85 A Element 104 |Democratic Governance Quality Service Suranto, Rendra S., Arif Z. & Sri S. Analysis of Community... IKM Per Element Conversion score of IKM Executor’s Behaviour 3,31 82,77 A Service Notice 3,12 78,28 B handling of complaints, suggestions and feedback 2,97 74,34 B Total of NRR Measured 3,20 80,08 B Element IKM service Element Quality Service B Source: Researcher data analysis, 2015. The table above shows that the average community satisfaction index (IKM) of Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) Tegal 2014 is 80.08 then converted to the value of quality service category B (good performance) overall. Related to the results of the IKM of BP2T Tegal of people’s expectations, it is necessary to do a comparative analysis between expectations and reality through the Importance Performance Analysis. The analysis is performed to determine the priority order of service elements that the performance of its services needs to be improved. The efforts are done to increase community satisfaction of public services. The results of the analysis of the expectation and reality in BP2T Tegal 2014 are presented in the following table. Table 2.14.Result of the Expectation and Reality Analysis in BP2T Tegal Quadrant A : Main Priority Service Procedure Service Time Quadrant C : Sub Priority Quadrant B : Achievement Maintenance Requirement Cost/Rate product specification type of service, executor’s competence, executor’s behavior, service notice, handling of complaints, suggestions and feedback Quadrant D : Element of inimportant service Source:Researcher data analysis 2015. The table above shows that there are complaints of people who want to have some changes in some elements of service in BP2T Tegal. These elements are as Procedures and Time element which are a condition Democratic Governance| 105 Part Two: Public Service Reform that people expect to be the focus of improvement in servicing public. It arises because the response from the public responding to the given service processes. The following is the factor causing the emergence of the procedure and service time elements. Table 2.15.Factors Causing Elements Improvement Servie Procedures • • Optimalization of queue machine License service depended on the authority of institution/other offices. Service Time • The time needed in average is more about 5 working days. Source: Researcher data analysis, 2015. The dynamics of IKM BP2T Tegal To be able to see the dynamics of change in the quality service in the Integrated Licensing Service Agency (BP2T) Tegal years 2011 to 2014, then the comparative analysis is carried out of the year as shown in the graph below. Figure. 2.17.The Dynamics of IKM BP2T Tegal 2011 – 2014 Source: Researcher data analysis, 2015. The chart above shows that there is a development of the IKM value in BP2T Tegal in 2014.The average value of the development is 1.2 percent each year. It can be concluded that in general, the services in BP2T Tegalis scored Good in the performance of public services. CONCLUSION The Community Satisfaction Index (IKM) in the Integrated Licensing Service Agency Tegal 2014 as a whole amounted to 80.08 which increased 1.2 percentas compared with the IKM value in 106 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Rendra S., Arif Z. & Sri S. Analysis of Community... the previous year. Therefore, the value of IKM in 2014 after being convertedto the quality service score is classified in category B, which means an average performance in BP2T Tegal is rated “Good”. Of the nine (9) elements tested the service in BP2T Tegal which got the quality service in the category A (excellent performance) are the time of service, executor’s competence, executor’sbehavior, and cost/ rate, while others like pre-service requirements, procedures, product specifications types service, service notice, and handling complaints, suggestions and inputs are classified in category B (good performance). Based on the Importance Performance Analysis, there are several elements thatare considered as top priorities in improving services in BP2T Tegal. The elements are service procedures and service time. Then the elements that are rated as “good” performance of the services are the following requirements; cost/rate, product specification types, executor’s competency, executor’s behavior, service notice, and handling complaints, suggestions and feedback REFERENCES Anonim, “Laporan Indeks Kepuasan Masyarakat Kota Depok. Bappeda Kota Depok”. 2008. Haksever, “Study Guide for Service Management and Operations”, Academi Internet Publishers, 2006. Hanif, Nurcholis, Teori dan Praktek Pemerintah dan Otonomi Daerah, Jakarta, Grasindo, 2007. Huges, E. “Owen, Public Management and Administration: An Introduction.The Mac Millan Press Ltd, Great Britain“, 1994. Hossein, Benyamin, “Otonomi Daerah: Menuju Kepemerintahan yang Baik Guna Pemberdayaan Sosial-Ekonomi Masyarakat.Seminar Umum Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, 1995. Moenir, H.A.S, “Manajemen Pelayanan Umum di Indonesia. Bandung, Bumi Aksara, 1998. Pamoedji, S, “Tata Kerja Organisasi”. Bandung, Bumi Aksara, 1996. Sinambela, “Reformasi Pelayanan Publik: Teori, Kebijakan dan Implementasi”. Bandung, Bumi Aksara, 2008. Septi Atik W, Ratminto, “Manajemen Pelayanan. Yogyakarta”, Pustaka Pelajar, 2012. Democratic Governance| 107 Part Two: Public Service Reform BP2T, “Renstra BP2T Kota Tegal”, 2014. Undang-Undang No. 23 tahun 2014 tentang Pemerintah Daerah Undang-Undang No. 25 tahun 2009 tentang Pelayanan Publik. Permendagri No. 24 tahun 2006 tentang Penyelenggaraan Pelayanan Perizinan Terpadu. Keputusan Menpan No. 16 tahun 2014 tentang Pedoman Umum Penyusunan Indeks Kepuasan Masyarakat. Perda No. 12 tahun 2008 tentang Organisasi dan Tata kerja Inspektorat, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Lembaga Teknis Daerah dan Badan Pelayanan Perizinan Terpadu Kota Tegal. Perwal No. 2 tahun 2009 tentang Pola dan Mekanisme Pelayanan Perizinan dan Non Perizinan Pada Badan Pelayanan Perizinan Terpadu Kota Tegal. 108 |Democratic Governance THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MINIMUM SERVICE STANDARDS IN THE FIELD OF HEALTH IN BAUBAU CITY REGIONAL HOSPITAL (RSUD): A CASE STUDY OF SPM REFERRAL SERVICES IN BAUBAU CITY REGIONAL HOSPITAL Suranto*, Dyah Mutiarin*, and Rahmat Dedi Saputra** *Lecturer, Graduate Program of Governmental Affairs and Administration Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta E-mail: suranto_umy@yahoo.com dyahmutiarin@umy.ac.id **Master of Government Affairs and Administration Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta Abstract The hospital has a strategic role in the effort to accelerate the improvement of public health level. The new paradigm of health care requires hospitals to provide quality services according to the needs and wishes of the patient with reference to the code of ethics of profession and medical.The performance of health care organizations typically usesa minimum standard criterion of service in accordance with the Decree of the Minister of Health No. 741/ Menkes/Per/VII/2008.The decree outline includes; a) basic health services, b) health care referrals, c) epidemiological investigation and prevention of outbreaks and d) health promotion and community empowerment.The purpose of this study is to investigate the implementation of the minimum service standards in the areas of health reference in Baubau City Regional Hospital and to determine the factors that affect the minimum service standards in the field of health reference in Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD). The method used in this research is descriptive qualitative. The data collection techniques in this research are interview and documentation. Meanwhile, the technique used to analyze the data in this research is descriptive analysis techniques. This analysis includes checking the data, the data grouping, data checking, data analysis and conclusion making. The results of this study showed that the implementation of the Minimum Service Standards in the field of health reference 109 Part Two: Public Service Reform in Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD) is already good. A minor lack of SPM implementation in the field of health reference Baubau City Hospital is in the amount of human resources required. The factors that affect the implementation of minimum service standard in the field of health reference in Baubau City Regional Hospital are; Communication, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. As for the factors of human resource, there is still a shortage of resources because there is only 80 percent sufficiency of human resources in Baubau City Regional Hospital. Keywords: Minimum service standards of health and referral services INTRODUCTION Nowadays health problems have become the basic need of the society. With their increasing standard of living, the public demand of quality healthcare also increases. This requires health care providers such as hospitals to improve the quality of service better, not only the services of curing diseases but also covers preventive services to improve the quality of life and provide satisfaction to consumers as users of health services. The hospital has a strategic role in the effort to accelerate the improvement of public health level. The new paradigm of health care requires hospitals to provide quality services according to the needs and wishes of the patient with reference to the code of ethics of profession and medical. In the rapid technological developments and the increasing competition, the hospital is required to make improvements to the quality of its service. Quality is at the core survival of an institution. Revolution of quality movement through integrated quality management approach becomes the demand that should not be ignored if an institution wants to live and develop. The recent increasing competition demanded an institution of service providers to always pamper the customers/consumers by providing the best services. The consumers will be looking for a product in the form of goods or services from companies that can provide the best service to them (Assauri, 2003: 25). To provide the best quality of service is not an easy task for the manager of the hospital because the services provided by the hospital 110 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... is in regards to the patients’ quality of life so that when an error occurs in the medical action, it can be a danger for the patient. The impact can aggravate patients’ pain, disability and even death (Jacobalis, S. 1995: 68). Hospital, as part of the national health system is required to improve the quality of the provision of facilities, services and independence. Thus the hospital as one of the agents of a competitive health care should be managed by actors who have an entrepreneurial spirit which is capable of effiecient and excellent quality and service, excellent innovation and excellent responsiveness to the needs of the patient (Jacobalis, S. 1995: 77). The performance of health care organizations typically uses a minimum standard criterion of service in accordance with the Decree of the Minister of Health No. 741/Menkes/Per/VII/2008. The decree outline includes; a) basic health services, b) health care referrals, c) epidemiological investigation and prevention of outbreaks and d) health promotion and community empowerment. The referral health service indicators include communication, resources, disposition and structure of bureaucracy. During the period of 2003-2008, the City Government of Baubau has built a variety of health care facilities including: 6 healthcare centers, 10 non-treatment health centers, 17 sub-health centers, which are supported by motivating 138 Integrated Health Centers, 15 mobile health units as well as 187 medical and paramedics personnel in The Regional Hospital (RSUD) of Baubau City with curative and rehabilitative orientation. Meanwhile for the development of public health activities, it is supported by 19 medics and 232 paramedic’s personnel at the health center and its networks. With the limitations of existing health workers in health centers or hospitals, the health care needs should be referred to a hospital which has enough health facilities. Based on the information above, researchers are interested in conducting research with the title “The Implementation of Minimum Service Standards in the Field of Health in Baubau City Regional Hospital (A Case Study of SPM Referral Service in Baubau City Regional Hospital). This research is aimed for the study results to eventually be used as the groundwork for Baubau City in running one of its functions which is to provide services for the health of the society. Democratic Governance| 111 Part Two: Public Service Reform THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Public Policy The scope of the study of public policy is very broad because it covers various fields and sectors such as economic, political, social, cultural, legal, and so on. In addition, if seen from the hierarchy, the public policy can be national, regional or local in forms of laws, government regulations, presidential decree, ministerial decree, local government/province regulations, the governor’s decision, the district’s/city’s regulation, and the regent’s/mayor’s decision. Pressman and Widavsky as quoted by Budi Winarno (2002: 17) define public policy as hypothesis that contain initial conditions and predicted consequences. Public policy should be distinguished from other forms of policy such as private policy. It is influenced by the involvement of non-governmental factors. Robert Eyestone as quoted by Leo Agustino (2008: 6) defines public policy as “the relation between government units with its surroundings”. Many people assume that the definition is too broad to be understood, because what is meant by public policy can include many things. According to Nugroho, there are two characteristics of public policy, namely: 1) public policy is something that is easy to understand, because the meaning is “things which are done in order to achieve national objectives”; 2) public policy is something that is easily measured, because the size is clear that the extent to which progress towards the ideals has been taken. According to Woll as quoted by Tangkilisan (2003: 2), public policy is a number of government activities to solve problems in the community, both directly and through various institutions that affect people’s lives. There are some experts who define public policy as actions taken by the government in response to a public crisis or issue. As well as Chandler and Plano as quoted by Tangkilisan (2003: 1), who state that public policy is a strategic utilization of the available resources to solve the problems of the public or the government. Furthermore, it is said that public policy is a form of intervention which is done continuously by the government in the interests of the disadvantaged groups in society so that they can live, and participate in the development broadly. 112 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... The Definition of Policy Implementation Implementation is one step in the process of public policy. Implementation is usually conducted after a policy has been formulated with clear objectives. Implementation is a series of activities in order to deliver the policy to the public so that the policy can bring results, as expected (Afan Gaffar, 2009: 295). The series of activities include the preparation of advanced set of rules which is the interpretation of the policy. For example, a statute appears with a number of Government Regulations, Presidential Decrees, and Regional Regulation, for the preparation of resources to move implementation including facilities and infrastructure, financial resources, and of course everyone who is responsible for implementing the policy, and how to deliver policy concretely to the public. The definition of implementation as proposed by Solichin Abdul Wahab is as follows: “Implementations are actions carried out by individuals or officials of government groups or private that are directed at achieving the goals which has been outlined in the policy decisions” (Wahab, 2001: 65). Donald S. Van Meter and Carl E. Vanhorn stated “Policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth prior to the policy decision. This includes both onetime efforts to transform decisions into operational terms, as well as continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes mandates by policy decisions (Meter and Vanhorn, 1975: 447). Factors Affecting Policy Implementation Based on the theory of George C. Edwards III (A.G. Subarsono, 2008: 90-92), the implementation of the policy is influenced by four variables: 1. Communication. Effective communication processes is needed within the framework of the implementation of the policy. Leaders must communicate the policies to be implemented to the field that are responsible in order to understand the intention and purpose of the policy. Communication is something which connects the organization and coordination is the origin of teamwork as well as the formation of synergies and integration. Communication between components of the EDS implementer should be done intensively so that the performance can be optimized. Democratic Governance| 113 Part Two: Public Service Reform 2. Resources. No matter how well the communication process of implementing the policy to the policy implementer and how well the command and authority has been given but if the resources available do not support, then it can hinder the implementation of the policy. The importance of resource issues in the implementation of EDS include: the number of teachers involved, the necessary teacher skills, information from principals and supervisors and various other adjustments. 3. Disposition. Disposition or attitude in question is the attitude of the policy implementer; in this case the EDS program implementers. It is associated with the presence of a strong stance for implementer that has the capacity to implement the program. Component program implementers need to be wholeheartedly committed in carrying out its functions so that it will produce a balanced view that the program is to be implemented for self- and school development towards the better. 4. Bureaucratic Structures. In the implementation of the policy, it involves many people, fields and environments that may affect the smoothness and success of the policy. Problems of coordination between bureaucratic structures may be from the inhibitor of the implementation of the policy. It requires a permanent procedure or standard operating procedure (SOP) for the smoothness of the policy. According to Merilee S. Grindle (Subarsono, 2005: 93) there are two major variables that affect the implementation of the policy, namely the content of policy and the context of implementation. Each of these variables is broken down into several items. It is mentioned by Subarsono (2005: 93). The content of policy variable include (1) the extent to which the interest of the target groups is included in the content of the policy; (2) the type of benefits received by the target group; (3) the extent of the desired change from a policy; (4) whether the location of a program is appropriate; (5) whether a policy has mentioned the implementer in detail; (6) whether a program supported by adequate resources. While the context of policy variable includes: (1) how much power, interests, and strategies that are owned by the actors are involved in the policy implementation; (2) the characteristics of the institution and the regime in power; (3) the level of compliance and responsiveness of the target group. 114 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... This Grindle model is described by Suwitri (2008: 86-89). Content variable is further detailed again into six elements, namely: 1. Parties whose interests are affected (interest affected). Theodore Lowi (in Grindle, 1980) describes that the type of public policy created will bring a certain impact on the kinds of political activity. Thus, if the public policy is intended to lead to changes in social relations, politics, economics, and so on, it will be able to stimulate the emergence of resistance from those whose interest are threatened by the public policy. 2. Types of benefits that can be obtained (type of benefits). Programs that provide benefits collectively or to many people are easier to gain support and a high level of compliance of the target groups or the public at large. 3. The range of changes that can be expected (extent of change envisioned). Programs that are long-term and demanding change people’s behavior and not directly or as soon as possible can benefit the public (target groups) are more likely to experience difficulties in implementation. 4. The position of decision makers (site of decision making). The more spread out the position of decision-makers in public policy implementation, both geographically and organizationally, the more difficult it is in implementing the program. It is because more and more units of decision makers are involved in it. 5. Program implementers. The ability of the program implementer will affect the successful implementation of the program. Bureaucracy which has an active staff, qualified, skilled and dedicated to the performance of duties strongly supports the successful implementation of the program. 6. Sources that can be provided (resources committed). The availability of adequate resources will support the successful implementation of the program or public policy. Efforts to Overcome Policy Barriers Legislation is a means for the implementation of public policy. A policy will be effective when in the making and implementation supported by adequate means. The elements that must be met in order for a policy to be implemented well are as follows: Democratic Governance| 115 Part Two: Public Service Reform 1. The laws or the policy itself, where there is the possibility of a mismatch between policies with unwritten law or custom prevailing in society. 2. The mentality of officers who implement the law or policy. The legal officer (formally) which includes judges, prosecutors, police, and so must have good mentality in implementing (applying) a legislation or policy. For if there were otherwise, there will be disturbances or obstacles in implementing the policy/legislation. 3. The facility, which is expected to support the implementation of a rule of law. If the legislation is aimed to be done well, it should also be supported by adequate facilities so as not to cause disturbances or obstacles in its implementation. 4. The citizens as objects, in this case, require the public legal awareness, legal compliance, and behavior as required by legislation (Bambang Sunggono, 1994: 158). Public Service Services are often viewed as a complex phenomenon. The term service itself has many meanings, ranging from personal service to service as a product. Various concepts regarding the services are proposed by the experts as Haksever et al. (2000) state that the service is defined as an economic activity that generates time, place, form and psychological usability. According to Edvardsson et al. (2005), the service is also an activity, processes and interactions as well as a change in the condition of a person or thing in the possession of the customer. Sinambela (2010: 3) states that basically every human being in need of service, even in the extreme it can be said that the service cannot be separated from human life. According to Kotlern in Sampara Lukman, the service is any activity that is beneficial in a collection or entity, and offers a satisfaction even though the results are not tied to a physical product. Furthermore Sampara arguesthat service is an activity that occurs within interpersonal direct interaction with others or physical machines, and provide customer satisfaction. Meanwhile, the term publik is derived from the English ‘public’, which means the general, community, and state. The word ‘public’ has actually been accepted into Bahasa Indonesia Baku and became ‘publik’, which means common, crowd, crowded. Inu et al. define ‘public’ as 116 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... a number of man who has a unity of thinking, feeling, expectations, attitudes or actions which are right and good based on values and norms are being owned. Therefore, the public service is defined as any activity undertaken by the government towards a number of human beings which has every profitable activity within a group or unity, and offer satisfaction even though the results are not tied to a physical product. Further it is said that public service can be defined as service providers to (to serve) the purpose of the person or people who have an interest in the organization in accordance with the basic rules and procedures that have been established. Health Services Of the various forms of service, health service is one form of services which, according to Levey and Loomba (1973) in Anwar (1999), is any organized effort, alone or jointly, within an organization to maintain and promote health, prevent illness and cure disease as well as the recovery of health of individuals, families, groups, and communities. According to Brotosaputro (1998), health services are all activities that directly seek to produce health services needed or demanded by society to deal with their health. Another source states that the definition of health services is something whose main purpose is preventive and is for the promotion of services (improvement of health) to the target of community. Health services also perform curative services (treatment) and convalescence (Notoatmodjo, 2003). The purpose of health service is to improve the health and ability of society as a whole in maintaining their health in order to achieve optimal health status independently so that health services should be available, accessible, acceptable by everyone; health policy-making should involve the recipient of health service, the environment which influence the health of the population, groups, families and individuals. Disease prevention is needed to improve health. Health is the responsibility of the individual and the client is a permanent member of the health team (Anwar, 1999). According to WHO (1984) in Juanita (2001) it is mentioned that behavioral factors that influence the use of health care services are: 1. Thoughts and Feelings. It is in the form of personal knowledge, perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and assessments toward an object, in this case the object of health. Democratic Governance| 117 Part Two: Public Service Reform 2. Important people as reference (Personal Reference) A person is more influenced by someone who is considered an important or major influence on the encouragement of the use of health services. 3. Resources. It includes facilities, money, time, energy, and so on. Sources also affect the behavior of a person or group of people in the use of health services. The influence can be positive and negative. 4. Culture. It is in the form of norms that exist in society in relation to the concept of healthy and sick. Anwar (1999) describes a variety of health service which should have the basic requirements, namely: the essential requirements that give effect to the public in determining the choice of the use of health care services in this case Integrated Health Care (Puskesmas), namely: 1. The Availability and Sustainability of Services. Good service is the health services that are available in the community and are sustainable. This means that all kinds of health services that are needed by the community can be found as well as its presence in the community and are available at every time of need. 2. Appropriateness and Public Acceptance. Good health service is to be made appropriate and acceptable by the public. This means that health services coping with the health problems dealt with, is not contrary to the public customs, culture, and beliefs. If it is not inappropriate, it is not a good health service. 3. Easily Reached by Community. The definition of reached here primarily from the location which is easily accessible by the public, so that the distribution of health facilities becomes very important. The range of facilities supports the determining of the effective demand. When the facility is easy to reach by using the means of transportation available, the facility will be widely used. User level in the past and the trend is the best indicator for long and short term changes of demand in the future. 4. Affordable. Good health service is a service that is affordable by the public, which means that the cost of the service should be in accordance with the economic ability. Expensive health care may only be enjoyed by some people. 5. Quality. Quality indicates the level of perfection of health services are organized and showed cure diseases as well as security measures that can satisfy the users of services in accordance with established standards 118 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... RESEARCH METHODS In this study, the writers used a qualitative descriptive study. According to Sukmadinata, descriptive study is aimed to describe the events in the present moment as it is. This research was conducted in Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD). Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD) was chosen because of the limitations of existing health workers in health centers or hospitals, so that the health care needs should be referred to a hospital that has enough health facilities. Meanwhile, the increasing needs of people in Baubau to quality health service continue to rise. With such circumstances, it is necessary for referral service to hospitals that have sufficient facilities. In this case, Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD), according to the researchers, has adequate health facilities. The type of data used is primary data and secondary data. Primary data used in this study is the result of interviews conducted with hospital’s president director, chairman and patient in the Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD). While the secondary data in this study are: General description of Baubau City area, the profile of Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD), and the Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD)’s annual report. The unit of analysis in this study can be seen in Table 4 below: Table 2.18.Data Analysis Unit Unit Analysis From the side of Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD) Hospital’s referral patient Informants Research Subtotal 1. Hospital’s director 1 2. Hospital’s Public Relations 1 3. Staff 4 Patient 5 Total 11 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The Implementation of Minimum Service Standards in the Field of Health Reference in Baubau City Regional Hospital (RSUD) The results obtained in the field, the implementation of the minimum service standards in the field of health reference in Baubau City Regional Hospital are as follows. Democratic Governance| 119 Part Two: Public Service Reform Table 2.19.The Achievement of SPM in Baubau Regional Hospital Achievement 2011 % 2012 % 2013 % Achieved 77 indicators 85.56% 78 indicators 86.67% 81 indicators 90.00% Not achieved 13 indicators 14.44% 12 indicators 13.33% 9 indicators 10.00% Total 90 indicators 100% 90 indicators 100% 90 indicators 100% Source: Baubau Regional Hospital, data processed in 2014. Based on the above table, it can be seen that the implementation of SPM in Baubau City Regional Hospital is quite good. This is because in 2011 the indicator of SPM measurement which is not achieved is only 13 items from 90 items of SPM indicators, meaning that it is only 14.44 percent. In the following year of 2012, there is an increase in the achievement which is only 12 indicators or 13.33 percent. Then in 2013, it can be seen that it is only 9 indicators or 10percent which is not achieved. Based on these results it can be seen that the Baubau City Regional Hospital had made improvements to improve the quality of health care in the community or the patient. The implementation of the minimum service standards in health based policy is as follows. The Results of Data Analysis in Dimension of Content of Policy 1. Parties whose interests are affected (interest affected) Minimum service standards policy in the field of health affect some other interests including the public welfare, the protection of the right for health, and the ease of access to health and health services. Here are the delivered parties which have interest in the SPM in the field of health. Table 2.20.Parties which Have Interest with the SPM No. Party of Interest Type of Interest 1. Regional Hospital Meet the demands of SPM implementation. 2. Patient Get standardized (good) service. 3. Community in general Get a guarantee of good health. 2. Types of benefits that can be obtained (the type of benefits) The type of benefits of minimum service standard policy in the field of health covers providing health care standards. 120 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... Related to the rights of patients, in Act No. 36 of 2009, some include: a. The rights to accept or reject some or all of the treatment (except of being unconscious, severe infectious diseases, severe mental disorders). b. The rights to personal secret (except on the orders of the Act, the court, the relevant permit, the relevant interests, public interests). c. The rights in demanding compensation due to error or negligence (except for life-saving action or disability prevention). Meanwhile some patients’ obligations are set in Act No. 29 of 2004 regarding Medical Practice, especially Article 53 of the Act, which include: a. Provide complete and truthful information about their health issues. b. Adhere to the advice and instructions of doctors and dentists. c. Comply with regulatory requirements in health facilities and infrastructure. d. Giving fee for the services received. With the minimum service standards, it will bring various benefits to parties related to the SPM. Among these benefits are; good service, there is a certainty on the rights and obligations of patients, which in turn allows people to obtain needed services. In addition, for the hospitals, with the implementation of SPM, the hospitals can certainly comply with the rules issued by the government on Minimum Service Standards. Resources that can be provided are defined as the adequacy of human resources and financial resources and facilities and infrastructure. The following is the HR data of Baubau City Regional Hospital. Table 2.21. Total Employees in Baubau Regional Hospital No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total Type of Employee Doctor Nurses Pharmaceutical Workers Community Health Workers Nutrition & Physical Therapist Workers Medical Technician Workers Sub total 23 139 9 15 14 22 222 Source: Data processed from the 2013 year-end report of Baubau City Regional Hospital. Democratic Governance| 121 Part Two: Public Service Reform Based on the table above, it is known that the number of employee in Baubau City Regional Hospital is still lacking, especially doctors. This is because doctors have a very vital role in health care. The number of doctor available which is only as many as 23 people would result in service that less than the maximum.Based on the information that has been described above, it can be concluded that the implementation of SPM in the field of health reference in Baubau City still needs to be improved. This deficiency lies in the human resources in the Baubau City Regional Hospital. The Result of Data Analysis in the Dimension of the Context of the Policy The dimension of the context of the policy is built based on several indicators as follows: 1. Power, Interests and Strategies of Actors Involved. The Regional Hospital is the actor involved and has interests in the policy of minimum service standard in the field of health reference. The implementation of SPM in Baubau City Regional Hospital has been done well. 2. The Characteristics of the Institutions and the Rulers. The minimum service standard policy in the field of health reference is implemented by Baubau Regional Hospital. The existence of SOP is one proof of the seriousness of the hospitals in implementing SPM in Baubau City Regional Hospital. 3. Compliance and Responsiveness. Minimum service standards in the field of health are implemented properly by Baubau City Regional Hospital. In general, the implementation of SPM has met the minimum standards according to the Decree of the Minister of Health. However, if the parameter is type C hospital then Baubau City Regional Hospital has not fully implemented them. Based on the analysis conducted, it can be said that the implementation of the Minimum Service Standards in the field of health reference in the Baubau City Regional Hospital is already good. Factors Affecting the Implementation of Minimum Service Standards in the Field of Health Reference in Baubau City Regional Hospital The service to the community should be the optimal service, meaning service which the quality can be justified and in accordance with the needs and expectations of service users. It should be noted also 122 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... that the development goals organized by the hospital is to support the achievement of national health development that is raising awareness, willingness and ability to live a healthy life for everyone who lives in the working area of the hospital in order to realize the highest health status in order to realize a healthy Indonesia. Based on the Decree of the Minister of Health No. 741/Menkes/PER/VII2008 related to health service referrals, it must contain two elements, namely; referral patient of 100 percent health service coverage of the poor in 2015 and coverage of emergency services level 1 that should be provided 100 percent by health facilities (hospitals) in Regency/City in the year 2015. Based on the data obtained in Baubau City Regional Hospital is as follows: a. The Coverage for the Poor Patients Here is the data coverage of the poor who look for treatment in Baubau City Regional Hospital with a wide range of health cards owned by the patients. Table 2.22.The Coverage of the Poor Patients Year Poor patients Total Hospital’s Patient 2011 2012 2013 Askes JPS Askes JPS Askes Jamkesmas 950 1,356 832 1,306 620 957 3,174 2,931 2,103 Total 6,021 8,208 Source: Data from Baubau City Regional Hospital processed in 2011-2013. Based on the table above, it can be seen that the number of patients with poor category is as much as 6,021 patients from a total of 8,208 patients of Baubau City Regional Hospital for three years (2011-2013). With this amount it means that coverage of the poor patients in Baubau City Regional Hospital is 73 percent only. Based on this result, it can be said that the coverage of the poor patients have not comply with the Decree of the Minister of Health No. 741/Menkes/PER/VII2008 which requires the patient’s poor coverage of 100percent. b. The Coverage of Emergency Services Below is presented the data on coverage of emergency services in Baubau City Regional Hospital. Democratic Governance| 123 Part Two: Public Service Reform Table 2.23.The Coverage of Emergency Services Types of Patients Payment 2011 2012 2013 Askes 950 (29.93%) 832 (28.39%) 620 (29.48%) General 779 (24.54%) 724 (24.70%) 471 (22.40%) Jamkesmas JPS Bahteramas Jasa Raharja Total 25 (0.79%) 22 (0.75%) 21 (1%) 1,356 (42.72%) 1,306 (44.56%) 957 (45.51%) 42 (1.32%) 43 (1.47%) 31 (1.47%) 22 (0.69%) 4 (0.14%) 3 (0.14%) 3174 (100%) 2931 (100%) 2103 (100%) Source: Data from Baubau City Regional Hospital processed in 2011-2013. Based on the table above, it is know that every year from 2011-2013 the coverage of emergency services in Baubau City Regional Hospital reached 100 percent. With the result, it can be said that the scope of the emergency services performed in the hospital have been able to comply with the Decree of the Minister of Health No. 741/Menkes/ PER/VII/2008. While the factors that affect the implementation of the minimum service standards in the field of health reference of Baubau City General Hospital are as follows: The Result of Dimensional Analysis of Communication The dimension of communication in Baubau City Regional Hospital was built by some indicators as follows: 1. Transmission. The communication support by hospitals is in the form of socialization for referrals patient to assist the delivery of communication. One form of the services that should be provided by a public servant is socialization. Baubau City Regional Hospital has been carrying out this function well. It is proven with the socialization into polies or part of hospital services. 2. Consistency. The Regional Hospital carries out the supervision on the implementation of the policy of minimum service standard in the field of health reference. With the supervision of the management it would improve the performance of hospital staff. SPM can eventually be implemented well in Baubau City Regional Hospital. 3. Clarity. The hospital provides information media in the form leaflet, brochures, information flow, and an information board for referrals patient. The information media is provided by the Regional Hospital 124 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... through the service flow mounted in the hospital’s wall. There is no printed media such as brochures, leaflet etc. The reason given is there are lacks of hospitals that implement the use of information media in the form of brochures and leaflet. This need is a concern from the hospital, because the printed media can also help hospitals in terms of publications to the society. Based on the above information, it can be seen that the services provided by the Baubau City Regional Hospital is already included in good category or already meet the minimum standards of health care reference. There is a bit of lack in the use of information media which is not yet optimal. It is shown in the absence of the role of printed media such as brochures, banners and leaflet. The Result of Dimensional Analysis of Resources In the implementation of a policy, the implementer is of course necessary in order to support the good implementation of the policy. Without any personnel to carry out a program, then any policy cannot be implemented and only remains a document without any realization. Therefore, the availability of sufficient competence implementer can encourage the success of the policy (Mangaro, 2013). Here are the results of the dimensional analysis of resources in Baubau City Regional Hospital. 1. Staff The regional hospital has sufficient human resources according to their educational qualifications. Based on the information above, the sufficiency of human resources in Baubau City Regional Hospital is on midwives and nurses. Workers such as general practitioners and specialist are not sufficient. Below is the data of HR owned by the hospital: Table 2.24.Hospital Staffsof Baubau City Regional Hospital No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Health Workers Doctor Dentist General Practitioners Nurses Pharmacist Nutritionists Medical Technician Personnel Number 7 People 3 People 13 People 139 People 9 People 14 People 22 People Source: Hospital Report 2013. Democratic Governance| 125 Part Two: Public Service Reform Based on the table above, it appears that the number of doctors is still very few which are 7 people only. This needs serious attention of the manager of the hospital. Because the doctor is one of the main elements that are needed to provide health services to the community. It also needs additional hospital staff, because the existing staffs now are not considered sufficient to provide maximum service to patients. This is associated with the arrival of the number of referral patients as many as 3,577 people in 2013 and the availability of doctors is only 7 people. 2. Information Mass media, electronic and printed give pretty easy access to information for referral patient to get the services. The information media in Baubau City Regional Hospital already exists in the form of billboards and flow of information. While for other media such as mass media, printed and electronic have not been used maximally. In the future, it needs attention from the hospitals, because these media also help people in obtaining health services. 3. Authority The staff carries out the minimum service standard referral health field as mandated by the hospital. 4. Facilities The hospital facilities are proper and have the funds to manage the policy of minimum service standard in the field of health reference. With the adequacy of the needs on hospital facilities, it will certainly be able to support the performance of Baubau City Regional Hospital. The adequacy of hospital facilities has also explained that Baubau City Regional Hospital has implemented a minimum service standard in the field of health reference. The results of the dimensional analysis of the human resources in Baubau City Regional Hospital can be said to have already been good. The weakness is related to personnel belonging to the hospital. The number of staff is too few compared to the expected needs. In the future, it is supposed to be noted by the hospitals to add more hospital staff or employees so that the implementation of SPM in the field of health could be better. 126 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... CONCLUSION Based on the results of the study and discussion that has been done in previous chapters related to the implementation of the minimum service standards in the field of health in Baubau City Regional Hospital, it can be concluded as follows: It can be said that the implementation of the Minimum Service Standards in the field of health in Baubau City Regional Hospital is already good. A slight lack of the implementation of SPM in the field of health reference Baubau City Regional Hospital is in the number of human resources required. Factors affecting the implementation of minimum service standard in the field of health reference in Baubau City Regional Hospital, are; Communication, Disposition and Bureaucratic Structure. While for the resources factor, there is still a shortage of resources because the sufficiency of human resources of Baubau City Regional Hospital only covers 80 percent. Based on the above conclusion, the researchers proposed suggestions as follows: Additional human resources in Baubau City Regional Hospital are needed associated with the minimum service standards provided. This suggestion is based on the results of the study that there is a shortage of human resources in Baubau City Regional Hospital. If the financial situation will be better, itallow hospitals to increase the number of human resources of Baubau City hospitals and medical facilities and infrastructure, because the existing infrastructure currently, is only about 80%. For other researchers who want to investigate the same issue, namely the implementation of minimum service standards of hospital, it is suggested to refer to the previous research. REFERENCES A.G. Subarsono. 2008. Analisis Kebijakan Publik. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar. Assauri, Sofyan 2003.Manajemen Pemasaran Jasa, Jilid 1, Jakarta: PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama. Democratic Governance| 127 Part Two: Public Service Reform Azwar, Saifuddin. 1999. Reliabilitas dan validitas: Seri pengukuran Psikologi. Yogyakarta: Sigma Alpha. Benyamin, David Pelayanan Kesehatan Masyarakat Di Puskesmas Sempaja Kecamatan Samarinda Utara (Studi Implementasi Peraturan Menteri Kesehatan RI Nomor 741/ Menkes/ Per/ VII/2008 Tentang Standar Pelayanan Minimal Bidang Kesehatan di Kabupaten/Kota). eJournal Administrasi Negara, Volume 1, Nomor 2, 2013: 440-452. Brotosaputro, B., 1998. Pendidikan (Penyuluhan) Kesehatan Masyarakat. Semarang: Badan Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro. Edvardsson, Bo, Gerry Larsson, and Sven Setterlind. 1997. Internal Service Quality and The Psychosocial Work Environment: An Empirical Analysis of Conceptual Interrelatedness. The Service Industries Journal Vol. 17.Page 252 -263. Fajrin Saleh, Noer Bahry Noor dan Rini Anggraeni (2014) Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Kebijakan Ponek Di RSUD Haji Padjonga Daeng Ngalle Kabupaten Takalar. Jurnal Kesehatan Masyarakat Universitas Hasanuddin. Gaffar, Afan. 2009. Politik Indonesia: Transisi Menuju Demokrasi, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar. Juanita. 2001. Pengaruh Krisis Ekonomi Terhadap Pelayanan Kesehatan Masyarakat. Skripsi. Universitas Sumatera Utara. Kushandajani, Otonomi Desa Dan Implikasi UU. No. 32 Tahun 2004 Terhadap Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Desa; Telaah Normative Dan Sosiologis” Jurnal Hukum Dan Dinamika Masyarakat, Vol. 3 (2) April 2006. Mangaro, Elizabeth. Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah Dalam Pelayanan Kesehatan Masyarakat Di Kecamatan Loloda Utara Kabupaten Halmahera Utara.Jurnal Eksekutif.Vol 2, No 1 2013. Meter, Donald Van, dan Carl Van Horn. 1975. The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework dalam Administration and Society London: Sage. Notoatmodjo, Soekidjo. 2003. Pendidikan Dan Perilaku Kesehatan. Jakarta: Rineka Cipta. Peraturan Menteri Kesehatan RI Nomor 741/MENKES/PER/VII/2008 Tentang Standar Pelayanan Minimal Bidang Kesehatan di Kabupaten/Kota. 128 |Democratic Governance Suranto, Dyah M., Rahmat D. S.. The Implementation of... Sinambela, L.P. 2010.Reformasi Pelayanan Publik; Teori,Kebijakan dan. Implementasi, cetakan kelima Jakarta: PT. Bumi Aksara. Sugiyono. 2010. Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif, Kualitatif dan R & D. Bandung: Alfabeta. Suharno. 2010. Marketing in Practice, edisi pertama. Yogyakarta: Graha Ilmu. Sukmadinata, Nana Syaodih. 2011. Metode Penelitian Pendidikan. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya. Syaibani, Achmat .2010. Quality of serving for taken care in outpatient in public health service (Puskesmas) Grogol Kabupaten Sukoharjo. Thesis, Magister of Public Administration, Post Graduate Programme, Sebelas Maret University Surakarta. Tangkilisan, Hesel Nogi. 2003. Implementasi Kebijakan Publik. Yogyakarta: Lukman. Wahab, Solichin Abdul. 2001. Analisa Kebijakan Dari Formulasi ke. Implementasi Kebijakan Negara. Jakarta: Bumi Aksara. Winarno, Budi. 2002. Teori dan Proses Kebijakan Publik. Yogyakarta: Media Pressindo. Democratic Governance| 129 130 Part Three Governance and Leadership 131 132 HOW DO ISLAM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE ADDRESS PUBLIC ISSUES? A COMPARATIVE VIEW IN THE CASE OF POVERTY AND CORRUPTION Ridho Al-Hamdi Lecturer, Department of Government Affairs and Administration Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta E-mail: ridhoalhamdi@umy.ac.id Abstract This study attempts to analyse the compatibility between Islam and good governance in addressing two main public issues namely poverty and corruption. To explain the compatibility both of them, the study explores the policy, agenda and strategy each of them. Employing literature review and a deep analysis, the main finding is that Islam and western perspective have a similar concept, policies, agendas and strategies in coping with poverty and corruption issues among society. This study believes that poverty and corruption is the root of backwardness and foolishness. Therefore, these should be minimized, even diminished from societal life in order to gain better prosperity in life. Keywords: Islam, good governance, poverty alleviation, corruption eradication _____________ Ridho Al-Hamdi, MA is currently a PhD student in political science at TU Dortmund University, Germany funded by DIKTI Republic of Indonesia. INTRODUCTION It cannot be denied that ten of the Muslim countries around the world have similar problems related to poverty and corruption. These two problems are still rampant within Muslim states whether in the national and local levels. As a matter of fact, the problems are the root of backwardness and foolishness for all human being. Due to these two problems also, a state has no ability to move forward in achieving a consolidated democracy and a people-centered welfare. Therefore, this study aims to analyse whether Islamic tenets are compatible with 133 Part Three: Governance and Leadership poverty alleviation and corruption eradication or not? If it’s compatible, how does Islam deals with these two public issues? As a comparative view, the study will present western’s good governance perspective. It will demonstrate the compatibility between Islam and good governance. Utilising a literature review, the study is going to analyse comparatively on the policy, agenda and strategy of Islam and good governance in coping with poverty and corruption issues. For technical definitions, the policy is a set of interrelated decisions regarding the selection of goals and the ways of obtaining them within a specified situation (Jenkins, 1978: 15; Dye, 1984: 1). The agenda denotes to a set of public issues as the application of the policy to be pursued. It is typically more specific and operational statements than policy. In other words, the agenda consists of programs and activities. In the meantime, the strategy is the way it operates the agenda by interrelatedways. Therefore, four main sections will be provided in this study. First is depicting the relationship between Islam and democracy in scholarly approaches. Second is explaining the concept on Islam and good governance. Third is analysing how Islam and good governance tackle poverty issues. Fourth is examining how Islam and good governance address corruption issues. ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: UNFINISHED DEBATE Since the nineteenth century, Islam and democracy has been at the heart of intellectual discourses in both the Muslim world and the West. A number of previous studies demonstrate that there are, at least, two main distinctive kinds of school of thought concerning Islam and democracy. The view that Islam is incompatible with democracy can be reflected in works by Huntington (1984, 1991), Kedourie (1992), Fukuyama (1992, 2001), and Lewis (2002). These scholars believe that Islam is inimical to democracy, because the two are different creatures. Meanwhile, the opposite perspective that Islam definitely has a positive culture with democracy can be represented by Rubenstein (1994), Anderson (1995), Halliday (1996), Entelis (1997), Gerges (1999), Rose (2002), Said (2002), Fish (2002), Tessler (2002), Al-Braizat (2002), and Norris and Inglehart (2003) who theorise that the absence of democracy in Muslim countries is not associated with Islam, but with 134 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... non-Islamic factors such as social and political economy, geopolitics, and international factors. The last view is also reinforced by Esposito and Voll (1996), Hefner (2000; 2009), Mousalli (2001), Mujani (2003), Abulbaki (2008), Akyol (2009) and Achilov (2010) who postulate that Islam as a political culture has positive values for democracy even with the capitalism. Huntington (1984: 216) argues that the Islamic resurgence and the rise of fundamentalist movements would seem to diminish democratic development particularly since democracy is frequently identified with the extremely Western. In addition, many Muslim states are very poor. One serious impediment to democratisation in Muslim countries, refers to Huntington (1991: 297-298), is the weakness of real commitment among its political leaders to democratic values, such as Adnan Menderes in Turkey and Soekarno in Indonesia. These leaders won power through the electoral system, but they used their power to undermine that system. It is hard to identify any Muslim leaders who made a reputation as an advocate of democracy. Afterward, Kedourie (1992: 1) posits that Islamic beliefs, norms, attitudes, and experience have shaped a distinctive view of politics. Muslims are proud of their heritage and closed to the outside world. This civilisation is a constraint for Muslims to learn about and to appreciate the social and political progress achieved by others. Furthermore, Fukuyama (1992: 347) is sure that although there have been pressures for greater democracy in the Middle East, Islam in these countries is a major barrier to democratisation because it brings power tothe Islamic fundamentalists hoping to establish some forms of popular theocracy. A month after the 9/11 tragedy, Fukuyama (October 11, 2001) forcefully claims that the fundamentalist versions of Islam which have been dominant in recent years, make Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity. In Fukuyama’s view, modernity can be characterised by liberal democracy and capitalism. Similarly, Lewis (2002: 100) assumes that the exclusivity of Islam lies in the fact that religion regulates all aspects of Muslim life by a single divine law named sharia. There is no distinction between the law of religion and the law of the state. Democratic Governance| 135 Part Three: Governance and Leadership On the other hand, Norris and Inglehart (2003) discover that there is no significant difference in reinforcement for democratic values among Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims in fact support positively democratic institutions. Moreover, Fish (2002: 4-37) urges that despite being poorer than the West, the interpersonal trust in Muslim countries is higher than in Catholic countries. The only problem in Muslim countries is that Muslims are likely not to support gender equality. However, the case of Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia show that democracy’s prospect in Muslim countries is more favourable. Afterward, Mousalli (2001) reveals that the concepts of shura and ikhtilaf are substantively democratic norms and values. Esposito and Voll (1996) refer to ijtihad and ijma‘ as Islamic norms which substantively reflect democratic culture. The political participation as a core concept in democracy is not an alien concept to Muslims. Employing World Values Survey data from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria, Tessler (2002: 229, 245) attempts to assess the influence of Islamic orientations on the attitudes toward democracy. The result shows that strong Islamic attachments is not incompatible with democracy and does not discourage the emergence of attitudes favorable to democracy to any significant degree. He also found that Islam as a set of personal religious practices and political values does not have a significant impact on the support for democratic values. Furthermore, Al-Braizat (2002: 269, 292) rejects Fukuyama’s claim. He argues that Islam is largely irrelevant as an explanatory variable for democracy or authoritarianism. Concentrating on religion as the sole independent variable or a yardstick could be seriously misleading and spurious. For Al-Braizat, Islam neither explains democracy nor authoritarianism. Support to Nazih Ayubi’s theory (1991), he believes that Islam is not a political religion. Also, through his cross-national analysis in Kazakhstan and Turkey, Achilov (2010: 217-224) reveals the fact that Islamic institutions which represented by Islamic educational, financial, and political institutions can coexist with basic elements of democracy, civil liberties and political rights and vice versa. Thus, Islam will continue to shape the democratisation process in Muslim politics for years to come. Even Akyol (2009: 41) is sure that Islam is very compatible with the Western’s capitalist economy supplemented 136 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... by a set of moral values which stress the care of the poor and the needy, because Islam actually is a religion founded by a businessman where the Prophet Mohammad SAW was a successful merchant for the greater part of his live and one that has cherished trade since its beginning. ISLAM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: UNIFYING THE CONCEPT In the contemporary world, there has been a common consensus that good governance is an essential for human resource development in any society or state. Numerous international institutions such World Bank, the United Nations of Development Program (UNDP) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) play vital roles to reach democratic governance. The impact of this phenomenal notion is that Islam by and at large is abandoned or deemed as alien from the reality. Thus, Khatab and Bouma (2007: 7) attempt to classify two different views among Muslim society and scholars concerning Islam and polity encompassing democracy and governance. Some argue that Islam as simply a religion without the right to govern or to order the daily affairs of human life. Others view that Islam as not merely a religion, but also a system and social order in all aspects of human life including the state and the law. Nonetheless, the fact that the failure of Muslim countries particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions in installing the democratic system revealed that political Islam embracing Islam as a religion is unable to maintain power and to create a new society. Therefore, this section attempts to provide a set of theoretical framework on the relationship between Islam and good governance. In spite of the reference to two primary sources of Muslim teachings namely Al-Qur’an and As-Sunnah to define good governance, it cannot be stated precisely that the two Muslims’ sources left a definite method of electing a leader or successor. Yet, according to Adebayo (2010: 1), democracy, as a matter of fact, is a concept which have been borrowed from Islam. Muslims has bequeathed a set of scientific knowledge and civilisation to the world which were later de-Islamised and westernised, then a system of government which allows for the rule of law, sovereignty, equity and justice, human rights and mutual consultation should not have escaped the knowledge of the western world. The west grasped every good thing from the Muslims, secularised it before Democratic Governance| 137 Part Three: Governance and Leadership representing it to the rest of the world. Moreover, good governance, as was explained by Hashem (2007: 63),isa bridge to strive in achieving justice in society, maintaining the dignity of individuals and protect group freedom, steering individuals towards achieving a means of sustainable livelihood before aspiring for other luxuries in social life. In Islam, the model of good governance has been explaining in a set of stories on the leadership of God’s apostles as mentioned in Al-Qur’an chapters. More obviously, Naqvi et al (2011: 10986-10988) demonstrates that the story of Zulqarnain can be found in the Chapter 18 verse 83 to 101, the story of Moses and Haroon is in the Chapter 2 verse 40 and onwards, the story of Taloot is in the Chapter 2 verse 246 to 252, the story of Dawood is in the Chapter 38 verse 18 to 26 and in the Chapter 29 verse 15 to 45, the story of Solomon is in the Chapter 38 and in the Chapter 29 verse 31 to 40, the story of Joseph is in the Chapter 12 verse 55 and onwards as well as the story of Muhammad can be traced in the Chapter 47 and in the various chapters in the Qur’an. Additionally, Adebayo (2010: 4-10) inserts that the Islamic model of governance was also depicted by Khularaur Rasyidin. Therefore, Naqvi et al (2011: 10990-10991) believe that the principal determinants of good governance in Islam are the leader’s personality and his leadership skills which can dominate over and optimise the required institutional infrastructures. The leader has to be responsible to ensure all parameters and essentials required for maintaining good governance. Thus, we need the right leader who has a personal charisma and a sophisticated leadership skill to run the routine government affairs. Consequently, a state has to be ruled by leaders who have these criteria: having a commitment to earn God’s happiness and having a concern to people’s welfare, an intellectual and fair commander, an effective planner, a rational policy maker, a thrifty financial manager, a distributor of justified taxation, a firm advocate of human rights, an astute defense planner, and an effective change manager causing revolution or evolution as applicable in societies. These requirements, indeed, demonstrate the importance of a mechanism on how to identify and elect the right leader of the government. Besides, Hashem (2007: 71) is also sure that the peace and stability in Muslim countries are dependent on the collective ability to go beyond the repudiation 138 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... authoritarian regimes and incompetent rulers. However, it depends on the approval of the majority of the society including non-religious individuals who accept Islam only as a civilisation, not identity. In the western world, the concept on good governance was developed primarily by a number of multilateral development institutions, i.e. World Bank, UNDP, and IMF. In accordance with this, World Bank (1992: 1) attempts to set up good governance, synonymous with sound development management, as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development. Good governance is central to create and sustain an environment which fosters strong and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to sound economic policies. Thus, the government plays a vital role in the provision of public goods and establishes the rules which make markets work efficiently and correctly to avoid market failure. In order to play this role, the government needs revenues and agents to collect revenues and produce the public goods. Likewise, UNDP (1997b) words good governance as the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. The economic governance encompasses the decisionmaking process which affects the country’s economic activities and its relationships with other economies. The political governance is the process of decision-making to formulate policy. The administrative governance is the system of policy implementation. There are three actors of good governance: the state, the private sector, and civil society. These institutions should be designed to contribute to the sustainable human development. As the result, UNDP (2010: 5) assumes that democratic governance should embrace mechanisms, processes, and institutions which determine how power is exercised, how decisions are made on public issues, and how citizens articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences. Meanwhile, IMF (2014: 1) argues that good governance is a broad concept covering all aspects of the way a country is governed, embracing its economic policies and regulatory framework as well as adherence to the rule of law. IMF places a great stress on promoting good governance when providing policy advice, financial support, and technical assistance to its member countries. IMF also has strong Democratic Governance| 139 Part Three: Governance and Leadership measures in place to ensure integrity, impartiality, and honesty in the discharge of its own professional obligations. However, IMF (1997: 3) has primary concerns merely related with macroeconomic stability, external viability, and orderly economic growth in member countries. Its involvement in governance should be restricted to economic aspects of governance. Moreover, World Bank (1994: 1-36) provides four major components of good governance: public-sector management, accountability, legal framework for development, and transparency and information. Meanwhile, according to UNDP (1997b), good governance has nine fundamental characteristics. They are participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision. Based on both Islam and the west perspective which was explored above, this study defines good governance as the manner, strategy, and bridge to strive human standard basic needs, social justice and stability as well as individual and group freedom by utilising local revenues and resources before aspiring further high needs. It can be reached only through the legal and elected government and other official democratic institutions which they are incorporating with private sectors and civil society. With respect to the features of good governance, it can be implied that it consists of participatory, law enforcement, accountable, effective and efficient, transparent, responsive, predictable, equitable, and leadership. Meanwhile, regarding the agenda of good governance, Islam focuses on the role and responsibility of leadership in ruling the state’s resources. Word Bank concerns with the type of state regime in which power is exercised in the management of the economic and social resources, and the capacity of the government to formulate policies. UNDP dedicates itself to human development and political institution reform. IMF prefers to choose the reform of economic and social resource control. Nevertheless, they have same goals that the power has to be controlled by the right government to maintain the state’s resources. HOW TO DEAL WITH POVERTY ISSUES? Literally, the term of “poverty” in Islam has, at least, eight similar words as cited in the Holy Qur’an: miskin (mentioned twenty-five times), faqir (thirteen times), imlaq (twice), sail (four times), mahrum 140 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... (twice), qooni’ (once),mu’tar (once), and bais (once). It reveals that Islam pays in-depth attention to poverty. According to Sabra (2000: 8-10) Miskin refers to a person worthy of pity, who may not actually be impoverished. It can be applied to any person who suffers misfortune of some kind and is worthy of one’s pity or deserving of sympathy. The term of miskin is always paired with faqir which has two meanings: poverty and need. Both refer to a person suffering from material deprivation which differs by degree. If miskin is who possessed some property, while faqir who was totally have no anything. However, both terms refer to those sufficiently poor to receive zakat. In doing so, poverty can be attributed to a person who is lacking material possessions or wealth and related to the stark reality of deprivation. Moreover, poverty can be explained in different ways correlated with income, material possessions, the community to which one belongs, etc. In fact, Güner (2005: 1, 9-10) argues that there is a fundamental misunderstanding amongst Muslims that they believe poverty is a part of a blessing from God and prosperity is likely moving people far from the wishes of Allah. This thought affects Muslims living in the deprivation and dependent on developed countries. Thus, Muslims should turn to basic Islamic teachings that Islam forcefully cares with poverty and encourages its believers to be a prosperous Muslim. In the same way, UNDP (1997a: 16-17) states that poverty can be seen from three different perspectives. First is income perspective. A poor person is who has income level under the defined poverty line. The cut-off poverty line frequently is defined in terms of having enough income for a particular amount of food. Second is basic needs perspective. Poverty is deprivation in fulfilling minimum requirements of human needs embracing the lack of food, basic health and education, essential services, employment, and participation. Three is capability perspective. Poverty represents the absence of some basic capabilities of people whether mentally or physically to achieve the smallest number of human necessary. Moreover, UNDP (1997a: 18) portrays that the deprivation is affected by three essential elements of human life. First, deprivation correlates to survival (the vulnerability of death at a relatively early age). Second, it relates to knowledge (being excluded from the world of reading and communication). Third, it links up to a Democratic Governance| 141 Part Three: Governance and Leadership decent standard of living. This is represented by a composite of three variables: the percentage of people with access to health services and to safe water, and the proportion of malnourished children under five. Thus, World Bank (2001: 1) puts forward that poor people are who live without fundamental freedoms of action and choice that the betteroff take for granted. They also face extreme vulnerability to ill health, economic dislocation, and natural disasters and are often exposed to ill treatment by institutions of the state and society as well as are powerless to influence key decisions affecting their lives. Policy.Islamic teachings, as said by Hamka (Tafsir Al-Azhar, the Chapter 107), believe that the essence of religion for human is not only conducting ritual worship and fasting but also giving charitable activities or feeding to the orphans and the poor people. Thus, Latief (2012: 1, 36) defines charity as a deed related to giving, receiving, helping, grantingand the redistribution of wealth. People tend to associate the charity with the practice of assisting the poor, the way the wealthy share their fortunes, and other such good deeds. In general, a charitable deed is considered as religiously meritorious and remains central to religiously-inspired social activism. Meanwhile, Islamic charity is the return of wealth which the rich should return or give their possessions to the poor. This is a mechanism to circulate wealth which underpins the fiscal theory of early Muslim society. The main idea of almsgiving is the purification of property,and the idea of the redistribution of property is a sociological and economic aspect of Islamic charity. Charitable activities in Indonesian current life are increasingly becoming modern trends among society and providing assistance to implement people welfare. However, World Bank (2014: 2) assumes that the world should not alleviate extreme poverty, but it must only meet with the MDGs target of halving world poverty. Current trends show a good progress that around 40 percent of developing countries have already achieved the first MDGs, and only 17 percent are seriously off track. It means that they would be unable, at current rates of progress, to have extreme poverty rates by 2030. Coping with this global poverty and inequality, the international community has set several goals for the opening years of the century: reducing by half the proportion of people living in extreme 142 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... income poverty, ensuring universal primary education, eliminating gender disparity in education, reducing infant and child mortality by two-thirds, reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters, ensuring universal access to reproductive health services, and implementing national strategies for sustainable development in each country. Thus, UNDP (1997a: 89-90) offers some policies. For the national policy, it consists of managing trade and capital flows more carefully, investing in poor people, fostering small enterprise, managing new technology, reducing poverty and providing safety nets, improving governance. Meanwhile, for the international policy, it contains a more supportive macro-economic policy environment for poverty eradication, a fairer institutional environment for global trade, a partnership with multinational corporations to promote growth for poverty reduction, action to stop the race to the bottom, selective support for global technology priorities, action on global debt, and better access to finance for poor countries. Agenda. From various studies on Islamic charitables, this study decides to select some agendas. Distributing zakat (mandatory almsgiving), infaq and shadaqah (voluntary giving) is a major agenda for Muslim society to alleviate poverty and deprivation. According to Richardson (2004: 156), zakat denotes to the compulsory transfer of a prescribed proportion of property by a Muslim who owns more wealth than the limit dictated under sharia. It is a pillar of faith and a deed of worship which involves monetary and fiscal action. Practically, zakat is a 2.5 percent tax levied on certain assets, including savings accounts, gold, and silver. The funds collected are used for charitable activities to improve the living standards of poor people embracing health care and education provision. Thus, Bhuiyan et al (2012: 1388) believes that the concept of zakat based on Islamic mode of financing is the best strategy to alleviate poverty and guarantee sustainable livelihood. A number of evidences in Muslim countries demonstrate that Islamic economics practically could assist to alleviate poverty and could grow rapidly in current life as a tool to diminish poverty problems. Farooq (2008: 55-58) presents an instance that if zakat is properly instituted and riba is eliminated, the poverty has a tendency to reductionism. In Selangor Malaysia, Ibrahim (2006: iv) proves that Democratic Governance| 143 Part Three: Governance and Leadership the circulation of zakat has positive contributions in reducing income inequality and lessening the severity of poverty. In Pakistan, Malik et al (1994: 947) as well as Akram and Afzal (2014: 1, 36) display that the disbursement of zakat an infaq among the poor, needy, destitute, orphans, and widows has play a significant role in fulfilling their basic needs and alleviating chronic poverty in the short run as well as in the long run. Likewise, in Pasuruan Indonesia, Effendi (2013: i-ii) depicts that the Islamic microfinance is the best means to combat poverty and allows the poor to empower both themselves and their communities through the creation and sustainment of their own businesses. People can maintain financial performances and increase client bases within a regional context. Its primary objective is self-sustainability. Thus, the programmes of the Islamic microfinance institutions in three different areas (upland, lowland, and coastal) positively contribute to alleviate poverty where microfinance clients and are able to develop their businesses after receiving financing or loans. Likewise, Riwajanti (2014: 60-61) attempts to draw the successful role of BMT in East Java in reducing poverty as well as improving sales, business expenditure, net income, household expenditure, and employment. It is also important to note that to reduce poverty, Latief (2012: 129-167) proposes another agenda namely provisioning health assistance for disadvantaged segments of society as a trend of the rise of zakat agencies in Indonesia. The growth of charitable clinics is influenced by the increase of Islamic aid and various social funds collected by zakat agencies. There has been a new tendency within national and multinational corporations in Indonesia to channel social funds to zakat agencies.The health assistance more specifically is also well-known as Islamic charitable clinics which set up by zakat agencies. There are two mains zakat agencies in Indonesia which established this agenda: Dompet Dhuafa and Rumah Zakat Indonesia. They have functioned as a mechanism to redistribute almsgiving to deserved beneficiaries, as an approach to interpret religious notions of welfare into social and economic domains, and implicitly, as a strategy to evaluate the feebleness of state welfare provision in the arena of healthcare. In addition, Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah clinics also have conducted similar deeds in providing health assistances. 144 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... In the western scholarship, World Bank (2001: 8-11) has three national agendas. First is opportunity, which embraces the encouragement of effective private investment, expanding into international markets, building the assets of poor people, addressing asset inequalities across gender, ethnic, racial, and social divides, and getting infrastructure and knowledge to poor areas–rural and urban. Second is empowerment, consists of laying the political and legal basis for inclusive development, creating public administrations that foster growth and equity, promoting inclusive decentralization and community development, promoting gender equity, tackling social barriers, and supporting poor people’s social capital. Third is security; encompasses formulating a modular approach to helping poor people manage risk, developing national programs to prevent, prepare for, and respond to macro shocks—financial and natural, designing national systems of social risk management that are also pro-growth, addressing civil conflicts, and tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Meanwhile, UNDP (1997a: 80-81) has its own agendas for poverty alleviation. First is restoring and accelerating economic growth. Second is promoting pro-poor growth to improve incomes and productivity in smallholder agriculture. Third is reversing environmental degradation. Fourth is stemming the spread of HN/AIDS among poor people through multisectoral, people-centred programmes. Fifth is accelerating the demographic transition in countries where fertility rates are still high. Sixth is developing instruments to improve the processes for peace building, conflict resolution and prevention as well as to help displaced persons. Afterward, strengthening poors’ abilities to fight poverty and build their assets should underpin the strategy for poverty alleviation. Besides, we require a policy to ensure the access of the poor to the critical economic asset of land, credit and housing; to ensure the access of the poor to health service and educational opportunities that can build their capabilities; and to create a policy environment which promotes pro-poor growth. Strategy. As stated by Latief (2012: 305-310), Islamic charitable clinics are not only manifested as Islamic giving, but also as social aid from ‘secular’ institutions. Additionally, the emergence of Islamic aid associations such as zakat agencies which specifically cater to Democratic Governance| 145 Part Three: Governance and Leadership disadvantaged communities in society may signify their rational responses to insufficient provision of crucial services (health, education, welfare and security). It is certainly correct that charitable action is closely related to the concept of muslaha which associated with ‘imagined Islamic welfare societies’. Islamic teachings should fulfill the needs of the society not only in terms of their physical well-being, but also their spiritual health and religious identity. World Bank (2000: i) underlines that to confront the challenge of reducing poverty, it must address the root causes of poverty and focus on necessary conditions for sustainable development. Poorly functioning public sector institutions and weak governance are major constraints to growth and equitable development in many developing countries. Thus, World Bank (2001: 6-7) proposes three strategies to alleviate poverty. First is promoting opportunity. It should be conducted to provide and expand large chances for poor people to reach their basic needs. Economic growth is vital for generating opportunity and greater equity is important for rapid progress in reducing poverty. Second is facilitating empowerment. The government and social institutions should collaborate to strengthen the participation of poor people in political processes and local decision-making. It is also important to remove social and institutional barriers which is a result of distinctions of gender, ethnicity, and social status because responsive institutions are a part of the overall growth process. Third is enhancing security. Diminishing vulnerability is a part of enhancing well-being. It requires the national action in managing the risk of economy wide shocks and effective mechanisms to reduce the risks faced by poor people, building of assets for them, diversifying household activities, and providing a range of insurance mechanisms to cope with adverse shocks. HOW TO COPE WITH CORRUPTION ISSUES? Islam has a number of accounts concerning corruption with various analogies. The term of “corruption” can refers to the word of ghasab which means a robbery crime or embezzlement of state’s treasury illegally (the Chapter 18 verse 79). It can also be part of hirabah (the Chapter 5 verse 33) which denotes to doing chaos and bloodshed. Most Muslim scholars define hirabah as a violence deed which carried 146 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... out by a person or groups of people to others in order to take over their treasury (Sabiq, 1998: 195). Afterward, corruption also can be defined as risywah which means a bribery act which carried out by minimally two people or more. One person, on one hand, is a briber (al-rasyi) and the rest, on the other hand, is bribed (al-murtasyi). Its explanation can be seen in the Chapter 2 verse 188. In addition, corruption can be called as al-ghulul (the Chapter 3 verse 161) which, as indicated by Katsir (1999: 78), means a treason deed to stealing from the war booty before its distribution. Distinguished from risywah, al-ghulul is merely conducted by a person and not embracing other sides as an actor. The Prophet Muhammad obviously stresses to keep away from al-ghulul deeds. Therefore, ‘Arafa (2012: 196-200) believes that corruption is a broad range of behavioral digressions which threaten the social, economic, and ecological balance. More specifically, corruption covers the matters of governance, decision making, rules through reproaching the abuse of trust placed in officials by the state through acts such as accepting gifts, outright theft of public funds, and undermining rules in exchange for bribes, on recommendation or due to family and tribal considerations. Individuals in general are prohibited from making recommendations in exchange for gifts as such behavior falls under risywah. Regarding bribery, some concepts are in close connection with this deed, namely illegal earnings or al-soht, gifts or al-hadiya, charity or al-sadaqah, and salaries or al-ga‘al. Meanwhile, IMF (2014: 1) and World Bank (1997: 8-9) defines corruption as an abuse of public office or authority or trust for private benefit, and is closely linked to a poor governance environment which offers bigger incentives and more opportunities for bribery. The public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues. Thus, corruption, in fact, undermines the public’s trust in its government. It also threatens market integrity, distorts competition, and endangers economic development. Democratic Governance| 147 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Moreover, UNDP (2011: 1) argues that corruption really undermines human development by diverting public resources to private gain and reducing access to public services. UNDP views corruption as a governance deficit, a result of malfunctioning state institutions due to poor governance. Democratic governance helps to battle corruption by creating inclusive, responsive, and accountable political processes to efficiently and effectively deliver social services to everyone comprising the poor and marginalised. World Bank (1997: 9) believes that one of the main ways in corruption is bribes. They can be used by private sectors to “buy” many things provided by central or local governments, or officials may seek bribes in supplying those things. Furthermore, UNDP (2011: 1-2) also agrees with the message of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon on the International AntiCorruption Day 2009 that when public money is stolen for private gain, it means fewer resources to build schools, hospitals, roads, and water treatment facilities. When foreign aid is diverted into private bank accounts, major infrastructure projects come to a halt. Corruption enables fake or substandard medicines to be dumped on the market, and hazardous waste to be dumped in landfill sites and in oceans. The vulnerable suffer first and worst. Indeed that the corruption derails a country’s progress and development embracing MDGs’ achievement. Thus, the major focus is strengthening preventive capacities to stop leakages of public resources and working together with partners such as the United Nations Office for Drug Control, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, WHO, OECD, World Bank, GTZ, Noraid and civil society organisations. Policy. Most Muslim scholars are in favor of the prohibition of corruption in all its shapes including nepotism, extortion, and bribery (‘Arafa, 2012: 202).In as much as a corruptor conducted an awful deed, he can be categorised as a traitor not only from his country embracing people within but also from his religion. Therefore, Islam obviously prohibits and resists to the corruption deed individually and collectively (the Chapter 9 verse 12; the Chapter 4 verse 29). More clearly, Islam punishes the corruptor to be slayed as the Chapter 5 verse 33 stated: “The recompense of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and do mischief in the land is only that they shall be killed or crucified 148 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... or their hands and their feet be cut off from opposite sides, or be exiled from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs in the Hereafter”. Other explanations concerning corruption in the Holy Qur’an can be read in the Chapter 2 verse 42, the Chapter 4 verse 58, the Chapter 5 verse 38, and the Chapter 8 verse 27. World Bank (1992: 41, 43-44) obviously highlights that the main weapon against corruption is to reduce the opportunities for it to a minimum, to eliminate economic distortions and administrative controls, and thus to reduce the scope for illicit arbitrage and bribery, “dash”, “speed money”, and the like. Transparency in government business has a vital ancillary role. World Bank is involved with transparency through its work on public expenditure e.g., transparency of budgets, elimination of “caisse noires” and through its assistance to governments in establishing transparent procurement procedures and in conducting environmental assessments. Some countries try to correct the mismanagement of their customs service by contracting it out to a wholly independent private enterprise such as Indonesia. Agenda. Based on the policy above, it can be explained that Islam has some agendas to cope with the corruption. First is underpinning the law enforcement for all kinds of corruptor. Indeed that the verdict for corruptors should affects for the change of their behavior. According to the Chapter 5 verse 38, a corruptor is also a thief which thieves the state treasury. The source of the state treasury is people funds and taxes. It can be simplified that the corruptor is a person who thieves people funds. Therefore, Islam supposes to decide qishash for a thief. According to M. Cherif Bassiouni (in ‘Arafa, 2012: 189), qishash denotes to a person who has committed a given violation will be punished in the same way and by the same means which he used in harming the other person. Second is embedding the worldview or ideology on anti-corruption. It is a continuous and sustainable agenda and can be started in the formal education from the elementary school to the college/university. Indeed, the content of the course does not only provide the knowledge on the corruption but also transferring the impact of the corruption as a hazardous act for society, state and religion. Various methods can be used to provide best understanding for the young generation. Democratic Governance| 149 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Meanwhile, World Bank (1994: 16) has some agendas which could be broadened to embrace a research program aimed at better understanding of a) the framework of economic incentives for corrupt behavior, b) whether some sorts of corruption are more dysfunctional than others; c) the relationship between corruption and political system; and d) measures that industrialised countries could take to discourage corrupt practices by exporters. Besides, World Bank should maintain a dialogue with various watchdog organisations established to fight corruption and with governments seeking practical ways to reduce the moral and economic costs of corruption. Strategy. In Islam, the corruption and bribery are considered as Ta‘azir offenses. Ta‘azir itself means all acts which infringe private or community interests of the public social order. The corruption and bribery can be categorised as Ta‘azir. Thus, it can be punished by imprisonment. However, Islam does not prescribe a specific penalty (‘Arafa, 2012: 192, 202). More broadly, as what was explained by Iqbal and Lewis (2002: 11-15) and ‘Arafa (2012: 234-237), that the vast Islamic intellectual heritage suggests three key pillars as strategy to eradicate corruption. First is moral education. The starting point for curing corruption lies in reforming social values, grounding them in appropriate concepts of social justice, and linking them with a broader worldview. This is the basis of the Islamic moral education programfor society. Second is law and incentives. Islam teaches the equality of people, irrespective of race or tribe, as the only criterion of merit is goodness and piety. Conversely, there is a complementary and powerful spiritual incentive structure that focuses on risks and rewards both in life and in the hereafter. Third is administration and managerial government. Separation of powers into trias politica (legislature, executiveand judiciary) is a better way to diminish corruption acts. World Bank (1994: 16) has its strategy to reduce corruption acts. First is reforming trade regime, which restricts the scope for discretionary treatment by customs officials and replace administrative actions with price mechanisms in the allocation of import licenses and foreign exchange. Second is reforming tax, based on lower, uniform rates, simpler rules, the strengthening of tax administration and record-keeping. Third is reforming regulation, such as the abolition of 150 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... price controls; the simplification of license requirements, and similar deregulation measures. Fourth is privatisation, to reduce the size of the state enterprise sector under bureaucratic control. Moreover, World Bank provides three actions as instances of institutional strengthening to improve controls and reduce incentives for corrupt behavior. First is reforming civil service to restore a professional, accountable, realistically paid, and well-motivated bureaucracy. Second is strengthening public procurement systems through the reform of laws, more transparent procedures, adoption of improved bidding documentation, competitive bidding, and staff training. Third is modernisation of public sector accounting, upgrading internal auditing capacity, and strengthening the audit institution. Thus, diminishing corruption requires the engagement of those outside government such as parliamentarians, civil society, households, the private sector, and the media. World Bank (1997: 26) assumes that tackling corruption in a certain country will depend on the country’s circumstances. In particular countries, economic policy reform will be the priority. In others, the targets may be interventions in tax or customs agencies or procurement reform. Circumstances will also determine whether the strategy should be comprehensive or incremental. Comprehensive strategies can be developed where national leadership is committed to change and the political will exists to undertake in-depth economic and institutional reforms. Opportunities for in-depth reform may exist at the local level or in particular agencies or departments even if those opportunities are missing at the national level. In some cases there may be more political will for economic policy reform than for in-depth work at the institutional level. Meanwhile, IMF (1997: 3) provides two strategies to avoid corrupt practices. First, improving the management of public resourcesthrough reforms covering public sector institutions for instance the treasury, central bank, public enterprises, civil service, and the official statistics function, including administrative procedures e.g., expenditure control, budget management, and revenue collection. Second, reinforcing the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable economic and regulatory environment conducive to efficient private sector activities e.g., price systems, exchange and trade regimes, and banking systems and their related regulations. Democratic Governance| 151 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Nonetheless, Rashidi and Babaei (2014: 22-23) explain that Islam and the West have different ways to tackle the corruption although both solutions are good and can complete each other. In Islam, the role of individual ethics to eradicate corruption is extremely significant. Whereas, the western strategy goes beyond ethical approaches, it solves the problems with changing procedures, providing individual reward and punishment, influencing special people, and deporting them. Thus, the internal dimension is belonging to Islam while the external strategy is West’s. CONCLUDING REMARKS Generally speaking, there are no significant distinctions between Islam and good governance; in fact they have a lot of similarities. The tangible evidences were provided here. The first question is how do Islam and good governance deal with poverty issues? The answer is there are three main policies: Religion is not onlya ritual worship but also social acts, making policy which has best impacts to poor people, is required to be involved in managing trade and capital flows more carefully, investing in poor people, and fostering small enterprise. For the agenda are conducting charitable activities and supporting the distribution of Zakat Infaq and Shadaqah (ZIS), supporting microfinance systems among poor people, building assets for poor people and provisioning health care (charitable clinics). Meanwhile, the strategies are activating mushola (prayer rooms) for ZIS activities, providing large chances for poor people to reach their basic needs, strengthening the participation of poor people in political processes and reinforcing gender equality and empowering women’s role. The second question is how do Islam and good governance address corruption issues? The answer is there are four main policies: prohibiting corruption in all shapes (nepotism, extortion and bribery), a corruptor is a traitor not only from his country but also from his religion, reducing any opportunities and pathways for conducting corruption and applying transparency systems in all sectors of bureaucracy. The agendas are underpinning the law enforcement to corruptors and the like, supporting to state institutions in dealing with corruption deeds and cooperating with watchdog organisations for seeking practical 152 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... ways to reduce costs of corruption. In the meantime, the strategies are moral education for society, separating powers into trias-politica, reforming and modernising government institutions for civil services and strengthening civil society, private sectors, and media to control the government. All in all, Islam, democracy and good governance have compatibility in the policy, agenda and strategy in addressing public issues such as poverty and corruption. They are not different creatures, but similar in distinctive ways. Therefore, this study recommends for further researches that there are some suggestions particularly in Indonesia and other Muslim countries around the world. First is the importance to examine the role and engagement of Muslim organisations and communities in alleviating poverty and eradicating corruptions acts. Second is the importance to analyse the performance of Muslim elites in the government whether in the national and local levels to address these two public issues. Third is the significance to study the role of Islam-based political parties in coping with those issues. However, a lot of perspectives can be analysed in distinctive disciplines. REFERENCES ‘Arafa, Mohamed A. 2012. “Corruption and Bribery in Islamic Law: Are Islamic Ideals Being Met in Practice?”,Annual Survey of Int’l & Comp. Law, Vol. XVIII, pp. 71-242 Achilov, Dilshod. 2010. Can Islam and Democracy Coexist? A CrossNational Analysis of Islamic Institutions in the Muslim World. PhD Dissertation, The University of Arizona Adebayo, R. Ibrahim. 2010. “Islam, Democracy and Good Governance: A Glimpse of the Islamic Political Thought”, ORITA Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies, XLII, 2 December, pp. 1-24 Akram, Mian M. and Muhammad Afzal. 2014. “Dynamic Role of Zakat in Alleviating Poverty: A Case Study of Pakistan”, Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper, No. 56211, pp. 1-45 Akyol, Mustafa. 2009. “Islam is Compatible with Capitalism” in David M. Haugen, Susan Musser, and Kacy Lovelace (Eds.), Islam Opposing Viewpoints. Farmington Hills: Greenhaven Press Al-Braizat, Fares. 2002. “Muslims and Democracy: An Empirical Democratic Governance| 153 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Critique of Fukuyama’s Culturalist Approach”, International Journal of Sociology, 43, pp. 269-299 Ayubi, Nazih. 1998. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London: Routledge Bhuiyan, Abul Bashar, et al. 2012. “The Approaches of Islamic and Conventional Microfinancing for Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Livelihood”, American Journal of Applied Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 9, pp. 1385-1389 Dye, Thomas R. 1984.Understanding Public Policy.Fifth Edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Effendi, Jaenal. 2013. The Role of Islamic Microfinance in Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Awareness in Pasuruan, East Java, Indonesia: A Comparative Study. PhD Dissertation, Göttingen University Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. 1996. Islam and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press Farooq, Mohammad Omar. 2008. “The Challenge of Poverty and the Poverty of Islamic Economics”,Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 35-58 Fish, M. Steven. 2002. “Islam and Authoritarianism”, World Politics, Vol. 55 (October), pp. 4-37 Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Three Free Press (A Division of Macmillan, Inc.) Fukuyama, Francis. 2001. “The West Has Won: Radical Islam Can’t Beat Democracy and Capitalism”, The Guardian, 11 October Güner, Osman. 2005. “Poverty in Traditional Islamic Thought: Is It Virtue or Captivity?”,Studies in Islam and the Middle East Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1-12 Hashem, Mazen. 2007. “Islamic Roots of Good Governance”, Arab Insight, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 63–71 Huntington, Samuel P. 1984. “Will More Countries Become Democratic?”, Political Science Quarterly, 99, pp. 193-218 Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press Ibrahim, Patmawati BTE HJ. 2006. Economic Role of Zakat in Reducing 154 |Democratic Governance Ridho Al-Hamdi. How Do Islam and... Income Inequality and Poverty in Selangor. PhD Dissertation, Universiti Putra Malaysia Iqbal, Zafar and Mervyn K. Lewis. 2002. Governance and Corruption: Can Islamic Societies and the West Learn from Each Other?”,The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 1-33 IMF. 1997. Good Governance: The IMF’s Role. Washington DC IMF. 2014. Factsheet: The IMF and Good Governance. Washington DC Jenkins, W.I. 1978. Policy Analysis: A Political and Organizational Perspective. New York: St. Martin’s Press Katsir, Ibnu. 1999. Tafsir Al-Qur’an al-‘Azim, Cairo: Daar al-Manar Kedourie, Elie. 1992. Politics in the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press Khatab, Sayed and Gary D. Bouma. 2007. Democracy in Islam. London and New York: Routledge Latief, Hilman. 2012. Islamic Charities and Social Activism: Welfare, Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia. PhD Dissertation, Utrecht University Lewis, Bernard. 2002. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response. Oxford: Oxford University Press Malik, Sohail J., Muhammad Hussain, and Nasim S. Shirazi. 1994. “Role of Infaq in Poverty Alleviation in Pakistan”, The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 33, No. 4 Part II (Winter), pp. 935-952 Moussalli, Ahmad S. 2001. The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida Naqvi,Imran Haider, et al. 2011. “The Model of Good Governance in Islam”, African Journal of Business Management, Vol. 5, No.27, pp. 10984-10992 Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2003. “Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis”, in Ronald Inglehart (Ed.),Human Values and Social Change.Findings from the Values Surveys. Leiden: Brill Rashidi, Siavash and Mohammadbager Babaei. 2014. “Administrative Corruption: The Contexts and Strategies (A Comparative Study of the Muslim and the West Perspectives)”, International SAMANM Journal of Finance and Accounting, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 16-24 Democratic Governance| 155 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Richardson, Gail. 2004. “Islamic Law and Zakat: Waqf Resources in Pakistan” in Stephen P. Heyneman (Ed.), Islam and Social Policy. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press Riwajanti, Nur Indah. 2014. “Exploring the Role of Islamic Microfinance Institution in Poverty Alleviation Through Microenterprises Development: A Case Study of Islamic Financial Cooperative (BMT) in Indonesia”, Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 7 (March), pp. 49–66 Sabiq, Sayyid. 1998. Fiqhu As-Sunnah. Cairo: Darus-Salam Sabra, Adam. 2000. Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt 1250-1517. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Tessler, Mark. 2002. “Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes toward Democracy in the Arab World: Evidence for the World Values Survey in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria”, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 43, pp. 229-249 UNDP. 1997a. Human Development Report 1997. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press UNDP. 1997b. Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document. New York UNDP. 2010. Democratic Governance Indicators and UNDP Human Development Reports: Framework Paper 3. Oslo: UNDP Oslo Governance Centre UNDP. 2011. “Anti-Corruption and Democratic Governance”. Fastfacts (November). New York World Bank. 1992. Governance and Development. Washington D.C World Bank. 1994. Governance: The World Bank Experience. Washington D.C World Bank. 1997. Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of World Bank. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management The World Bank World Bank. 2000. Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy. September World Bank. 2001. World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. Oxford: Oxoford University Press World Bank. 2014. World Development Indicators 2014. Washington D.C 156 |Democratic Governance BUILD COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE MODEL TO SUSTAINABLE TOURISM DEVELOPMENT: LEARNING FROM THE DISASTER MANAGEMENTTOURISM MERAPI VOLCANO TOUR IN SLEMAN REGENCY Muchamad Zaenuri Lecturer, Department of Governmental Studies Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta E-mail: e_zaenuri@yahoo.co.id INTRODUCTION The important role of tourism in sustainable development is not in doubt. Most countries manage tourism seriously and make it a dominant sector in foreign exchange earnings, employment creation, and poverty alleviation. The tourism sector is one of the largest sectors in the world as an economic generator, but its existence is very vulnerable to disasters caused by nature or humans. According to Henderson (1999: 1), tourism is an industry that is always ‘haunted’ by crises and disasters and can even be considered as extremely sensitive and vulnerable because it is easily influenced by changes and happenings around it. Tourism can grow because the decision to travel starts from human intentions to acquire the comforts of life and enjoy the beauty of the environment, thus highly vulnerable to the tourism community in disaster risk perception and environmental fluctuations caused by climate change. Everyone will travel when the tour visits destinations which are free from crises, disasters, extreme weather disturbances and riots. Moreover, disaster is also an event that is unpredictable and unavoidable, as well as its appearance in different form of intensity. This is in line with what is proposed by Wickramashinge (2008: 2) that the revival of tourism is characterized by complexity and some of the criteria are not aligned with disaster, meaning that tourism could rise and flourish when kept away from disaster. Indonesia is not only known for its natural beauty and diverse tourist destinations but also its vulnerability to natural disasters. The 157 Part Three: Governance and Leadership country is also known as “Ring of Fire” since it has the largest number of volcanoes in the world which are always in state of alert, ranging from Mount Merapi, Sinabung, Lokon, Rinjani, and so on. Moreover, natural disasters have colored the history of Indonesia, ranging from earthquakes followed by tsunami in Aceh, the earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java, flood in Jakarta, and many more disasters such as landslides and forest burning that cause thick smoke covering some area of Indonesia’s land. Not to mention accidents which happened in the transportation sector, ranging from land transportation such as rail accidents, water transportation such as shipwreck, and air transportation with several aircraft crashes. Indonesia’s region is located at the confluence of several faults continent, causing Indonesia prone to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunami. This surely affects the number of tourist arrivals to Indonesia. Head of the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) Rusman Heriawan admits that natural disasters occurred in Indonesia such as the tsunami in Mentawai and the eruption of Mount Merapi indeed has an impact on the number of tourists who visit Indonesia (Kompas.com, November 9, 2010). In a more specific case, the number of tourists visiting to DIY (Special Region of Jogjakarta) during the 2005-2011 period was quite volatile and heavily influenced by macro-economic conditions and external factors such as natural disasters. The number of tourists to the region experienced a decrease twice in 2006 as the impact of the earthquake and in 2010 as a result of the eruption of Merapi. Based on statistics, during 2011 the number of tourists visiting Yogyakarta 3.2 million, consisting of 3.058 million domestic tourists and foreign tourists 148.76 thousand (CPM DIY, 2012). Yet, during the eruption of Mount Merapi, the number of tourists visiting the region dropped dramatically until 80 percent (DIY BPS, 2012). The same experience took place in Sleman, one of the districts located in the northern province of DIY. Sleman is a district with many interesting sights and attractions. At the end of 2010, Mount Merapi, which largely occupies Sleman territory, erupted. As a consequence, both the local government and the society really experienced the 158 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... devastating impact of the eruption, particularly those directly damaged by the disaster. Although the eruption has now ceased, but some problems remain, whether it is social problems or economic problems experienced by the society living around Mount Merapi. Disaster-tourism has been misinterpreted and risen controversies as it seems unethical. The term is closely identical with having fun above other people’s misery. In an article presented at the Ecotourism Seminar II, Prof. Heddy Sri Ahimsa says that various disaster-tourism controversy not only takes place in Indonesia but also in the United States such as in the areas most severely damaged by Carolline, a storm that swepth away its surroundings. In Indonesia, the emergence of the concept of disaster-tourism came from the earthquake that devastated several villages in Bantul and Klaten a few years ago and also the eruption of Mount Merapi, which had killed Mbah Maridjan, a cultural-bound caretaker of the mountain who suddenly became a well-known public figure after being a survivor in the Merapi eruption before the devastating eruption in 2010. The place that received impact from the eruption of Mount Merapi was able to attract tourists on its own (Ahimsa, 2012). The emergence of the new tourist attraction in Sleman which belongs to disaster-tourism, on the one hand, provides some benefits; yet, on the other hand, seeing from the perspectives of the local government and the society, such tourism may lead to new problems. In terms of the government’s regulation, the government of Sleman Regency experiences an emptiness of rules in the form of community relocation and land use, while the society are faced with many businessmen who start buying lands around the affected areas to be used as tourist facilities. The land that becomes the new tourist attraction reaches 80% of the former, abandoned communal land (Village Potential Entry List Umbulharjo, 2013); yet, its utility for the purposes of tourism remains an issue until today. The local government is less able to cope with these issues. Based on an interview with the Head of Tourism Development, Sleman Office of Culture and Tourism (March 23, 2014) and based on data taken from the author’s self observation, it is revealed that since the eruption took Democratic Governance| 159 Part Three: Governance and Leadership place until setting the location of the eruption as a tourist destination, the local government fails to demonstrate its capacity to manage the newly nature-created tourist spot resulted by the disaster. The Sleman government puts its focus more on the mitigation and relocation of the residents affected by the eruption of Merapi. Its work on the tourist attraction is still limited to provision of signs that indicate which place is safe and not safe. However, though the work on mitigation and relocation is accomplished, the tourist spot remains untouched by the government as human resources who have the capacity of working on it is not available. As the Merapi eruption bringing a new and exciting travel destination, local people participate by forming small communities that provide volcano tours by driving a jeep and a trail vehicle. However, based on the author’s observation and some information from the local police office, the level of security of those facilities cannot be guaranteed with some number of accidents though no casualties (Source: http://m.aktual.co/nusantara/161221sleman-akan-adakantour-citystate-of-volcano). Moreover, some people attempts to build a museum called “What’s Left” that contains items that no longer functions as a result of hot clouds of Merapi. Yet, the operational purposes of the museum is not professionally managed and not supported by adequate human resources, making it less attractive to visit (Kedaulatan Rakyat, January 12, 2012). The tourism industry is attempting to capture some interesting opportunities. Investors started to build hotels around the area of the Merapi eruption, while travel agencies started to make the slopes of Merapi as a travel package by creating options of tour packaging. Some parties in the tourism industry had already begun to invest, but it still raises doubts about the sustainability of this volcano tour. One reason that will potentially drop the interest of the the investors is the absence of guarantee that the site will serve as the next tourist attraction. Another reason is that there is no clear information on which areas that could be managed commercially. Moreover, there is no clear road map from the government for the development of tourism in the future volcano. Until now the government has not issued any new official letter regarding the management of tourist volcano, while the management is supposed 160 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... to end their work by December 31, 2011, two years since the first appointment. This situation encourages the local village government to take over its management (Jogja Daily, Monday, January 9, 2012). The role of the three pillars of the tourism stakeholders is not optimal. It is still merely adjusting the environmental changes that occur, especially local governments and communities, as it has not focused on sustainable tourism development. Meanwhile, the private sector seems to be looking at the best moment to market the new tourist attraction and destination as an alternative excursion. Problems that occur among the three actors of the tourism is the absence of synergy that leads to the development of sustainable and accelerating tourism. Moreover, it can be seen that there is a conflict of interest between the role of government, private and public. Seeing from the perspective of Public Administration, there is a need to develop new collaborative approach among the three pillars of the governance. The need for new approaches for managing disaster-tourism is based on the fact that the three pillars of governance have not realized their shared vision in managing tourist destinations. For instance, the government does not want Kepuharjo village to develop into a tourist destination but prefer to establish a sand mining. This was confirmed by the fact the the government no longer issue a permission to manage the volcano tour in the region Kepuharjo village to any parties. Moreover, community participation in the management of disaster tourism is seen as sporadic and unstructured, making it difficult to establish a synergistic network among tourism stakeholders. Harsana’s study (2013) shows that the volcano tour management which involves many people have not been backed up by a solid organization and human resources. Harsana proposes that there is a need for a permanent and long-term partnership to manage this disaster-tourism. In general, Harsana concludes that there is still the need for excavation of tourism potential in the area of Merapi volcano tour with most of the people involved. Based on the facts previously mentioned, the following research problems are proposed: (1) How is the concept of governance applied to the tourism sector? (2) How can the concept of collaborative Democratic Governance| 161 Part Three: Governance and Leadership governance explain the management of tourism-disaster? (3) Who and what are the role of stakeholders in collaborative governance? (4) How is the existing condition model of collaborative governance on disastertourism? (5) What model that can be suggested so that collaborative governance can fully support the disaster-tourism? THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK The Concept of Governance in Tourism The tourism management and development was initially carried out by the government alone. Yet, with the increasing of public demand for tourism services that the government can no longer function as the single actor, particularly when it is faced with disasters, the private sector and community involvement in providing tourism services is inevitable. This condition makes it possible to look at the tourism issue from the perspective of governance. The concept of governance has a long history with most countries having tried to develop this concept in accordance with their own needs through the interaction between the rulers and ruled with regard to historical background, customs, law and society where the concept was developed. The origin of governance rooted in the German tradition in the 17th century and the 18th century. The 19th century marked the establishment of associations such as trade unions to encourage people to participate in politics and government (Kim, 2010). Currently, the concept of governance has evolved even further due to the changing role of government (Kjaer, 2004). The governance etymologically is different from government as governance involves a complex interaction among various stakeholders in the public arena(Clayton, 1994). On the other side, government only refers to the role of government as asingle actor. Some experts define governance eas the newgoverning process in which various actors manages the public arena through mutual interaction (Kjaer, 2004). For the purposes of preparinghis dissertation, Kim (2010: 51) identified several definitions of governance as follows: 162 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... Box 1 Some Definitions on Governance ‘Governance’ refers to changing the meaning of governance (government), leading to the new process of how to set the government ....governance refers to the organization of independent, inter-organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, and the rules or significant autonomy from state (Rhodes, 1997: 15) ‘Governance’ refers to the capacity of directing the political system, the ways the government to do things without making assumptions first before obtaining the direction of the institution or agency (Gamble, 2000: 110) ‘Governance’ refers to maintain coordination and coherence of different actors with different objectives, among others, the purpose of political actors and institutions, the interests of companies, civil society organizations and transnational (Pierre, 2000a: 4) ‘Governance’ is understood as a system of rules to activities that are desired collectively by using a mechanism designed to ensure the safety, prosperity, coherence, stability, and continuity (Rosenau 2000: 171) ‘Governance’ is a descriptive label that is used to look at the changing nature of the policy process in recent decades. In particular, growing sensitivity in various arenas and actors involved in the making of public policy (Richard andSmith, 2002:2) ‘Governance’ refers to the creation and maintenance of a system of rules that govern the public arena by involving the state, civil society and marketbased actors to relate and interact with each other (Hyden et al., 2004: 16) Source: Adapted from Kim (2010: 51). From the aforementioned, various definitions, with regard to the concept of governance as the new process set up in the public arena, there are two different viewpoints: “governance without government” (Rhodes, 1996: 652) and “governance by more than one government” (Kjaer, 2004: 44). Specifically, Rhodes (1997) focuses on the selforganizing network that is based on the interdependence between stakeholders and a high degree of autonomy. Against this view, Kjaer (2004: 58) suggests that governance is pluralistic and hierarchically complex dealing with markets and networks because it is believed that the hierarchy, market and networks coexist in the government. Pierre (2000) also considers that governance is a new strategy for the Democratic Governance| 163 Part Three: Governance and Leadership restructuring of the country based on public-private coordination. In this perspective, the government still plays an important role in helping to build and maintain a variety of institutions, including markets, and adjusts to new circumstances (Pierre, 2000; Gamble, 2000). With regard to these two different views, Hyden et al. (2004) argue that there has been a general shift from top-down process by governments to the bottom-up by the relevant stakeholders because citizens have grown and have many demands. The application of the concept of governance in tourism has been put forward by Pitana (2005: 96-97) in discussing the actors involved and cooperate in the tourism system. The concept of the actors involved in the tourism system is actually referring to the three pillars of governance. This can be seen in the following figure: Figure 3.3.In theTourism SectorThree PillarsGovernance Source: Pitana, 2005. In the system of tourism, there are many actors who play different roles in moving the system. The actors are the perpetrators of tourism in various circles. In general, these actors are grouped into three main pillars, namely government, private and public. Included in the government group is the government in various administrative areas, ranging from the central government to local governments to village government that serves as a regulator or facilitator; private group 164 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... includes the association of tourism enterprises and entrepreneurs/ tourism industry as direct perpetrators of tourist services; and the community includes public figures, specific community groups, intellectuals, NGOs and the media that support tourism. The concept of governance in tourism has led to the establishment of partnerships among the three pillars of governance and is practically proven in leading to improvements in the management of tourism. The concept of partnership itself in the tourism still needs to be studied more in depth because the partnership is part of a wider concept of governance, namely collaborative governance. The Concept of Collaborative Governance Contemporary public issues are very diverse and complex largely, thus difficult to be solved by any single government actor (Huxham, 2000). Therefore, most people in the world are trying to manage their public affairs collectively to achieve the goal of sustainable tourism development. This indicates that there has been a fundamental shift from government to governance due to challenges such as globalization, decentralization, technology development, climate change and disasters as well as the growth of civil society. However, the process of governance that gives an opportunity for the involvement of non-governmental actors in public affairs is faced with a dilemma. One fundamental problem is that the government serves as a strong actor who always dominates the role (Innes and Booher, 2004). To resolve this dilemma participation, the government must engage the new concept of collaborative governance. In the 1990s, the paradigm of collaborative governance as a new paradigm to address the diverse issues in a complex society began to develop. At this paradigm, the basic principle is the equality of relationships between stakeholders in the public sector, private sector and society based on consensus through deliberation (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Huxam, 2000; Innes & Booher, 2004; Anshel & Gash, 2008). Collaborative governance is a concept that may represent the principles of modern governance among the various areas of governance. This is because the capacity of consensus building is able to overcome most of the contemporary issues in communities where Democratic Governance| 165 Part Three: Governance and Leadership residents are given a chance to control their lives through negotiations with other actors (Innes and Booher, 2004). According to the English dictionary, “collaboration” means “involving people or groups working together to produce something” and “governance” is “the process of governing a country or organization” (Oxford University Press, 2004). Ansell and Gash (2008: 544) defines the collaborative government as “governance set up where one or more public agencies directly involved stakeholders of non-state in the process of collective decision making formal, consensus-oriented and deliberation and which aims to make or implement public policy or managing public assets”. In terms of concept, collaborative governance can be defined as a new form of governance processes that involve all the different stakeholders in a working relationship with each other through regular dialogue and interaction in the pursuit of common goals (Innes and Booher, 2004; Huxham 2000). The main role of collaborative governance is to encourage all stakeholders in order to achieve a common goal by sharing different resources in order to create innovative thinking through negotiation and cooperation (Innes and Booher, 2004). On further developments, many scholars are interested to develop further understanding of this collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007: 543-571). With the aim to elaborate contingency model of collaborative governance, they conducted a meta-analysis study of 137 cases that discuss collaborative governance. The results of their literature study conclude that collaborative governance is a governance set up one or more public institutions directly involved in both state and non-state, including stakeholders, in the process of collective decision making formal, consensus-oriented and discussion. This is similar to the concept proposed by Cullen (2000) that in order to achieve competitive governance there is a need for consensus among the pillars of governance. The aim of the collaboration is to create or implement public policies and managing public programs or assets in order to address the complex problems more quickly based on participation and a strong network. The concept of governance puts emphasis on the values of cooperation. Different experts have tried to explain the phenomenon of collaboration in the implementation of government affairs and services under the term “collaborative government” (Sink, 1998; Peter, 1998; Fosler, 2002; Ansell 166 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... and Gash, 2007) and “partnership governance” (Bovaird, 2004; Munro, 2008; Dwiyanto, 2012). To understand the concept of collaborative governance, it is necessary to explore the term “collaboration” more detail in order to reveal the reasons why collaboration is important in modern governance and how it can be achieved. Currently, collaboration has become an important instrument for public management as to encourage the different stakeholders to understand their differences and to achieve common goals by combining human and material resources (Lasker et al., 2001). In particular, collaboration between stakeholders can provide an adequate solution to complex issues such as social inequalities (Flynn, 2007). The concept of collaboration can be classified into three types (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002), namely, in the form of a formal contract between the organization and the law, informal networks within individual relationships based on trust and reciprocity, and associated with longterm partnerships and joint formal consensus decision making and implementation. Collaborative relationships such as networks have been developed since the 1990s as a result of fragmentation of the new political environment, decentralization, restructuring, and challenges faced by the country such as globalization, internationalization and privatization (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). This shows that the complexity, dynamics and diversity in our society has brought a fundamental shift from hierarchical to a network (Newman et al., 2004). Sink (1998: 23) explains that the collaborative process among organizations with common interest in a particular issue attempt to find solutions that are determined collectively in order to achieve goals they could not achieve individually. Peter (1998: 34) says that in a collaborative partnership, principal-agent relationship is not valid because the form of partnership is the cooperation between the principal to principal. Fosler (2002) explains in more detail that the collaborative partnership involving intensive cooperation between the parties, including the existence of a conscious effort to do alignment in goals, strategies, agendas, resources and activities. It involves two institutions that basically have a different purpose to build a shared vision and attempt to make it happen. In order to achieve collaborative governance, the two should share a common vision that will convince stakeholders regarding the future of the institutions. Under the Democratic Governance| 167 Part Three: Governance and Leadership common vision, every component of the two is willing to fully participate in various affairs in the future. Both organizations, which basically have different purposes, develop shared vision and together the organizations try to realize the vision. Public and private parties are given chance to participate in the decision making process and in the management of public affairs. Participation can foster democratic governance involving the wider community from all walks of life to determine the public agenda (Newman, 2004) and be a form of transparency in fostering good governance (Kim, 2005). Regarding the benefits of collaboration, Lasker et al. (2001) states that collaboration can make an idea comprehensive, practical and transformative. In particular, the transformative thinking is very important because it can make people change the way they think when they interact with other stakeholders who have different purposes and culture. Through the creation of ways of thinking, collaboration can influence how problems are recognized and addressed. However, there are few catalysts and barriers to collaboration, especially with regard to the way in which actors and organizations collaborate on cross-cutting issues. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 100-110) introduce the key factor to build up the capacity of the collaboration, including a skilled communicator who plays an important role in building relationships, facilitating and coordinating cooperation, and creating a strong link between the stakeholders based on individual capacity and organizational capacity. This shows the importance of systems and processes to encourage collaboration among stakeholders. On the other hand, Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 110-112) also describe some of the barriers to collaboration, such as different formal rules, informal norms, and different resources of various stakeholders. These barriers can potentially damage the capacity of collaboration as they will cause an imbalance of power and conflict. Although Bovaird (2004) and Munro (2008) mention collaboration as a partnership, in fact the two concepts have a substantive difference in that collaboration has a wider meaning than the partnership. According to Wildavsky, as quoted by Wanna (2008: 3), collaboration involves several different dimensions. First, the collaboration could involve co- 168 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... operation to establish similarity, improve consistency and harmonize activities between the actors. Second, collaboration can be a negotiation process, which involves a readiness to compromise and make trade-offs. Third, the collaboration could involve the role of supervision, inspection, pulling together and coordinating center. Fourth, collaboration can involve power and coercion, the ability to force or impose its own preferences to the other, to a certain extent, with compliance or involvement. Fifth, the collaboration may involve future commitments and intentions, the possibility of behaving, planning or preparation to align activities. Finally, collaboration can foster engagement, development of internal motivation and personal commitment to the activities, decisions, organizational goals or more strategic objectives. Of the six dimensions was not always running consistent or complementary to each other-indeed, but it can also be mutually exclusive. According to Wanna (2008: 3-5), collaboration must undergo stages that show the scale and intensity or degree of the collaboration, while partnerships do not. The scale of collaboration can be described as a ladder that shows an increased commitment from the lowest level of collaboration to the most complex and highest level of integration. The highest level of collaboration raises the risk of political and managerial which has already been a consensus, whereas a partnership would not pose any political and managerial risk. Table 2.2 shows the increase of the intensity. The following is a list of the level of cooperation that is relevant to the policy process and that indicate what activities are involved in each of the various levels. Tabel 3.2. Scale of Collaboration Degree of collaboration What is involved-activities Highest level: high normative commitment to collaboration; often highest political/managerial risks Transformative interaction between network actors; substantive engagement and empowerment; search for high degree of stakeholder and inter-actor consensus and cooperation; coalition building by government and non-government actors Medium-high level: strong normative orientation; high level of political/managerial risk Strong engagement of stakeholders in decisions or policy process and implementation; devolving decision-making capacities to clients; more complex innovations in policy-delivery processes Democratic Governance| 169 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Degree of collaboration What is involved-activities Medium-level: commitment to multiparty input and buy-in; moderate levels of political/ managerial risk Formal commitment to inter-agency consultation and collaboration; joined government strategies; formal joint involvement exercises and joint funding initiatives Medium-low level: operational forms of collaboration to ‘get job done’; some political/managerial risk Forms of co-production: technical improvements in delivery chains; assistance to comply with obligations; direct consultation with clients over delivery and compliance systems; systematic use of evaluation data; public reporting on targets informed by client preferences Lowest level: marginal operational adjustments, low levels of political/managerial risk Incremental adjustments using consultative processes; client discussions and feedback mechanisms; gaining information on needs/expectations of others Source: Wanna (2008:4). From the table it can be seen that the intensity of collaboration shown by the scale range from the lowest level to the highest one. The lowest scale contains risk of political or managerial lower with marginal operations, so that activities that occur are still incremental in the form of consultation and discussion to obtain input and information. Moreover, those who collaborate can formulate an idea and hope to achieve a picture of the future together. While the highest scale of collaboration contains high political and managerial which lead to normative commitment, so the activities have been directed to transformative interaction and substantive empowerment. The form of the activities carried out among the actors is tangible coalition between the government and non-governmental parties based on the principles of cooperation and consensus. The concept put forward by Wanna is further clarified by Shergold (2008: 13-22) that the concept of collaborative governance is a transformative process from a direct-instruction relationship type towards the type which satisfy the principles collaboration. The following table shows the types of relationship: Table 3.3.The Transformation Process of Collaboration Command The process of centralized control - with clear lines of hierarchical authority. Coordination The process of collective decision making – imposed on participating institutions. 170 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... Cooperation The process of sharing ideas and resources – for mutual benefit Collaboration The process of shared creation – brokered between autonomous institutions Source: Shergold, 2008:20. From the table it can be seen that in the beginning the collaboration between the government and other stakeholders is command in which the relationship is hierarchical with strong control from the government. In this stage, stakeholders are not involved in decision making. The next stage is the coordination in which a process of collective decision making between the government and other stakeholders is encouraged. Then in the next stage, the coordination has tranformed into a cooperation in which ideas and resources are shared for the sake of mutual benefits. Finally the final stage of the relationship is collaborative in that shared creation is formed with the establishment permanent and autonomous institutions. Stakeholders The concept of exposure indicates that the collaboration in tourism sector is getting stronger and the interdependence among stakeholders will be more capable in managing disaster tourism. There is a need to formally bring together a variety of stakeholders in a mutual interaction which tries to reach a common vision for the sake of sustainable development of tourism and to contribute to the improvement of people’s welfare. The government as key stakeholders in the governance of the sector is experiencing tremendous changes, thus necessary to identify who are other stakeholders in the governance of tourism. In the domain of tourism issues, there are a number of parties that influence and are influenced by the diversity, complexity and dynamics related to the issues in tourism. However, not all stakeholders are equally important; therefore, in order to assess and understand the interactions in collaborative governance of disaster-tourism it is necessary to identify the stakeholders involved and less involved (Adu-Ampong, 2012). In this case, the use of the concept of stakeholders needs to be encouraged because it gives an overview of the stakeholders that are considered important in the governance of disaster-tourism in the area. Democratic Governance| 171 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Success or failure of the implementation of collaborative models of governance is highly dependent on the participation of stakeholders (Kooiman, 2000; Newman, 2004). It is clear that the stakeholders to the concept of governance are certainly the government, private and public. The development of this concept of collaborative governance should be mentioned at least one question to identify appropriate stakeholders, i.e. who can be considered as stakeholders (Adu-Ampong, 2012: 16). In a normative concept proposed by Donaldson and Preston (1995: 74) the three stakeholders are considered to be a reason for identifying the stakeholders. The essence of the concept of Donaldson and Preston (1995) in this study is the need to identify the interests of all stakeholders in the domain of disaster-tourism problems. Not all stakeholders can engage in collaborative governance on this disaster-tourism, so it is urged to clarify the concept of stakeholders for identifying and understanding the interests of all stakeholders. In identifying the stakeholders involved in the tourism sector, Mitchell et al (1997) propose three elements that can be used as a condition whether individuals or groups can be considered as stakeholders. They argue that individuals or groups could be considered as stakeholders if they have the three elements of power, legitimacy and urgency; these elements determine the extent to which individuals or groups have significance as a stakeholder. These elements also identify the dynamics of the interaction between and among stakeholders. So in the tourism domain-disaster problems, stakeholders should be considered are those that are the real power in the form of some authority, has the legitimacy to engage the management of tourism and / or that have a direct influence on the governance of the tourism sector. The use of these three characteristics in defining stakeholders can also be used to describe the intensity among stakeholders (Adu-Ampong, 2012: 19). With the involvement of different intensity in the management of tourism, Clarkson (1995) divides stakeholders into primary and secondary. Key stakeholders are individuals or groups whose support are crucial to the survival and functioning of the organization and the tourism sector; secondary stakeholders as individuals or groups are considered not essential to the survival of the organization,; yet, in the past, present or future they can influence or be influenced by the organization. 172 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... Stakeholders of Merapi Volcano Tours The Merapi volcano tours cover the region in which there are many potential tourist attractions which require the involvement of all stakeholders including the government, private and public. The involvement of those stakeholders is certainly not equal in terms of intensity. Some are directly involved in the management, while others do not have chance to directly participate in the management. Stakeholders who have a direct involvement are so-called primary stakeholders, while those who indirectly involve in the management belong to secondary stakeholders. The Government (State and Local Government) It is undeniable that the role of government in regulating and developing Merapi volcano tour is very large, especially in giving direction and guidance to players of tour business. Although the region largely belongs to disaster-prone areas and local governments are unable to regulate everything, the responsibility for risk and community development remains on the shoulders of the government. The part of the government which is involved directly in the management of this disaster-tourism is the Office of Culture and Tourism (Disbudpar, Sleman Regency. In accordance with the statement of the head of the agency, local governments routinely provide briefing or training to the community, including providers of tourist services. This is important as half of the service providers are managed by people who lack knowledge and tourist services. To ensure the quality of the service, the local government provides many short trainings. The trainings involve various speakers who share more on tourism with regards to aspects of disaster management. The Regent’s accident when he and his team went around the area with a jeep car can be a lesson. At that time, one person suffered injury and had to undergo treatment at the hospital. Meanwhile, the secondary stakeholders are Regional Disaster Management Center of Sleman, Department of Tourism of Yogyakarta and Indonesian government. Though an indirect one, the Regional Disaster Management Center of Sleman gives a constant reminder that based on some regulations, one of them is the 2014 Presidential Decree Democratic Governance| 173 Part Three: Governance and Leadership number 70, the slopes of Mount Merapi belongs to protected area(L.1), which means that should be no permanent buildings and permanent tourism activity around. BPBD doen not strictly implement the rule; yet, tourism stakeholders must pay attention to the behavior or status of Mount Merapi. The role of government is focused on things that are regulative and provides guidance to tourism actors. The role of the central government has been clear with the existence of regulations, such as law, government regulations and ministerial decrees. There has been no single specific guidane on the management of tourism around Merapi Mount; yet, there have been several trainings on disaster management, particularly in post-disaster phase after the eruption. From the description, it can be identified several stakeholders from the government involved in the management of the Merapi volcano tour, either directly or indirectly, as follows: Table 3.4.Stakeholders from Government No Stakeholder 1 Primary 2 Secondary Organization Role Office of Culture and Tourism, Sleman Regency Presentingthe rulesof a technical nature and do tourism human resource development BPBDs Sleman, Yogyakarta Tourism Office, the Central Government Providing regulation of a general nature. Source: PrimaryDataProcessed. Tourism Industry (Travel Agents and Lodging Providers) The tourism industry around Merapi volcano tour is more on providing tour packages tour by visiting the post-disaster tourist attractions. Attractions made the goal more reliant on natural attractions. A tour package is based on the extent of ODTW visited by driving a jeep as a means of transportation other travel. Many tour players sell tour packages related to the exotic tourist attraction after the eruption of Merapi. Tourism stakeholders from the private sector are the primary nature of the tourism entrepreneurs in the form of travel agents and 174 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... accommodation providers. Either actors or primary stakeholder is the cutting edge in providing tourist services that need to obtain guidance from the government to provide the best service. As the economic power to support the tourism business, the primary stakeholder is trying to collaborate with the government with the principles of mutuality and mutual benefit. Regulation that allows them to carry out tourism activities is a must. Travel agencies conduct a lot of events of which purpose is to promote their Mount Merapi tour package. These travel agencies work together with tour operators located in the volcanic area to create tour package where tourists can explore the slopes of Mount Merapi, particularly the areas affected by Mount Merapi eruption. Private agencies actively promote tourism spots in Sleman, Yogyakarta, particularly the area around Mount Merapi affected by the eruption. Tour package that allows tourists to explore the area is the most popular and frequently booked tour package. Both online and offline promotion are conducted to sell the tour package; online promotion is done through website or blogs, while offline promotion is done by distributing brochures and leaflets in some hotels. Besides exploring the area around Mount Merapi destroyed by the eruption, tour agencies also promote another tour package where tourists ride off-road motor vehicles to explore Mount Merapi area. Collaboration between government and private organizations emphasize on the understanding of safety and comfort concept during the tour. In order to guarantee tourist’s safety and comfort, the government works together with the police department to provide counseling and assistance in tourism service operation. Lodging and accommodation business also participate actively to ensure tourist’s comfort. The attempt motel and hotel owners do to promote their businesses is limited to distributing brochures and leaflets. Most accommodations around Mount Merapi are inns or home stays, and, as the consequences, facilities provided are fairly simple and natural, similar to the theme of the tour package being offered. Mrs. Sri Murwaningsih who is the owner of “Tunas Mekar” inn, one of the lodging facilities in the area, has made her place conduct Democratic Governance| 175 Part Three: Governance and Leadership various promotional activities, provide culture-based service and emphasize on personal touch. Primary collaborators are business persons in tourism sectors mainly travel agencies and owners of lodging facilities. Both of them or primary stakeholders are leaders in providing necessary tourism service and the ones who should get directions from the government in order to provide the best service. As economic strength that supports tourism sector, primary stakeholders should work together with the government on the basis of mutualism or collaboration beneficial for both sides. Having regulations that ease them to conduct tourism service is a necessity. Another type of collaboration between motel or the homestay owners and local government is mainly to strengthen tourism organization or develop human resources in tourism sector. Strengthening tourism organization is done through the establishment of an organization for all motel or homestay owners around the volcanic tour so that it is easier for them to contact the government and provide service to the tourists. The development of human resources is mainly in the form of increasing capacity and improving competence to provide a better tourism service. Human resource in tourism sector training of which topic is living harmoniously with volcano was conducted some time ago. In line with the demand of tourism business, Association of Indonesian Tour and Travel Agency of Yogyakarta (secondary stakeholder) keeps motivating and becomes a facilitator whenever there is a problem between business persons in tourism sector and the government or the society. The collaborators works together to develop better tourism sector in Sleman; however up until now strong coordination has not been established and, as the effect, the collaboration fails to work effectively. The business persons feel that they need more directions or guidance from the government as the one who issues regulations and authorities. Clear regulation is the main aspiration of motel and homestay owners and innovative promotion is the major issue travel agencies have to deal with. It is indeed that both issues should be consulted to the regional government of Sleman as the tourism management. However, the role and participation of private sectors cannot be neglected because they have relatively big impact in carrying out business activities in tourism sector. It can be seen from the impact caused by the role of the private sectors. 176 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... Related to the eruption of Mount Merapi, Association of Indonesian Tour and Travel Agency has taken some actions especially in recovery image that Yogyakarta is safe for tourists. Furthermore, regulations about disaster-tourism should be more clearly in order to ease its promotion. In terms of organization, there is no hierarchical relation between Association of Indonesian Tour and Travel Agency and tourism agencies, but they have the same purpose so that they can work together to face government regulations and promote tourism sector. The table explains the role of primary and secondary stakeholders. The table is as follow: Table 3.5.Private Collaborators No. Stakeholder 1. Primary 2. Secondary Organization Role Travel agency and motel and homestay owners Conduct promotion and provide tourism service Association of Indonesian Tour and Travel Agency Provide direction and counseling to business persons in tourism sector Source: Primary Data Society (Tourism Agency Group and Management Team) Public participation in tourism sector is inevitable since groups of people belong to different organization participate actively in providing tourism service, for example providing tourism facilities or selling souvenirs. Primary stakeholders in providing the service are majority of people involving groups that provides jeeps, off-road vehicles and some other groups of people who join tourism awareness group. Jeep provider group are people who rent their jeep so that the tourists can explore Mount Merapi volcanic tour. The group belongs to an organization facilitated by some people. There are four groups as provider namely 86 MJTC, Grinita, STMJ and JWP. All of them provide the same tour package with the same price in order to avoid unhealthy competition. There are three regular tour packages provided by the group namelyshort, medium and long. Meanwhile, there are two special tour packages namely long tour and watching sunrise in the morning as well as night special packet enabling tourists to enjoy night atmosphere of Yogyakarta. Besides that, there is off-road motor vehicle group with forty five members. The group has one organization, GMTC. Exploring the Democratic Governance| 177 Part Three: Governance and Leadership volcanic area of Mount Merapi using off-road motor vehicle is more challenging because one can ride his/ her own motorbike. Motorbike allows its renter to explore more routes compared to jeep. Other groups of people with direct participation in providing tourism service are food and souvenir vendors. These groups provide direct service to the tourists to fulfill their immediate need. Public component as secondary stakeholders Mount Merapi volcanic tour management team established from all elements of the society. In order to enable collaboration between all related parties, the regional government of Sleman, Yogyakarta gives freedom to the local government of Umbulharjo, a village located in the foot of Mount Merapi and the society to establish management team of Mount Merapi volcanic tour. Based on the Recommendation Letter from the Head of Sleman Municipality number 556/0063 issued on January 12, 2011 about the management of Mount Merapi volcanic tour extended by Extended Recommendation Letter number 590/ 590 issued on March 8, 2011, it has been clear who is responsible for the management of the tourism spot. As further action of the recommendation letter from the head of the municipality, based on the letter of the Secretary of the Region number 556/0373 about the management of Mount Merapi volcanic tour area, it has become really obvious that the local government of Umbulhardjo is the one to manage the area and the government should establish a team of management. Based on the letter from the Secretary of Region, the head of Umbulhardjo village takes further action by issuing village regulation. Based on the 2012 village regulation number 4 issued on April 12, 2012 about the management of Mount Merapi volcanic tour area in Umbulhardjo, several issues related to the management of the area are addressed. Based on the regulation, local public figure, youth and authority should be a part of the management team of Volcanic Tour tourism area in Umbulhardjo. The team initially is secondary stakeholders whose management roles include planning, organizing, implementing and evaluating all services available in Mount Merapi volcanic tour. The team is responsible for managing tourism areas included in high-risk disaster area. The team answers to the head of Umbulhardjo village and should 178 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... make an annual report. Providing all facilities in the form of attraction, amenity and accessibility also becomes the responsibility of the team. The involvement of stakeholders in managing Mount Merapi volcanic tour is still needed considering that the management team established by the local government of Umbulhardjo has a little experience and limited human resource, in terms of experience and competence. Most of the members of Umbulhardjo’s management team are public figures with senior high school diploma, some of them even have only junior high school diploma, and none of them has any experience in tourism sector. The management of disaster-tourism performed by the management team has yet showed satisfying result and the team still relies heavily on several parties. When identified, there are some stakeholders that facilitate the management and service of disastertourism. It is described in the following chart: Figure 3.4. Stakeholder’s Participation in Volcanic Tour from the Society Source: Primary Data, modified. So far, management team works together only with certain tourism service providers for example the jeep drivers, off-road motor vehicle owners, souvenir vendors, tour guides and owners of the food stall. The coordination these groups have involves making lists of types of products they offer, as well as their prices and discussing some regulations established by the Department of Culture and Tourism of Sleman, Yogyakarta. The management does not have any authority to manage the stakeholders associated with it. Any issues related to the Democratic Governance| 179 Part Three: Governance and Leadership tourism service should always be discussed with the management team. There was some criticism related to the lack of involvement from the society especially food and souvenir vendors. Interviews conducted to the food and souvenir vendors reveal the fact that the management team had never involved them from the beginning. At the beginning, in 2012, the management team is not certain whether or not the society could be involved as parts of the team because the society consists of various different local communities. However, some members of the management are criticized due to several issues, such as the lack of communication with the society even though the members of the management team are the representatives of the society or the public figures from the society. Most of the interviewees are not certain whether or not the management team can truly represent the real aspiration of the society living in the slopes of Mount Merapi. In the beginning of 2012, when the management team has just been established, the management team had actually involved the society. They recruited the members of the local youth organization (karang taruna) and the head of hamlet, a small group of society in a village. Based on the observations, the management team is showing bias elite where none of the management team members are the representatives of the tourism service providers although they are the ones who really understand the situation around the slopes of Mount Merapi and interact with the tourists. Thus, the opinions saying that the management is dominated by the village elite are getting stronger. Table below describes the role of the society as the stakeholders. The table is as follows: Table 3.6.Stakeholders from the Society No. 1. 2. Stakeholder Organization Role Primary Community groups, i.e. tour guides, jeep drivers, offroad motor vehicle owners, souvenir vendors, food stalls Secondary Conduct coordination among Mount Merapi volcanic tour all related parties and manage management team Mount Merapi volcanic tour tourism service Source: Primary Data. 180 |Democratic Governance Provide tourism service and sell souvenirs Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... Existing Patterns of Disaster Tourism Collaboration Based on the role of the Three Pillars of Governance in the disastertourism management, a scheme can be develop to illustrate existing relationship between in all activities carried out by the stakeholders and the level of collaboration established in the framework of collaborative governance. The figure describes the scheme of the existing relationship or collaboration. Figure 3.5. Existing Model of Collaboration Source: Field Data Collection. Based on the model, one can conclude that disaster-tourism stakeholders involve the government, private and public sector. Among the three stakeholders, some of them are primary stakeholders, while some others are secondary stakeholders. The level of collaboration between the government and private and public sector still at the medium level, where the government gives some information about potential tourism spots while for the society, the government function as human resource developer so that the society can provide adequate tourism service. Coordinating role takes place in primary collaboration between the government and private sectors and the same role takes place between the government and the society. Meanwhile, the private sectors and the society work together to develop tour package and provide tourism service and this collaboration tends to be a cooperative one. In the secondary stakeholders, the government informs policies and regulations to the Association of Indonesian Tour and Travel Agency and Democratic Governance| 181 Part Three: Governance and Leadership provides assistance to Mount Merapi volcanic tour management team. The secondary collaboration between the government and private and public sectors is at the medium-low level and limited to the obedience to the policies. The association and management team work together with the government in order to run the tourism service smoothly. Since primary stakeholders play the major role in these collaborative activities, the following scheme illustrates the collaboration between primary stakeholders and some related partiesThe figure is as follows: Figure 3.6.Collaborative Transformation Model Source: Fielddata collection. Expected Collaboration Pattern Models existed on the field show several weaknesses, namely (1) there is not any institution that acts as primary stakeholders to manage the volcanic tour completely; (2) level of collaboration between stakeholders is either relatively low or medium low; (3) collaborative transformation is mostly in the form of coordination; (4) there is not any high-level stakeholder whose transformation is collaborative. Based on the weaknesses, recommendation about a model that is expected to increase the effectiveness of Mount Merapi volcanic tour management. The recommended model is to shift the position of management team as the center of all service in Mount Merapi volcanic tour. The management team is going to carry out all functions of management starting from planning, implementation and evaluation of all service in the volcanic tour. 182 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... Relationship is being built with all stakeholders until the ones at the high level and the transformation process taking place is a collaborative one. The figure describes the recommended model of collaborative transformation. Figure 3.7. Expected Collaborative Transformation Model Source: Primary Data, modified. CONCLUSION Collaborative governance is really suitable to use in disastertourism management as an attempt to support sustainable tourism growth. The model is used as an alternative to deal with limitation and declining local government capability. The model gives roles to non-government powers to participate in tourism management. Collaborative governance model has a long term and is a high-level correlation, where non-government powers and the government work together by sharing resources and risks. To be able to implement the model, it is essential to establish regulations that give central role towards management team. The regulations can be in the form of public policy of the government of Sleman, Yogyakarta giving full authority to the management team to develop programs and activities in Mount Merapi volcanic tour service. Democratic Governance| 183 Part Three: Governance and Leadership REFERENCES Adu-Ampong, Emmanuel Akwasi, 2012, “Tourism Governance and Regulation: Institutional Collaboration in the Central Region of Ghana”, International Institute of Social Sciences, Netherland. Ansell, Chris and Alison Gash, 2007. “Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice”, Journal of Public Administrasi Research and Theory 18 : 543-571. Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Sleman, 2012, Sleman Dalam Angka, Tidak Diterbitkan. Badan Pusat Statistik Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 2012, Statistik Pariwisata. Tidak Bovaird, T, 2004. “Public Private Partnership from Contested Concept to Prevalent Practice”, International Review of Administrative Science, 70 (2): 199-215. Bupati Sleman, 2011, “Surat Rekomendasi No. 556/0063 Tentang Pengelolaan Kawasan Wisata Volcano Tour Kecamatan Cangkringan”, Tertanggal 12 Januari 2011, Tidak Diterbitkan. Clarkson, M.B.E.(1995) ‘A Stakeholder Frame workfor Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance’, The Academy of Management Review 20(1): 92–117. Clayton, A., 1994, “Governance, Civil Society and the New World Order”, in Clayton, A. (eds), Governance, Democracy and Conditionality – Whot Role for NGOs ?, Oxford: INTRAC. Cullen, Ronald B, and Donald B. Chusman, 2000.Transitions to Competitive Government,Speed, Consensus and Performance, New York : State University of New York Press. Donaldson, T. and L.E. Preston, 1995, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications’, TheAcademy of Management Review 20 (1): 65–91. Dwiyanto, Agus, 2012. Manajemen Pelayanan Publik: Peduli, Inklusif, dan Kolaboratif, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press. Flynn, Noorman, 2007, Public Sector Management, London: SAGE. Harsana, Minta, Maria Tri Widayati dan Roland Sinulingga, 2013, Kajian Pengelolaan Volcano Tour Merapi Di Kecamatan Cangkringan Kabupaten Sleman, Dinas Kebudayaan Dan Pariwisata Kabupaten Sleman, Tidak Diterbitkan. 184 |Democratic Governance Muchamad Zaenuri. Build Collaborative Governance... Huxam, C, 2008, “The Challenge of Collaborative Governance”, Public Management: an International Journal of Research and Theory, 2(3), 337-357. Henderson, J.C., 1999. “Tourism Management and the Southeast Asian Economic Environmental Crises.A Singapore Perspective”. Journal of Managing Leisure 4, p. 107-120. Hyden, G., Court, J. and Mease, K, 2004, Making Sense of Governance – Empirical Evidence from Sixteen Developing Countries, Colorado: Lynne Reinner. Innes, J.E.and Booher, D.E. 2004, “Reframing Public Participation : Strategie for the 21th Century”, Planning Theory and Practices, 5(4), 419-436. Kim, Tae Byung, 2010, “Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development in Urban Planning in South Korea”, Ph.D.Thesis, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Birmingham Business School, The University of Birmingham. Kjaer, A.M., 2004, Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press. Kooiman, Jan, 2000, “Societal Governance: Levels, modes and orders of social political interaction”, J.Pierre (ed.) Debating Governance. Authority, Steering and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lasker et al., 2001, “Partnership Synergy: A Practical Framework for Studying and Strengthening the Collaborative Advantage”,The Milbank Quarterly,79(2):179-205. Mitchell, R.K., B.R. Agleand D.J. Wood, 1997, ‘Towarda Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining thePrinciple of Whoand What Really Counts’, The Academy of Management Review 22(4): 853–886. Munro, H.A.D., Roberts, M., & Skelcher, C., 2008. “Partnership Governance and Democratic Effectiveness: Community Leaders and Public Managers as Dual Intermediaries”, Public Policy and Administration, 23(1):61-79. Newman, Janet, Marian Barnes, Helen Sullivan and Andrew Knops, 2004, “Public Particiption and Collaborative Governance”, Journal of Social Policy, 33(2), pp. 203-223. Pemerintah Desa Umbulharjo, 2012, “Peraturan Desa No. 4 Tahun 2012 Tentang Pengelolaan Kawasan Volcano Tour Desa Umbulharjo”, Tidak Diterbitkan. Democratic Governance| 185 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Pierre, Jon, and B. Guy Peters, 2000.Governance, Politics and the State. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Pitana, I Gde dan Putu G. Gayatri, 2005, Sosiologi Pariwisata, Andi Offset, Yogyakarta. Rhodes, R.A.W, 1996, “The New Governance: Governing without Government”, Political Studies, XLIV: 652-667. Shergold, Peter, 2008, “Governing through collaboration”, in Jenine O’Flynn and John Wanna, Collaborative Governance, A new era of public policy in Australia ?, Canberra: Australia National University E-Press. Sink, David W, 1998. “Interorganizational Collaboration”, in Jay M. Shafritz, The International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration, 1188-91, Boulder CO: Westview Press. Sullivan, H.and Skelcher, C. 2002, Working across Boundaries: Collaboration in Public Services, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan. Wanna, John, 2008, “Collaborative government: meanings, dimensions, drivers and outcomes”, Janine O’Flynn and John Wanna, Collaboratif Governance, A new era of public policy in Australia, Canberra: ANU E-Press. Wickramasinghe, Vasantha S.K., 2008. “Analytical Tourism Disaster Management Framework for Sustainable Following a Sudden Calamity”, Ph.D Dissertation, Division of Engeneering and Policy for Cold Regional Environment, Hokkaido University, Japan. Harian Jogja, Senin, 9 Januari 2012 Kedaulatan Rakyat, 12 Januari 2012 Kompas.com, 9 November 2010 186 |Democratic Governance TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC SECTOR: THE CASE STUDY OF HERY ZUDIANTO ERA IN YOGYAKARTA CITY Isnaini Muallidin and Erni Zuhriyanti Lecturer, Department of Government Affairs and Administration Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta E-mail: isnainimuallidin@gmail.com Abstract The purpose of this study is to describe the theoretical and empirical implementation of transformational leadership of Hery Zudianto era in Yogyakarta. The method of this study used qualitative data techniques in-depth interview and secondary data studies. Results of this study point out to theoretically transformational leadership that has been implemented under Hery Zudianto leadership in Yogyakarta with the type of influence that is extremely idealistic, inspirited extended motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individual consideration. Keywords: Transformational leadership, Yogyakarta City, Herry Zudianto era INTRODUCTION Leadership is a determined factor in the development and progress of an organization. The leadership capability will impact the progress of organizations because the leader is needed to determine the vision and goals of organization, allocate resources and motivation to be more competent, changes coordination, and build intense empowerment adherent to establish the most turn or right direction. As noted by Kotler (in Lunenburg, 2011) explains that: “The leadership process involves (a) developing a vision for the organization; (b) aligning people with that vision through communication; and (c) motivating people to action through empowerment and through basic need fulfillment. The leadership process creates uncertainty and change in the organization”. 187 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Based on the definition, it can be seen that a leadership is urgently vehement in guarding the progress of the organization in the face of fluctuating conditions which are often unpredictable. According to Lawler (2007), fluctuations of changes require a leader to anticipate changes with the comprehensive knowledge for transforming the organizational changes. One model of leadership that seems to be promising in terms of managing the changes in this organization, it has a transformational leadership model based on the vision and empowerment that shown positive effects. One of popular leadership approach that had gained a lot of response from researchers in the early 1980s is the transformational approach. Transformational leadership is part of the New Leadership Paradigm which gives more attention to the charismatic and affective elements of leadership. Bass and Riggio (2006) fatten up the popularity of transformational leadership caused by an emphasis on intrinsic motivation and development for suiting the needs of adherent organizations, inspired and empowered to succeed in times of uncertainty. However, the pertinence of transformational leadership in accordance with public context is debatable, many scholars of public administration argue that public organizations context in terms of size and structure, making it difficult transformational leadership or even unethical to be implemented (Tavfelin, 2013; 1). This paper will inspect the wave theory of transformational leadership in Zudianto Hery era in Yogyakarta theoretically and empirically have led to leadership that is transformational. This paper will discuss theoretically about the leadership of the theoretical and empirical critique and experience under the leadership of Hery Zudianto era in Yogyakarta. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The History of Transformational Leadership Theory The historical background of the establishment the theory of transformational leadership is inseparable from the wave theory that existed before, in the same manner can be seen in Figure 3.7 below. 188 |Democratic Governance Isnaini Muallidin & Erni Zuhriyanti. Transformational Leadership... Figure 3.7. The Wave of Transformational Leadership Thought History Source: Javelin, 2013. When referring to the early history of leadership research can be traced back to the early twentieth century. Early research on leadership is more focused on nature (trait) and the characteristics of a leader in the effort to identify a successful leader. The researchers develop leadership personality tests and compare the results against those who are considered leaders. The research studied are individual traits, such as; intelligence, birth order, and socioeconomic status. This approach has given rise to criticism because it is only identifying properties that cannot be predicted in a varying situations, as a leader should not only be decisive, but also flexible and inclusive to changes (Tavfelin, 2013; 9). The next wave of leadership studies are focusing on the behavior and leadership style. This approach became popular from the 1940s until the late 1960s. Leadership is the pioneer in Ohio State study and began with a gathering of more than 1,800 reports related to leadership behaviors. After continuing the search on leadership behaviors, researchers looked at two fundamental factors in view of leadership behavior, namely: initiation of structure and consideration. Initiation illustrates the structure of a concern with organizational tasks and includes activities such as organizing, planning and defining the tasks and the work of employees. A consideration illustrates concerns with individual and interpersonal relationships and includes behaviors related to social and emotional needs of employees as well as their development. Empirical research trying to determine the type of better behavior but in the end could not come to a certain conclusion (Tavfelin, 2013; 9). As a reaction of inconclusive results of the leadership behaviors and effective style, some researchers focus in the late 1960s to the influence of the situation and context in which leadership takes place. Effective leaders Democratic Governance| 189 Part Three: Governance and Leadership are now recommended for having the ability to adapt their leadership style to the requirements of their followers and the situation. A number of different theories flourish such as; Blake and Mouton (1969) developed the Leadership Grid, Hersey and Blanchard (1969) developed a model of situational leadership. Other examples include Vroom and Yetton (1973) with a normative decision model, contingency theory of Fiedler, and the House (1971) on the theory of goal path. Situational leadership theory turned out to be very popular, for several reasons. First, it is useful as an answer to the authoritarian leadership style too with the emergence of large organizations. Secondly, purpose as a learning tool for managers who appreciate the construction, though still just a simple descriptive. However, in practice this theory generally failed to meet standard scientific, perhaps they try to over explain few variables (Hughes et al, 2006). In the early 1980s, there was a disappointment associated with leadership theory, this is attributed to the fact that most leadership models accounted for a relatively small percentage of the variance in performance related results (Tavfelin Bryman, 2013; 10). Out of this pessimism, finally a new wave of alternative approaches emerged. Unlike the previous leadership model, with a focus on the rational processes and behavior of leaders, a new leadership model emphasizes the emotions, values, and behaviors of symbolic leaders. It emerges from the early works of charismatic and transformational leadership theory that has become the most widely studied of their kind over the last 20 years (Avolio et al., Tavfelin, 2013, 10). Transformational leadership theory is based on the study of charismatic leadership, studied by Weber, who argued that the charismatic leader of the authority depends on those who appear to have quality that make them stand out from others. A leader often appears in times of crisis and to persuade others to follow their example of leaders like Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King, and Hitler also (Hughes et al., 2006). James MacGregor Burns (1978) introduced the transformational leadership concept. He studied political leaders in the United States, and suggested that leadership can be expressed in two different forms, transformational or transactional leadership, which in his opinion is the opposite of each other. Transactional leaders have 190 |Democratic Governance Isnaini Muallidin & Erni Zuhriyanti. Transformational Leadership... exchange relationships with their followers. This exchange can be financial, psychological or political, and money can be exchanged for productivity, praise for loyalty, or the promise for assessment. Apart from the exchange, the relationship between leaders and followers lasts no more than exchange. So it did not establish a deeper relationship between the leader and the follower. To achieve change, Burn argued another form of better leadership which is transformational leadership. The transformational leader speaks to the values and followers to be part of a group that has the same goal. By showing the problem with the situation and appealing vision for the future to reflect the values of their followers. Transformational leadership to help their followers to go beyond expectations realized their vision into reality (Bass & Riggio, 2006). Transformational leadership arises from and is rooted in the writings of Burns (1978), Bass (1985), Bennis and Nanus (1985), and Kouzes and Posner (1987). Transformational Leadership Concept and Theory As an idea, transformational leadership was first mentioned in 1973, in a sociological study conducted by the authors Downton, JV. And then, James McGregor who uses the term transformational leadership in his book “Leadership” (1978). In 1985, Barnard M. Bass presented a transformational leadership theory that becomes a reference of experts in research projects, doctors and books dissertations in the field of leadership transformational (Simic, 1989; 49). In the early stages of transformational leadership research, development concept has contributed to the development of the concept of the most actual leader. The most intense interest in the concept of transformational leadership is the result of two trends. First, big companies, such as AT & T, IBM, GM, etc., in a comprehensive manner has changed the style of their leadership due to social, economic, and technology development quickly, so that the necessary leadership styles could be more inspiring and innovative for its subordinates and into anticipated changes. Second, the basic theory of leadership rests on the personal characteristics to analyze the leader, the leader’s behavior and situation is different; it does not take into consideration several characteristics of the quality of their leaders (Simic, 1989; 50). Democratic Governance| 191 Part Three: Governance and Leadership The transformational leadership as a concept and theory is understood as a leadership style that involves followers, give inspiration to the followers, and is committed to realizing the shared vision and goals for an organization, and challenged the followers to be an innovative problemsolver, and develop leadership capacity through training, mentoring, through variety of challenges and support Bass and Riggio (2006; 4). According to Bass and Riggio (2006: 6-7), in his theory of transformational leadership, there are four core components which are always attached, namely: 1. Idealistic effect. Transformational leaders behave in ways affecting their followers and then the followers can admire and respect, so that it can be trusted. There are two aspects that can be seen to influence this ideal, namely: the behavior of leaders and elements associated with the leader. In addition, leaders who have a lot of ideal influence are willing to take risks and be consistent and not act arbitrarily. They can be counted on to do the right thing, show ethical and moral standards of behavior. 2. Motivation gives inspiration. Transformational leaders behave in ways that motivate and inspire those around them by providing meaning and challenge to work. Aroused team spirit, enthusiasm and optimism will be displayed. Thus, leaders gain followers who are actively involved with the patterns of intense communication and demonstrate a commitment to the goals and a shared vision. 3. Intellectual stimulation. Transformational leaders encourage their followers to attempt to be innovative and creative by questioning assumptions, reframing problems, and approaching old situations in new ways. Creativity is encouraged. There is no public criticism to the mistakes of individual members. New ideas and creative problem solutions are collected from followers, including in the process of overcoming the problem and finding solutions. Followers are encouraged to try new approaches, and their ideas are not criticized because they are different from the ideas of the leaders. 4. Individual Consideration. Transformational leaders pay special attention to each individual follower’s needs for the achievement and 192 |Democratic Governance Isnaini Muallidin & Erni Zuhriyanti. Transformational Leadership... growth by acting as a coach or mentor. Potential followers and colleagues developed at a higher level. This behavior indicates the acceptance of individual differences (for example, some employees received more encouragement, more autonomy, clear standards). Driven two-way communication and interaction with personalized followers (eg, the leader recalled a previous conversation, is aware of the problems of individuals, and see the individual as a whole person not just as an employee). Leaders are listening to more followers. Delegation of tasks is a means to develop a task delegated and is monitored to see whether the followers need direction or support and to assess progress. Criticism and Lack of Transformational Leadership Theory Transformational leadership has some weaknesses in its implementation. According to Northouse (2013; 202-204) there are six weaknesses and criticisms of the transformational leadership theory, namely; First, it lacks clear conceptual. Because of the substantial overlap between each of the four components (idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration) it indicate that there is no clear dimension. Furthermore, the parameters of transformational leadership are often overlapping with the conceptualization of a similar leadership. For example, transformational and charismatic leadership are often treated synonymously, although in some models of leadership, charisma is only one component of transformational leadership. Second, the criticism focuses on how transformational leadership is measured. Some researchers typically use multiple versions of Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) to measure transformational leadership. However, some studies have criticized the validity of the MLQ. In some versions of the MLQ, four factors of transformational leadership (influence idealistic, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration) are correlated with each other, which mean they are not different factors. Moreover, several factors of transformational leadership are correlated with factors of transactional leadership and laissez-faire, which means they may not be unique to the transformational models. Democratic Governance| 193 Part Three: Governance and Leadership Third, the transformational leadership treats leadership as a personality trait or tendency and is private rather than the behavior of the train. Train people in these approaches are a problem because it is difficult to teach people to change their properties. Although many experts, including Weber, House, and Bass, stressed that transformational leadership has a regard to the behavior of leaders, such as how leaders engage with followers and there is a tendency to see this approach from the perspective of nature. This problem is compounded because the word transformational creates an image of one person to be the most active component in the process of leadership. For example, although the “create a vision” involves the input of the follower, there is a tendency to see the transformational leader as visionary. There is also a tendency to see a transformational leader as a person who has a special quality that transforms others. Fourth, researchers have established that the actual transformational leaders are capable of transforming individuals and organizations. There is evidence to suggest that transformational leadership is associated with positive outcomes, such as organizational effectiveness. However, research has not shown a causal relationship between transformational leader and followers or obvious organizational changes. Fifth, transformational leadership is elitist and anti-democratic. Transformational leaders often play a direct role in creating change, developing a vision, and advocating a new direction. This gives a strong impression that the leaders act independently of followers or put himself above the needs of the followers. Sixth, transformational leadership has the potential to be abused. The transformational leadership has regard to changes in the values of society towards a new vision. But who is to determine the direction that the new one is better? And who decided that a new vision is a vision that is better? RESEARCH METHODS The method in this research is qualitative method with the method of data collection that is both primary and secondary. The collections of primary data were obtained using in-depth interviews and secondary data and were obtained from relevant sources: journals, magazines and books. 194 |Democratic Governance Isnaini Muallidin & Erni Zuhriyanti. Transformational Leadership... RESULT AND ANALYSIS The implementation of transformational leadership theory in the public sector has been reviewed by Maora and Ticlau (2012), which explains some of the constraints and opportunities in the empirical context when applied in the public sector. First, fundamental problem for the implementation of transformational leadership style in public sectors was deemed less effective. This is because the strength of the control mechanisms by bureaucracy is centralization, formalization, and routinization. However, in line with developments in public administration theory that uses the New Public Management (NPM) concept emphasize on the creativity, innovation, flexibility, responsiveness of public organizations at the same time with a decrease costs, increase effectiveness and sensitivity to the needs of citizens. In this scenario, often leaders are people who are viewed as initiators and catalysts for reform. In such a context, it is clearly suited to the type of transformational leadership. Second, the public sector seems to change to be less responsive. The distance between the objectives proposed by public institutions and the results obtained are never great while the government cannot ignore reformation. However, the reform is actually ambiguous and incremental because it does not have a coherent vision of what needs to be done to produce measurable results. Stimulus for the transformation is to a large extent, generated by factors outside the national government. Thirdly, the issue of ethics and values of the public does not match with the transformational model, because transformational leaders will use their charisma in socially constructive ways to serve others so that transformational leaders can be effective in the public sector. Results of research conducted by Zuhriyati, et al (2012) with the theme “Transformative Leadership in Innovation in Government Administration of Herry Zudianto Era in Yogyakarta “ showed that transformational leadership can be applied either by the Mayor Hary Zuhdianto through analyzing four components of transformational leadership theory: First, Idealists Influence. Based on research analyzed by Herrera Zudianto, the characters that describe the dimensions of transformative Democratic Governance| 195 Part Three: Governance and Leadership leaders were first called idealized influence (idealized influence). The first dimension is described as the leader’s behavior to makes his followers admire, respect and at the same time believe him. Based on the public perception of Yogyakarta, Herry Zudianto is a leader of good character, so the staff admires, respect and trust him. He gave concrete examples of the implementation of the principles of transparency, accountability, and fairness. He was consistent with what he said and committed to the realization of what he had said. He did not distinguish between status and class, word and deed, and do not assume that he is a ruler but he thinks he is the head of public servants who should perform the public service as best as possible. He wants to open the tap of democracy through open public communication and dialogue of its staff and the public. The implication is that it caused a public participation from the effect of increasing the economic opportunities that benefit the community and government. Secondly is inspirational motivation. In this transformational leader dimension, it is described that a leader should be able to articulate clear expectations of achievement to the subordinates, be able to demonstrate commitment, against the whole purpose of the organization, and able to inspire team spirit within the organization through the growth of enthusiasm and optimism. Herrera Zudianto is a mayor that when he has decided something, then he will try hard to implement, although sometimes it may seem impossible. He’s always eager to do anything and is followed by the staff eagerly in their respective duties. For example in implementing commitment, RPJPD product planning, RPJMD and the budget is implemented consistently so that it does not violate existing local regulations. He shows commitment and strives to provide motivation to the staff to commit to what has been planned. If a plan has been agreed or a program has been written, then for sure he will charge to realize the promise to its staff. He will ask the next day, asking how its implementation, or if it has not realized any obstacles. He also frequently gives sudden instructions to check the readiness of its staff so that they must always be ready to answer questions. Thus, it is a motivation to always be ready to work with the full Professionalism. Third, intellectual stimulation. Transformation leader must be able to foster new ideas give creative solutions to the problems faced by 196 |Democratic Governance Isnaini Muallidin & Erni Zuhriyanti. Transformational Leadership... his subordinates, and provide motivation to subordinate to seek new approaches in carrying out organizational tasks. In essence the new ideas always arise because Herrera Zudianto is a person who is hungry for innovation. And he appreciates the input of new ideas from his staff; he listens carefully and then follows up with a program that is funded by the budget. He gives stimulus to foster new ideas from the staff,, and greets and asks for input from his staff either in person or in writing even through social networking either BBM or Facebook. Fourth, Individualized Consideration Dimension. In this dimension, transformational leaders are described as a leader who will listen attentively to the inputs of his staff and specifically want to pay attention to the needs of subordinates. He made a favorable policy for the community for example with the establishment of the Smart Park. With the establishment of the park, surrounding traders increased their incomes. Moreover, there is no longer a thug who withdraws money to traders because it is monitored directly by the government of the city of Yogyakarta. Carts that were not in uniform now use carts from the government administration. They are also required to pay in PPAY as a provision in the future. Herrera Zudianto also often directly check the state of the Smart Parkt and conducts dialogue with the public, asking people about what the needs of the society is, especially the trade in the region. Every 21st and 22nd, meetings between traders and government, such as chief, sub-district head and occasional mayor are conducted. If there are complaints from traders, it will be acted upon by the government and moved to Satpol PP as a regulator of traders on the sidewalk and the police on duty to secure from the threat of thugs. CONCLUSION The transformational leadership theory studies, theoretically has given a new color in the stagnation of leadership thought in the early 1980s. The development model of transformational leadership thinking is more attractive from a variety of experts in both academic and leadership. Because the concepts and theories of transformational leadership is able to provide the size and components that can be measured, although there are still many shortcomings and criticisms. In implementation, the transformational leadership theory in an era Democratic Governance| 197 Part Three: Governance and Leadership of public sector leadership Hery Zudianto in Yogyakarta provide the best learning and success in establishing an effective system of local governance. This is because under the leadership of Hery Zudianto, he has to implement its transformational style with the type of influence that is very idealistic, provide inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individual consideration. REFERENCES Bass, B. M., & Riggio, R. E. 2006.Transformational leadership (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Hughes, R. L., Ginnet, R. C., & Curphy, G. L. 2006.Leadership: Enhancingthe Lesson of Experience(5th ed.). New York: McGrawHill. Lawler, J. 2007. “Leadership in social work: A case of caveat emptor?”British Journal of Social Work, 37, 123 – 41. Lunenburg, Fred C. 2011. “Leadership versus Management: A Key Distinction—At Least in Theory”. International Journal Of Management, Business, And Administration Volume 14, Number 1. Mora, Cristina and Ticlau, Tidor.2012. “Transformational Leadership In The Public Sector. A Pilot Study Using MLQ To Evaluate Leadership Style In Cluj County Local Authorities”. Revista de cercetare intervenie social, vol. 36, pp. 74-98 Northouse, Peter G. 2013. Leadership Theory and Practice Sixth Edition. United State of America; Sage Publication. Simic, Ivana. 1989. “Transformational Leadership The Key To Successful Management Of Transformational Organizational Changes”. University Of Niš The Scientific Journal Facta UniversitatisSeries: Economics And Organization, Vol.1, No 6, 1998 Pp. 49 – 55 Tafvelin, Susanne. 2013 .The Transformational Leadership Process Antecedents, Mechanisms, and Outcomes in the Social Services. Sweden; Print and MediaUmeå Zuhriyati, Erni, Darumurti, Awang, Rahmawati, Dian ka. 2012. Kepemimpinan Transformatif dalam Inovasi Pemerintah di Pemerintahan Kota Yogyakarta di Era Herry Zudianto.Working Paper No. 001/JKSG Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta 198 |Democratic Governance About Editors 1. Dr. Dyah Mutiarin is a lecturer at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, teaching in Department of Government Affairs and Administration and also Master of Government Affairs and Administration. She was born in November 8th, 1971 in Kendal, Central Java. She graduated Bachelor and Master from Department of Public Administration – Gadjah Mada University. She finished her PhD from School of social Science-University Science of Malaysia in 2006. Her main interests are public management, public finance, public policy, tourism studies and women development studies. She has done consultancy works with local government, national and international donors. 2. Isnaini Muallidin, MAP., is a lecturer at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, teaching in Department of Government Affairs and Administration and also Master of Government Affairs and Administration. He graduated Bachelor from Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, and Master from Master Program of Public Administration – Gadjah Mada University. He is currently as a Doctoral Program student at Brawijaya University. His main interests are public management, and public policy. 199 3. Dr. Phil. Ridho Al-Hamdi is a lecturer at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, teaching in Department of Government Affairs and Administration and also Master of Government Affairs and Administration. He graduated Bachelor from Faculty of Islamic Theology and Philosophy, Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia and Master degree from Political Science Program, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia. He obtained his Doctoral Degree from Institut für Philosophie und Politikwissenschaft, Technische Universität Dortmund (Campus Nord), Dortmund, Germany. His main interests are democracy, good governance, political parties, election, Islam and politics, and political ideologies. 4. Queeny Pearl Tomaro graduated Bachelor at Mindanao State University -Iligan Institute of Technology (MSU-IIT), Iligan City, Philippines. She is currently one of international students at Master Program of Government Affairs and Administration. Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia. She is also currently as visiting fellow at Master of Government Affairs and Administration. Her main interests are public administration and government policy. 200