



00048370

Digitized with financial assistance from



on 07 January, 2017

Processed at
The Preservation & conservation
Laboratory of
The Asiatic Society of Bombay

Date JUNE-2000

ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS

ON THE

ORIGIN AND HISTORY

OF

THE PEOPLE OF INDIA,

THEIR RELIGION AND INSTITUTIONS,

COLLECTED, TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED,

BY **48370**

J. MUIR, D.C.L., LL.D., PH.D.

VOLUME THIRD.

THE VEDAS: OPINIONS OF THEIR AUTHORS AND OF LATER INDIAN WRITERS
ON THEIR ORIGIN, INSPIRATION, AND AUTHORITY.

SECOND EDITION,
REVISED AND ENLARGED.



LONDON:

TRÜBNER & CO., 60, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1868.

(All Rights Reserved.)



00048370

PREFACE.

THE object which I have had in view in the series of treatises which this volume forms a part, has been to investigate critically the most important points in the civil and religious history of the Hindus. Having shown in the First Volume that the mythical and legendary accounts given in the Purānas, etc., regarding the origin of the caste system which has long prevailed in India, are mutually contradictory and insufficient to establish the early existence of the popular belief regarding the distinct creation of four separate tribes, as an original and essential article of the Brahmanical creed; and having endeavoured to prove, in the Second Volume, by a variety of arguments, drawn chiefly from comparative philology and from the contents of the Rigveda, that the Hindus are descended from a branch of the Indo-European stock, which dwelt originally along with the other cognate races in Central Asia, and subsequently migrated into Northern Hindustan, where the Brahmanical religion and institutions were developed and matured;—I now come, in this Third Volume, to consider more particularly the history of the Vedas, regarded as the sacred Scriptures of the Hindus, and the inspired source from which their religious and philosophical systems (though,

to a great extent, founded also on reasoning and speculation) profess to be mainly derived; or with which, at least, they all claim to be in harmony.

When I speak, however, of the history of the Veda, I am reminded that I am employing a term which will suggest to the philosophical reader the idea of a minute and systematic account of the various opinions which the Indians have held in regard to their sacred books from the commencement, through all the successive stages of their theological development, down to the present time. To do anything like this, however, would be a task demanding an extent of research far exceeding any to which I can pretend. At some future time, indeed, we may hope that a history of the theological and speculative ideas of the Indians, which shall treat this branch also of the subject, may be written by some competent scholar. My own design is much more modest. I only attempt to show what are the opinions on the subject of the Veda, which have been entertained by certain distinct sets of writers whom I may broadly divide into three classes—(1) the mythological, (2) the scholastic, and (3) the Vedic.

The first, or mythological class, embraces the writers of the different Purāṇas and Itihāsas, and partially those of the Brāhmanas and Upanishads, who, like the compilers of the Purāṇas, frequently combine the mythological with the theosophic element.

The second, or scholastic class, includes the authors of the different philosophical schools, or Darśanas, with their scholiasts and expositors, and the commentators

on the Vedas. The whole of these writers belong to the class of systematic or philosophical theologians ; but as their speculative principles differ, it is the object of each particular school to explain and establish the origin and authority of the Vedas on grounds conformable to its own fundamental dogmas, as well as to expound the doctrines of the sacred books in such a way as to harmonize with its own special tenets.

The third class of writers, whose opinions in regard to the Vedas I have attempted to exhibit, is composed (1) of the rishis themselves, the authors of the Vedic hymns, and (2) of the authors of the Upanishads, which, though works of a much more recent date, and for the most part of a different character from the hymns, are yet regarded by later Indian writers as forming, equally with the latter, a part of the Veda. As the authors of the hymns, the earliest of them at least, lived in an age of simple conceptions and of spontaneous and childlike devotion, we shall find that, though some of them appear, in conformity with the spirit of their times, to have regarded their compositions as in a certain degree the result of divine inspiration, their primitive and elementary ideas on this subject form a strong contrast to the artificial and systematic definitions of the later scholastic writers. And even the authors of the Upanishads, though they, in a more distinct manner, claim a superhuman authority for their own productions, are very far from recognizing the rigid classification which, at a subsequent period, divided the Vedic writings from all other religious works, by a broad line of demarcation.

It may conduce to the convenience of the reader, if I furnish here a brief survey of the opinions of the three classes of writers above described, in regard to the Vedas, as these opinions are shown in the passages which are collected in the present volume.

The first chapter (pp. 1-217) contains texts exhibiting the opinions on the origin, division, inspiration, and authority of the Vedas, which have been held by Indian authors shortly before, or subsequent to, the collection of the Vedic hymns, and consequently embraces the views of the first two of the classes of writers above specified, viz. (1) the mythological and (2) the scholastic. In the first Section (pp. 3-10), I adduce texts from the Purusha Sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the Chhāndogya Upanishad, the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, and the Institutes of Manu, which variously represent the Vedas (*a*) as springing from the mystical sacrifice of Purusha; (*b*) as resting on (or inhering in) Skambha; (*c*) as cut or scraped off from him, as being his hair, and his mouth; (*d*) as springing from Indra; (*e*) as produced from time; (*f*) as produced from Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya; (*g*) as springing from Prajāpati, and the waters; (*h*) as being the breathing of the Great Being; (*i*) as being dug by the gods out of the mind-ocean; (*j*) as being the hair of Prajāpati's beard, and (*k*) as being the offspring of Vāch.

In page 287 of the Appendix a further verse of the Atharva-veda is cited, in which the Vedas are declared to have sprung from the leavings of the sacrifice (*uchchhishta*).

In the second Section (pp. 10–14) are quoted passages from the Vishṇu, Bhāgavata, and Mārkaṇḍeya Purānas, which represent the four Vedas as having issued from the mouth of Brahmā at the creation; several from the Harivaṁśa, which speak of the Vedas as created by Brahmā, or as produced from the Gāyatrī; another from the Mahābhārata, which describes them as created by Vishṇu, or as having Sarasvatī for their mother; with one from Manu, which declares the Vedas, along with certain other objects, to be the second manifestation of the Sattva-guṇa, or pure principle, while Brahmā is one of its first manifestations.

λ The third Section (pp. 14–18) contains passages from the Brāhmaṇas, the Vishṇu Purāna, and the Mahābhārata, in which the Vedas are celebrated as comprehending all beings, as being the soul of metres, hymns, breaths, and gods, as imperishable, as the source of form, motion, and heat, of the names, forms, and functions of all creatures, as infinite in extent, as infinite in their essence (*brahma*), though limited in their forms as Rich, Yajush, and Sāman verses, as eternal, and as forming the essence of Vishṇu.}

The fourth Section (pp. 18–36) contains passages from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, in which the great benefits resulting from the study of the Vedas, and the dignity, power, authority, and efficacy of these works are celebrated; together with two other texts from the latter author and the Vishṇu Purāna, in which a certain impurity is predicated of the Sāma-veda (compare the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāna, as quoted in p. 12, where the four

Vedas are described as respectively partaking differently of the character of the three Guṇas, or Qualities); and some others from the Vāyu, Padma, Matsya, and Brahma-vaivartta Purānas, and the Mahābhārata, and Rāmāyana, which derogate greatly from the consideration of the Vedas, by claiming for the Purānas and Itihāsas an equality with, if not a superiority to, the older scriptures. A passage is next quoted from the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, in which the Vedas and their appendages are designated as the “inferior science,” in contrast to the “superior science,” the knowledge of Soul; and is followed by others from the Bhagavad Gītā, the Chhāndogya Upanishad and the Bhāgavata Purāna, in which the ceremonial and polytheistic portions of the Veda are depreciated in comparison with the knowledge of the supreme Spirit.

The fifth Section (pp. 36–49) describes the division of the Vedas in the third or Dvāpara age, by Vedavyāsa and his four pupils, according to texts of the Vishṇu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purānas; and then adduces a different account, asserting their division in the second or Tretā age, by the King Purūravas, according to another passage of the same Bhāgavata Purāna, and a text of the Mahābhārata (though the latter is silent regarding Purūravas).

Section vi. (pp. 49–57) contains passages from the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purānas and the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, regarding the schism between the adherents of the Yajurveda, as represented by the different schools of Vaiśampāyana and Yājñavalkya, and quotes certain remarks of

Prof. Weber on the same subject, and on the relation of the Rig and Sāma Vedas to each other, together with some other texts, adduced and illustrated by that scholar, on the hostility of the Ātharvānas towards the other Vedas, and of the Chandogas towards the Rig-veda.

• Section vii. (pp. 57-70) contains extracts from the works of Sāyana and Mādhava, the commentators on the Rig and Taittirīya Yajur Vedas, in which they both define the characteristics of the Veda, and state certain arguments in support of its authority. Sāyana (pp. 58-66), after noticing the objections urged against his views by persons of a different school, and defining the Veda as a work consisting of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, asserts that it is not derived from any personal, or at least not from any human, author (compare the further extract from him in p. 105); and rests its authority on its own declarations, on its self-proving power, on the Smṛiti (*i.e.* non-vedic writings of eminent saints), and on common notoriety. He then encounters some other objections raised against the Veda on the score of its containing passages which are unintelligible, dubious, absurd, contradictory, or superfluous. Mādhava (pp. 66-70) defines the Veda as the work which alone reveals the supernatural means of attaining future felicity; explains that males only, belonging to the three superior castes, are competent to study its contents; and asserts that, inasmuch as it is eternal, it is a primary and infallible authority. This eternity of the Veda, however, he appears to interpret as not being absolute, but as dating from the first creation, when it was produced from Brahmā,

though, as he is free from defects, the Veda, as his work, is self-proved.⁶

Section viii. (pp. 70–108) contains the views of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, the (alleged) authors of the Mīmāṃsā and Brahma (or Vedānta) Sūtras on the eternity of the Veda. Jaimini asserts that sound, or words, are eternal, that the connection between words and the objects they represent also, is not arbitrary or conventional, but eternal, and that consequently the Vedas convey unerring information in regard to unseen objects. This view he defends against the Naiyāyikas, answering their other objections, and insisting that the names, derived from those of certain sages, by which particular parts of the Vedas are designated, do not prove those sages to have been their authors, but merely the teachers who studied and handed them down; while none of the names occurring in the Veda are those of temporal beings, but all denote some objects which have existed eternally. Two quotations in support of the supernatural origin of the Veda are next introduced from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara (a condensed account of the Mīmāṃsā system) and from the Vedārtha-prakāśa (the commentary on the Taittirīya Yajur-veda). The arguments in both passages (pp. 86–89) are to the same effect, and contain nothing that has not been already in substance anticipated in preceding summaries of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine. In reference to their argument that no author of the Veda is remembered, I have noticed here that the supposition which an objector might urge, that the rishis, the acknowledged utterers of the hymns,

might also have been their authors, is guarded against by the tenet, elsewhere maintained by Indian writers, that the rishis were merely seers of the pre-existing sacred texts. Some of the opinions quoted from the Sūtras of Jaimini are further enforced in a passage from the summary of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine, which I have quoted from the Sarva-darśana-sangraha. The writer first notices the Naiyāyika objections to the Mīmāṃsaka tenet that the Veda had no personal author, viz. (1) that any tradition to this effect must have been interrupted at the past dissolution of the universe; (2) that it would be impossible to prove that no one had ever recollected any such author; (3) that the sentences of the Veda have the same character as all other sentences; (4) that the inference,—drawn from the present mode of transmitting the Vedas from teacher to pupil,—that the same mode of transmission must have gone on from eternity, breaks down by being equally applicable to any other book; (5) that the Veda is in fact ascribed to a personal author in a passage of the book itself; (6) that sound is not eternal, and that when we recognize letters as the same we have heard before, this does not prove their identity or eternity, but is merely a recognition of them as belonging to the same species as other letters we have heard before; (7) that though Parameśvara (God) is naturally incorporeal, he may have assumed a body in order to reveal the Veda, etc. The writer then states the Mīmāṃsaka answers to these arguments thus: What does this alleged 'production by a personal author' (*pauruṣheyatva*) mean? The Veda, if supposed to be so pro-

duced, cannot derive its authority (*a*) from inference (or reasoning), as fallible books employ the same process. Nor will it suffice to say (*b*) that it derives its authority from its truth: for the Veda is defined to be a book which proves that which can be proved in no other way. And even if Parameśvara (God) were to assume a body, he would not, in that state of limitation, have any access to supernatural knowledge. Further, the fact that different śākhās or recensions of the Vedas are called after the names of particular sages, proves no more than that these recensions were studied by those sages, and affords no ground for questioning the eternity of the Vedas,—an eternity which is proved by the fact of our recognizing letters when we meet with them. These letters are the very identical letters we had heard before, for there is no evidence to show either that letters of the same sort (G's, for instance,) are numerically different from each other, or that they are generic terms, denoting a species. The apparent differences which are observable in the same letter, result merely from the particular characteristics of the persons who utter it, and do not affect its identity. This is followed by further reasoning in support of the same general view; and the writer then arrives at the conclusion, which he seems to himself to have triumphantly established, that the Veda is underrived and authoritative.

The question of the effect produced on the Vedas by the dissolutions of the world is noticed in some extracts from Patanjali's Mahābhāshya and its commentators, which have been adduced by Prof. Goldstücker

in the Preface to his *Mānava-kalpa Sūtra*, and which I have partly reprinted in pp. 95 ff. It is admitted by Patanjali, that, though the sense of the Vedas is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same, and that this difference is exhibited in the different recensions of the *Kāthakas* and other schools. Patanjali himself does not say what is the cause of this alteration in the order of the letters; but his commentator, *Kaiyyāṭa*, states that the order was disturbed during the great mundane dissolutions, etc., and had to be restored (though with variations) by the eminent science of the *rishis*. *Kullūka*, the commentator on *Manu* (see p. 6), maintains that the Veda was preserved in the memory of *Brahmā* during the period of dissolution; and promulgated again at the beginning of the *Kalpa*, but whether in an altered form, or not, he does not tell us. The latter point is also left unsolved in *Sankara's* commentary on *Brahma Sūtra* i. 3, 30, which I quote in the Appendix, pp. 300 ff. Pages 93 ff. contain some remarks (by way of parenthesis) on the question whether or not the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* admits the existence of a Deity.

In the extract given in pp. 98–105 from his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*,¹ *Sankara*, who follows the author of those *Sūtras*, and *Jaimini*, in basing the authority of the Vedas on the eternity of sound, finds it necessary to meet an objection that, as the gods mentioned in the Veda had confessedly an origin in time, the

¹ My attention was originally drawn to this passage by a treatise, then unpublished, by the Rev. Prof. Bancroft, formerly of Bishop's College, Calcutta.

words which designate those gods cannot be eternal, but must have originated co-evally with the created objects which they denote, since eternal words could not have an eternal connection with non-eternal objects. This difficulty he tries to overcome (ignoring the ground taken by Jaimini, that the Veda contains no references to non-eternal objects) by asserting that the eternal connection of words is not with individual objects, but with the species to which these objects belong, and that Indra and the other gods are proved by the Veda to belong to species. Sankara then goes on to assert, on the authority of Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 28, fortified by various texts from the Vedas and the Smritis, that the gods and the world generally are produced (though not in the sense of evolution out of a material cause) from the word of the Vedas (see pp. 6 and 16) in the form of *sphoṭa*. This last term will be explained below. This subject above referred to, of the eternal connection of the words of the Veda with the objects they represent, is further pursued in a passage which I have quoted in the Appendix, p. 300, where an answer is given to the objection that the objects denoted by the words of the Veda cannot be eternal, as a total destruction of everything takes place (not, indeed, at the intermediate, but) at the great mundane dissolutions. The solution given is that, by the favour of the supreme Lord, the inferior lords Brahmā, etc., retain a recollection of the previous mundane conditions; and that in each successive creation everything is produced exactly the same as it had previously been. I then proceed in p. 105 to adduce a passage from Sāyaṇa, the

commentator on the Rig-veda, who refers to another of the Brahma Sūtras, i. 1, 3 (quoted in p. 106), declaring that Brahma was the source of the Veda, which Sankara interprets as containing a proof of the omniscience of Brahma. Sāyana understands this text as establishing the superhuman origin of the Veda, though not its eternity in the proper sense, it being only meant, according to him (as well as to Mādhava; see p. xi.), that the Veda is eternal in the same sense as the æther is eternal, *i.e.* during the period between each creation and dissolution of the universe.

In opposition to the tenets of the Mīmāṃsakas, who hold the eternity (or the eternal self-existence) of the Veda, and to the dogmas of the Vedānta, as just expounded, Gotama, the author of the Nyāya aphorisms, denies (Section ix. pp. 108–118) the eternity of sound; and after vindicating the Veda from the charges of falsehood, self-contradiction, and tautology, deduces its authority from the authority of the wise, or competent, person or persons who were its authors, as proved by the efficacy of such of the Vedic prescriptions as relate to mundane matters, and can be tested by experience. It does not distinctly result from Gotama's aphorism that God is the competent person whom he regards as the maker of the Veda. If he did not refer to God, he must have regarded the rishis as its authors. The authors of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras, and of the Tarka Sangraha, as well as the writer of the Kusumānjali, however, clearly refer the Veda to Īśvara (God) as its framer (pp. 118–133). Udayana, the author of the latter

work (pp. 128-133), controverts the opinion that the existence of the Veda from eternity can be proved by a continuous tradition, as such a tradition must, he says, have been interrupted at the dissolution of the world, which preceded the existing creation. He, therefore (as explained by his commentator), infers an eternal (and omniscient author of the Veda; asserting that the Veda is *paurusheya*, or derived from a personal author; that many of its own texts establish this; and that the appellations given to its particular śākhās or recensions, are derived from the names of those sages whose persons were assumed by Īśvara, when he uttered them at the creation. In pp. 125 ff. I have quoted one of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras, with some passages from the commentator, to show the conceptions the writers entertained of the nature of the supernatural knowledge, or intuition, of the rishis.

Kapila, the author of the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms (pp. 133-138), agrees with the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika aphorists in denying the eternity of the Veda, but, in conformity with his own principles, differs from Gotama and Kaṇāda in denying its derivation from a personal (*i.e.* here, a divine) author, because there was no person (*i.e.* as his commentator explains, no God) to make it. Viṣṇu, the chief of the liberated beings, though omniscient, could not, he argues, have made the Veda, owing to his impassiveness, and no other person could have done so from want of omniscience. And even if the Veda have been uttered by the primeval Puruṣa, it cannot be called his work, as it was breathed forth by him unconsciously. Kapila agrees

with Jaimini in ascribing a self-demonstrating power to the Veda, and differs from the Vaiśeshikas in not deriving its authority from correct knowledge possessed by a conscious utterer. He proceeds to controvert the existence of such a thing as *sphoṭa* (a modification of sound which is assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas, and described as single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words, and constituting a whole), and to deny the eternity of sound.

In the tenth Section (pp. 138-179) I shew (*a*) by quotations from the aphorisms of the Vedānta and their commentator (pp. 140-145), that the author and expounder of the Uttara Mīmāṃsā (the Vedānta) frequently differ from Jaimini the author of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in the interpretation of the same texts of the Upanishads. A similar diversity is next (*b*) proved at greater length (pp. 145-173), by quotations from the aphorisms and commentaries of the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya, to characterize the expositions proposed by the adherents of those two systems respectively. One quotation is given in pp. 175 ff. to shew (*c*) that the same is true in regard to the followers of the Vaiśeshika philosophy, who distinctly reject the Vedāntic explanations; and last of all (*d*) I have made some extracts (pp. 177 ff.) from the Bhakti Sūtras of Sāṅḍilya to exhibit the wide divergence of that writer from the orthodox views of the Vedānta regarding the sense of the Vedas. In pp. 173-175 I quote some remarks of Dr. E. Roer, and Prof. Max Müller, regarding the doctrines of the Upanishads, and their relations to the different philosophical schools.

In the facts brought forward in this section we find another illustration (1) of the tendency common to all dogmatic theologians to interpret in strict conformity with their own opinions the unsystematic and not always consistent texts of an earlier age which have been handed down by tradition as sacred and infallible, and to represent them as containing, or as necessarily implying, fixed and consistent systems of doctrine ; as well as (2) of the diversity of view which so generally prevails in regard to the sense of such texts among writers of different schools, who adduce them with equal positiveness of assertion as establishing tenets and principles which are mutually contradictory or inconsistent.

In the eleventh Section (pp. 179–207) some passages are adduced from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, and from Kullūka's commentary on Mañu, to show that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the scholastic writers between the Vedas on the one hand, and all other classes of Indian scriptures, embraced under the designation of Smṛiti (including the Darśanas, the Institutes of Manu, the Purānas, and Itihāsas, etc.), on the other, the first being regarded as independent and infallible guides, while the others are (in theory) held to be authoritative only in so far as they are founded on, and coincide with, the Veda. The practical effect of this distinction is, however, much lessened by the fact that the ancient sages, the authors of the Smṛitis, such of them, I mean, as, like Manu, are recognized as orthodox, are looked upon by Mādhava and Sankara as having had access to Vedic texts now no longer extant, as having held communion with the gods,

and as having enjoyed a clearness of intuition into divine mysteries which is denied to later mortals (pp. 181–185). Sankara, however (as shewn in pp. 184–192), does not regard all the ancients as having possessed this infallible insight into truth, but exerts all his ingenuity to explain away the claims (though clearly sanctioned by an Upanishad) of Kapila, who was not orthodox according to his Vedāntic standard, to rank as an authority. In his depreciation of Kapila, however, Sankara is opposed to the Bhāgavata Purāna (p. 192). I then proceed to observe (pp. 194–196) that although in ancient times the authors of the different philosophical systems (*Darśanas*) no doubt put forward their respective opinions as true, in opposition to all the antagonistic systems, yet in modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta appears to be generally recognized; while the authors of the other systems are regarded, *e.g.* by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, as, amid all their diversities, having in view, as their ultimate scope, the support of the Vedāntic theory. The same view, in substance, is taken by Vijnāna Bhikshu, the commentator on the Sāṅkhya Sūtras, who (pp. 196–203) maintains that Kapila's system, though atheistic, is not irreconcilable with the Vedānta and other theistic schools, as its denial of an Īśvara (God) is only practical, or regulative, and merely enforced in order to withdraw men from the too earnest contemplation of an eternal and perfect Deity, which would impede their study of the distinction between matter and spirit. To teach men this discrimination, as the great means of attaining final liberation, is one of the two main objects, and strong

points, of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, and here it is authoritative; while its atheism is admitted to be its weak side, and on this subject it has no authority. Vijnāna Bhikshu goes on to say that it is even supposable that theistic systems, in order to prevent sinners from attaining knowledge, may lay down doctrines partially opposed to the Vedas; and that though in these portions they are erroneous, they will still possess authority in the portions conformable to the Śruti and Smṛiti. He then quotes a passage from the Padma Purāṇa, in which the god Śiva tells his consort Pārvatī that the Vaiśeṣhika, the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya, the Purva-mīmāṃsā Darśanas, and the Vedāntic theory of illusion, are all systems infected by the dark (or *tūmasa*) principle, and consequently more or less unauthoritative. All orthodox (*āstika*) theories, however, are, as Vijnāna Bhikshu considers, authoritative, and free from error on their own special subject. And as respects the discrepancy between the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta, regarding the unity of Soul, he concludes that the former is not devoid of authority, as the apparent diversity of souls is acknowledged by the Vedānta, and the discriminative knowledge which the Sāṅkhya teaches is an instrument of liberation to the embodied soul; and thus the two varying doctrines, if regarded as, the one practical (or regulative), and the other real (or transcendental), will not be contradictory. At the close of Section eleventh (pp. 204–207) it is shewn that the distinction drawn by the Indian commentators between the superhuman Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa Sūtras, etc., as well as the Smṛitis, is not borne out by

certain texts which I had previously cited. * The Bṛihad Āraṇyaka and Muṇḍaka Upanishads (pp. 8, 31) seem to place all the different sorts of Sāstras or scriptures (including the four Vedas) in one and the same class, the former speaking of them all promiscuously as being the breathing of Brahma, while the latter describes them all (except the Upanishads) as being parts of the "inferior science," in opposition to the "superior science," or knowledge of Brahma. In the same spirit as the Muṇḍaka, the Chhāndogya Upanishad also (quoted in p. 32 f.) includes the four Vedas in the same list with a variety of miscellaneous Sāstras (which Nārada has studied without getting beyond the confines of exoteric knowledge), and never intimates (unless it be by placing them at the head of the list) that the former can claim any superiority over the other works with which they are associated. As, however, Sankara could not, in consistency with the current scholastic theory regarding the wide difference between the Vedas and all other Sāstras, admit that the latter could have had a common origin with the former, he endeavours in his comment on the passage of the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad to which I have adverted, to shew that the other works, which are there said to have been breathed out by the great Being along with the Vedas, were in reality portions of the Brāhmanas. This explanation can scarcely apply to all the works enumerated, and its force is weakened by the tenor of the other passages from the Muṇḍaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads, while any such distinction is repudiated in the statements of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas quoted in pp. 27-30 and 105.

In the twelfth Section (pp. 207-217) the arguments in support of the Veda, adduced in the philosophical systems, and by the various commentators, as above summarised, are recapitulated, and some remarks are made on these reasonings. My observations are intended to shew that the arguments in question are inconclusive, or assume the points to be established; that the rishis are proved by the contents of the hymns to have been their real authors; and that numerous events which have occurred in time, are undoubtedly mentioned in the Vedas. This as we have seen (above, p. xvi.) is admitted by Sankara.

The Second Chapter (pp. 217-286) exhibits the opinions of the rishis in regard to the origin of the Vedic hymns. Its object is to shew in detail that, though some at least of the rishis appear to have imagined themselves to be inspired by the gods in the expression of their religious emotions and ideas, they at the same time regarded the hymns as their own compositions, or as (presumably) the compositions of their forefathers, distinguishing between them as new and old, and describing their own authorship in terms which could only have been dictated by a consciousness of its reality. The first, second, and third Sections (pp. 218-244) contain a collection of passages from the Rig-veda in which a distinction is drawn (1) between the rishis as ancient and modern, and (2) between the hymns as older and more recent; and in which (3) the rishis describe themselves as the makers, fabricators, or generators of the hymns; with some additional texts in which such authorship appears

to be implied, though it is not expressed. Section fourth (pp. 245-283) contains a variety of passages from the same Veda, in which (1) a superhuman character or supernatural faculties are ascribed to the earlier rishis; and (2) the idea is expressed that the praises and ceremonies of the rishis were suggested and directed by the gods in general, or, in particular, by the goddess of speech, or by some other or others of the different deities of the Vedic pantheon. To illustrate, and render more intelligible and probable, the opinions which I have ascribed to the old Indian rishis regarding their own inspiration, I have quoted in the same Section (pp. 267-273) a number of passages from Hesiod and Homer to shew that the early Greek bards entertained a similar belief. I then advert (pp. 273-274) to the remarkable divergence between the later religious histories of Greece and of India. I next enquire briefly (in pp. 274-275) in what way we can reconcile the apparently conflicting ideas of the rishis on the subject of the hymns, considered, on the one hand, as their own productions, and, on the other, as inspired by the gods. Then follow (pp. 275-279) some further texts from the Rig-veda, in which a mystical, magical, or supernatural efficacy is ascribed to the hymns. These are succeeded (pp. 279-283) by a few quotations from the same Veda, in which the authors complain of their own ignorance; and by a reference to the contrast between these humble confessions and the proud pretensions set up by later theologians in behalf of the Veda, and its capability of imparting universal knowledge. The ideas of the rishis regarding their own inspiration differ widely from the conceptions

of later theorists; for while the former looked upon the gods, who were confessedly mere created beings, as the sources of supernal illumination, the latter either regard the Veda as eternal, or refer it to the eternal Brahma, or Īśvara, as its author. The fifth and last Section (pp. 283 - 286) adduces some texts from the Śvetāśvatara, Muṇḍaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads, which show the opinions of the writers regarding the inspiration, of their predecessors; and refers to the similar claims set up on their own behalf by the writers of the Itihāsas and Purānas, as shewn in the passages quoted in pp. 27 - 30.

With all its imperfections this volume may perhaps possess a certain interest, not only for the student of Indian history, but also for the divine and the philosopher, as furnishing a few documents to illustrate the course of theological opinion in a sphere far removed from the ordinary observation of the European student, — a course which, quite independently of the merits of the different tenets involved in the enquiry, will, I think, be found to present a remarkable parallel in various respects to that which is traceable in the history of those religious systems with which we are most familiar. In both cases we find that a primitive age of ardent emotion, of simple faith, and of unarticulated beliefs, was succeeded by a period of criticism and speculation, when the floating materials handed down by preceding generations were compared, classified, reconciled, developed into their consequences, and elaborated into a variety of scholastic systems.

In the Preface to the first edition I stated as follows: "In regard to the texts quoted from the Rig-veda, I

have derived the same sort of assistance from the French version of M. Langlois, which has been acknowledged in the Preface to the Second Volume, p. vi. I am also indebted for some of the Vedic texts to Boehtlingk and Roth's Lexicon."

A comparison of the former edition with the present will shew that considerable alterations and additions have been made in the latter. The texts which formerly stood in the Appendix have now been transferred to their proper places in the body of the work; and various other passages have been transposed. The principal additions will be found in the first four sections, in the ninth (pp. 115-127), tenth (which is altogether new), eleventh (pp. 185 ff.), and in the Appendix.

I am indebted to various learned friends for assistance in different parts of the work, which I have acknowledged in the notes. My thanks are especially due to Professors Goldstücker and Cowell for various important corrections which they have suggested in my translations of passages of a scholastic and philosophical character, quoted either in the body of the volume or in the Appendix,—corrections which are incorporated in the text,—as well as for some further remarks and suggestions which will be found in the notes or Appendix. I am also under obligations to Professor Aufrecht for some emendations of my renderings in the early part of the work, as well as for his explanations of many of the texts of the Rig-veda cited in the Second Chapter.

CONTENTS.

PAGES.

v.—xxviii. PREFACE.

- 1—217. CHAPTER I. OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, DIVISION, INSPIRATION, AND AUTHORITY OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS SHORTLY BEFORE, OR SUBSEQUENT TO, THE COLLECTION OF THE HYMNS OF THE RIG-VEDA.
- 3—10. SECT. I. Origin of the Vedas according to the Purusha-sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Brāhmanas, Upanishads, and Institutes of Manu.
- 10—14. SECT. II. Origin of the Vedas according to the Vishṇu, Bhāgavata, and Mārkaṇḍeya Purānas, the Harivaṁśa, the Mahābhārata; eternity of the Veda; miscellaneous statements regarding it.
- 14—18. SECT. III. Passages of the Brāhmanas and other works in which the Vedas are spoken of as being the sources of all things, and as infinite and eternal.
- 18—36. SECT. IV. Passages from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu eulogistic of the Veda, with some statements of a different tenor from Manu and other writers.
- 36—49. SECT. V. Division of the Vedas, according to the Vishṇu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purānas, and the Mahābhārata.
- 49—57. SECT. VI. Accounts in the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purānas of the schisms between the adherents of the Yajur-veda, Vaiśampāyana, and Yājñavalkya; hostility of the Ātharvanas towards the other Vedas; and of the Chhandogas towards the Rig-veda.

PAGES.

- 57—70. SECT. VII. Reasonings of the Commentators on the Vedas, in support of the authority of the Vedas.
- 70—108. SECT. VIII. Arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins in support of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.
- 108—138. SECT. IX. Arguments of the followers of the Nyāya, Vaiśeshika, and Sāṅkhya systems in support of the authority of the Vedas, but against eternity of sound, and of the Vedas; Vaiśeshika conception of the intuitive knowledge of the rishis.
- 138—179. SECT. X. Extracts from the Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeshika, and Bhakti aphorisms, and their commentators, illustrative of the use which the authors of the different Darśanas make of Vedic texts, and the different modes of interpretation which they adopt.
- 179—207. SECT. XI. Distinction in point of authority between the Veda and the Smṛitis or non-Vedic Sāstras, as stated in the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, and by the commentators on Manu, and the Vedānta; Vijnāna Bhikshu's view of the Sāṅkhya; opinion of Śankara regarding the authority of the orthodox rishis; difference of view between him and Mādhusūdana regarding the orthodoxy of Kapila and Kaṇāda, etc.: the distinction between the Vedas and other Sāstras, drawn by later writers, not borne out by the Upanishads.
- 207—217. SECT. XII. Recapitulation of the arguments urged in the Darśanas, and by commentators, in support of the authority of the Vedas, with some remarks on these reasonings.
- 217—286. CHAPTER II. THE RISHIS, AND THEIR OPINIONS IN REGARD TO THE ORIGIN OF THE VEDIC HYMNS.
- 218—224. SECT. I. Passages from the Hymns of the Veda which distinguish between the Rishis as Ancient and Modern.
- 224—232. SECT. II. Passages from the Veda in which a distinction is drawn between the older and the more recent hymns.

PAGES.

- 232—244. SECT. III. Passages of the Rig-veda in which the Rishis describe themselves as the composers of the Hymns, or intimate nothing to the contrary.
- 245—283. SECT. IV. Passages of the Rig-veda in which a supernatural character is ascribed to the Rishis or the Hymns; similar conceptions of inspiration entertained by the Greeks of the Homeric age; limitations of this opinion in the case of the Vedic Rishis.
- 283—286. SECT. V. Texts from the Upanishads, showing the opinions of the authors regarding the inspiration of their predecessors.
- 287—312. APPENDIX.
287. Quotation from the Atharva-veda xi. 7, 24.
- 287—288. Amended translations by Professor Aufrecht.
- 288—289. Quotations from Manu and the Mahābhārata on Vedic and other study.
- 289—290. Various illustrative quotations and references.
290. Amended translation by Professor Cowell.
290. Note by Professor Cowell on the phrase *Kālātyayūpadishṭa*.
291. Amended translation by Professor Cowell.
- 292—300. Quotation of Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 34—38, with Sankara's comments, shewing the incompetence of Sūdras to acquire the highest divine knowledge, with a short passage of a contrary tenor from the Bhagavat Gītā.
- 300—308. Quotation from Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 30, with Sankara's comment, in continuation of the reasoning in pp. 101—105 in support of the eternity of the words of the Veda, and in refutation of the objections derived from the alleged non-eternity of creation; with Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 36, and part of Sankara's comment.
- 308—309. Quotation from Manu, ii. 14 f.; and from Kullūka in explanation of the term *samayādhyushita*.

- PAGES.
- 309—10. Corrections by Professors Cowell and Goldstücker.
310. Quotation from Commentary on Vishṇu Purāṇa, i. 17, 54.
310. Quotation from Vājasaneyi Sāmhitā, xiii. 45; and Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 21.
311. Additional texts (i. 67, 4; i. 109, 1, 2; and x. 66, 5) from the Rīg-veda, regarding the composition of the hymns.
312. Supplementary note by Prof. Goldstücker, on *Kālātya-yāpadishṭa*.
-

ERRATA ET CORRIGENDA.

- Page 24, line 11. For Brahmā read Brahṁā.
- „ 45, „ 15. For *Fayush* read *Yajush*.
- „ 53, „ 8. For theologicans read theologians.
- „ 62, „ 2 from foot: For its author read their authors.
- „ 85, „ 4 „ Before *Prajūpatir* insert xi. 213.
- „ 95, „ 2 „ For *dhvanitvam* read *dhvanitam*.
- „ 96, „ 16. The same correction.
- „ 101, „ 22. For Vanap. read S'āntip.
- „ 149, „ 6. For *śabdūdikshiter* read *śabdād ikshiter*.
- „ 159, „ 16. For *chaindri-* read *cha indri-*.
- „ 159, „ 31. For *paratvou-* read *paratvo-*.
- „ 160, „ 18. For *punar-utpattir* read *punar-anutpattir*.
- „ 213, „ 16. For p. 120 read p. 118.
- „ 221, „ 24. For vi. 21, 1 read vi. 21, 8.
- „ 224, „ 7 from foot. Omit *dhishan* 7.
- „ 261, „ 12. For vi. 62, 3 read vi. 26, 3.

ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS.

VOLUME THIRD.

CHAPTER I.

OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, DIVISION, INSPIRATION, AND AUTHORITY OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS SHORTLY BEFORE, OR SUBSEQUENT TO, THE COLLECTION OF THE HYMNS OF THE RIG-VEDA.

IN the preceding volumes of this work¹ I have furnished a general account of the ancient Indian writings, which are comprehended under the designation of Veda or Śruti. These works, which, as we have seen, constitute the earliest literature of the Hindus, are broadly divisible into two classes: (1) The Mantras or hymns, in which the praises of the gods are celebrated and their blessing is invoked; (2) the Brāhmaṇas, which embrace (a) the liturgical institutes in which the ceremonial application of these hymns is declared, the various rites of sacrifice are prescribed, and the origin and hidden import of the different forms are explained, and (b) the Āraṇyakas,² and Upanishads (called also Vedāntas, *i.e.* concluding portions of the Vedas), which in part possess the same character as some of the earlier portions of the Brāhmaṇas, and are in part theological treatises in which the spiritual aspirations which

¹ See Vol. I. pp. 2 ff. and Vol. II. pp. 169 ff. See also Professor Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

² For more precise information see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 313 ff. from which it will be perceived that only some of the Āraṇyakas form part of the Brāhmaṇas, and that two of the Upanishads are included in a Saṁhitā.

were gradually developed in the minds of the more devout of the Indian sages are preserved. It is, therefore, clear that the hymns constitute the original and, in some respects, the most essential portion of the Veda; that the Brāhmaṇas arose out of the hymns, and are subservient to their employment for the purposes of worship; while the Upanishads give expression to ideas of a speculative and mystical character which, though to some extent discoverable in the hymns and in the older portion of the Brāhmaṇas, are much further matured, and assume a more exclusive importance, in these later treatises.

I content myself here with referring the reader who desires to obtain a fuller idea of the nature of the hymns, and of the mythology which they embody, to the late Professor H. H. Wilson's translation of the earlier portion of the Rig-veda, to his prefaces to the several volumes, to Professor Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, and to two papers of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, entitled Contributions to a knowledge of the Cosmogony and Mythology of the Rig-veda. In the fourth volume of this work I return to the latter branch of the subject, and compare the conceptions which the rishis entertained of the different objects of their worship, with those representations of the deities who bore the same names, which occur in Indian writings of a later date, whether mythological or theological.

The task to which I propose in the meantime to devote myself, is to supply some account of the opinions entertained by Hindu writers, ancient and modern, in regard to the origin and authority of the Vedas. With this view I have collected from some of the later hymns, from the Indian writings of the middle and later Vedic era (the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads) as well as from the books, whether popular or scientific, of the post-vedic period (the Purāṇas, the Itihāsas, the Institutes of Manu, the aphorisms of the Darśanas, or systems of philosophy, and their commentators, and the commentaries on the Vedas) such passages as I have discovered which have reference to these subjects, and propose to compare the opinions there set forth with the ideas entertained on some of these points by the writers of the more ancient hymns, as deducible from numerous passages in their own compositions.

The mythical accounts which are given of the origin of the Vedas

are mutually conflicting. In some passages they are said to have been created by Prajāpati from fire, air, and the sun, or by some other process. In other texts they are said to have been produced by Brahmā from his different mouths, or by the intervention of the Gāyatrī, or to have sprung from the goddess Sarasvatī, or to have otherwise arisen. I proceed to adduce these several passages.

SECT. I.—*Origin of the Vedas according to the Purusha-sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Brāhmanas, Upanishads, and Institutes of Manu.*

Purusha-sūkta.—In the ninth verse of this hymn (Rig-veda, x. 90, already quoted in Vol. I. pp. 8 and 9) the three Vedas are said to have been produced from the mystical victim Purusha: *Tasmād yajnāt sarva-hutaḥ ṛichah sāmāni jajnire | chhandāmsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajūyata |* “From that universal sacrifice sprang the rich and sāmān verses: the metres sprang from it: from it the yajush arose.”³

This is the only passage in the hymns of the Rig-veda in which the creation of the Vedas is described.

In the Atharva-veda the following texts refer to that subject:

x. 7, 14 *Yattra rishayah prathamajāḥ ṛichah sāma yajur mahi | ekarshir yasminn ūpitaḥ Skambham tam brūhi katamaḥ svid eva saḥ |*
 20. *Yasmād ṛicho apātakshan yajur yasmād apākashan | sāmāni yasya lomāni atharvāngiraso mukham | Skambham tam brūhi katamaḥ svid eva saḥ |*

“Declare who that Śkambha (supporting-principle) is in whom the primeval rishis, the rich, sāmān, and yajush, the earth, and the one rishi, are sustained. . . . 20. Declare who is that Skambha from whom they cut off the rich verses, from whom they scraped off the yajush, of whom the sāmān verses are the hairs, and the verses of Atharvan and Angiras the mouth.”

³ The word *veda*, in whatever sense we are to understand it, occurs in R.V. viii. 19, 5: *Yah samidhū yah ūhuti yo vedena dadāsa martyo agnaye | yo namasū svadhvarah |* 6. *Tasya id arvanto ramhayante ūśavas tasya dyummitamān yasaḥ | na tam aṅho deva-kṛitān kulaś chana na martya-kṛitam naśat |* “The horses of that mortal who, devoted to sacrifice, does homage to Agni with fuel, with an oblation, with ritual knowledge (?), with reverence,—(G) speed forward impetuously; and his renown is most glorious. No calamity, caused either by god or by man, can assail him from any quarter.”

xiii. 4, 38. *Sa vai ṛigbhyo ajāyata tasmād ṛicho ajāyanta |*

“He (apparently Indra, see verse 44) sprang from the ṛich verses : the ṛich verses sprang from him.”

xix. 54, 3. *Kālād ṛichah samabhavan yajuhḥ kālād ajāyata |*

“From Time the ṛich verses sprang : the yajush sprang from Time.”⁴

The following texts from the same Veda may also be introduced here :

iv. 35, 6. *Yasmāt pakvād amṛitaṁ sambabhūva yo gāyatrīyāḥ adhipatir babhūva | yasmīn vedāḥ nihitāḥ viśvarūpās tenaudanenāti tarāmi mṛityum |*

“I overpass death by means of that oblation (*odana*), from which, when cooked, ambrosia (*amṛita*) was produced, which became the lord of the Gāyatrī, and in which the omniform Vedas are comprehended.”

vii. 54, 1. *Ṛichaṁ sāma yajāmahe yūbhyūṁ karmāṇi kurvate | ete sadasi rājato yajnaṁ deveshu yachhataḥ | 2. Ṛichaṁ sāma yad aprāksham havir ojo yajur balam | esha mā tasmād mā hiṁsīd vedāḥ priṣṭhāḥ śachīpato |*

“We worship the Ṛich and the Sāman, wherewith men celebrate religious rites, which shine in the assembly, and convey sacrifices to the gods. 2. Inasmuch as I have asked the Ṛich and the Sāman for butter and for vigour, and the Yajush for strength,—let not the Veda, so asked, destroy me, o lord of strength (Indra).”

The next passage is from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 8, 1 ff. :

Prajāpatir vai idam agre āsīd ekaḥ eva | so 'kāmayata syūm prajāyoya iti | So 'śrāmyat sa tapo'tapyata | tasmāch chrāntāt tepānāt trayo lokūḥ asṛjyanta pṛithivy antarikshaṁ dyauḥ | sa imāṁs trīṇ lokān abhitatāpa | tebhyaḥ taptēbhyaḥ trīṇi jyotīṁshy ajāyanta agniṛ yo 'yam pavate sūryaḥ | sa imāni trīṇi jyotīṁshy abhitatāpa | tebhyaḥ taptēbhyaḥ trayo vedūḥ ajāyanta agner ṛigvedo vāyor yajurvedaḥ sūryāt sāmavedaḥ | sa imāṁs trīṇ vedūn abhitatāpa | tebhyaḥ taptēbhyaḥ trīṇi sukṛāṇy ajāyanta bhūr ity ṛigvedād bhūvaḥ iti yajurvedāt svar iti sāmavedāt | Tad ṛigvedenaiva hotram akurvata yajurvedena ādhvaryavaṁ sāmavedena udgītham | yad eva trayayai vidyāyai śukraṁ tena brahmatvam uchchakrāma.

“Prajāpati was formerly this universe [*i.e.* the sole existence], one only. He desired, ‘may I become, may I be propagated.’ He toiled

⁴ See my translation of the entire hymn in the Journal of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1865, p. 381. The Vishṇu Purāṇa, i. 2, 13, says : *Tad eva sarvam evaitad vyaktū-vyakta-svarūpavat | tathā puruṣa-rūpeṇa kūla-rūpeṇa cha sthitam |* “This (Brahma) is all this universe, existing both as the perceptible and the imperceptible; existing also in the forms of Puruṣa and of Kāla (Time).”

in devotion, he performed austerity. From him, when he had so toiled, and performed austerity, three worlds were created,—earth, air, and sky. He infused warmth into these three worlds. From them, thus heated, three lights were produced,—Agni (fire), this which purifies (*i.e.* Pavana, or Vāyu, the wind),⁵ and Sūrya (the sun). He infused heat into these three lights. From them so heated the three Vedas were produced,—the Rig-veda from Agni (fire), the Yajur-veda from Vāyu (wind), and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya (the sun). He infused warmth into these three Vedas. From them so heated three luminous essences were produced,—bhūh from the Rig-veda, bhuvah from the Yajur-veda, and svar from the Sāma-veda. Hence, with the Rig-veda they performed the function of the hotṛi; with the Yajur-veda, the office of the adhvaryu; with the Sāma-veda, the duty of the udgāṭri; while the function of the brahman arose through the luminous essence of the triple science [*i.e.* the three Vedas combined].”

Chhândogya Upanishad.—A similar passage (already quoted in Volume Second, p. 200) occurs in the Chhândogya Upanishad (p. 288 of Dr. Röer's ed.):

*Prajāpatiḥ lokān abhyatapat | teshāṃ tapyamānānām rasān prābṛihad
agnim pṛithivyāḥ vāyum antarikshād ādityaṃ divaḥ | sa etās tisro devatāḥ
abhyatapat | tāsāṃ tapyamānānām rasān prābṛihad agner ṛicho vāyor
yajūṃshī sāmā ādityāt | sa etāṃ trayīm vidyām abhyatapat | tasyās
tapyamānāyāḥ rasān prābṛihad bhūr iti ṛigbhyo bhuvār iti yajurbhyaḥ
svar iti sāmabhyaḥ |*

“Prajāpati infused warmth into the worlds, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences, viz. Agni (fire) from the earth, Vāyu (wind) from the air, and Sūrya (the sun) from the sky. He infused warmth into these three deities, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences,—from Agni the ṛich verses, from Vāyu the yajush verses, and from Sūrya the sāmā verses. He then infused heat into this triple science, and from it so heated he drew forth its essences,—from ṛich verses the syllable bhūh, from yajush verses bhuvah, and from sāmā verses svar.”⁶

⁵ See S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 2, 19: . . . *ayam eva sa Vāyur yo 'yam pavats* . . . “This is that Vāyu, he who purifies.”

⁶ Passages to the same effect occur also in the Aitareya (v. 32-34) and Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇas. That in the former will be found in Dr. Haug's translation of the

Manu.—The same origin is assigned to the three Vedas in the following verses from the account of the creation in *Manu*, i. 21–23, where the idea is no doubt borrowed from the *Brāhmaṇas* :

Sarveshām tu sa nāmāni karmāni cha pṛithak pṛithak | Veda-sadbhaya evādau pṛithak saṁsthās cha nirmame | Karmātmanām cha devānām so 'srijat prāṇinām prabhūḥ | sādhyānām cha ganaṁ sūkshmaṁ yajnaṁ chaiva sanātanam | Agni-vāyu-ravibhyas tu trayam brahma sanātanam | dudoha yajna-siddhyartham ṛig-yajuh-sāma-lakṣhaṇam |

“He [*Brahmā*] in the beginning fashioned from the words of the *Veda*⁷ the several names, functions, and separate conditions of all [creatures]. That Lord also created the subtle host of active and living deities, and of *Sādhyas*, and eternal sacrifice. And in order to the performance of sacrifice, he drew forth from *Agni*, from *Vāyu*, and from *Sūrya*, the triple eternal *Veda*, distinguished as *Rich*, *Yajush*, and *Sāman*.”

Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, the commentator, annotates thus on this passage :

Sanātanaṁ nityam | vedāpaurusheyatva-pakṣho Manor abhimateḥ | pūrva-kalpe ye vedās te eva Paramātma-mūrtter Brahmaṇaḥ sarvajñasya smṛity-ārūdhāḥ | tūn eva kalpādāv agni-vāyu-ravibhyaḥ āchakarsha | śrautaś cha ayam artho na sanānīyaḥ | tathācha śrutiḥ | “ agner ṛigvedo vāyor yajurvedaḥ ādityāt sāmavedaḥ ” iti |

“The word *sanātana* means ‘eternally pre-existing.’ The doctrine of the superhuman origin of the Vedas is maintained by *Manu*. The same Vedas which [existed] in the previous mundane era (*Kalpa*) were preserved in the memory of the omniscient *Brahmā*, who was one with the supreme Spirit. It was those same Vedas that, in the beginning of the [present] *Kalpa*, he drew forth from *Agni*, *Vāyu*, and *Sūrya* : and this dogma, which is founded upon the *Veda*, is not to be questioned, for the *Veda* says, ‘the *Rig-veda* comes from *Agni*, the *Yajur-veda* from *Vāyu*, and the *Sāma-veda* from *Sūrya*.’”

Another commentator on *Manu*, *Medhātithi*, explains this passage in a more rationalistic fashion, “by remarking that the *Rig-veda* opens with a hymn to fire, and the *Yajur-veda* with one in which air is mentioned.”—*Colebr. Misc. Ess. i. p. 11, note.*

Brāhmaṇa ; and the one in the latter is rendered into German by *Weber* in his *Ind. Stud.* ii. 303 ff.

⁷ *Kullūka* explains this to mean, “Having understood them from the words of the *Veda*” (*Veda-sadbhayaḥ eva avagamyā*).

To the verses from Manu (i. 21-23) just cited, the following from the second book may be added, partly for the purpose of completing the parallel with the passages previously adduced from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Chhāndogya Upanishad :

Manu, ii. 76 ff. *Akāraṃ chāpy ukāraṃ cha makāraṃ cha Prajāpatiḥ | Veda-trayād niraduhad bhūr bhuvah svar itīti cha | 77. Tribhyaḥ eva tu vedebhyaḥ pādām pādām adūduhat | "tat" ity ṛicho'syāḥ sāvitryāḥ parameshthī prajāpatiḥ | 81. Oṃkāra-pūrvikās tisro mahāvyaḥ-ritayo 'vyayāḥ | Tripadā chaiva gāyatrī vijneyāḥ Brāhmaṇo mukham.*

76. "Prajāpati also milked out of the three Vedas the letters *a, u,* and *m,* together with the words *bhūh, bhuvah,* and *sva*r. 77. The same supreme Prajāpati also milked from each of the three Vedas one of the [three] portions of the text called *sāvitri* [or *gāyatrī*], beginning with the word *tat*.⁸ 81. The three great imperishable particles (*bhūh, bhuvah, sva*r) preceded by *om*, and the *gāyatrī* of three lines, are to be regarded as the mouth of Brahmā."

The next passage, from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 1, 8, first speaks generally of Prajāpati creating the three Vedas, and then afterwards, with some inconsistency, describes their production from the waters :⁹

So'yam purushaḥ Prajāpatir akāmayata "bhūyān syām prajāyeya" iti | so'srāmyat sa tapo'tapyata | sa śrāntas tepūno brahma eva prathamam asrījata trayīm eva vidyām | sū eva asmaī pratishthā 'bhavat | tasmād āhur "brahma asya sarvasya pratishthā" iti | tasmād anūchya pratishthati | pratishthā hy eshā yad brahma | tasyām pratishthāyām pratishthito'tapyata | 9. So'po'srījata vāchaḥ eva lokāt | vūg eva asya sū'srījyata | sū idam sarvam āpnod yad idam kincha | yad āpnod tasmād āpaḥ | yad avrīnot tasmād vāḥ | 10. So'kāmayata "ābhyo'dbhyo'dhī prajāyeya" iti | so'nayā trayyā vidyayā saha apaḥ prāviśat | totuḥ āndam samavarttata | tad abhyamṛīśat | "astu" ity "astu bhūyo'st" ity eva tad abravīt | tato brahma eva prathamam asrījyata trayy eva vidyā | tasmād āhur "brahma asya sarvasya prathamajam" iti | api hi tasmāt purushād brahma eva pūrvam asrījyata tad asya tad mukham eva asrījyata | tasmād anūchānam āhur "agni-kalpaḥ" iti | mukham hy etad agner yad brahma |

⁸ This text, Rig-veda, iii. 62, 10, will be quoted in the sequel.

⁹ This passage with the preceding context is given in the Fourth Volume of this work, pp. 18 f.

“This Male, Prajāpati, desired, ‘May I multiply, may I be propagated.’ He toiled in devotion; he practised austere-fervour. Having done so he first of all created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. This became a basis for him. Wherefore men say, ‘sacred knowledge is the basis of this universe.’ Hence after studying the Veda a man has a standing ground; for sacred knowledge is his foundation. Resting on this basis he (Prajāpati) practised austere-fervour. 9. He created the waters from Vāch (speech), as their world. Vāch was his: she was created. She pervaded all this whatever exists. As she pervaded (*āpnot*), waters were called ‘āpaḥ.’ As she covered (*avṛinot*) all, water was called ‘vār.’ 10. He desired, ‘May I be propagated from these waters.’ Along with this triple Vedic science he entered the waters. Thence sprang an egg. He gave it an impulse; and said, ‘Let there be, let there be, let there be again.’ Thence was first created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. Wherefore men say, ‘Sacred knowledge is the first-born thing in this universe. Moreover, it was sacred knowledge which was created from that Male in front, wherefore it was created as his mouth. Hence they say of a man learned in the Veda, ‘He is like Agni; for sacred knowledge is Agni’s mouth.’”

The next passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 3, 10, 1, briefly states that the Vedas were created after Soma:

Prajāpatiḥ Somaṁ rājānam asṛijata | taṁ trayo vedāḥ anv asṛijanta |

“Prajāpati created king Soma. After him the three Vedas were created.”

The same Brāhmaṇa in other places, as iii. 3, 2, 1, speaks of the Veda as derived from Prajāpati (*Prajāpatyo vedāḥ*).

Satapatha Brāhmaṇa.—According to the following passage of the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*, xiv. 5, 4, 10 (= *Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad*, p. 455 of Rōer’s ed. and p. 179 of trans.) the Vedas, as well as other *Sāstras*, are the breath of Brahma:

Sa yathā ārdredhāgner abhyāhitāt prithag dhūmāḥ viniścharanti evaṁ vai are ’sya mahato bhūtasya nisvasitam etad yad ṛigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo tharvāṅgīrasaḥ itihāsaḥ purāṇaṁ vidyā upanishadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇy anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni asyaiva etāni sarvāṇi nisvasitāni |

“As from a fire made of moist wood various modifications of smoke proceed, so is the breathing of this great Being the Rig-veda, the

Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Atharvāngirases, the Itihāsas, Purāṇas, science, the Upanishads, verses (*ślokas*), aphorisms, comments of different kinds—all these are his breathings.”

It is curious that in this passage the Vedas appear to be classed in the same category with various other works, such as the Sūtras, from some at least of which (as we shall see further on), they are broadly distinguished by later writers, who regard the former (including the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads) as of superhuman origin, and infallible correctness, while this character is expressly denied to the latter, which are represented as *pauruṣeya*, or merely human compositions, possessed of no independent authority.

In the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad (pp. 50–53 of Dr. Rōer's ed.) Prajāpati [identified with Death, or the Devourer] is said to have produced *Vāch* (speech), and through her, together with soul, to have created all things, including the Vedas :

Sa tayā vāchā tena ātmanā idaṁ sarvaṁ asṛijata yad idaṁ kincha ṛicho yajūṁśhi sāmāni chhandāṁsi yajnān prajāḥ paśūn |

“By that speech and that soul he created all things whatsoever, rich, yajush, and sāmān texts, metres, sacrifices, creatures, and animals.”

And in Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 4, 3, 12 (p. 290 of the same Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad) it is said :

Trayo vedāḥ ete eva | vāg eva ṛig-vedo mano yajur-vedāḥ prānaḥ sāma-vedāḥ |

“The three Vedas are [identifiable with] these three things [speech, mind, and breath]. Speech is the Rig-veda, mind the Yajur-veda, and breath the Sāma-veda.”

The following text, from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 52, gives a singular account of the production of the Vedas :

“Samudre tvā sadane sādāyāmi” iti | Mano vai samudraḥ | manaso vai samudrād vāchā 'bhryā devās trayīm vidyām nirakhanan | tad esha śloko 'bhyuktaḥ “ye (yat?) samudrād nirakhanan devās tīkshṇābhīr abhribhīḥ | sudevo adya tad vidyād yatra nirvapaṇam dadhu” iti | manaḥ samudro vāc tīkshṇā 'bhriḥ trayī vidyā nirvapaṇam | etad esha śloko 'bhyuktaḥ | manasi tāṁ sādāyati |

“I settle thee in the ocean as thy scat.”¹⁰ Mind is the ocean.

¹⁰ I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht for the following explanation of this formula, which is taken from the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xiii. 53. The words are addressed to a

From the mind-ocean with speech for a shovel the gods dug out the triple Vedic science. Hence this verse has been uttered: 'May the brilliant deity to-day know where they placed that offering which the gods dug out with sharp shovels.' Mind is the ocean; speech is the sharp shovel; the triple Vedic science is the offering. In reference to this the verse has been uttered. He settles it in Mind."

The next passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 39, 1, speaks of the Veda as being "the hair of Prajāpati's beard" (*Prajāpater vai etāni śmaśrūṇi yad vedāḥ*). The process of its germination is left to the imagination of the reader.

In another text of the same Brāhmaṇa, Vāch (speech) is called the mother of the Vedas :

ii. 8, 8, 5. *Vāg aksharam prathamajāṛitasya vedūnām mātā amṛitasya nābhīḥ | sū no jushānā upa yajnam āgūd avantī devī suhavā me astu | yām ṛishayo mantra-kṛito manishīṇaḥ anvaiçhhan devās tapasū śraṃeṇa |*

"Vāch (speech) is an imperishable thing, and the first-born of the ceremonial, the mother of the Vedas, and the centre-point of immortality. Delighting in us, she came to the sacrifice. May the protecting goddess be ready to listen to my invocation,—she whom the wise rishis, the composers of hymns, the gods, sought by austere-fervour, and by laborious devotion."

SECT. II.—*Origin of the Vedas according to the Vishṇu, Bhāgavata, and Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇas, the Harivaṃśa, the Mahābhārata; eternity of the Veda; miscellaneous statements regarding it.*

In the Vishṇu and Bhāgavata Purāṇas we find a quite different tradition regarding the origin of the Vedas, which in these works are said to have been created by the four-faced Brahmā from his several mouths. Thus the Vishṇu Purāṇa says, i. 5, 48 ff. :

Gāyatrām cha ṛichas chaiva trivṛit-sūma-rathantaram | Agnishṭomaṃ cha yajnanām nirmame prathamād mukhāt | yajūṃshī traishṭubham çhhandāḥ stomaṃ panchadaśam tathā | Vṛikat sūma tathokthyaṃ cha dakshīṇād asṛijad mukhāt | sāmāni jagati-çhhandāḥ stomaṃ saptadaśam

brick at the time when the hearth (*chityā*) for the reception of the sacred fires is being constructed. As the bricks are severally called *apasyū* (properly 'efficacious,' but erroneously derived from *ap*) they are addressed as if placed in various parts of water

tathā | vairūpam atirātraṁ cha paśchimād asṛjād mukhāt | ekaviṁśam atharvānam āptoryāmānam eva cha | Anuṣṭubhaṁ sa vairājam uttarād asṛjād mukhāt |

“From his eastern mouth Brahmā formed the gāyatra, the rich verses, the triṣṛit, the sāma-rathantara, and of sacrifices, the agniṣṭoma. From his southern mouth he created the yajush verses, the triṣṭubh metre, the panchadaśa-stoma, the ṛihat-sāman, and the ukthya. From his western mouth he formed the sāman verses, the jagatī metre, the saptadaśa-stoma, the vairūpa, and the atirātra. From his northern mouth he framed the ekaviṁśa, the atharvan, the āptoryāman, with the anuṣṭubh and virāj metres.”¹¹

In like manner it is said but with variations, in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iii. 12, 34, and 37 ff. :

Kadūchid dhyāyataḥ srasṭur vedūh āsaṁś chaturmukhāt | kathaṁ sṛakṣhyāmy ahaṁ lokān samavetān yathā purā | . . . Rīg-yajuh-sāmā-tharvākhyān vedān pūrvādibhir mukhaiḥ | śastram iyyāṁ stuti-stomam prāyaśchittaṁ vyadhāt kramāt |

“Once the Vedas sprang from the four-faced creator, as he was meditating ‘how shall I create the aggregate world as before?’ . . . He formed from his eastern and other mouths the Vedas called rich, yajush, sāman, and atharvan, together with praise, sacrifice, hymns, and expiation.”

And in verse 45 it is stated that the ushṇih metre issued from his hairs, the gāyatrī from his skin, the triṣṭubh from his flesh, the anuṣṭubh from his tendons, the jagatī from his bones (*Tasyoṣṇig āsīl lomabhyo gāyatrī cha tvacho vibhoḥ | triṣṭup māṁsāt snuto ’nuṣṭup jagaty asthnaḥ Prajāpateḥ*).

The Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa says on the same subject, 102, 1 :

Tasmād anḍād vibhinnāt tu Brahmaṇo ’vyakta-jaṅmanah | ṛicho babhū-rah prathamam prathamād vadanād mune | 2. Javā-pushpa-nibhāḥ sadyas tejo-rūpānta-saṁhatāḥ | pṛithak pṛithag vibhinnās cha rajo-rūpa-vahās tataḥ | 3. Yajūṁshi dakṣiṇād vaktrād aniruddhāni kanchanam | yādri- varṇaṁ tathā-varṇāny asaṁhati-dharāni cha | 4. Paśchimaṁ yad vibhor vaktram Brahmaṇaḥ parameshṭhinaḥ | āvirbhūtāni sāmāni tutaś chhan- dāṁsi tōny atha | 5. Ātharvaṇam aśeṣaṁ cha bhṛiṅgūnjana-chaya-prab- ham | ghorāghora-svarūpaṁ tad ābhichārīka-sāntikam | 6. Uttarāt pra-

¹¹ See Wilson's Transl. vol. i. p. 84.

kaṭibhūtaṁ vadanāt tasya vedhasaḥ | sukha-sattva-tamaḥ-prāyaṁ saumyā-saumya-svarūpavat | 7. Riḥo rajo-guṇāḥ sattvaṁ yajushāṁ cha guṇo mune | tamo-guṇāni sāmāni tamaḥ-sattvam atharvasu |

1. "From the eastern mouth of Brahmā, who sprang by an imperceptible birth from that divided egg (Manu, i. 9, 12), there suddenly issued first of all the rich verses, (2) resembling China roses, brilliant in appearance, internally united, though separated from each other, and characterized by the quality of passion (*rajas*). 3. From his southern mouth came, unrestrained, the yajush verses of the colour of gold, and disunited. 4. From the western mouth of the supreme Brahmā appeared the sāmān verses and the metres. 5 and 6. From the northern mouth of Vedhas (Brahmā) was manifested the entire Ātharvaṇa of the colour of black bees and collyrium, having a character at once terrible and not terrible,¹² capable of neutralizing the arts of enchanters, pleasant, characterized by the qualities both of purity and darkness, and both beautiful and the contrary. 7. The verses of the rich are distinguished by the quality of passion (*rajas*), those of the yajush by purity (*sattva*), those of the sāmān by darkness (*tamas*), and those of the atharvan by both darkness and purity."

Harivaṁśa.—In the first section of the *Harivaṁśa*, verse 47, the creation of the Vedas by Brahmā is thus briefly alluded to :

Riḥo yajūṁshi sāmāni nirmame yajna-siddhaye | sādhyās tair ayajan devān ity evam anuśūsruma |

"In order to the accomplishment of sacrifice, he formed the rich, yajush, and sāmān verses: with these the Sādhyas worshipped the gods, as we have heard."

The following is the account of the same event given in another part of the same work; *Harivaṁśa*, verse 11,516:

Tato 'srijad vai tripadām gāyatrīṁ veda-mūtarām | Akaroḥ chaiva chaturō vedān gāyatrī-sambhavan |

After framing the world, Brahmā "next created the gāyatrī of three lines, mother of the Vedas, and also the four Vedas which sprang from the gāyatrī."¹³

¹² *Ghorāghora* is the correct MS. reading, as I learn from Dr. Hall, and not *yāvuddhora*, as given in Professor Banerjea's printed text.

¹³ The same words *gāyatrīṁ veda-mūtarām* also occur in the M.Bh. Vanaparvan, verse 13,432; and the same title is applied to Vāch in the Taitt. Br. as quoted above, p. 10.

A little further on we find this expanded into the following piece of mysticism, verse 11,665 ff. :

Samāhita-manā Brahmā moksha-prāptena hetunā | chandra-maṇḍala-saṁsthānāj jyotis-tejo mahat tadā | Praviśya hṛdayaṁ kshipraṁ gāyatrīyūḥ nayanāntare | Garbhasya sambhavo yaś cha chaturdhā purushātmakāḥ | Brahma-tejomayo 'vyaktāḥ śūsvato 'tha dhruvo 'vyāyāḥ | na chendriya-guṇair yukto yuktas tejo-guṇena cha | chandrāmśu-vimala-prakhyo bhṛā-jishnur varna-saṁsthitaḥ | Netrābhyāṁ janayad devaḥ ṛig-vedaṁ yajushā saha | sāmavedaṁ cha jihvāgrād atharvānaṁ cha mūrddhataḥ | Jāta-mātrās tu te vedāḥ kṣhetraṁ vindanti tattvataḥ | Tena vedatvam āpannā yasmād vindanti tat padam | Te srijanti tadū vedāḥ brahma pūrvaṁ sanūtanam | Puruṣhaṁ divya-rūpābhaṁ svaiḥ svair bhūvair mano-bhavaīḥ |

“For the emancipation of the world, Brahmā, sunk in contemplation, issuing in a luminous form from the region of the moon, penetrated into the heart of Gāyatrī, entering between her eyes. From her there was then produced a quadruple being in the form of a Male, lustrous as Brahmā, undefined, eternal, undecaying, devoid of bodily senses or qualities, distinguished by the attribute of brilliancy, pure as the rays of the moon, radiant, and embodied in letters. The god fashioned the Rig-veda, with the Yajush from his eyes, the Sāma-veda from the tip of his tongue, and the Atharvan from his head. These Vedas, as soon as they are born, find a body (*kshetra*). Hence they obtain their character of Vedas, because they find (*vindanti*) that abode. These Vedas then create the pre-existent eternal brahma (sacred science), a Male of celestial form, with their own mind-born qualities.”

I extract another passage on the same subject from a later section of the same work, verses 12,425 ff. When the Supreme Being was intent on creating the universe, Hiranyagarbha, or Prajāpati, issued from his mouth, and was desired to divide himself,—a process which he was in great doubt how he should effect. The text then proceeds :

Iti chintayatas tasya "om" ity evotthitāḥ svarāḥ | sa bhūmār antarīkṣhe cha nāke cha kṛitavān svanam | Tam chaivābhyasatas tasya manāḥ-sāramayam punaḥ | hṛidayād deva-derasya vashaṭkūrah samutthitāḥ | bhūmy-antarīkṣha-nākānām bhūyāḥ svarātmakāḥ parāḥ | mahāsmṛitimayāḥ puṇyāḥ mahāryāhṛitayo 'bhavan | ckhandasām pravaraḥ devī chaturvīṁśā-kṣharā 'bhavat | Tat-padaṁ saṁsmaran divyam sūvitṛim akarot prakḷuḥ |

rik-sāmātharva-yajushāś chaturo bhagavān prabhuḥ | chakāra nikhilān vedān brahma-yuktena karmanā |

“While he was thus reflecting, the sound “om” issued from him, and resounded through the earth, air, and sky. While the god of gods was again and again repeating this, the essence of mind, the vashaṭkāra proceeded from his heart. Next, the sacred and transcendent vyāḥṛitis, (bhūḥ, bhuvah, svar), formed of the great smṛiti, in the form of sound, were produced from earth, air, and sky. Then appeared the goddess, the most excellent of metres, with twenty-four syllables [the gāyatrī]. Reflecting on the divine text [beginning with] “tat,” the Lord formed the sāvitṛī. He then produced all the Vedas, the Rīch, Sāman, Atharvan, and Yajush, with their prayers and rites.” (See also the passage from the Bhāg. Pur. xii. 6, 37 ff., which will be quoted in a following section.)

Mahābhārata.—The Mahābhārata in one passage speaks of Sarasvatī and the Vedas as being both created by Achyuta (Vishṇu) from his mind (Bhīshma-parvan, verse 3019: *Sarasvatīm cha vedāṁś cha manasaḥ sarjje 'chyutaḥ*). In another place, Sānti-parvan, verse 12,920, Sarasvatī is said, in conformity with the texts quoted above, pp. 10 and 12, from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, the Vana-parvan, and the Harivaṁśa, to be the mother of the Vedas :

Vedānām mātaraṁ paśya mat-sthām devīm Sarasvatīm |

“Behold Sarasvatī, mother of the Vedas, abiding in me.”

Mamu.—According to the verses in Manu, xii. 49, 50, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 41, the Vedas, with the other beings and objects named along with them, constitute the second manifestation of the sattva guṇa, or pure principle; while Brahmā is placed in a higher rank, as one of the first manifestations of the same principle. The word Veda in this passage is explained by Kullūka of those “embodied deities, celebrated in the Itihāsas, who preside over the Vedas” (*Vedābhīmāninyāś cha devatūḥ vighrahavatyāḥ itihāsa-prasiddhāḥ*).

SECT. III.—*Passages of the Brāhmaṇas and other works in which the Vedas are spoken of as being the sources of all things, and as infinite and eternal.*

The first text of this sort which I shall cite is from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, x. 4, 2, 21 :

Atha sarvāṇi bhūtāni paryaikshat | sa trayyām eva vidyūyām sarvāṇi bhūtāny apasyat | atra hi sarveshām chhandasām ātmā sarveshām stomānām sarveshām prānānām sarveshām devānām | etad vai asti | etad hy amṛitam | yad hy amṛitam tad hy asti | etad u tad yad martyam | 22. Sa aikshata Prajāpatiḥ “ trayyām eva vidyūyām sarvāṇi bhūtāni | hanta trayīm eva vidyām ātmānam abhisaṁskaravai ” iti | 23. Sa ṛicho vyauhat | dvādaśa bṛihatī-sahasrāṇy etāvatyo ha ṛicho yāḥ Prajāpati-sṛiṣṭūś tās triṁśattame vyūhe panktiṣv atishṭhanta | tāḥ yat triṁśattame vyūhe tishṭhanta tasmāt triṁśad māsayā rātrayaḥ | atha yat panktiṣu tasmāt pānktaḥ Prajāpatiḥ | tāḥ aṣṭāśataṁ śatāni pānktyo ’bhavan |

21. “ Then he looked around upon all beings. He beheld all beings in this triple Vedic science. For in it is the soul of all metres, of all hymns of praise, of all breaths, of all the gods. This, indeed, exists.¹⁴ It is an undying thing. For that which is undying (really) exists. This is that which is mortal.¹⁵ Prajāpati reflected, ‘ All beings are comprehended in the triple Vedic science : come let me dispose myself in the shape of the triple Vedic science.¹⁶ He arranged the verses of the Rig-veda. Twelve thousand Bṛihatīs, and as many Ṛich-verses which were created by Prajāpati, stood in rows in the thirtieth class. Since they stood in the thirtieth class there are thirty nights in the month. Since they stood in rows (*pankti*) Prajāpati is called Pānkta. They formed eighteen hundreds of rows.”

The next text, from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 12, 9, 1, speaks of the three Vedas as being respectively the sources of form, motion, and heat, or brilliancy :

Ṛigbhyo jātām sarvaso mūrṭtim āhuḥ sarvā gatir yājushī haiva śasvat | sarvaṁ tejaḥ sāma-rūpyam ha śasvat |

“ They say that form universally proceeds from ṛich verses; that motion is always connected with the yajush, and that all heat has the nature of the sāman.”

We have already seen, p. 6, that Manu (i. 21) speaks of the names,

¹⁴ “ Always exists ” (*sarvadā vidyate*).—Comm.

¹⁵ On this the commentator remarks: *Yach cha mūrṭyam māṇa-dharmāṇāṁ manushyūdi tad apy etat trayī-bhūtam eva | ato martyūmṛitātmaṁ sarvaṁ jagad attrāntarbhūtam |* “ And that which is mortal, subject to death, the human race, etc., is also one with the triple Vedic science. Hence the latter includes all the world both mortal and immortal.”

¹⁶ I owe this interpretation of this clause to Prof. Aufrecht.

functions, and conditions of all things as fashioned from the words of the Veda. It is similarly said in the Vishṇu Purāṇa, i. 5, 58 :

*Nāma rūpaṃ cha bhūtānāṃ kṛtīyānāṃ cha pravarttanāṃ | Veda-śab-
debhya evādaḥ devādīnāṃ cakāra saḥ | ṛishīnāṃ nāmadheyāni yathā
veda-śrutāni vai | yathā-niyoga-yogyāni sarveśhām api so 'karot |*

“In the beginning he created from the words of the Veda the names, forms, and functions of the gods and other beings. He also assigned the names of all the rishis as indicated in the Vedas, and as appropriate to their respective offices.”

The same idea is repeated in the Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan, 8533 :

*Ṛishayas tapasā vedūn adhyaishanta divānīsam | An-ādi-nīdhanā
vidyā vāg utsriṣṭā, Svayambhuvā | ādaḥ vedamayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ
pravṛittayah | ṛishīnāṃ nāmadheyāni yāś cha vedeshu sriṣṭayah | nānā-
rūpaṃ cha bhūtānāṃ karmanāṃ cha pravarttayan (pravarttanam?) |
veda-śabdebhya evādaḥ nirmimīte sa īśvaraḥ |*

“Through austere-fervour (*tapas*) the rishis studied the Vedas, both day and night. In the beginning knowledge (*vidyā*)” without beginning or end, divine speech, formed, of the Vedas, was sent forth by Svayambhū (= Brahmā, the self-existent): from her all activities are derived. It is from the words of the Veda that the lord in the beginning frames the names of the rishis, the creations which (exist) in the Vedas, the various forms of beings, and the activity manifested in works.”

The Mangalācharaṇa, or prayer prefixed to their commentaries on the Rik Sanhitā and Taittirīya Sanhitā, by both Sāyaṇa and Mādḥava, is as follows :

*Yasya niśvasitaṃ vedāḥ yo vedebhyo 'khilāṃ jagat | nirmame tam aham
vande vidyā-tīrtham maheśvaram |*

“I reverence Maheśvara the hallowed abode of sacred knowledge, of whom the Vedas are the breathings, and who from the Vedas formed the whole universe.”

The following passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 10, 11, 3, asserts that the Vedas are infinite in extent :

Bharadvājo ha tribhīr āyurbhīr brahmacharyyam uvāsa | taṃ ha jīrṇīm

¹⁷ In quoting this line in a passage of his Vedārtha-prakāśa, or commentary on the Taittirīya Sanhitā, which I shall adduce further on, Mādḥava Āchāryya gives the reading *nityā*, ‘eternal,’ instead of *vidyā*, ‘knowledge.’ It is possible that the line may be taken from some other book.

sthaviraṃ śayānam Indraḥ upavrajya uvācha | “*Bharadvāja yat te chaturtham āyur dadyām kim etena kuryyāḥ*” iti | “*brahmacharyyam eva enena chareyam*” iti hā uvācha | 4. *Taṃ ha trīn giri-rūpān avijnātān iva darśayānchakāra* | *teshām ha ekaikasmād muṣṭim ādade* | *sa ha uvācha* “*Bharadvāja*” ity āmantrya | “*vedāḥ vai ete* | *anantāḥ vai vedūḥ* | *etad vai etais tribhīr: āyurbhīr anvavochathāḥ* | *atha te itarad ananūktam eva* | *ehi imaṃ viddhi* | *ayaṃ vai sarva-vidyā*” iti | 5. *Tasmai ha etam agnim sāvitrām uvācha* | *taṃ sa viditvā amṛito bhūtvā svargaṃ lokam iyāya ādityasya sāyujyam* | *amṛito ha eva bhūtvā svargaṃ lokam ety ādityasya sāyujyaṃ yaḥ evaṃ veda* | *eshā u eva trayī vidyā* | 6. *Yāvantaṃ ha vai trayyā vidyayā lokāṃ jayati tāvantam lokāṃ jayati yaḥ evaṃ veda* |

“Bharadvāja lived through three lives”¹⁸ in the state of a religious student (*brahmacharyya*). Indra approached him when he was lying old and decrepit, and said to him: ‘Bharadvāja, if I give thee a fourth life, how wilt thou employ it?’ ‘I will lead the life of a religious student,’ he replied. 4. He (Indra) showed him three mountain-like objects, as it were unknown. From each of them he took a handful: and, calling to him, ‘Bharadvāja,’ said, ‘These are the Vedas. The Vedas are infinite. This is what thou hast studied during these three lives. Now there is another thing which thou hast not studied, come and learn it. This is the universal science.’ 5. He declared to him this Agni Sāvitra. Having known it he (Bharadvāja) became immortal, and ascended to the heavenly world, to union with the sun. He who knows this ascends to heaven, to union with the sun. This is the triple Vedic science. He who knows this conquers a world as great as he would gain by the triple Vedic science.”

Another text from the Taittirīya Sanhitā, vii. 3, 1, 4, puts the matter somewhat differently :

Atha brahmā (brahma-vādino?) vadanti parimitāḥ vai ṛichaḥ parimitāni sāmāni parimitāni yajūṃshi atha tasya eva anto nāsti yad brahma |

“The expounders of sacred science say, ‘R̥ich verses are limited, sāmā verses are limited, yajush verses are limited; but there is no end of sacred knowledge.”

Fishnu Purāna.—At the end of Section 6 of the third book of the

¹⁸ This does not appear to mean, three lives in three different births, but a life of thrice the usual length, or already twice renewed.

Vishṇu Purāṇa we have the following assertion of the eternity of the Veda :

Iti śākhāḥ prasankhyātāḥ śākhā-bhedās tathaiva cha | karttārāś chaiva śākhānām bheda-hetus tathoditāḥ | sarva-manvantareshv eva śākhā-bhedāḥ samāḥ smritāḥ | Prājāpatyā śrutir nityā tad-vikalpās tv ime dvija |

“Thus the Śākhās, their divisions, their authors, and the cause of the division have been declared. In all the manvantaras the divisions of the Śākhās are recorded to be the same. The śruti (Veda) derived from Prajāpati (Brahmā) is eternal : these, o Brāhman, are only its modifications.”

In another passage of the same book, Vishṇu is identified with the Vedas : Vishṇu Purāṇa, iii. 3, 19 ff. :

Sa riñ-mayaḥ sa sāmamayaḥ sa chātmā sa yajurmayaḥ | riḡ-yajuh-sāma-sūrātmā sa evātmā śaririnām | sa bhidyate vedamayaḥ sa vedaṁ karoti bhedair bahubhiḥ saśākhāḥ | śākhā-pranētā sa samasta-śākhāḥ ināna-svarūpo bhagavān anantaḥ |

“He is composed of the Rich, of the Sāman, of the Yajush ; he is the soul. Consisting of the essence of the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman, he is the soul of embodied spirits. Formed of the Veda, he is divided ; he forms the Veda and its branches (śākhās) into many divisions. Framer of the Śākhās, he is also their entirety, the infinite lord, whose essence is knowledge.”

SECT. IV.—*Passages from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, eulogistic of the Veda, with some statements of a different tenor from Manu and other writers.*

The following panegyric on Vedic study is taken from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 6, 1 :

Pancha eva mahāyajnāḥ | tāny eva mahāsattrāṇi bhūta-yajno manushya-yajnaḥ pitṛi-yajno deva-yajno brahma-yajnaḥ iti | 2. Ahar ahar bhūtebhyo balim haret | tathā etam bhūta-yajnaṁ samāpnoti | ahar ahar dadyād ā uda-pūtrāt tathā etam manushya-yajnaṁ samāpnoti | ahar ahaḥ svadhākuryād ā uda-pātrāt tathā etaṁ pitṛi-yajnaṁ samāpnoti | ahar ahaḥ svāhākuryād ā kūshṭhāt tathā etaṁ deva-yajnaṁ samāpnoti | 3. Atha brahma-yajnaḥ | svādhyāyo vai brahma-yajnaḥ | tasya vai etasya brahma-

*yajnasya vāg eva juhūr manah upabhrich chakshur dhruvā medhā sruvāḥ
 satyam avabhrithāḥ svargo lokaḥ udayanam | yāvantaṁ ha vai imāṁ pri-
 thivīm vittena pūrṇām dadaṁ lokaṁ jayati tris tāvantaṁ jayati bhūyām-
 saṁ cha akshayām yaḥ evaṁ vidvān ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte |
 tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyaḥ | 4. Poya-āhutayo ha vai etāḥ devānām yad
 ṛichāḥ | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān ṛicho 'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte poya-
 āhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati | te enaṁ triptās tarpayanti yoga-
 kshemeṇa prāneṇa retasā sarvātmanā sarvābhīḥ puṇyābhīḥ sampadbhīḥ |
 ghṛita-kulyāḥ madhu-kulyāḥ pitṛin svadhā abhivahanti | 5. Ājyāhutayo
 ha vai etāḥ devānām yad yajūṁshi | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān yajūṁshy ahar
 ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte ājyāhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati te enam
 triptās tarpayanti yoga-kshemeṇa ityūdi | 6. Somāhutayo ha vai etāḥ
 devānām yat sāmāni | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān sāmāny ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam
 adhīte somāhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati ityūdi | 7. Meda-āhutayo
 ha vai etāḥ devānām yad atharvāngirasah | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān atharvān-
 giraso 'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte meda-āhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tar-
 payati ityūdi | 8. Madho-āhutayo ha vai etāḥ devānām yad anusūsanāni
 vidyā vākovākyam itihāsa-purāṇaṁ gāthāḥ nūrāsāṁsyaḥ | sa yaḥ evaṁ vid-
 vān ityūdi | 9. Tasya vai etasya brahma-yajnasya chatcāro vashaṭkārāḥ
 yad vāto vāti yad vidyotate yat stanayati yad avasphūrjati | tasmād evaṁ
 vidvān vāte vāti vidyotamāne stanayaty avasphūrjaty adhīyāta eva vashaṭ-
 kārāṇām achhaṁbaṭkārāya | ati ha vai punar mrityum muchyate guchhati
 Brahmaṇaḥ sātnatām | sa ched api prabalam iva na śakṁyūd apy ekaṁ
 deva-padam adhīyāta eva tathā bhūtebhyo na hīyate | xi. 5, 7, 1 : Atha
 ataḥ svādhyāya-prasāṁsū | priye svādhyāya-pravaohane bhavataḥ | yukta-
 manāḥ bhavaty aparādhiṇo 'har ahar arthūn sādhyate sukhaṁ svapiti
 parama-chikitsakaḥ ātmano bhavāti | indriya-sāmyamaś cha ekārāmatū
 cha prajñā-vṛiddhir yaśo loka-paktiḥ | prajñā varddhimānū chaturo dharmān
 brāhmaṇam abhinishpādayati brāhmaṇyam pratirūpa-charyyāṁ yaśo
 loka-paktim | lokaḥ pachyamānaś chaturbhir dharmair brāhmaṇam bhun-
 akty archayā cha dāneṇa cha ajyeyatayā cha abadhayatayā cha | 2. Yo ha vai
 ko cha śramāḥ ime dyāvā-prithivī antureṇa svādhyāyo ha eva teshāṁ para-
 matā kashṭhā yaḥ evam vidvān svādhyāyam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo
 'dhetavyaḥ | 3. Yad yad ha vai ayāṁ chhandasaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte tena
 tena ha eva asya yajna-kratunū ishṭam bhavati yuḥ evaṁ vidvān svādhyā-
 yam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyaḥ | 4. Yadi ha vai apy abhyuk-
 taḥ alankṛitaḥ suhitaḥ sukho śayane śayānūḥ svādhyāyam adhīte ā ha*

eva sa nakhāgrebhyas tarpayate yaḥ evaṁ vidvān svādhyāyam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyaḥ | 5. Madhu ha vai ṛicho ghrītaṁ ha sāmāny amṛitaṁ yajūṁshī | yad ha vai ayaṁ vākovākyam adhīte kshīraudana-māmsaudanau ha eva tau | 6. Madhunā ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān ṛicho 'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enaṁ triptās tarpayanti sarvāiḥ kāmāiḥ sarvair bhogaiḥ | 7. Ghrītena ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān sāmāny ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enaṁ triptāḥ ityādi | 8. Amṛitena ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evam vidvān yajūṁshy ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enaṁ triptāḥ ityādi | 9. Kshīraudana-māmsaudanābhyāṁ ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān vākovākyam itihāsa-purānam ity ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enaṁ triptāḥ ityādi | 10. Yanti vai āpaḥ | ety ādityaḥ | eti chandramāḥ | yanti nakshatrāṇi | yathā ha vai na iyur na kuryur evaṁ ha eva tad ahar brāhmaṇo bhavati yad ahaḥ svādhyāyaṁ na adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyaḥ | tasmād apy ṛichaṁ vā yajur vā sāma vā gāthāṁ vā kuṁvyāṁ vā abhivyāhared vratasya aryaavachhedāya |

“There are only five great sacrifices, which are the great ceremonies, viz., the offering to living creatures,¹⁹ the offering to men, the offering to the fathers, the offering to the gods, and the Veda-offering (*brahmayajna*). 2. Let an oblation be daily presented to living creatures. Thus the offering to them is fulfilled. Let (hospitality) be daily bestowed even down to the bowl of water. Thus is the offering to men fulfilled. Let the oblation to the fathers be daily presented,²⁰ down to the bowl of water with the *svadhā* formula. Thus is the offering to the fathers fulfilled. Let the oblation to the gods be daily presented as far as the faggot of wood. Thus is the offering to the gods fulfilled. 3. Next is the Veda-offering. This means private study²¹ (of the sacred books). In this Veda-sacrifice speech is the *juhū*, the soul the *upabṛit*, the eye the *dhruvā*, intelligence the *sruva*,²² truth the ablution, and paradise

¹⁹ This sacrifice, as I learn from Prof. Aufrecht, consists in scattering grain for the benefit of birds, etc. See Böttlingk and Roth's *Lexicon*, s.v. *balī*. In regard to the other sacrifices see Colebrooke's *Misc. Essays*, i. pp. 150, 153, 182 ff., 203 ff.

²⁰ In explanation of this Professor Aufrecht refers to *Kātyāyana's Śrauta Sūtras*, iv. 1, 10, and *Manu*, iii. 210, 214, 218.

²¹ *Svādhyāyaḥ sva-sākhādhyānam* | “Reading of the Veda in one's own *sākhā*.”—Comm.

²² These words denote sacrificial spoons or ladles of different kinds of wood. See the drawings of them in Prof. Müller's article on the funeral rites of the *Brāhmins*, *Journ. of the Germ. Or. Soc.* vol. ix. pp. lxxviii. and lxxx.

the conclusion. He who, knowing this, daily studies the Veda, conquers an undecaying world more than thrice as great as that which he acquires who bestows this whole earth filled with riches. Wherefore the Veda should be studied. 4. Verses of the Rig-veda are milk-oblations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with milk-oblations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him with property, with breath, with generative power, with complete bodily soundness, with all excellent blessings. Streams of butter, streams of honey flow as svadhā-oblations to the fathers. 5. Yajush-verses are offerings of butter to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with offerings of butter; and they, being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as in the preceding paragraph). 6. Sāman-verses are soma-libations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with soma-libations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as above). 7. Verses of Atharvan and Angiras (*atharvāngirasaḥ*²³) are oblations of fat to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with oblations of fat; and they etc. (as above). 8. Prescriptive and scientific treatises, dialogues, traditions, tales, verses, and eulogistic texts are oblations of honey to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these, satisfies the gods with oblations of honey; and they etc. (as above). 9. Of this Veda-sacrifice there are four Vashaṭkāras, when the wind blows, when it lightens, when it thunders, when it crashes; wherefore when it blows, lightens, thunders, or crashes, let the man, who knows this, read, in order that these Vashaṭkāras may not be interrupted.²⁴ He who does so is freed from dying a second time, and attains to an union with Brahma. Even if he cannot read vigorously, let him read one text relating to the gods. Thus he is not deprived of his living creatures."

xi. 5, 7, 1: "Now comes an encomium upon Vedic study. Study and teaching are loved. He (who practises them) becomes composed in mind. Independent of others, he daily attains his objects, sleeps pleasantly, becomes his own best physician. Control of his senses, concentration of mind, increase of intelligence, renown, capacity to educate mankind [are the results of study]. Increasing intelligence secures for

²³ The Atharva Saṁhitā is so called.

²⁴ See Böthlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v. *chhambat*.

the Brāhman the four attributes of saintliness, suitable conduct, renown, and capacity for educating mankind. When so educated, men guarantee to the Brāhman the enjoyment of the four prerogatives which are his due, reverence, the receipt of gifts, freedom from oppression, and from death by violence. 2. Of all the modes of exertion, which are known between heaven and earth, study of the Veda occupies the highest rank, (in the case of him) who, knowing this, studies it. Wherefore this study is to be practised. 3. On every occasion when a man studies the Vedic hymns he (in fact) performs a complete ceremonial of sacrifice, *i.e.* whosoever, knowing this, so studies. Wherefore this study, etc., etc. 4. And even when a man, perfumed with unguents, adorned with jewels, satiated with food, and reposing on a comfortable couch, studies the Veda he (has all the merit of one who) performs penance (felt) to the very tips of his nails:²⁵ (such is the case with him) who, knowing this, studies. Wherefore etc. 5. Rig-veda-verses are honey, Sāma-verses butter, yajus-verses nectar (*amṛita*). When a man reads dialogues (*vākovākya*) [and legends], these two sorts of composition are respectively oblations of cooked milk and cooked flesh. 6. He who, knowing this, daily reads Rig-veda-verses, satisfies the gods with honey; and they, when satisfied, satisfy him with all objects of desire, and with all enjoyments. 7. He who, knowing this, daily reads Sāma-verses, satisfies the gods with butter; and they, when satisfied, etc. (as before). 8. He who, knowing this, daily reads Yajus-verses, satisfies the gods with nectar; and they, etc. (as before). 9. He who, knowing this, daily studies dialogues and the different classes of ancient stories, satisfies the gods with milk- and flesh-oblations; and they, etc. (as before). 10. The waters move. The sun moves. The moon moves. The constellations move. The Brāhman who on any day does not study the Veda, is on that day like what these moving bodies would be if the ceased to move or act. Wherefore such study is to be practised. Let

²⁵ This sentence is differently rendered by Professor Weber, Ind. Stud. x. p. 112, as follows: "He burns (with sacred fire) to the very tips of his nails." In a later page of the same Essay we are told that according to the doctrine of a teacher called Nāka Maudgalya as stated in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, the study and teaching of the Veda are the real *tapas* (*svādhyāya-pravachane eva tad hi tapas*). In the text of the Āraṇyaka itself, vii. 8, it is declared that study and teaching should always accompany such spiritual or ritual acts as *ṛitam*, *satyam*, *tapas*, *dama*, *sama*, the *agnihotra* sacrifice, etc. See Indische Studien, ii. 214, and x. 113.

a man therefore present as his offering a verse of the Rig-veda, or the Sāman, or the Yajush, or a Gāthā, or a Kumūvyā, in order that the course of his observances may not be interrupted."

Manu employs the following honorific expressions in reference to the Vedas (xii. 94 ff.) :

*Pitri-deva-manushyānām vedas chakshuh sanātanam | asakyaṃ chūprameyaṃ cha veda-sāstram iti sthitiḥ | Yā veda-vāhyāḥ smṛitayo yās cha kāscha kudṛishṭayaḥ |*²⁶ *sarvās tā nishphalāḥ pretya tamo-nishṭhāḥ hi tāḥ smṛitāḥ | Utpadyante chyavanto cha yāny ato 'nyāni kānichit | Tāny arvāk-kālikatayā*²⁷ *nishphalāny anṛitāni cha | Chāturvaryaṃ trayo lokās chatvāras chāśramāḥ pṛithak | Bhūtam bhavad bhavishyaṃ cha sarvaṃ vedāt prasiddhyati | śabdāḥ sparśās cha rūpaṃ cha raso gandhaḥ cha panchamaḥ | vedā eva prasiddhyanti prasūti-guṇa-karmataḥ | Bibharti*²⁸ *sarva-bhūtāni veda-sāstraṃ sanātanam | Tasmād etat param manye yaj jantor asya sādhanam | Saināpatyaṃ cha rājyaṃ cha daṇḍa-netṛitvam eva cha | sarva-lokādhipatyaṃ cha veda-sāstra-vid arhati | Yathā jātabalo vahniḥ dahaty ārdṛān api drumān | tathā dahati veda-jnaḥ karma-jām dosham ūtmanaḥ | veda-śūstrārtha-tattva-jno yatra tatrāśrame vasa, | ihaiva loke tishṭhan sa brahmabhūyāya kalpate |*

"The Veda is the eternal eye of the fathers, of gods, and of men; it is beyond human power and comprehension; this is a certain conclusion. Whatever traditions are apart from the Veda, and all heretical views, are fruitless in the next world, for they are declared to be founded on darkness. All other [books] external to the Veda, which arise and pass away, are worthless and false from their recentness of date. The system of the four castes, the three worlds, the four states of life, all that has been, now is, or shall be, is made manifest by the

²⁶ *Dṛishṭārtha-vākyāni* "chaitya-vandanāt svargo bhavati" ity ādīni yāni cha asat-tarka-mūlāni devatā-pūrvādi-nirākaraṇāt makūni veda-vi-uddhūni chārvāka-darśanāni | "That is, deductions from experience of the visible world; such doctrines as that 'heaven is attained by obeisance to a chaitya,' and similar Chārvāka tenets founded on false reasonings, contradicting the existence of the gods, and the efficacy of religious rites, and contrary to the Vedas."—Kullūka.

²⁷ *Jānāntanāt vāt* | "From their modernness."—Kullūka.

²⁸ "Havir agnau hūyate | so 'gnir ādityam upasavati | tat sūryo raśmibhir varshati | tenannam bhavati | atha iha bhūtānām utpatti-sihitḥ cheti hai ir jayati" iti brāhmaṇam | "The oblation is cast into the fire; fire reaches the sun; the sun causes rain by his rays; thence food is produced; thus the oblation becomes the cause of the generation and maintenance of creatures on this earth!;" so says a Brāhmaṇa.—Kullūka.

Veda. The objects of touch and taste, sound, form, and odour, as the fifth, are made known by the Veda, together with their products, qualities, and the character of their action. The eternal Veda supports all beings: hence I regard it as the principal instrument of well-being to this creature, man. Command of armies, royal authority, the administration of criminal justice, and the sovereignty of all worlds, he alone deserves who knows the Veda. As fire, when it has acquired force, burns up even green trees, so he who knows the Veda consumes the taint of his soul which has been contracted from works. He who comprehends the essential meaning of the Veda, in whatever order of life he may be, is prepared for absorption into Brahmā, even while abiding in this lower world."

The following are some further miscellaneous passages of the same tenor, scattered throughout the Institutes (Manu, ii. 10 ff.):

Śrutis tu vedo vijneyo dharmasūtraṃ tu vai smṛitiḥ | te sarvārthesv amīmāṃsyē tābhyāṃ dharmo hi nirbāhau | 11. Yo 'vamanyeta te māle hetu-sūstrāśrayād dvijaḥ | sa sādhubhir vahishkāryyo nāstiko veda-nindakaḥ | . . . 13. Dharmāṃ jijnāsamānānām pramāṇam paramaṃ śrutiḥ |

"By śruti is meant the Veda, and by smṛiti the institutes of law: the contents of these are not to be questioned by reason, since from them [a knowledge of] duty has shone forth. The Brāhman who, relying on rationalistic treatises,²⁹ shall condemn these two primary sources of knowledge, must be excommunicated by the virtuous as a sceptic and reviler of the Vedas. . . . 13. To those who are seeking a knowledge of duty, the śruti is the supreme authority."

In the following passage, the necessity of a knowledge of Brahma is asserted, though the practice of ritual observances is also inculcated (vi. 82 ff.):

Dhyānikoṃ sarvaṃ evaitad yad etad abhisadditam | na hy anadhyātma-rit kaśchit kriyā-phalam upāśnute | adhiyajnam brahma japeḍ ādhidai-rikam eva cha | ādhyatmikaṃ cha satatāṃ vedāntābhikṣitaṃ cha yat | Idam śaraṇam ajnānām idam eva vijānatām | idam anvichchhatām svargam idam ānantiyam ichchhatām |

²⁹ This, however, must be read in conjunction with the precept in xii. 106, which declares: *ārshaṃ dharmopadeśam cha veda-sūstrāvivodhinā | yas tarkenānusandhatte sa dharmāṃ veda nāparaḥ |* "He, and he only is acquainted with duty, who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the precepts of the smṛiti, by reasonings which do not contradict the Veda."

“All this which has been now declared is dependant on devout meditation : no one who is ignorant of the supreme Spirit can reap the fruit of ceremonial acts. Let a man repeat texts relating to sacrifice, texts relating to deities, texts relating to the supreme Spirit, and whatever is declared in the concluding portions of the Veda (the Upanishads). This [Veda] is the refuge of the ignorant, as well as of the understanding ; it is the refuge of those who are seeking after paradise, as well as of those who are desiring infinity.”

The following text breathes a moral spirit, by representing purity of life as essential to the reception of benefit from religious observances (ii. 97) :

Vedās tyūgās cha yajnās cha niyamās cha tapāmsi cha | na vipradushṭa-bhāvasya siddhiṃ gachhanti karchichit |

“The Vedas, almsgiving, sacrifices, observances, austerities, are ineffectual to a man of depraved disposition.”

The doctrine which may be drawn from the following lines does not seem so favourable to morality (xi. 261 ff.) :

Haṭvā lokān apīmāms trīn aśnann api yatastataḥ | Rīgvedaṃ dhārayan vipro nainah prāpnoti kinchana | Rīksaṃhitāṃ trīr abhyasya yajushāṃ va samāhitaḥ | sāmnaṃ vā sa-rahasyānāṃ sarva-pāpaiḥ pramuchyate | yathā mahā-kradam prāpya kshiptam loṣṭaṃ vinaśyati | tathā duścharitaṃ sarvaṃ vede trivṛiti majjati |

“A Brāhman who should destroy these three worlds, and eat food received from any quarter whatever, would incur no guilt if he retained in his memory the Rīg-veda. Repeating thrice with intent mind the Saṃhitā of the Rīk, or the Yajush, or the Sāman, with the Upanishads, he is freed from all his sins. Just as a clod thrown into a great lake is dissolved when it touches the water, so does all sin sink in the triple Veda.”

Considering the sacredness ascribed in the preceding passages to all the Vedas, the characteristics assigned to three of them in the passage quoted above (p. 12) from the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, as well as the epithet applied to the Sāma-veda in the second of the following verses are certainly remarkable ; (Manu, iv. 123 ff.) :

Sāma-dhvanāv rīg-yajushī nādhīyīta kudāchana | vedasyādhītya vā 'py antam āraṇyakam adhītya cha | Rīgvedo deva-dāivatyo yajurvedas tu mānushaḥ | Sāmavedaḥ smṛitaḥ pītriyas tasmāt tasyāsūchir dhvaniḥ |

“Let no one read the Rich or the Yajush while the Sāman is sounding in his ears, or after he has read the conclusion of the Veda (*i.e.* the Upanishads) or an Āraṇyaka. The Rig-veda has the gods for its deities; the Yajur-veda has men for its objects; the Sāma-veda has the pitris for its divinities, wherefore its sound is impure.”

The scholiast Kullūka, however, will not allow that the sound of the Sāma-veda can be really “impure.” “It has,” he says, “only a semblance of impurity” (*tasmāt tasya aśuchir iva dhvaniḥ | na tv aśuchir eva*). In this remark he evinces the tendency, incident to so many systematic theologians, to ignore all those features of the sacred text on which they are commenting which are at variance with their theories regarding its absolute perfection. As it was the opinion of his age that the Veda was eternal and divine, it was, he considered, impossible that impurity or any species of defect could be predicated of any of its parts; and every expression, even of the highest authorities, which contradicted this opinion, had to be explained away. I am not in a position to state how this notion of impurity came to be attached to the Sāma-veda. The passage perhaps proceeded from the adherents of some particular Vedic school adverse to the Sāma-veda; but its substance being found recorded in some earlier work, it was deemed of sufficient authority to find a place in the miscellaneous collection of precepts,—gathered no doubt from different quarters, and perhaps not always strictly consistent with each other,—which make up the Mānava-dharma-śāstra.

Vishṇu Purāna.—The following passage from the Vishṇu Purāna, at the close, ascribes the same character of impurity to the Sāma-veda, though on different grounds, Vish. Pur. ii. 11, 5 :

*Yā tu śaktiḥ parā Vishṇor ṛig-yajuh-sāma-sanjñitā | saishū trayī
tapaty añho jagataś cha hinasti yat | saiva Vishṇuḥ sthitaḥ sthityām
jagataḥ pālonodyataḥ | ṛig-yajuh-sāma-bhūto 'ntaḥ savitur dvija tish-
ṭhati | māsi māsi ravir yo yas tatra tatra hi sū parā | trayīmayī Vishṇu-
śaktir avasthānam karoti vai | Richas tapanti pūrvāhne madhyāhne 'tha
yajūmshy atha | vṛihadhrathantarādīni sāmāny ahnaḥ kshaye ravau |
angam eshū trayī Vishṇor ṛig-yajuh-sāma-sanjñitā | Vishṇu-śaktir avas-
thānam māsāditye karoti sū | na kevalam ravau śaktir vaishṇavī sū tra-
yīmayī | Brahmā 'tha Purusho Rudras trayam etat trayīmayam | sur-
gādūr ṛiṇmayo Bruhmā sthitau Vishṇur yajurmayaḥ | Rudraḥ sūmamayo
'ntāya tasmāt tasyāśuchir dhvaniḥ |*

“The supreme energy of Vishṇu, called the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman—this triad burns up sin and all things injurious to the world. During the continuance of the world, this triad exists as Vishṇu, who is occupied in the preservation of the universe, and who in the form of the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman, abides within the sun. That supreme energy of Vishṇu, consisting of the triple Veda, dwells in the particular form of the sun, which presides over each month. The Rich verses shine in the morning sun, the Yajush verses in the meridian beams, and the Vṛihad-rathantara and other Sāma verses in his declining rays. This triple Veda is the body of Vishṇu, and this his energy abides in the monthly sun. But not only does this energy of Vishṇu, formed of the triple Veda, reside in the sun: Brahmā, Purusha (Vishṇu), and Rudra also constitute a triad formed of the triple Veda. Acting in creation, Brahmā is formed of the Rig-veda; presiding over the continuance of the universe, Vishṇu is composed of the Yajur-veda; and for the destruction of the worlds, Rudra is made up of the Sāma-veda; hence the sound of this Veda is impure.”

Vāyu Purāna.—Other passages also may be found in works which are far from being reputed as heretical, in which the Vedas, or particular parts of them, are not spoken of with the same degree of respect as they are by Manu. Thus the *Vāyu Purāna* gives precedence to the *Purānas* over the Vedas in the order of creation (i. 56³⁰):

*Prathamam sarva-śāstrāṇām Purānam Brahmaṇū smṛitam | anantaram
cha vaktreḥyo vedās tasya vinissṛitāḥ |*

“First of all the *Sastras*, the *Purāna* was uttered by Brahmā. Subsequently the Vedas issued from his mouths.”

Similarly the *Padma Purāna* says:

*Purānam sarva-śāstrāṇām prathamam Brahmaṇū smṛitam | tri-varṇa-
sādhanaṁ puṇyam śata-koṭi-pravistaram | nirdagdheshu cha lokeshu vāji-
rūpeṇa Keśuvāḥ | Brahmaṇas tu samādeśād vedān ahṛitavān asau | angāni
chaturō vedān purāna-nyāya-vistarā[n?] | mīmāṃsā[m?] dharmā-śūstraṁ
cha parigrīhyātha sāmpratam | matsya-rūpeṇa cha punaḥ kalpādūr uda-
kāntare | aśesham etat kathitam ityādi |³¹*

“The *Purāna*, which is an instrument for effecting the three objects

³⁰ Page 48 of Prof. Aufrecht's Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the Bodleian Library at Oxford.

³¹ See the same Catalogue p. 12, col. i.

of life, which is pure, and extends to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of all the Śāstras which Brahmā uttered. When the worlds had been burnt up, Keśava (Kṛiṣṇa), in the form of a horse, and obeying Brahmā's command, rescued the Vedas. Having taken them with their appendages, the Purāṇas, the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Institutes of Law, he now at the beginning of the Kalpa promulgated them all again in the form of a Fish from the midst of the waters."

In the Matsya Purāṇa, iii. 2 ff., not only is priority of creation claimed for the Purāṇas, but also the qualities of eternity and identity with sound, which are generally predicated of the Vedas alone:

*Rūpaṃ dadhāra*³² *prathamam amarāṇam Pitāmahaḥ* | *āvīrbhūtās tato vedāḥ sūṅgopāṅga-pada-kramāḥ* | 3. *Purāṇaṃ sarva-śāstrāṇām prathamam Brahmanā smṛitam* | *nityaṃ śabdamayam puṇyam sata-koṭi-pravistaram* | 4. *Anantaraṃ cha vaktrebhyo vedās tasya vinissṛitāḥ* | *mīmāṃsā nyāya-vidyā cha pramāṇūśhṭaka-saṃyutā* | 5. *Vedābhyāsa-rata-syāsya prajā-kāmasya mānasāḥ* | *manasū pūrta-sṛiṣṭāḥ vai jātāḥ ye tena mānasāḥ* |

2. "Pitāmaha (Brahmā), first of all the immortals, took shape: then the Vedas with their Angas and Upāṅgas (appendages and minor appendages), and the various modes of their textual arrangement, were manifested. 3. The Purāṇa, eternal, formed of sound, pure, extending to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of the Śāstras which Brahmā uttered: and afterwards the Vedas, issued from his mouth; and also the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya with its eightfold system of proofs. 5. From him (Brahmā), who was devoted to the study of the Vedas, and desirous of offspring, sprang mind-born sons, so called because they were at first created by his mind."

The Vāyu Purāṇa says further on in the same section from which I have already quoted:³³

Yo vidyāḥ chaturō vedān sūṅgopanishado dvijaḥ | *na chet purāṇaṃ saṃvidyāṇā naiva sa syād vichakṣaṇaḥ* | *Itihāsa-purāṇābhyāṃ vedān samuparīṃhayet* | *vibhety alpa-śrutād vedo mām ayaṃ praharishyati* |

³² This quotation is made from the Taylor MS. No. 1918 of the India Office Library. The Guikowar MS. No. 3032 of the same collection, reads here *tapas chachāra*, "practised austerity," instead of *rūpaṃ dadhāra*, "took shape," and has besides a number of other various readings in these few lines.

³³ See p. 50 of Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue.

“He who knows the four Vedas, with their supplements and Upanishads is not really learned, unless he know also the Purāṇas. Let a man, therefore, complete the Vedas by adding the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. The Veda is afraid of a man of little learning, lest he should treat it injuriously.”

The first of these verses is repeated in the Mahābhārata, Ādiparvan verse 645, with a variation in the first half of the second line *na chā-khyānam idaṁ vidyāt*, “unless he know also this narrative” (i.e. the Mahābhārata). The second of the verses of the Vāyū Purāṇa also is to be found in the same book of the Mahābhārata verse 260, and is followed by these lines :

261. *Kārshṇaṁ vedam imaṁ vidvān śrāvayitvā'nnam āsnute |*
 264. *Ekataś chaturo vedān Bhārataṁ chaitad ekataḥ | purā kila suraiḥ*
sarvaiḥ sametya tulayā dhṛitam | chaturbhyaḥ sa-rahasyebhyo vedebhyo
hy adhiķaṁ yadā | tadā-prabhṛiti loko'smin mahābhāratam uchyate |

“The man who knows this Veda relating to Kṛishṇa (the Mahābhārata), and repeats it to others, obtains food. . . . 264. All the collected gods formerly weighed in a balance the four Vedas which they placed in the one scale, and this Bhārata which they put into the other. When the latter was found to exceed (in weight) the four Vedas with the Upanishads, it was thenceforward called in this world the Mahābhārata.”

Here there is a play upon the word Bhārata, as in part identical with bhāra, “weight.”

The following verses of the same Ādiparvan and many others are also eulogistic of the great epic poem :

2298. *Idaṁ hi vedaiḥ sammitam pavitram api chottamam | śrāvyaṅgām*
uttamaṁ chedam purāṇam ṛishi-saṁstutam |

“This (Mahābhārata) is on an equality with the Veda, pure, most excellent, the best of all works that are to be recited, ancient, and praised by rishis.”

2314. *Vijneyaḥ sa cha vedānām pārāgo Bhāratam paṭhan |*

The reader of the Bhārata is to be regarded as having gone through the Vedas.”

The benefits derivable from a perusal of the same poem are also set forth in the Svargārohaṇika-parvan, verses 200 ff.

In the same way the Rāmāyaṇa, i. 1, 94, speaks of itself, as “this

pure and holy narrative, which is on an equality with the Vedas" (*idam pavitram ākhyānam punyaṁ vedaiś cha sammitam*).

And in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, ii. 8, 28, it is said: *Prāha bhāgavataṁ nāma purāṇam brahma-sammitam | Brahmano Bhagavat-proktaṁ Brahma-kalpe upāgate |*

"(Brahmarāta) declared the Purāṇa called the Bhāgavata, which stands on an equality with the Veda (*brahma*), and was declared by Bhagavat to Brahmā when the Brahma-kalpa had arrived."

Brahma-vaivarṭta Purāṇa.—The Brahma-vaivarṭta Purāṇa asserts in a most audacious manner its own superiority to the Veda (i. 48 ff.):

Bhavanan yat tvayā prishṭaṁ jnātaṁ sarvam abhīpsitam | sāra-bhūtaṁ purāṇeshu Brahma-vaivarṭtam uttamam | Purāṇopapurāṇānāṁ vedānāṁ bhrama-bhājanāṁ |

"That about which, venerable sage, you have inquired, and which you desire, is all known to me, the essence of the Purāṇas, the pre-eminent Brahma-vaivarṭta, which refutes the errors of the Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas, and of the Vedas." (Professor Aufrecht's Cat. p. 21.)

In the following passage also, from the commencement of the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, the Vedic hymns (though a divine origin would no doubt be allowed to them³⁴) are at all events depreciated, by being classed among other works as part of the inferior science, in contrast to the Brahma-vidyā or knowledge of Brahma, the highest of all knowledge, which is expressly ascribed to Brahmā as its author:

1. *Brahmā devānāṁ prathamakṣ sambabhūva viśvasya karttā bhuvanasya goptā | sa brahma-vidyāṁ sarva-vidyā-pratishṭhām Atharvāya jyeshṭha-putrāya prāha |* 2. *Atharvane yām pravādetā Brahmā Atharvā tām purovāchāṅgīre brahma-vidyām | sa Bhāradvājya Satyavāhāya prāha Bhāradvājō 'ngīrase parāvarām |* 3. *Saunako ha vai Mahāsālo 'ngīrasaṁ*

³⁴ In fact the following verses (4 and 6) occur in the second chapter of the same Mund. Up.: *Agnir mūrdhā chakshushī chandra-sūryayā disaḥ śrotre vāg virpitāś cha vedāḥ | vāyuh prāno hridayaṁ viśvam asya padbhyām pṛithivī hy eśha sarva-bhūtāntarātmanā | . . . 6. Tasmād richaḥ sāma yajūṁśhi dīkshō yujnūs cha sarvo krutavo dakṣiṇās cha | saṁvatsaram cha yajamānaś cha lokūḥ somo yatra pavate yatra sūryaḥ |* "Agni is his [Brahma's] head, the sun and moon are his eyes, the four points of the compass are his ears, the uttered Vedas are his voice, the wind is his breath, the universe is his heart, the earth issued from his feet: he is the inner soul of all creatures. . . . 6. From him came the Rich verses, the Sāman verses, the Yajush verses, initiatory rites, all oblations, sacrifices, and gifts, the year, the sacrificer, and the worlds where the moon and sun purify."

vidhivad upapannaḥ prapachchha | kasmin nu bhagavo vijnāte sarvam idaṃ vijnātam bhavatīti | 4. Tasmai sa hovācha | dve vidye veditavye iti ha smu yad brahma-vido vadanti parā chaivāparā cha | 5. Tatrāparā "ṛigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvavedaḥ śikshā kalpo vyākaraṇaṃ niruktaṃ chhando jyotisham" iti | atha parā yayā tad aksharam adhigamyate |

“Brahmā was produced the first among the gods, maker of the universe, preserver of the world. He revealed to his eldest son Atharva, the science of Brahma, the basis of all knowledge. 2. Atharvan of old declared to Angis this science, which Brahmā had unfolded to him; and Angis, in turn, explained it to Satyavāha, descendant of Bharadvāja, who delivered this traditional lore, in succession, to Angiras. 3. Mahāsāla Śaunaka, approaching Angiras with the proper formalities, inquired, ‘What is that, o venerable sage, through the knowledge of which all this [universe] becomes known?’ 4. [Angiras] answered, ‘Two sciences are to be known—this is what the sages versed in sacred knowledge declare—the superior and the inferior. 5. The inferior [consists of] the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Atharva-veda, accentuation, ritual, grammar, commentary, prosody, and astronomy. The superior science is that by which the imperishable is apprehended.”³⁵

I adduce some further passages which depreciate the ceremonial, or exoteric parts of the Vedas, in comparison with the esoteric knowledge of Brahma.

My attention was drawn to the following passage of the Bhagavad Gītā, ii. 42 ff., by its quotation in the Rev. Professor K. M. Banerjea's Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy :

Yā imāṃ pushpitāṃ vācham p. vadanty avipaśchilāḥ | veda-vāda-ratāḥ pārtha nānyad astīti vūdināḥ | kā. 'mānaḥ svarga-parāḥ janma-kurmaphala-pradūm | kriyā-viśeṣa-bahulām bhogaiśvarya-gatim prati | bhogaiśvarya-prasaktānām tayā 'pahṛita-chetasām | vyarasāyātmiḥ buddhiḥ samādhau na vidhīyate | traigunya-vishayāḥ vedāḥ nistraigunyo bhavār-

³⁵ Compare the Mahābhārata, Ādip. verse 258, which speaks of the Āraṇyakas as superior to (the other parts of) the Vedas, and amṛita as the best of medicines (*āraṇyakaṃ cha vedebhyaś' chaushadhībhyo 'mṛitaṃ yathā*). Similarly the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, x. 3, 5, 12 (quoted in Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 315, note), speaks of the Upanishads as being the essence of the Yajush: *Tasya vai etasya yajusho rasaḥ eva upanishat |*

juna | . . . yāvān arthaḥ udapāne sarvataḥ samplutodake | tāvān sarveshu vedeshu brāhmaṇasya vijānataḥ |

“A flowery doctrine, promising the reward of works performed in this embodied state, prescribing numerous ceremonies, with a view to future gratification and glory, is preached by unlearned men, devoted to the injunctions of the Veda, assertors of its exclusive importance, lovers of enjoyment, and seekers after paradise. The restless minds of the men who, through this flowery doctrine, have become bereft of wisdom, and are ardent in the pursuit of future gratification and glory, are not applied to contemplation. The Vedas have for their objects the three qualities (*sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, or ‘goodness,’ ‘passion,’ and ‘darkness’); but be thou, Arjuna, free from these three qualities . . . As great as is the use of a well which is surrounded on every side by overflowing waters, so great [and no greater] is the use of the Vedas to a Brāhman endowed with true knowledge.”

Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 1, 1, p. 473 (Colebrooke’s Essays, i. 12):

“*Adhīhi bhagavaḥ*” *iti ha upasāda Sanatkumāraṁ Nāradaḥ | taṁ ha uvācha “yad vettha tena mā upasāda tatas te ūrdhvaṁ vakshyāmi” iti |* 2. *Sa ha uvācha “ṛigvedam bhagavo ’dhyemi yajurvedam sāmavedam ātharvaṇam chaturtham itihāsa-purānam panchamaṁ vedānām vedam pitryam rāsīm daivaṁ nidhīm vākovākyaṁ ekāyanaṁ deva-vidyām brahma-vidyām bhūta-vidyām kshatra-vidyām nakshatra-vidyām sarpa-deva-jana-vidyām etad bhagavo ’dhyemi |* 3. *So ’ham bhagavo mantra-vid evāsmi na ātma-vid | śrutam hy eva me bhagavadḍrīṣebhyas ’tarati śokam ātma-vid’ iti so ’ham bhagavaḥ śochāmi tam mā bhagavān śokasya pārāṁ tārayatv’ iti | taṁ ha uvācha “yad vai kincha etad adhyagīshṭhāḥ nāma evaitat |* 4. *Nāma vai ṛigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedaḥ ātharvaṇaḥ chaturthaḥ itihāsa-purānaḥ panchamo vedānām vedaḥ pitryo rāsir daivo nidhir vākovākyaṁ ekāyanaṁ deva-vidyā brahma-vidyā bhūta-vidyā kshatra-vidyā nakshatra-vidyā sarpa-deva-jana-vidyā nāma evaitad nāma upāsva” iti |* 5. *“Sa yo nāma brahna ity upāste yūvad nāmno gataṁ tatra asya yathā kāmachāro bhavati yo nāma brahma ity upāste” | “asti bhagavo nāmno bhūyaḥ” iti | “nāmno vāra bhūyo ’sti” iti | “tan me bhagavān bravīt” iti |*

1. “Nārada approached Sanatkumāra, saying, ‘Instruct me, venerable sage.’ He received for answer, ‘Approach me with [*i.e.* tell me] that which thou knowest; and I will declare to thee whatever more is to be learnt.’ 2. Nārada replied, ‘I am instructed, venerable sage, in the

Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvaṇa, [which is] the fourth, the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, [which are] the fifth Veda of the Vedas, the rites of the pitris, arithmetic, the knowledge of portents, and of great periods, the art of reasoning,³⁶ ethics, the science of the gods, the knowledge of Scripture, demonology, the science of war, the knowledge of the stars, the sciences of serpents and deities; this is what I have studied. 3. I, venerable man, know only the hymns (*mantras*); while I am ignorant of soul. But I have heard from reverend sages like thyself that 'the man who is acquainted with soul overpasses grief.' Now I, venerable man, am afflicted; but do thou transport me over my grief.' Sanatkumāra answered, 'That which thou hast studied is nothing but name. 4. The Rig-veda is name; and so are the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvaṇa, which is the fourth, and the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, the fifth Veda of the Vedas, etc. [all the other branches of knowledge are here enumerated just as above],—all these are but name: worship name. 5. He who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma, ranges as it were at will over all which that name comprehends;—such is the prerogative of him who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma.' 'Is there anything, venerable man,' asked Nārada, 'which is more than name?' 'There is,' he replied, 'something which is more than name.' 'Tell it to me,' rejoined Nārada.'

(Sankara interprets the words *panchamaṁ vedānāṁ vedam* differently from what I have done. He separates the words *vedānāṁ vedam* from *panchamaṁ* and makes them to mean "the means of knowing the Vedas," i.e. grammar. See, however, the Bhāg. Pur. i. 4, 20, below, p. 42, and iii. 12, 39, to be quoted further on.

Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 7, 1, 22 (= Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, iv. 3, 22, p. 792 ff., p. 228–9 of Dr. Rōer's English): *Atra pitā apitū bhavati mātā amātū lokāḥ alokāḥ devāḥ adevāḥ vedūḥ avedūḥ yajñāḥ aya-jñāḥ | atra steno 'steno bhavati bhrūna-hā abhrūna-hā paulkaso 'paulkasoś chāṇḍālo 'chāṇḍālah śramaṇo 'śramaṇas tāpaso 'tūpaso nauvāgatam puṅ-gvau anauvāgatam pāpena³⁷ tīrṇo hi tadū sarvān śokān hṛidayasya bhavati |*

³⁶ *Vākovākyaṁ = tarka-sūtram* — Sāyana. The word is elsewhere explained as meaning "dialogues" (*ulti-pratyukti-rūpam prakaraṇam*—Comm. on S. P. Br. xi. 5, 6, 8). The sense of some of the terms in this list of sciences is obscure; but exactness is not of any great importance to the general drift of the passage.

³⁷ I give here the reading of the Br. Ār. Up. The S. P. Br. in Professor Weber's

“In that [condition of profound slumber, *sushupti*,] a father is no father, a mother is no mother, the worlds are no worlds, the gods are no gods, and the Vedas are no Vedas, sacrifices are no sacrifices. In that condition a thief is no thief, a murderer of embryos is no murderer of embryos, a Paulkasa no Paulkasa, a Chāṇḍāla no Chāṇḍāla, a Sramaṇa no Sramaṇa, a devotee no devotee; the saint has then no relation, either of advantage or disadvantage, to merit or to sin; for he then crosses over all griefs of the heart.”

(I quote from the commentary on the Br. Ār. Up. Sankara's explanation of the unusual words *nanvāgata* and *ananvāgata*: *Nanvāgataṁ na anvāgatam ananvāgatam asambaddham ity etat punyena śāstra-vihitena karmanū tathā pāpena vihitākaraṇa-pratishiddha-kriyā-lakṣhaṇena* | “*Nanvāgata*=*na* (not) *anvāgata*, and *ananvāgata*=*asambaddha*, unconnected. This condition is unconnected either with merit, *i.e.* action enjoined by the śāstra, or with sin, *i.e.* action defined as the neglect of what is enjoined, or the doing of what is forbidden.”

To the same effect the great sage Nārada is made to speak in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iv. 29, 42 ff. :

Prajāpati-patiḥ śākṣhād bhagavān Giriśo Manuḥ | Dakṣhodayaḥ prajādhyaḥkṣhāḥ naiśhṭhikāḥ Sanakādayaḥ | Marīchir Atry-angirasau Pulastyaḥ Pulahaḥ Kratuḥ | Bhṛigur Vaśishṭhaḥ ity ete mad-antāḥ brahmavādināḥ | adyāpi vāchaspatayas tapo-vidyā-samādhibhiḥ | paśyanto 'py na paśyanti paśyantam Parameśvaram | śabda-brahmaṇi duṣhpāro charantaḥ uruvistare | mantra-lingair vyavachchinnam bhajanto na viduḥ param | yadā yasyānugrihṇāti bhagavān ātma-bhāvitaḥ | sa jahāti matiṁ loke vede cha parinishṭhitaṁ | tasmāt karmasu varhishmann ajnānūd artha-kāsishu | mā 'rtha-dṛishṭiṁ kṛithāḥ śrotra-sparśishu asprishla-vas-tushu | sva-lokaṁ na vidus te vai yatra devo Janārdanaḥ | āhur dhūmra-dhiyo vedaṁ sa-karmakam a-tad-vidaḥ | āstīrya darbhair prāg-agraiḥ kārtsnyena kṣhiti-manḍalam | stabdho vṛihad-vadhād mānī karma nāvaiśhi yat param | tat karma Hari-toshaṁ yat sū vidyā tan-matir yayā |

“Brahmā himself, the divine Giriśa (Śiva), Manu, Daksha and the other Prajāpatis, Sanaka and other devotees, Marīchi, Atri, Angiras, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Bhṛigu, Vaśishṭha—all these expounders of sacred knowledge, and masters of speech, including myself (Nārada) as

text gives *ananvāgataḥ punyena ananvāgataḥ pāpena*. And yet the commentary alludes to the word *ananvāgata* being in the neuter.

the last, though seeing, are yet, to this day, unable, by austerity, by science, by contemplation, to see Parameśvara (the supreme God), who sees all things. Wandering in the vast field of the verbal brahma (the Veda), which is difficult to traverse, men do not recognise the Supreme; while they worship him as he is circumscribed by the attributes specified in the hymns (*mantras*). When the Divine Being regards any man with favour, that man, sunk in the contemplation of soul, abandons all thoughts which are set upon the world and the Veda. Cease, therefore, Varhishmat, through ignorance, to look upon works which merely seem to promote the chief good, as if they truly effected that object, (works) which only touch the ear, but do not touch the reality. The misty-minded men, who, ignorant of the Veda, declare that works are its object, do not know [his] own world, where the divine Janār-dana abides. Thou who, obstinate man that thou art, strewest the whole earth with sacrificial grass, with its ends turned to the east, and art proud of thy numerous immolations,—thou knowest not what is the highest work of all. That by which Hari (Vishṇu) is pleased, is work; that by which the thoughts are fixed on him, is science.”

I copy the comment on a part of this passage, viz. on verses 45 and 46:

S'abda-brahmaṇi vede urur vistāro yasya arthato 'pi pāra-sūnye tasmin carttamānāḥ mantrāṇām lingair vajra-hastatrādi-guṇa-yukta-vividhadevatā-bhidhāna-sāmarthyaiḥ parichehinnam eva Indrādi-rūpam tat-tat-karmāgrahaṇa bhajantaḥ param Parameśvaram na viduḥ | Tārhy anyak ko nāma | karmādy-āgrahaṇ hitvā parameśvaram eva bhajed ity ata ūha “yadā yam anugrihṇāti” | anugrahe hetuḥ | ātmani bhāvitaḥ san sa tudā loka loka-ryavahāre vede cha karma-mārge parinishṭhitām matiṃ tyajati |

“Men, conversant with the verbal brahma, the Veda, of which the extent is vast, and which, in fact, is boundless, worshipping Parameśvara [the supreme God] under the form of Indra, etc., circumscribed by the marks specified in the hymns, i.e. limited to various particular energies denominated deities, who are characterised by such attributes as ‘wielder of the thunderbolt,’ etc.; worshipping Him, I say, thus, with an addiction to particular rites, men do not know the supreme God. What other [god], then, [is there]? He, therefore, in the words, ‘When he regards any one with favour,’ etc., says, let a man, abandoning all addiction to works, etc., worship the supreme God alone. The reason for this favour [is supplied in the following words]:

‘Sunk in the contemplation of soul, he then relinquishes his regard directed to the business of the world and to the Veda, *i.e.* to the method of works.’”

The following passage from the Kaṭha Upanishad (ii. 23) is of a somewhat similar tendency (p. 107 of Roër’s ed. and p. 106 of Eng. trans.):

*Nāyam ātmā pravachanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena |
yam evaiśha vrinute tena labhyas tasyaiśha ātmā vrinute tanūñ svām |*

“This Soul is not to be attained by instruction, nor by understanding, nor by much scripture. He is attainable by him whom he chooses. The Soul chooses that man’s body as his own abode.”

The scholiast interprets thus the first part of this text :

*Yadyapi durvijneyo ’yam ātmā tathāpy upāyena suvijneyaḥ eva ity
āha nāyam ātmā pravachanena aneka-veda-svīkaraṇena labhyo jneyo nāpi
medhayā granthārtha-dhāraṇā-saktyā na bahunā śrutena kevalena | kena
tarhi labhyaḥ ity uchyate |*

“Although this soul is difficult to know, still it may easily be known by the use of proper means. This is what [the author] proceeds to say. This soul is not to be attained, known, by instruction, by the acknowledgement of many Vedas; nor by understanding, by the power of recollecting the contents of books; nor by much scripture alone. By what, then, is it to be attained? This he declares.”

It is not necessary to follow the scholiast into the Vedantic explanation of the rest of the passage.³⁸

The preceding passages, emanating from two different classes of writers, both distinguished by the spirituality of their aspirations, manifest a depreciation, more or less distinct and emphatic, of the polytheism of the Vedic hymns, as obstructive rather than promotive, of divine knowledge, and express disregard, if not contempt, of the ceremonies founded on that polytheism, and performed with a view to the enjoyments of paradise.

SECT. V.—*Division of the Vedas, according to the Viśṇu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purānas, and the Mahābhārata.*

Some of the Purānas, as we have seen above, represent the four Vedas as having issued from Brahmā’s different mouths. If they had

³⁸ See Prof. Müller’s *Anc. Sansk. Lit.* 1st ed. p. 320, and p. 109.

each a separate origin of this kind, it would seem that they must have had from the time of their production a distinct existence also. And yet it is elsewhere said that there was originally but one Veda, which was subsequently divided into four portions.

Thus the Vishṇu Purāṇa gives the following account of the division of the Veda, described as having been originally but one, into four parts, iii. 2, 18 :

*Kṛite yuge paraṁ jñānam Kapilādi-svarūpa-dhṛik | dadāti sarva-bhū-
tānām sarva-bhūta-hīte rataḥ | chakravartti-svarūpeṇa tretāyām api sa
prabhuḥ | Duṣṭānām nigrahaṁ kurvan pariṣṭi jagattrayam | Vedam
ekam chatuṛ-bhedaṁ kṛitvā śākhā-śatair vibhuḥ | karoti bahulam bhūyo
Vedavyāsa-svarūpa-dhṛik | vedāṁ tu dvāpare vyasya, etc.*

“ In the Kṛita age, Vishṇu, devoted to the welfare of all creatures, assumes the form of Kapila and others to confer upon them the highest knowledge. In the Tretā age the Supreme Lord, in the form of a universal potentate, represses the violence of the wicked, and protects the three worlds. Assuming the form of Vedavyāsa, the all-pervading Being repeatedly divides the single Veda into four parts, and multiplies it by distributing it into hundreds of śākhās. Having thus divided the Vedas in the Dvāpara age,” etc.³⁹

This is repeated more at length in the following section (Vish. Pur. iii. 3, 4 ff.) :

*Veda-drumasya Maitreya śākhā-bhedaḥ sahasraśaḥ | na śakyo vistaro
vaktuṁ sankṣhepeṇa śṛiṇushva tam | Dvāpare dvāpare Viṣṇur Vyāsa-
rūpī mahāmuno | Vedam ekam sa bahudhā kurute jagato hitaḥ | vīryaṁ
tejo balaṁ chālpaṁ manushyāṅām avekshya vai | hitāya sarva-bhūtānām
veda-bhedān karoti saḥ | yayā sa kurute tanvā vedam ekam prithak pra-
bhuh | Vedavyāsābhidhānā tu sū mūrttir Madhuvīdviśaḥ | . . . Aṣṭā-
viṁśati-kṛitvo vai vedāḥ vyastāḥ maharshibhiḥ | Vaivasvate 'ntare tasmin
dvāpareshu punaḥ punaḥ |*

“ It is not possible, Maitreya, to describe in detail the tree of the Vedas with its thousand branches (śākhās); but listen to a summary. A friend to the world, Vishṇu, in the form of Vyāsa, divides the single Veda into many parts. He does so for the good of all creatures, because he perceives the vigour, energy, and strength of men to have become

³⁹ Compare on this subject portions of the passage of the Mahābhārata quoted in the First Volume of this work, pp. 144-146.

decreased. Vedavyāsa, in whose person he performs this division, is an impersonation of the enemy of Madhu (Viṣṇu). . . . Eight-and-twenty times in the Dvāpara ages of this Vaivasvata Manvantara⁴⁰ have the Vedas been divided by great sages." These sages are then enumerated, and Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana⁴¹ is the twenty-eighth.

The subject is resumed at the beginning of the next section (Viṣh. Pur. iii. 4, 1 ff.):

*Ādya vedāḥ chatuṣhpādāḥ śata-sūhasra-sammitāḥ | Tato daśa-guṇāḥ
kṛitsno yajno 'yaṁ sarva-kāmadhuk | Tato 'tra mat-suto Vyāso 'śhṭāvīn-
śatitame 'ntare | vedam ekam chatuṣhpādāṁ chaturdhā vyabhajāt prabhuk |
yathā tu tena vai vyastāḥ Vedavyāsenā dhimatā | Vedās tathā samastais
tair vyastāḥ Vyāsais tathā mayā | tad anenaiva vedānāṁ sūkhābhedaṁ
dvijottama | chaturyugeshu rachitāṁ samasteshu avadhāraya | Kṛishṇa-
dvaipāyanaṁ Vyāsam vidhi Nārāyaṇam prabhūm | ko 'nyo hi bhūvi
Maitreya Mahābhārata-kṛid bhavet | Tena vyastāḥ yathā Vedāḥ mat-pu-
treṇa mahātmanū | Dvāpare hy atra Maitreya tad me śṛiṇu yathārthataḥ |
Brahmaṇā chodito Vyāso vedān vyastum prachakrame | Atha śiṣhyān sa
jagrāha chaturo veda-pūra-gūn | Rīgveda-śrūvakam Pūilaṁ jagrāha sa
mahāmuniḥ | Vaiśampāyana-nāmānaṁ Yajurvedasya chūgrukṛt | Jaimi-
niṁ Sāma-vedasya tathāivātharvaveda-vit | Sumantus tasya śiṣhyo 'bhūd
Vedavyāsasya dhimatāḥ | Romaharṣana-nāmānam mahābuddhim mahā-
munim | Sūtaṁ jagrāha śiṣhyāṁ sa itihāsa-purāṇayoḥ |*

"The original Veda, consisting of four quarters, contained a hundred thousand verses. From it arose the entire system of sacrifice, tenfold (compared with the present) and yielding all the objects of desire. Subsequently, in the twenty-eighth manvantara my son, [Parāśara is the speaker] the mighty Vyāsa, divided into four parts the Veda which was one, with four quarters. In the same way as the Vedas were divided

⁴⁰ For an account of the Manvantaras, see the First Part of this work, pp. 39, 43 ff.

⁴¹ Lassen (Ind. Ant. 2nd ed. i. 777, note) remarks: "Vyāsa signifies arrangement, and this signification had still retained its place in the recollection of the ancient recorders of the legend, who have formed from his name an irregular perfect, viz. *vivyāsa*." Lassen refers to two passages of the Mahābhārata in which the name is explained, viz. (i. 2417), *Vivyāsa vedān yasmāt sa tasmād Vyāsaḥ iti sprītaḥ* | "He is called Vyāsa because he divided the Veda." And (i. 4236) *Yo vyasya vedānāṁ chatwas tapasū bhagaṇān rīhiḥ | loke vyāsatum āpede kārshṇyat kṛishnatvam eva cha* | "The divine sage (Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa) who, through fervid devotion, divided the four Vedas, and so obtained in the world the title of Vyāsa, and from his blackness, the name of Kṛishṇa."

by the wise Vyāsa, so had they been divided by all the [preceding] Vyāsas, including myself. And know that the śākhā divisions [formed] by him [were the same as those] formed in all the periods of four yugas. Learn, too, that Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa was the lord Nārāyaṇa; for who else on earth could have composed the Mahābhārata? Hear now correctly how the Vedas were divided by him, my great son, in this Dvāpara age. When, commanded by Brahmā, Vyāsa undertook to divide the Vedas, he took four disciples who had read through those books. The great muni took Paila as teacher of the Rich, Vaisāmpāyana of the Yajush, and Jaimini of the Sāman, while Sumantu, skilled in the Atharva-veda, was also his disciple. He took, too, as his pupil for the Itihāsas and Purāṇas the great and intelligent muni, Sūta, called Romaharshana."⁴²

Vāyu Purāṇa.—In the same way, and partly in the same words, the Vāyu Purāṇa (section lx.) represents the Vedas to have been divided in the Dvāpara age. It first describes how this was done by Manu in the Svāyambhuva, or first manvantara, and then recounts how Vyāsa performed the same task in the existing seventh, or Vaivasvata manvantara; and, no doubt, also in the Dvāpara age, though this is not expressly stated in regard to Vyāsa.

The following is an extract from this passage (as given in Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue of the Bodleian Sanskrit MSS. p. 54):

Dvāpare tu purāṇṛitte Manoh svāyambhuve 'ntare | Brahmā Manum uvāchedam vedāṃ vyasya mahāmata | Parivṛittāṃ yugaṃ tāta svalpa-viryāḥ dvijātayāḥ | saṃvṛittāḥ yuga-doshena sarvaṃ chaiva yathākramam | bhrashṭa-mānaṃ yuga-vaśād alpa-siṣṭāṃ hi drīṣyate | Daśa-sāhasra-bhā-gna hy avasiṣṭam kṛitād idam | vīryaṃ tejo balaṃ chālpaṃ sarvaṃ chaiva pranaśyati | vede vedāḥ hi kāryyāḥ syur mā bhūd veda-vināśanaṃ | vede nāsam anuprāpte yajno nāsaṃ gamishyati | yajno nashṭe deva-nāśas

⁴² Mahīdhara on the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā (Weber's ed. p. 1) says, in regard to the division of the Vedas: *Tatrādaḥ Brahma-paramparayā praptāṃ Vedāṃ Vedavyāso manda-matīṃ manushyān vicīntya tat-kṛipayā chatuṛdhū vyasya Rīg-yajuh-sīmā-tharvākhyāṃś chaturō vedān Paila-Vaisāmpāyana-Jaimini-Sumantuḥyāḥ kramād upādīdeśa te cha sva-śākhībhyāḥ | Evam paramparayā sahasra-śākhō Vedo jūtaḥ |* "Vedavyāsa, having regard to men of dull understanding, in kindness to them, divided into four parts the Veda which had been originally handed down by tradition from Brahmā, and taught the four Vedas, called Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan, in order, to Paila, Vaisāmpāyana, Jaimini, and Sumantu; and they again to their disciples. In this way, by tradition, the Veda of a thousand śākhās was produced."

tataḥ sarvam praṇāsyati | Ādya vedāś chatuḥ-pādo sata-sāhasra-sammitaḥ | Punar daśu-guṇaḥ kritsno yajno vai sarva-kāma-dhuk | Evam uktas tathety uktvā Manur loka-kite rataḥ | vedam ekam chatuḥ-pādaṁ chaturdhā vyabhajāt prabhuḥ | Brahmano vachanāt tāta lokānām hita-kāmīyā | tad aham varṭtamānena yushmākam veda-kalpanam | manvantareṇa vakshyāmi vyatītānām prakalpanam | pratyakshena parokṣaṁ vai tad nibodhata sattamāḥ | Asmin yuge kṛito Vyāsaḥ Pārūsaryuḥ parantapaḥ | "Dvaipāyanaḥ" iti khyāto Viṣṇor aṁśaḥ prakīrtitaḥ | Brahmanā choditaḥ so 'smin vedāṁ vyastum prachakrame | Atha śiṣhyān sa jagrāha chaturō veda-kāraṇāt | Jaiminiṁ cha Sumantuṁ cha Vaiśampāyanam eva cha | Pailāṁ teshāṁ chaturīṅgāṁ tu panchamāṁ Lomaharṣhanam |

“In the former Dvāpara of the Svāyambhuva manvantara, Brahmā said to Manu, ‘Divide the Veda, o sage. The age is changed; through its baneful influence the Brāhmans have become feeble, and from the same cause the measure of everything has gradually declined, so that little is seen remaining. A part (of the Veda) consisting of only these ten thousand (verses) is now left to us from the Kṛita age; vigour, fire, and energy are diminished; and everything is on the road to destruction. A plurality of Vedas must be made out of the one Veda, lest the Veda be destroyed. The destruction of the Veda would involve the destruction of sacrifice; that again would occasion the annihilation of the gods, and then everything would go to ruin. The primeval Veda consisted of four quarters and extended to one hundred thousand verses, while sacrifice was tenfold, and yielded every object of desire.’ Being thus addressed, Manu, the lord, devoted to the good of the world, replied, ‘Be it so,’ and in conformity with the command of Brahmā, divided the one Veda, which consisted of four quarters, into four parts.⁴³ I shall, therefore, narrate to you the division of the Veda in the existing manvantara; from which visible division you, virtuous sages, can understand those invisible arrangements of the same kind which were made in past manvantaras. In this Yuga, the victorious son of Parāśara, who is called Dvaipāyana, and is celebrated as a portion of Viṣṇu, has been made the Vyāsa. In this Yuga, he, being commanded by Brahmā, began to divide the Vedas. For this purpose he took four pupils, Jaimini, Sumantu, Vaiśampāyana,

⁴³ The Mahābhārata, S’āntip. verse 13,678, says the Vedas were divided in the Svāyambhuva manvantara by Apāntaratamas, son of Sarasvatī (*Tena bhinnās tadā vedā manoh svāyambhuvo 'ntari*).

and Paila, and, as a fifth, Lomaharshana" [for the Purāṇas and Iti-
hāsas, etc.]

Bhāgavata Purāṇa.—It is in its third book, where the different man-
vantāras are described, that the Vishṇu Purāṇa gives an account of the
division of the Vedas. In the book of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa where
the manvantaras are enumerated, there is no corresponding allusion to
the division of the Vedas; but a passage to the same effect occurs in
the fourth section of the first book, verses 14 ff. :

*Dvāpare samanuprāpte tritīya-yuga-paryaye | jātuḥ Purāsarūd yogī
Vāsavyām kalayā Hareḥ | 15. Sa kadāchit Sarasvatyāḥ upasprīṣya jalām
śuchi | viriktaḥ ekaḥ āsīnaḥ udite ravi-maṇḍale | 16. Parāvara-jnaḥ sa
ṛishiḥ kālenāvryakta-ramhasā | yuga-dharma-vyatikaram prāptam bhūvi
yuge yuge | 17. Bhautikānām cha bhāvānām śakti-hrāsaṁ cha tat-kṛi-
tam | āsraddhadhānān nissatvān durmedhān hrasitūyushaḥ | 18. Dur-
bhagāms janān vīkshya munir divyena chakshushā | sarva-varnāsramānām
yud dadhyau hitam amogha-dṛik | 19. Chāturohtraṁ karma śuddham pra-
janām vīkshya vaidīkam | vyadadhād yajna-santatyai vedam ekoṁ chatur-
vidham | 20. Rīg-yajuh-sāmātharvākhyāḥ vedās chatvāra uddhṛitūḥ |
itihāsa-purāṇāṁ cha panchamo veda uchyate | 21. Tattrarg-veda-dharaḥ
Pailaḥ sāmago Jaiminiḥ kavīḥ | Vaisampāyana evaiko nishṇāto yajushām
uta | 22. Atharvāngirasām āsīt Sumantur dāruṇo munīḥ | itihāsa-purāṇā-
nām pitū me Romaharshanaḥ | 23. Te ete ṛishayo vedāṁ evām evām vyasyann
anekadhā | śishyair praśishyais tach-chhishyair vedās te sūkhino 'bhavan |
24. Te eva vedāḥ durmedhair dhāryante purushair yuthā | evām chakāra
bhagavān Vyāsaḥ kṛipāna - vatsalaḥ | 25. Strī - śūdra - dvijabandhūnām
trayī na śruti-gocharā | karma-śreyasi mūdhānām śreyāḥ eva bhaved tha |
iti Bhāratam ākhyānām kṛipayā muninā kṛitam |*

14. "When the Dvāpara age had arrived, during the revolution of
that third yuga, the Yogin (Vyāsa) was born, a portion of Hari, as the
son of Parāśara and Vāsavyā. 15. As on one occasion he was sitting
solitary at sunrise, after touching the pure waters of the Sarasvatī, (16)
this rishi, who knew the past and the future, perceiving, with the eye
of divine intelligence, that disorder had in each yuga been introduced
into the duties proper to each, through the action of time, whose march
is imperceptible, (17) that the strength of beings formed of the elements
had in consequence declined, that men were destitute of faith, vigour,
and intelligence, that their lives were shortened, (18) and that they

were miserable,—reflected with unerring insight on the means of benefitting the several castes and orders. 19. Discerning that the pure Vedic ceremonies ought to be performed for men by the agency of four classes of priests, he divided the one Veda into four parts, with a view to the performance of sacrifice. 20. Four Vedas, called the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan, were drawn forth from it; while the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are called the fifth Veda. 21. Of these the Rich was held by Paila, the sage Jaimini chanted the Sāman, Vaiśampāyana alone was versed in the Yajush, (22) the dreadful muni Sumantu in the verses of Atharvan and Angiras, and my father Romaharshana in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. 23. Each of these rishis arranged his own Veda in many ways; and by the successive generations of their disciples the Vedas were separated into branches (*sākhās*). 24. The venerable Vyāsa, kind to the wretched, acted thus in order that the Vedas might be recollected by men of enfeebled understanding. 25. And as women, Sūdras, and the inferior members of the twice-born classes were unfitted for hearing the Veda, and were infatuated in desiring the blessings arising from ceremonies, the muni, with a view to their felicity, in his kindness composed the narrative called the Mahābhārata.”

But notwithstanding the magnitude of the great legendary and theological repertory which he had thus compiled, Vyāsa, we are told, was dissatisfied with his own contributions to sacred science until he had produced the Bhāgavata Purāṇa consecrated to the glory of Bhagavat (Kṛishṇa).⁴⁴ The completion of this design is thus narrated, Bhāg. Pur. i. 7, 6 :

*Anarthopaśamūñ sākshād bhakti-yogam Adhokshaje | lokasyājānato
vidvāñś chakre Sātvata-saṁhitām | 7. Yasyām vai śrūyamānāyām
Kṛishṇe parama-pūruṣe | bhaktir udpatyate puṁsaḥ śoku-moha-bhayā-
pahā | 8. Sa saṁhitām Bhāgavatīm kṛitvā 'nukramya chātmejam |
Sukam adhyāpayāmāsa nivrītti-niratam munih |*

“Knowing that devotion to Adhokshaja (Kṛishṇa) was the evident means of putting an end to the folly of the world, which was ignorant of this, he composed the Sātvata-Saṁhitā (the Bhāgavata). 7. When a man listens to this work, devotion to Kṛishṇa, the supreme Puruṣa, arises in his mind, and frees him from grief, delusion, and fear. Having

⁴⁴ See Wilson's Vishṇu Purāṇa, Preface, p. xlvii.

completed and arranged this Sanhitā, the muni taught it to his son Suka, who was indisposed to the pursuit of secular objects."

Towards the close of this Purāṇa also, in the sixth section of the twelfth book (verses 37 ff.), there is to be found what Professor Wilson (Vish. Pur. Pref.) calls "a rather awkwardly introduced description of the arrangement of the Vedas and Purāṇas by Vyāsa."

The passage (as given in the Bombay lithographed edition) is as follows :

*Sūta uvācha | samāhitātmano brahman Brahmanah parameshthinaḥ |
 hṛid-ākāsād abhūd nādo vṛitti-rodhād vibhāvayate | yad-upāsanayā brah-
 man yogino malam ātmanah | dravya-kriyā-kāraḥkhyam dhūtvā yānty
 apanurbhavam | Tato 'bhūt trivṛid oṃkāro yo 'vyakta-prabhavaḥ svarāt |
 yat tal lingam Bhagavato Brahmanah paramātmanah | sṛjoti yaḥ imaṃ
 sphoṭam supta-śrotre cha śūnya-dṛik | yena vāg vyajyate yasya vyaktir
 ākāśo ātmanah | svadhāmno brahmanah sūkshād vāchakah paramātmanah |
 sa-sarva-mantrapanishad-veda-vijam sanātanam | tasya hy āsams trayo
 varṇāḥ a-kūrādyaḥ Bhṛigūdvaḥ | dhāryante jais trayo bhāvāḥ guṇāḥ
 nāmārtha-vṛittayah | tato 'kshara-samānnōyam asṛjad bhugavān ejaḥ |
 Antassthoshma-svara-sparśa-hrasva-dīrghādi-lakshanaṃ | tenāsau chaturō
 vedāms chaturbhir vadanair vibhuḥ | sa-vyāhṛitikān sōmkārāms chatur-
 hotra-vivakshayaḥ | putrān adhyāpayat tāms tu brahmarshin brahma-
 kovidān | te tu dharmopadeshtārah sva-putrebhyaḥ samādiśan | te param-
 parayā prāptās tat-tach-chhishyaḥ dhṛita-vrataih | chaturyugeshv aha
 vyastāḥ dvāparādau maharshibhiḥ | kshīṇāyushah kshīṇā-sattvān dur-
 medhān vīkshya kālataḥ | vedān brahmarshayo vyasyan hṛidisthāch-
 yuta-noditāḥ | Asmin apy antare brahman bhugavān loka-bhūvanah |
 brahmesūdyair lokapālair yāchito dharmā-guptage | Parāsarāt Satyavat-
 yām aṃsāmsa-kalayā vibhuḥ | avatīrno mahābhāga vedān okare chatur-
 vidham | ṛig-atharva-yajuh-sāmnām rāśin uddhṛitya vargaśah | chatasrah
 saṃhitās chakre mantrair maniganāḥ iva | tāsām sa chaturah śishjān
 upāhūya mahāmatih | Ekaikām saṃhitām brahman ekaikasmai dadau
 vibhuḥ | Pulāya saṃhitām ādyām bahvṛichākhyaṃ uvācha ha | Vaiśam-
 pāyana-sanjāya nigadākhyaṃ yajur-gaṇam | sāmnām Jaininayo prāhu
 talhā, chhandoga-saṃhitām | Atharvāṅgīrasīm nāma sva-śishāya Su-
 mantave |*

"Sūta speaks : 'From the æther of the supreme Brahma's heart, when he was plunged in meditation, there issued a sound, which is

perceived [by the devout] when they close their organs of sense. By adoring this sound, devotees destroy the soul's threefold taint, extrinsic, inherent, and superhuman,⁴⁶ and become exempt from future birth. From this sound sprang the *omkāra*, composed of three elements, self-resplendent, of imperceptible origin, that which is the emblem of the divine Brahma, the supreme spirit. He it is who hears this sound (*sphoṭa*), when the ears are insensible and the vision inactive,—(this *sphoṭa* or *omkāra*) through which speech is revealed, and which is manifested in the æther, from the Soul.⁴⁶ This [*omkāra*] is the sensible exponent of Brahma, the self-sustained, the supreme spirit; and it is the eternal seed of the Vedas, including all the Mantras and Upanishads. In this [*omkāra*] there were, a descendant of Bṛiḡu, three letters, A and the rest, by which the three conditions, the [three] qualities, the [three] names, the [three] significations, the [three] states⁴⁷ are maintained. From these [three letters] the divine and unborn being created the traditional system of the letters of the alphabet, distinguished as inner (*y, r, l, v*), *uṣṡmas* (*ś, sh, s, h*), vowels, long and short, and consonants. With this [alphabet] the omnipresent Being, desiring to reveal the functions of the four classes of priests, [created] from his four mouths the four Vedas with the three sacred syllables (*vyāhṛitis*) and the *omkāra*.⁴⁸ These he taught to his sons, the brahmarshis, skilled in sacred lore; and these teachers of duty, in turn declared them to their sons. The Vedas were thus received by each succeeding generation of devout pupils from their

⁴⁶ *Dravya-kriyā-kāra*, which the scholiast interprets as answering to *adhibhūta*, *adhyātma*, and *adhidaiva*. See the explanation of these terms in Wilson's *Sūkhya-kārikā*, pp. 2 and 9.

⁴⁷ I quote the scholiast's explanation of this obscure verse: *Ko'sau paramātmā tam āha 'sṛjnoti' iti | inam sphoṭam avyaktam omkāram | nanu jīvaḥ evo tam sṛjnotu | na ity āha | sūpta-śrotre karmu-pidhānūdinā arṛitike 'pi śrotre sati | jīvas tu karanādīnatvād na tadū śrotā | tad-upalabdhis tu tasya paramātmā-dūrikū eva ity bhūvaḥ | Īśvaras tu naivam | yataḥ sūnya-dṛik sūnye 'pi indriya-vargo dṛik jūnānā yasya | tathā hi sūpto yadā śabdañ śrutvū prabuddhyato na tadū jīvaḥ śrotā līnen-driyatvāt | ato yas tadā śubdañ śrutvū jīvam prabodhayati sa yathā paramātmā eva tadvat | ko 'sūv omkāras tam vīśinashṭi sārādhena yena vāḡ bṛiḡaḡ vyajyate yasya cha hṛīdayāḡkāśo ātmanāḡ sakāśād vyaktir abhivyaaktiḡ*. The word *sphoṭa* will be explained below, in a future section.

⁴⁸ These the scholiast explains thus: *Guṇāḡ sattvōdayaḡ | nāmāni ṛig-yajur-sū-māni | arthāḡ bhūr-bhuvāḡ-svar-lōkāḡ | vṛittayo jāgrad-ādyāḡ |*

⁴⁹ If I have translated this correctly, the *omkāra* is both the source of the alphabet, and the alphabet of the *omkāra* !

predecessors, and in each of the systems of four yugas were divided by great sages at the beginning of the Dvāpara.⁴⁹ The Brahmarshis, impelled by Achyuta, who resided in their hearts, divided the Vedas, because they perceived that men had declined in age, in power, and in understanding. In this manvantara also,⁵⁰ the divine and omnipresent Being, the author of the universe, being supplicated by Brahmā, Īśa (Śiva), and the other guardians of the world, to maintain righteousness, became partially incarnate as the son of Parāśara and Satyavatī, and divided the Veda into four parts. Selecting aggregates of Rich, Atharvan, Yajush, and Sāman verses, and arranging them in sections (*vargas*), he formed four *sanhitās* (collections) of the hymns, as gems [of the same description are gathered together in separate heaps]. Having summoned four disciples, the wise lord gave to each of them one of these sanhitās. To Paila he declared the first sanhitā, called that of the Bahvrichas; to Vaiśampāyana the assemblage of Yayush verses, called Nigada; to Jaimini the Chhandoga collection of Sāman verses; and to his pupil, Sumantu, the Atharvāngirasi."

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa, however, is not consistent in the account which it gives of the division of the Vedas. In a passage already quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 158, it speaks of that division as having been the work of the monarch Purūravas, and as having taken place in the beginning of the Tretā age. From the importance of this text I will extract it here again at greater length.

The celestial nymph Urvasī, the Purāṇa tells us, had been doomed, in consequence of a curse, to take up her abode upon earth. She there

⁴⁹ *Dvāparādaū* can only mean the "beginning of the Dvāpara;" but the scholiast undertakes by the following process of reasoning to show that it means the end of that yuga: *Dvāparādaū dvāparam ādir yasya tad-antyaṃśa-lakṣaṇasya kūtasya | tasmīn dvāparānte veda - vibhāgu - prasiddheḥ Śantanu - sama - kīla - Vyāsatāra - prasiddheś cha | vyastā vibhaktāḥ |* "Dvāparādaū means the period of which the dvāpara was the beginning, i.e. the time distinguished as the concluding portion of that yuga; since it is notorious that the Vedas were divided at the end of the Dvāpara, and that the incarnation of Vyāsa was contemporaneous with Śantanu. *Vyastāḥ = vibhaktāḥ*, divided."

⁵⁰ From this it appears that hitherto the account had not referred to the present manvantara. The scholiast remarks: *Evaṃ sāmūnyato veda-vibhāga-kramam uktrā vaivasvata-manvantare viśeṣato nirūpayitum āha |* "Having thus [in the preceding verses] generally described the manner in which the Vedas are divided, [the author] now states [as follows], with the view of determining particularly [what was done] in the Vaivasvata manvantara."

fell in love with King Purūravas, the report of whose manly beauty had touched her heart, even before she had been banished from paradise. After spending many happy days in the society of her lover, she forsook him in consequence of his having infringed one of the conditions of their cohabitation, and Purūravas was in consequence rendered very miserable. He at length, however, obtained a renewal of their intercourse, and she finally recommended him to worship the Gandharvas, who would then re-unite him with her indissolubly.

The Purāna then proceeds (ix. 14, 43 ff.):

Tasya saṁstuvatas tushṭāḥ agnistikālim dadur nṛipa | Urvaśim manya-
mānas tām so 'budhyata charan vane | Sthālīm nyasya vane gatvā grihān
ādhyāyato niśi | Tretāyām sampravṛittāyām manasi trayy avarttata |
Sthālī-sthānaṁ gato 'śvatthaṁ samī-garbhaṁ vilakshya saḥ | Tena dve
araṇī kṛtvā Urvaśi-loka-kāmyayā | Urvaśim mantrato dhyāyann adharā-
raṇim uttarām | Ātmānam ubhayor madhye yat tat prajananam prakkuḥ |
Tasya nirmathanāj jāto jātavedaḥ vibhāvasuḥ | Trayyā cha vidyayā rājñā
putratve kalpitā trivṛit | Tenāyajata yajneśaṁ bhagavantam adhoksha-
jam | Urvaśi-lokam anvichhan sarva-devamāyūṁ Harim | Ekaḥ eva purā
vedaḥ praṇavaḥ sarva-vāñmayuḥ | Devo nārāyaṇo nānyaḥ cko 'gnir varṇaḥ
eva cha | Purūravasa evāsīt trayī tretā-mukhe nṛipa | Agnīnā prajayā
rājñā lokaṁ gāndharvam eyivān |

“The Gandharvas, gratified by his praises, gave him a platter containing fire. This he [at first] supposed to be Urvaśi, but became aware [of his mistake], as he wandered in the wood. Having placed the platter in the forest, Purūravas went home; and as he was meditating in the night, after the Tretā age had commenced, the triple Veda appeared before his mind.⁶¹ Returning to the spot where he had placed the platter, he beheld an *aśvattha* tree springing out of a *samī* tree, and formed from it two pieces of wood. Longing to attain the world where Urvaśi dwelt, he imagined to himself, according to the sacred text, Urvaśi as the lower and himself as the upper piece of wood, and the place of generation as situated between the two.⁶² Agni was produced from its

⁶¹ *Karma-bodhakam veda-trayaṁ prūdurabhūt |* “The three Vedas, expounders of rites, were manifested to him,” as the scholiast explains.”

⁶² Allusion is here made to a part of the ceremonial for kindling a particular sacrificial fire; one of the formulas employed at which, as given in the Vāj. Saṁhitā, 5, 2, is, “thou art Urvaśi” (*Urvaśy asi*), and another, “thou art Purūravas” (*Purūravāḥ*)

friction, and, according to the threefold science [Veda], was under his triple form, adopted by the king as his son. With this fire, seeking to attain the heaven of Urvāṣī, he worshipped the divine Hari, the lord of sacrifice, Adhokshaja, formed of the substance of all the gods. There was formerly but one Veda, the sacred monosyllable *om*, the essence of all speech; one god, Nārāyaṇa; one Agni, and [one] caste. From Purūravas came the triple Veda in the beginning of the Tretā age. Through Agni, his son, the king attained the heaven of the Gandharvas.”⁶³

On the close of this passage the commentator remarks :

*Navv anādir veda-traya-bodhito brāhmaṇādīnām Indrādy-aneka-deva-
yajanaena svarga-prāpti-hetuḥ karma-mārgaḥ kathaṁ sādīr iva varṇyate |
Tatrāha “eka eva” iti dvābhyām | Purā kṛita-yuge sarva-vāṇmayāḥ
sarvāsām vāchām vija-bhūtaḥ pranavaḥ eka eva vedaḥ | Devaḥ cha Nārā-
yaṇaḥ eka eva | Agniḥ cha eka eva laukikaḥ | Varṇaḥ cha eka eva haṁso
nāma | Veda-trayī tu Purūravasaḥ sakāsād āsīt . . . Ayam bhūvaḥ |
kṛita-yuge sattva-pradhānāḥ prayaśaḥ sarve 'pi dhyāna-nishṭhāḥ | rajaḥ-
pradhāne tu Tretā-yuge vedādi-vibhāgena karma-mārgaḥ prakato babhūva
ity arthaḥ |*

“How is it that the eternal method of works, which is pointed out by the three Vedas, and through which Brāhmans and others, by worshipping Indra and many other gods, attain to paradise, is spoken of [in the preceding verses] as if it had a beginning in time? He [the author of the Purāṇa] answers this in these two verses. Formerly, *i.e.* in the Kṛita age, there was only one Veda, the sacred monosyllable *om*, the essence of all words, *i.e.* that which is the seed of all words; and there was only one god, Nārāyaṇa; only one fire, that for common uses; and

asi, the former denoting the lower (*adharaḥ. ōṇī*), and the latter the upper, piece of wood (*uttarāṅgi*), by the friction of which the fire was to be produced. See Weber's Indische Studien, i. 197, and note; Roth's Illustrations of the Nirukta, p. 154; the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, iii. 4, 1, 22, and Kātyāyana's Śrauta Sūtras, v. 1, 28 ff. The commentator on the Vṛjanasaneī Saṁhitā explains the formula *Urvasy asi* thus: *Yathā Urvāṣī Purūravas-
nṛipasya bhogāya adhasṭit sete ta ivaṭ tvam ulho 'vasthīṭī
'si |* “As Urvāṣī lies under King Purūravas for sexual connection, so thou art placed underneath.”

⁶³ This story is also told in a prose passage in the Viṣ. Pur. iv. 6. It is there stated that Purūravas divided fire, which was originally one, in a threefold manner (*eko 'gnir ādāv abhavat Ailena tu atra manvantare trōitū prarurtūṭī*). No mention, however, is there made of his having divided the Vedas, or partitioned society into castes.

only one caste, the Hansa. But the triple Veda came from Purūravas. . . . The meaning is this: in the Kṛita age the quality of goodness predominated in men, who were almost all absorbed in meditation. But in the Tretā age, when passion (*rajas*) prevailed, the method of works was manifested by the division of the Vedas."⁶⁴

This last quoted passage of the Bhāgavata gives, as I have intimated, a different account of the division of the Vedas from that contained in the other two texts previously adduced from the same work, and in the citations from the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas. The one set of passages speak of the Veda as having been divided by Vyāsa into four parts in the Dvāpara age; while the text last cited speaks of the triple Veda as having originated with Purūravas in the Tretā age; and evidently belonged to a different tradition from the former three. The legend which speaks of three Vedas may possibly have a somewhat more ancient source than that which speaks of four, as it was not till a later date that the Atharva asserted its right to be ranked with the three others as a fourth Veda. The former tradition, however, would appear to have had its origin partly in etymological considerations. The word Tretā, though designating the second Yuga, means a triad, and seems to have been suggested to the writer's mind by the triple fire mentioned in the legend.

Mahābhārata.—The following passage from the Mahābhārata, Śānti-parvan (verses 13,088 ff.), agrees partially in tenor with the last passage from the Bhāgavata, but is silent regarding Purūravas:

*Idam kṛita-yugaṁ nāma kālāḥ śreṣṭhāḥ pravarttibūḥ | Ahimsyāḥ
yajna-paśavo yugo 'smin na tūl anyathā | Chatuṣpāt sakalo dharmo bha-
viṣhyaty atra vai surāḥ | Tatas Tretā-yugaṁ nāma trayī yatra bhaviṣh-
yati | Prokṣhitāḥ yajna-paśavo badhaṁ prāpsyanti vai makhe*⁶⁵ | *Yatra*

⁶⁴ This legend is borrowed from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 1, 1 ff. (pp. 855-858 Weber's ed.), where the motive for its introduction is to describe the process by which fire was generated by Purūravas in obedience to the command of the Gandharvas, as the means of his admission into their paradise. See Professor Müller's translation of this story in the Oxford Essays for 1856, pp. 62, 63, or the reprint in his Chips from a German Workshop; and the First Volume of this work, p. 226. The legend is founded on the 95th hymn of the tenth book of the Rig-veda.

⁶⁵ Manu (i. 85, 86) differs from this passage of the Mahābhārata in making the Dvāpara the age of sacrifice: *Anye kṛitayuge dharmāḥ Tretāyām Dvāpare paro | Anye kaliyuge nrīnām yuga-hrāsānurūpataḥ | Topaḥ paraṁ Kṛitayuge Tretāyām jñānam uchyate | Dvāpare yajnam evāhur ānam ekam kalau yuge* | "Different duties are practised by men in the Kṛita age, and different duties in the Tretā, Dvāpara, and

pūdaś chaturtho vai dharmasya na bhaviṣhyati | Tato vai dvāparaṃ nāma miśraḥ kālo bhaviṣhyati |

“This present Kṛita age is the best of all the yugas; in it it will be unlawful to slay any animals for sacrifice; in this age righteousness shall consist of all its four portions and be entire. Then shall follow the Tretā age, in which the triple Veda shall come into existence, and animals fit for sacrifice shall be slaughtered as oblations. In that age the fourth part of righteousness shall be wanting. Next shall succeed the Dvāpara, a mixed period.”

The M. Bh. (Sāntip. 13,475) relates that two Asuras, who beheld Brahmā creating the Vedas, suddenly snatched them up and ran off. Brahmā laments their loss, exclaiming:

Vedo me paramāṃ cakṣur vedo me paramam balam | . . . Vedān rite hi kiṃ kuryāṃ lokānāṃ śriṣṭim uttamām |

“The Veda is my principal eye; the Veda is my principal strength. . . . What shall I do without the Vedas, the most excellent creation in the universe?” They were, however, recovered and restored to Brahmā (verses 13,506 ff.).

Vishnu Purāna.—The following verse, Vish. Pur. iii. 2, 12, refers to the periodical disappearance of the Vedas:

Chaturyugānte vedānāṃ jāyate kali-viplavaḥ | pravarttayanti tān etya bhūi saptarshayo divaḥ |

“At the end of the four ages (*yugas*) the disappearance of the Vedas, incident to the Kali, takes place. The seven rishis come from heaven to earth, and again give them currency.” (Compare M. Bh. Sāntip. verse 7660, which will be quoted further on.)

SECT. VI.—*Accounts in the Vishnu and Vāyu Purānas of the schisms between the adherents of the Yajur-veda, Vaiśampāyana and Yājñavalkya; hostility of the Ātharvānas towards the other Vedas; and of the Chhandogas towards the Rig-veda.*

The Vishnu Purāna, iii. 5, 2 ff., gives the following legend regarding

Kali ages, in proportion to the decline in those yugas. Devotion is said to be supreme in the Kṛita, knowledge in the Tretā, sacrifice in the Dvāpara, and liberality alone in the Kali.” See also Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, verse 8505, which agrees with Manu. See also the First Volume of this work, pp. 39 ff.

the way in which the Yajur-veda came to be divided into two schools, the black and the white :

Yājñavalkyas tu tasyābhūd Brahma-rāta-suto dvija | Śiṣhyaḥ parama-dharma-jño guru-vṛitti-paraḥ sadā | Rishir yo'dya mahāmeruṁ samāje nāgamishyati | Tasya vai sapta-rātraṁ tu brahma-hatyā bhavishyati | Pūrvam eva muni-gaṇaiḥ samayo 'bhūt krito dvija | Vaiśampāyana ekas tu taṁ vyatikrāntavāns tadā | S'vasrīyam bālakaṁ so 'tha padū sprish-ṭam aghātayat | Śiṣhyān āha sa " bhoḥ śiṣyāḥ brahma-hatyāpahaṁ vratam | Charadhvam mat-krito sarve na vichāryyam idam tathā " | *Athāha Yājñavalkyas taṁ " kim ebhir bhagavan dvijaiḥ | Kleśitair alpatejobhir charishye 'ham idam vratam "* | *Tataḥ kruddho guruḥ prāha Yājñavalkyam mahāmatih | " Muchyatām yat tvayā 'dhītam matto viprāvamanyaka | Nistejaso vadasy etūn yas tvam brāhmaṇa-pungavān | Tena śiṣhyena nārtho 'sti mamājñā-bhaṅga-kūriṇā "* | *Yājñavalkyas tataḥ prāha bhaktau tat te mayo-dītam | Mamāpy alaṁ tvayā 'dhītam yad mayā tad idam dvija | Ity uktvā rudhirāktāni sarvopāni yajūṁshi saḥ | Chhardayitvā dadau tasmai yayau cha svechhayā munih | yajūṁshy atha visrīṣṭūni Yājñavalkyena vai dvija | Jagrihus tittirībhūtā Taittirīyās tu te tataḥ | Brahma-hatyā-vratam chīrnam gurunā choditais tu yaiḥ | Charakādhvaryavas te tu charaṇād munisattamāḥ | Yājñavalkyo 'tha Maitreya prānāyāma-parāyanah | tush-ṭava prayataḥ sūryam yajūṁshy abhilashaṁs tataḥ | . . . Ity evam-ādibhis tena stūyamanah stavaiḥ raviḥ | vāji-rūpa-dharaḥ prāha " vṛiyatām " iti " vānchhitam " | Yājñavalkyas tadā prāha pranīpatya divākaram | yajūṁshi tāni me dehi yāni santi na me gurau | Evam ukto dadau tasmai yajūṁshi bhagavān raviḥ | vyātayāma-sañjñāni yāni vetti na tad-guruḥ | Yajūṁshi yair adhītāni tāni viprair dvijottama | vājinas te samākhyātāḥ sūryo 'svaḥ so 'bhavad yataḥ |*

" Yājñavalkya, son of Brahma-rāta, was his [Vaiśampāyana's] disciple, eminently versed in duty, and always attentive to his teacher. An agreement had formerly been made by the Munis that any one of their number who should fail to attend at an assembly on Mount Meru on a certain day should incur the guilt of Brahmanicide during a period of seven nights. Vaiśampāyana was the only person who infringed this agreement, and he in consequence occasioned the death of his sister's child by touching it with his foot. He then desired all his disciples to perform on his behalf an expiation which should take away his guilt, and forbade any hesitation. Yājñavalkya then said to him,

‘Reverend sir, what is the necessity for these faint and feeble Brāhmins? I will perform the expiation.’ The wise teacher, incensed, replied to Yājñavalkya, ‘Contemner of Brāhmins, give up all that thou hast learnt from me; I have no need of a disobedient disciple, who, like thee, stigmatizes these eminent Brāhmins as feeble.’ Yājñavalkya rejoined, ‘It was from devotion [to thee] that I said what I did; but I, too, have done with thee: here is all that I have learnt from thee.’ Having spoken, he vomited forth the identical Yajush texts tainted with blood, and giving them to his master, he departed at his will. [The other pupils] having then become transformed into partridges (*tittiri*), picked up the Yajush texts, which were given up by Yājñavalkya, and were thence called Taittirīyas. And those who by their teacher’s command had performed the expiation for Brahmanicide, were from this performance (*charaṇa*) called Charakādhvaryus. Yājñavalkya then, who was habituated to the exercise of suppressing his breath, devoutly hymned the sun, desiring to obtain Yajush texts. . . . [I pass over the hymn.] Thus celebrated with these and other praises, the sun assumed the form of a horse, and said, ‘Ask whatever boon thou desirest.’ Yājñavalkya then, bowing down before the lord of day, replied, ‘Give me such Yajush texts as my teacher does not possess.’ Thus supplicated, the sun gave him the Yajush texts called Ayātayāma, which were not known to his master. Those by whom these texts were studied were called Vājins, because the sun (when he gave them) assumed the shape of a horse (*vājīn*).”

I quote also the parallel text from the Vāyu Purāṇa, as it exhibits some slight variations from the preceding (Auf. Cat. p. 55):

*Kāryam ūsīd rīshīnām cha kinchīd brāhmaṇa-sattamāḥ | Meru-prish-
ṭhām samāsādya tais tadā “’stv” iti mantritām | Yo no’tra sapta-
rātreṇa nāgachhed dvija-sattamāḥ | sa kuryād brahma-badhyām vai
samayo naḥ prukirttitaḥ | Itas to sa-gaṇāḥ sarve Vaiśampāyana-ra-
jī-
tāḥ | Prayayuh saptarātreṇa yatra sandhīḥ kṛito ’bhavut | Brāhmaṇa-
nām tu vacchanūd brahma-badhyām chakāra saḥ | Sīshyān atha samānīya
sa Vaiśampāyano ’bravīt | “Brahma-badhyām charadhvaṃ vai mat-kṛite
dvijaḥ-sattamāḥ | sarve yūyām samāgamyā brūta me tad-hitām vāchaḥ” |
Yājñavalkyaḥ uvācha | Aham eva churishyāmi tishṭhantu nunayas to ime |
bālaṃ chotthāpayishyāmi tapasū svēna bhūvitaḥ | Evam uktas tataḥ krod-
dho Yājñavalkyam athūbravīt | uvācha “yat trayā ’dhītūṃ sarvam praiy-*

arpayasva me” | *Evam uktaḥ saṅgāpāni yajūṁshi pradadau guroḥ | ru-*
dhireṇa tathā 'ktāni chharditvā brahma-vittamaḥ | Tataḥ sa dhyānam
āsthāya sūryam ārādhayad dvijaḥ | “sūrya brahma yad uchekhinnaṁ
khaṁ gatvā pratitishṭhati” | Tuto yāni gatāny ūrdhaṁ yajūṁshy
āditya-maṇḍalam | Tāni tasmai dadau tushṭaḥ sūryo vai Brāhmarātaye |
Aśva-rūpaḥ cha mārtaṇḍo Yājñavalkyāya dhimate | Yajūṁshy adhyate
yāni brāhmaṇāḥ yena kenachit (yani kanchit?) | aśva-rūpāni (-rūpeṇa?)
dattāni tatas ī Vājino 'bhavan⁵⁶ | brahma-hatyā tu yaiś chīrṇā charaṇāt
charakāḥ smritāḥ | Vaiśampāyana-śiṣhyās to charakāḥ śamudāhṛitāḥ |

“The rishis having a certain occasion, met on the summit of Mount Meru, when, after consultation, they resolved and agreed together that any one of their number who should fail to attend there for seven nights should become involved in the guilt of brahmanicide. They all in consequence resorted to the appointed place for seven nights along with their attendants. Vaiśampāyana alone was absent, and he, according to the word of the Brāhmins, committed brahmanicide. He then assembled his disciples, and desired them to perform, on his behalf, an expiation for his offence, and to meet and tell him what was salutary for the purpose. Yājñavalkya then said, ‘I myself will perform the penance; let all these munis refrain: inspired by my own austere-fervour I shall raise up the boy (whom thou hast slain).’ Incensed at this speech of Yājñavalkya [Vaiśampāyana] said to him, ‘Restore all that thou hast learned (from me).’ Thus addressed, the sage, deeply versed in sacred lore, vomited forth the identical Yajush texts stained with blood, and delivered them to his teacher. Plunged in meditation, the Brāhmin (Yājñavalkya) then adored the sun, saying, ‘Sun, every sacred text which disappears [from the earth] goes to the sky, and there abides.’ The sun, gratified, and [appearing] in the form of a horse, bestowed on Yājñavalkya, son of Brāhmarāta, all the Yajush texts which had ascended to the solar region. As all the Yajush texts which these Brāhmins study were given by him in the form of a horse, they in consequence became Vājins. And the disciples of Vaiśampāyana, by whom the expiatory rite was accomplished, were called *Charakas*, from its accomplishment (*charaṇa*).”⁵⁷

⁵⁶ I am indebted to Dr. Hall for communicating to me the various readings of this verse in the India Office Library MSS., but some parts of it seem to be corrupt.

⁵⁷ In a note to p. 461 (4to. ed.) of his Translation of the Vishnu Purāṇa, Prof. Wilson

It is sufficiently evident from the preceding legend that the adherents of the two different divisions of the Yajurveda (the Taittirīya or black, and the Vājasaneyi or white), must in ancient times have regarded each other with feelings of the greatest hostility—feelings akin to those with which the followers of the rival deities, Vishṇu and Śiva, look upon each other in modern days. On this subject I translate a passage from Professor Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 84 :

“Whilst the theologians of the Rich are called Bahvrichas, and those of the Sāman Chhandogas, the old name for the divines of the Yajush is Adhvaryu : and these ancient appellations are to be found in the Sanhitā of the Black Yajush (the Taittirīya), and in the Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajush (the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa). The latter work applies the term Adhvaryus to its own adherents, whilst their opponents are denominated Charakādhvayus, and are the objects of censure. This hostility is also exhibited in a passage of the Sanhitā of the White Yajush, where the Charakāchārya, as one of the human sacrifices to be offered at the Purushamedha, is devoted to Dushkrīta or Sin.”⁶⁸

In his Indische Studien (iii. 454) Professor Weber specifies the following passages in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa as those in which the Charakas, or Charakādhvayus are censured, viz. iii. 8, 2, 24 ; iv. 1, 2, 19 ; iv. 2, 3, 15 ; iv. 2, 4, 1 ; vi. 2, 2, 1, 10 ; viii. 1, 3, 7 ; viii. 7, 1, 14, 24. Of these I quote one specimen (iv. 1, 2, 19) :

mentions the following legend illustrative of the effects of this schism. “The Vāyu and Matsya relate, rather obscurely, a dispute between Janamejaya and Vaisāmpāyana. in consequence of the former's patronage of the Brāhmins of the Vājasaneyi branch of the Yajur-veda, in opposition to the latter, who was the author of the Black or original Yajush. Janamejaya twice performed the Asvamedha according to the Vājasaneyi ritual, and established the Trisarvī, or use of certain texts by Āsmaka and others, by the Brāhmins of Anga, and by those of the middle country. He perished, however, in consequence, being cursed by Vaisāmpāyana. Before their disagreement, Vaisāmpāyana related the Mahābhārata to Janamejaya.”

⁶⁸ Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā, xxx. 18 (p. 846 of Weber's ed.) : *Dushkrītīya charakāchāryyam* | (*charakānām gurūm*—Scholiast). Prof. Müller also says (Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 350), “This name Charaka is used in one of the Khilas (the passage just quoted) of the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā as a term of reproach. In the 30th Adhyāya a list of people is given who are to be sacrificed at the Purushamedha, and among them we find the Charakāchārya as the proper victim to be offered to Dushkrīta or Sin. This passage, together with similar hostile expressions in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, were evidently dictated by a feeling of animosity against the ancient schools of the Adhvaryus, whose sacred texts we possess in the Taittirīya-veda, and from whom Yājñavalkya succeeded in order to become himself the founder of the new Charaṇas of the Vājasaneyins.”

Tāḥ u ha Charakāḥ nānā eva mantrābhyāṃ juhvati "prāṇodānau vai asya etau | nānā-vīryau prāṇodānau kurmaḥ" iti vadantaḥ | Tad u tathā na kuryāt | mohayanti ha te yajamānasya prāṇodānau | api id vai enam tūshnīm juhuyāt |

"These the Charakas offer respectively with two mantras, saying thus: 'These are his two breathings,' and 'we thus make these two breathings endowed with their respective powers.' But let no one adopt this procedure, for they confound the breathings of the worshipper. Wherefore let this libation be offered in silence."

But these sectarian jealousies were not confined to the different schools of the Yajur-veda; the adherents of the Atharva-veda seem to have evinced a similar spirit of hostility towards the followers of the other Vedas. On this subject Professor Weber remarks as follows in his *Indische Studien*, i. 296: "A good deal of animosity is generally displayed in most of the writings connected with the Atharvan towards the other three Vedas; but the strongest expression is given to this feeling in the first of the Atharva Parisiṣṭas (Chambers Coll. No. 112)."

• He then proceeds to quote the following passage from that work:

Bahvṛicho hanti vai rāshṭram adhvaryur nāsayet sutān | Chhandogo dhanam nāsayet tasmād Ātharvaṇo guruḥ | Ajnānād vā pramādād vā yasya syād bahvṛicho guruḥ | deśa-rāshṭra-purāmātya-nāśas tasya na saṁśayaḥ | yadi vā 'dhvaryavaṁ rājā niyunakti purohitam | śustrena badhyate kṣhipram parikṣhīnārtha-vāhanah | yathaiva pangur adhvānam apakṣhī chāṇḍa-bhojanam (chāṇḍa-jo nubhak?)⁵⁹ | evaṁ chhandoga-gururū rājā vṛiddhiṃ na gachhati | puvdhā jalado yasya maudo vā syāt kathan-chana | abdād dasabhyo māsebhyo rāshṭra-bhramśaṁ sa gachhati |

"A Bahvṛicha (Rig-veda priest) will destroy a kingdom; an Adhvaryu (Yajur-veda priest) will destroy offspring; and a Chhandoga (Sāma-veda priest) will destroy wealth;—hence an Ātharvaṇa priest is the [proper] spiritual adviser. (The king) who, through ignorance or mistake, takes a Bahvṛicha priest for his guide will, without doubt, lose his country, kingdom, cities, and ministers. Or if a king appoints an Adhvaryu priest to be his domestic chaplain, he forfeits his wealth and his chariots, and is speedily slain by the sword. As a lame man makes no progress on a road, and an egg-born creature which is without wings

⁵⁹ For the ingenious conjectural emendation in brackets, I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht. I adopt it in my translation.

cannot soar into the sky, so no king prospers who has a Chhandoga for his teacher. He who has a Jalada or a Mauda for his priest, loses his kingdom after a year or ten months."

"Thus," continues Professor Weber, "the author of the *Parīśiṣṭa* attacks the adherents of certain *Sākhās* of the *Atharva-veda* itself, for such are the *Jaladas* and the *Maudas*, and admits only a *Bhārgava*, a *Paippalāda*, or a *Saunaka* to be a properly qualified teacher. He further declares that the *Atharva-veda* is intended only for the highest order of priest, the *brahman*, not for the three other inferior sorts."

The following passage is then quoted :

Atharvā sṛjate ghoram adbhutaṁ śamayet tathā | atharvā rakshate yajnum yajnasya patir Angirāḥ | Divyāntariksha-bhaumānām utpātānām anakadhā | śamayitā brahma-veda-jnas tasmād dakṣiṇato Bhṛiguḥ | Brahmā śamayet nādhvaryur na chhandogo na bahvrichaḥ | rakshāṁsi rakshati brahmā brahmā tasmād atharva-vit |

"The *Atharva* priest creates horrors, and he also allays alarming occurrences; he protects the sacrifice, of which *Angiras* is the lord. He who is skilled in the *Brahma-veda* (the *Atharva*) can allay manifold portents, celestial, aerial, and terrestrial; wherefore the *Bhṛigu* [is to be placed] on the right hand. It is the *brahman*, and not the *adhvaryu*, the *chhandoga*, or the *bahvricha*, who can allay [portents]; the *brahman* wards off *Rakshases*, wherefore the *brahman* is he who knows the *Atharvan*."

I subjoin another extract from Professor Weber's *Indische Studien*, i. 63 ff., which illustrates the relation of the *Sāma-veda* to the *Rig-veda*,⁶⁰ as well as the mutual hostility of the different schools: "To understand the relation of the *Sāma-veda* to the *Rig-veda*, we have only to form to ourselves a clear and distinct idea of the manner in which these hymns in general arose, how they were then carried to a distance by those tribes which emigrated onward, and how they were by them regarded as sacred, whilst in their original home, they were either—as living in the immediate consciousness of the people—subjected to modifications corresponding to the lapse of time, or made way for new hymns by which they were pushed aside, and so became forgotten. It is a foreign country which first surrounds familiar things with a sacred charm; emigrants continue to occupy their ancient men-

⁶⁰ See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 202 f.

tal position, preserving what is old with painful exactness, while at home life opens out for itself new paths. New emigrants follow those who had first left their home, and unite with those who are already settlers in a new country. And now the old and the new hymns and usages are fused into one mass, and are faithfully, but uncritically, learned and imbibed by travelling pupils from different masters;—several stories in the *Bṛihad Āraṇyaka* are especially instructive on this point, see *Ind. Stud.* p. 83;—so that a varied intermixture arises. Others again, more learned, then strive to introduce arrangement, to bring together what is homogeneous, to separate what is distinct; and in this way theological intolerance springs up; without which the rigid formation of a text or a canon is impossible. The influence of courts on this process is not to be overlooked; as, for example, in the case of Janaka, King of Vidcha, who in *Yājñavalkya* had found his Homer. Anything approaching to a clear insight into the reciprocal relations of the different schools will in vain be sought either from the *Purānas* or the *Charaṇavyūha*, and can only be attained by comparing the teachers named in the different *Brāhmaṇas* and *Sūtras*, partly with each other and partly with the text of *Pāṇini* and the *gaṇapāṭha* and commentary connected therewith (for the correction of which a thorough examination of *Patanjali* would offer the only sufficient guarantee). For the rest, the relation between the S.V. and the R.V. is in a certain degree analogous to that between the White and the Black *Yajush*; and, as in the *Brāhmaṇa* of the former (the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*), we often find those teachers who are the representatives of the latter, mentioned with contempt, it cannot surprise us, if in the *Brāhmaṇa* of the *Sāma-veda*, the *Paingins* and *Kaushitakins* are similarly treated.”

It is sufficiently manifest from the preceding passages of the *Purānas* concerning the division and different *Sākhās* of the Vedas, that the traditions which they embody contain no information in regard to the composition of the hymns, and nothing tangible or authentic regarding the manner in which they were preserved, collected, or arranged. In fact, I have not adduced these passages for the purpose of elucidating those points, but to show the legendary character of the narratives, and their discrepancies in matters of detail. For an account of the *Sākhās* of the Vedas, the ancient schools of the *Brahmans*, and other matters of a similar nature, I must refer to the excellent work of Professor Müller,

the "History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature," pp. 119-132 and 364-388 and elsewhere.

SECT. VII.—*Reasonings of the Commentators on the Vedas, in support of the authority of the Vedas.*

I proceed now to adduce some extracts from the works of the more systematic authors who have treated of the origin and authority of the Vedas, I mean the commentators on these books themselves, and the authors and expositors of the aphorisms of several of the schools of Hindu philosophy.⁶¹ Whatever we may think of the premises from which these writers set out, or of the conclusions at which they arrive,

⁶¹ Although the authors of the different schools of Hindu philosophy (as we shall see) expressly defend (on grounds which vary according to the principles of the several systems) the authority of the Vedas, they do not consider themselves as at all bound to assert that the different portions of those works are all of equal value. nor do they treat their sacred scriptures as the exclusive sources out of which their own theology or philosophy are to be evolved. On the relation of Indian thinkers generally to the Vedas, I quote some remarks from an article of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1862, pp. 310 f. : "It is evident from some of the hymns of the Veda (see Müller's Hist. of Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 556 ff.) that theological speculation has been practised in India from a very early period. . . . As, therefore, the religious or mythological systems of India became developed, it was to be expected that they should exhibit numerous variations springing out of the particular genius of different writers; and more especially that, whenever the speculative element predominated in any author, he should give utterance to ideas on the origin of the world, and the nature and action of the Deity or deities, more or less opposed to those commonly received. In the stage here supposed, a fixed and authoritative system of belief or institutions had not yet been constructed, but was only in process of construction, and therefore considerable liberty of individual thought, expression, and action would be allowed; as is, indeed, also shown by the existence of different schools of Brāhmins, not merely attached to one or other of the particular Vedas, but even restricting their allegiance to some particular recension of one of the Vedas. Even after the Brahmanical system had been more firmly established, and its details more minutely prescribed, it is clear that the same strictness was not extended to speculation, but that if a Brāhmin was only an observer of the established ceremonial, and an assertor of the privileges of his own order, he might entertain and even profess almost any philosophical opinion which he pleased (Colebrooke, Misc. Ess. i. 379; Müller, Anc. Sansk. Lit. 79). In this way the tradition of free thought was preserved, and speculative principles of every character continued to be maintained and taught without hindrance or scandal. Meanwhile the authority of the Vedas had come to be generally regarded as paramount and divine, but so long as this authority was nominally acknowledged, independent thinkers were permitted to propound a variety of speculative principles, at variance with their general tenor, though perhaps not inconsistent with some isolated

we cannot fail to be struck with the contrast which their speculations exhibit to the loose and mystical ideas of the Purāṇas and Upanishads, or to admire the acuteness of their reasoning, the logical precision with which their arguments are presented, and the occasional liveliness and ingenuity of their illustrations.

I.—The first passage which I shall adduce is from Sāyaṇa's introduction to his commentary on the Rig-veda, the Vedārthaprakāśa, pp. 3 ff. (Sāyaṇa, as we have seen in the Second Volume of this work, p. 172, lived in the 14th century, A.D.):

Nanu Vedaḥ eva tavad nāsti | kutaḥ tad-avāntara-viśeṣaḥ ṛigvedaḥ | Tathā hi | ko 'yaṁ vedo nāma | na hi tatra lakṣaṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ vā 'sti | na cha tad-ubhaya-vyatirekeṇa kinchid vastu prasidhyati | Lakṣaṇa-pramāṇābhyāṁ hi vastu-siddhir iti nyāya-vidūṁ matam | "Pratyakṣānumānāgameshu pramāṇa-viśeṣeshv antimo Vedaḥ iti tallakṣaṇam" iti chet | na | Manv-ādi-smṛitishv ativyāpteh | Samaya-balena samyak parokṣānubhava-sādhanam ity otasya āgama-lakṣaṇasya tāsū api sabbhāvāt | "apauruṣheyatve sati iti viśeṣaṇād adoṣaḥ" iti chet | na | Vedasyāpi paramēśvara-nirmitatvena pauruṣheyatvāt | "Sarīra-dhāri-jīva-nirmitatvābhāvād apauruṣheyatvam" iti chet | [na] | "Sahasra-śīrṣhā puruṣaḥ" ityādi-śrutiḥ ṛiṣarasyāpi śarīritvāt | "Karma-phala-rūpa-śarīra-dhāri-jīva-nirmitatvābhāva-mātrena apauruṣheyatvaṁ vivakṣitam" iti chet | na | Jīva-viśeṣair Agni-Vāy-Ādityair vedānāṁ utpāditatvāt | "Rigvedaḥ eva Agner ajāyata Yajurvedo Vāyoḥ Sāmavedaḥ Ādityād" iti śruter ṛiṣarasya agny-ādi-prcrakatvena nirmātritvaṁ drashtavyam | "mantra-brāhmaṇātmakeḥ śabda-rūṣir vedaḥ" iti chet | na | Īdriṣo mantrāḥ | idṛiṣam brāhmaṇam ity anayor adyāpi anirṇātatvāt | Tasmād nāsti kinchid vedasya lakṣaṇam | Nāpi tat-sabbhāve pramāṇaṁ paśyāmaḥ | "Rigvedaṁ bhagavo 'dhyemi Yajurvedaṁ Sāmavedaṁ Ātharvaṇam chatuṛtham" ityādi vākyaṁ pramāṇaṁ" iti chet | na | tasyāpi vākyaṣya vedāntahpātītvena ātmāśrayatva-prasaṅgāt | Na khalu nipuṇo 'pi eva-skandham āroddhūṁ prabhaved iti | "Vedaḥ eva dvijātīnāṁ nīḥṣreyaśakaraḥ parak" iti ādi smṛiti-vākyaṁ pramāṇam" iti chet | na | tasyāpy ukta-śruti-mūlatvena nirākṛitatvāt | pratyakṣādīkaṁ śankitum apy ayo-

portions of their contents. It was only when the authority of the sacred books was not merely tacitly set aside or undermined, but openly discarded and denied, and the institutions founded on them were abandoned and assailed by the Buddhists, that the orthodox party took the alarm."

gyam | *Veda-vishayā loka-prasiddhiḥ sārva-janīnā 'pi "nīlām nabhaḥ" ityādi-vad bhrāntā* | *Tasmāl lakṣhaṇa-pramāṇa-rahitasya vedasya sadbhāvo na angīkarttuṃ śakyate iti pūrva-pakṣaḥ* |

Atra uchyate | mantra-brāhmaṇāt-makam tāvad aduṣṭam lakṣhaṇam | ata eva Āpastambo yajña-paribhāshāyām evāha "mantra-brāhmaṇayor veda-nūmadheyam" iti | tayos tu rūpam uparishṭhād nirneṣhyate | apauruṣheya-vākyatvam iti idam api yādriṣam asmābhir vivakṣhitam tādriṣam uttaratra spashṭībhaviṣhyati | pramāṇāny api yathoktāni śruti-smṛitiloka-prasiddhirūpāni veda-sadbhāvo drashṭavyāni | Yathā ghaṭa-paṭādi-dravyānām sva-prakāśatvādbhāve 'pi sūrya-chandrādīnām sva-prakāśatvam avirudham tathā manushyādīnām sva-skandhārohāsambhāve 'py akunṭhita-śakter vedasya itara-vaṣṭu-pratipādakatva-vat sva-pratipādakatvam apy astu | Ata eva sampradāya-vido 'kunṭhitām śaktim vedasya darsayanti "ohodanā hi bhūtam bhaviṣhyantaṃ sūkṣhmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṛiṣṭam ity evanjātiyam artham śaknoty avagamayitum" iti | Tathā sati veda-mūlāyāḥ smṛites tad-ubhaya-mūlāyāḥ loka-prasiddhes cha pramāṇyaṃ dūrvaram | Tasmāl lakṣhaṇa-pramāṇa-siddho vedo na kenāpi chārvākādīnā 'podhūṃ śakyate iti sthītam |

Nanv astu nāma Vedākhyaḥ kaśchit padārthaḥ | tathāpi nāsau vyākhyānam arhati apramāṇatvena anupayuktatvāt | Na hi Vedāḥ pramāṇam tal-lakṣhaṇasya tatra duḥsampādātāt | tathā hi "samyag anubhava-sādhanam pramāṇam" iti kechid lakṣhaṇam āhuḥ | aparo tu "anadhigatārtha-gaṅṭri pramāṇam" ity āchakṣate | na chaitad ubhayaṃ vedo sambhāvati | mantra-brāhmaṇāt-mako hi vedāḥ | tatra mantrāḥ kechid abodhakāḥ | "amyak sā te Indra riṣṭir" (R.V. i. 169, 3) ity eko mantraḥ | "Yādriṣmin dhāyi tam apasyayā vidad" (R.V. v. 44, 8) ity anyaḥ | "Sṛiṇyā iva jarbharī turpharītū" (R.V. x. 106, 6) ity aparāḥ | "Āpānta-manyus tripala-prabharmā" (R.V. x. 89, 5) ity ādayaḥ udāhāryāḥ | na hy etair mantraiḥ kaśchid apy artho 'vabudhyate | eteshv anubhavo eva yadā nāsti tadā tat-samyaktvaṃ tadīya-sādhanatvaṃ cha dūrāpetam | "Adhaḥ svid āsīd" (R.V. x. 129, 5) iti mantrasya bodhakatvo 'pi "sthāṇur vā puruṣho vā" ityādi-vākya-vat sandigdhārtha-bodhakatvād nāsti pramāṇyam | "Oshadhe trāyasva enam" (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti manthro darbhavishayaḥ | "Svadhite mā enam hiṃsīr" (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti kshuravishayaḥ | "Sṛinota grāvāṇaḥ" iti pāshāṇa-vishayaḥ | Eteshv aohetanūnām darbhavishaya-pāshāṇānām chetana-vat sambodhanam śrīyate | tato "dvaṃ chandramasāv" iti vākya-vad viparītārtha-bodhakatvād apramāṇ-

yam | “*Ekaḥ eva Rudro na dvitīyo ’vatasthe*” | “*sahasrūṇi sahasraśo ye Rudrāḥ adhi bhūmyām*”⁶² ity anayos tu mantrayor “*yārājīvam aham maunī*” ity vākya-vad vyāghāta-bodhakatvād aprāmānyam | “*Āpaḥ undantu*” (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) iti manthro yajamānasya kshaura-kāle jalena śirasāḥ kledanam brūte | “*S’ubhike śiraḥ ūroha śobhayanti mukham mama*” iti manthro vivāha-kāle mangalācharanārtham pushpa-nirmitūyāḥ śubhikāyāḥ vara-badhvoḥ śirasya avasthānam brūte | *tayoś cha mantrayor loka-prasiddhārthānūvāditvād anadhigatārtha-gantritraṃ, nāsti* | *tasmād mantra-bhāgo na pramāṇam* |

Atra uchyaate | “*Amyag*”-ādi-mantrānām artho Yāskena nirukta-granthe ’vabodhitāḥ | *tat-parichaya-rahitānām anavabodho na mantrānām doṣham ūvahati* | *Ata eva atra loka-nyāyam udāharanti* “*na esha sthāṇor aparūdho yaḍ enam andho na paśyati* | *purushāparādho sambhavati*” iti | “*Adhaḥ svid āsīd*” iti mantras cha na sandeha-prabodhanāya pravṛittāḥ kīmtarhi jagat-kāranasya para-vastuno ’tigambhīratvaṃ niśchetum eva pravṛittāḥ | *tad-artham eva hi guru-sāstra-sampradāya-rahitair durbo-dhyatvam “adhaḥ svid” ity anayā varho-bhāngyā upanyasyati* | *Sa eva abhiprāyaḥ uparitaneshu “ko addhā veda” (R.V. x. 129, 6) ity ādi-mantreshu spashṭikṛitāḥ* | “*Ośadhy*”-ādi mantreshv api chetanāḥ eva *tat-tād-abhimāni-devatās tena tena nāmnū sambodhyante* | *tās cha devatāḥ bhagavatū Bādārāyaṇena “abhimāni-vyapadeśas tu” iti sūtre sūtritāḥ* | *Ekasyāpi Rudrasya sva-mahimnū sahasra-mūrtti-svīkārād nāsti paras-param vyāghātaḥ* | *Jalādi-dravyeṇa śiraḥ-kledanāder loka-siddhatve ’pi tad-abhimāni-devatōnugrahasya aprasiddhatvāt tad-vishayatvena ajnātārtha-jñāpakatvam* | *tato lakṣhaṇa-sadbhāvād asti mantra-bhāgasya pramāṇyam* |

“But, some will say, there is no such thing as a Veda; how, then, can there be a Rig-veda, forming a particular part of it? For what is this Veda? It has no characteristic sign or evidence; and without these two conditions, nothing can be proved to exist. For logicians hold that ‘a thing is established by characteristic signs and by proof.’ If you answer that ‘of the three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and scripture, the Veda is the last, and that this is its sign;’ then the objectors rejoin that this is not true, for this sign extends too far, and includes also Manu’s and the other Smṛitis; since there exists in them

⁶² The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xvi. 53, has, *asankhyātā sahasrūṇi ye Rudrāḥ adhi bhūmyām* |

also this characteristic of Scripture, viz. that in virtue of common consent it is a perfect instrument for the discovery of what is invisible.' If you proceed, 'the Veda is faultless, in consequence of its characteristic that it has no person (*purusha*) for its author;' ⁶³ they again reply, 'Not so; for as the Veda likewise was formed by Parameśvara (God), it had a person (*purusha*) for its author.' If you rejoin, 'It had no person (*purusha*) for its author, for it was not made by any embodied living being;' [they refuse ⁶⁴ to admit this] on the ground that, according to such Vedic texts as 'Purusha has a thousand heads,' it is clear that Īśvara (God) also has a body. If you urge that *apauruṣheyatva* ('the having had no personal author') means that it was not composed by a living being endowed with a body which was the result of works;—the opponent denies this also, inasmuch as the Vedas were created by particular living beings—Agni (fire), Vāyu (wind), and Āditya (the sun); for from the text 'the Rig-veda sprang from Agni, the Yajur-veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya,' etc., it will be seen that Īśvara was the maker, by inciting Agni and the others. If you next say that the Veda is a collection of words in the form of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas, the objectors rejoin, 'Not so, for it has never yet been defined that a Mantra is so and so, and a Brāhmaṇa so and so.' There exists, therefore, no characteristic mark of a Veda. Nor do we see any proof that a Veda exists. If you say that the text, 'I peruse, reverend sir, the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, and the Ātharvaṇa as the fourth,' is a proof, the antagonist answers, 'No, for as that text is part of the Veda, the latter would be open to the objection of depending upon itself; for no one, be he ever so clever, can mount upon his own shoulders.' If you again urge that such texts of the Smṛiti as this, 'It is the Veda alone which is the source of blessedness to twice-born men, and transcendent,' are proofs, the objector rejoins, 'Not so; since these too must be rejected, as being founded on the same Veda.' The

⁶³ Or, the meaning of this may be, "If you urge that, as the Veda has no personal author, there is—in consequence of this peculiar characteristic—no flaw (in the proposed definition), etc."

⁶⁴ I have translated this, as if it there had been (which there is not) a negative particle *na* in the printed text, after the *iti chet*, as this seems to me to be necessary to the sense. I understand from Prof. Müller that the negative particle is found in some of the MSS. [I am, however, informed by Prof. Goldstücker that *na* is often omitted, though understood, after *iti chet*.]

evidence of the senses and other ordinary sources of knowledge ought not even to be doubted.⁶⁵ And common report in reference to the Veda, though universal, is erroneous, like such phrases as 'the blue sky,' etc. Wherefore, as the Veda is destitute of characteristic sign and proof, its existence cannot be admitted. Such is the first side of the question.

"To this we reply: The definition of the Veda, as a work composed of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, is unobjectionable. Hence Āpastamba says in the Yajñaparibhāṣā, 'the name of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa is Veda.' The nature of these two things will be settled hereafter.⁶⁶ The sense we attach to the expression 'consisting of sentences which had no personal author' will also be declared further on. Let the proofs which have been specified of the existence of the Veda, viz. the Veda (itself), the Smṛiti, and common notoriety, be duly weighed. Although jars, cloth, and other such [dark] objects have no inherent property of making themselves visible, it is no absurdity to speak of the sun, moon, and other luminous bodies, as shining by their own light. Just in the same way, though it is impossible for men or any other beings to mount on their own shoulders, let the Veda through the keenness of its power be held to have the power of proving itself, as it has of proving other things.⁶⁷ Hence traditionists set forth this penetrating force of the Veda; thus, 'Scripture is able to make known the past, the future, the minute, the distant, the remote.' Such being the case, the authority of the Smṛiti, which is based on the Veda, and that of common notoriety, which is based on both, is irresistible. Wherefore it stands fast that the Veda, which is

⁶⁵ The drift of this sentence does not seem to me clear. From what immediately follows it would rather appear that the evidence of the senses may be doubted. Can the passage be corrupt?

⁶⁶ See the First Volume of this work, pp. 2 ff. and the Second Volume, p. 172.

⁶⁷ The same thing had been said before by S'ankāra Achāryya (who lived at the end of the 8th or beginning of the 9th century, A.D. See Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. 332), in his commentary on the Brāhma Sūtras, ii. 1, 1: *Vedasya hi nirapekṣhaṁ svārthe prāmānyaṁ raver iva rūpa-vishaye | puruṣa-vachasām tu mūlāntarāpekṣhāṁ svārthe prāmānyaṁ vaktri-smṛiti-vyavahitāṁ cha iti viprakarṣhaḥ* | "For the Veda has an independent authority in respect of its own sense, as the sun has of manifesting forms. The words of men on the other hand, have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent upon another source [the Veda], and which is separated [from the authority of the Veda] by the fact of its author being remembered. Herein consists the distinction [between the two kinds of authority]."

established by characteristic sign, and by proof, cannot be overturned by the Chārvākas or any other opponents.

“But let it be admitted that there is a thing called a Veda. Still, the opponents say, it does not deserve explanation, being unsuited for it, since it does not constitute proof. The Veda, they urge, is no proof, as it is difficult to show that it has any sign of that character. Now, some define proof as the instrument of perfect apprehension; others say, it is that which arrives at what was not before ascertained. But neither of these definitions can be reasonably applied to the Veda. For the Veda consists of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa. Of these mantras some convey no meaning. Thus one is *amyak sā te Indra rishtir*, etc.; another is *yādṛiṣmin*, etc.; a third is *śrinyā iva*, etc. The texts *āpantu-manyuḥ*,⁶⁸ etc., and others may be adduced as further examples. Now no meaning whatever is to be perceived through these mantras; and when they do not even convey an idea at all, much less can they convey a perfect idea, or be instruments of apprehension. Even if the mantra *adhaḥ svid āsīd upari svid āsīd*, ‘was it below or above?’ (R.V. x. 129, 5) convey a meaning, still, like such sayings as ‘either a post or a man,’ it conveys a dubious meaning, and so possesses no authority. The mantra, ‘deliver him, o plant,’ has for its subject grass. Another, ‘do not hurt him, axe,’ has for its subject an axe (*kshura*). A third, ‘hear, stones,’ has for its subject stones. In these cases, grass, an axe, and stones, though insensible objects, are addressed in the Veda as if they were intelligent. Hence these passages have no authority, because, like the saying, ‘two moons,’ their import is absurd. So also the two texts, ‘there is one Rudra; no second has existed,’ and ‘the thousand Rudras who are over the earth,’ involving, as they do, a mutual contradiction (just as if one were to say, ‘I have been silent all my life’), cannot be authoritative. The mantra *āpaḥ undantu* expresses the wetting of the sacrificer’s head with water at the time of tonsure; while the text ‘*śubhike*,’ etc. (‘garland, mount on my head and decorate my face’) expresses the placing of a garland formed of flowers on the heads of the bridegroom and bride, by way of blessing, at the time of marriage. Now, as these two last texts merely repeat a matter of

⁶⁸ See Nirukta, v. 12, and vi. 15, and Roth’s Illustrations. It is not necessary for my purpose to inquire whether the charge of intelligibility brought against these different texts is just or not.

common notoriety, they cannot be said to attain to what was not before ascertained. Wherefore the Mantra portion of the Veda is destitute of authority.

“To this we reply, the meaning of these texts, ‘*amyāk,*’ and the others, has been explained by Yāska in the Nirukta.⁶⁹ The fact that they are not understood by persons ignorant of that explanation, does not prove any defect in the mantras. It is customary to quote here the popular maxim, ‘it is not the fault of the post that the blind man does not see it; the reasonable thing to say is that it is the man’s fault.’ The mantra ‘*adhaḥ svid,*’ etc. (‘was it above or below?’) (R.V. x. 129, 5) is not intended to convey doubt, but rather to signify the extreme profundity of the supreme Essence, the cause of the world. With this view the author intimates by this turn of expression the difficulty which persons who are not versed in the deep Scriptures have, in comprehending such subjects. The same intention is manifested in the following mantras *ko addhū veda,* etc. (R.V. x. 129, 6) (‘who knows?’ etc.) In the texts *oshadhe,* etc. (‘o herb,’ etc.), the deities who preside over these various objects are addressed by these several names. These deities are referred to by the venerable Bādarāyaṇa in the aphorism *abhimāni-vyapadeśaḥ.* As Rudra, though only one, assumes by his power a thousand forms, there is no contradiction between the different texts which relate to him. And though the moistening, etc., of the head by water, etc., is a matter of common notoriety, yet as the goodwill of the deities who preside over these objects is not generally known, the texts in question, by having this for their subject, are declaratory of what is unknown. Hence the Mantra portion of the Veda, being shown to have a characteristic mark, is authoritative.”

Sāyaṇa then, in p. 11 of his Preface, proceeds to extend his argument to the Brāhmaṇas. These are divisible into two parts, Precepts (*vidhi*), and Explanatory remarks (*arthavāda*). Precepts again are either (a) incitements to perform some act in which a man has not yet engaged (*aprarīta-pravarttanam*), such as are contained in the ceremonial sections (*Karma-kāṇḍa*); or (b) revelations of something previously unknown (*ajñāta-jñāpanam*), such as are found in the portions which treat of sacred knowledge or the supreme spirit (*Brahma-kāṇḍa*). Both these parts

⁶⁹ See the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1866, pp. 323, 329, 334, and 337.

are objected to as unauthoritative. The former is said (1) to enjoin things afterwards declared to be improper; and (2) to prescribe in some texts things which are prohibited in others. Thus in the Aitareya, Taittirīya, and other Brāhmaṇas, many injunctions given in other places are controverted in such phrases as, "This or that must not be regarded;" "This must not be done in that way" (*tat tad na ādṛityam | tat tathā na kāryyam*).⁷⁰ And again prescriptions are given which are mutually contradictory. Another objection is that no result, such as the attainment of paradise, is perceived to follow the celebration of a *jyotiṣṭoma* or other sacrifice; whilst satisfaction never fails to be experienced immediately after eating (*jyotiṣṭomādishv apy anuṣṭhānānantaram eva cha svargādi-phalaṁ na upalabhyate | na hi bhōjanānantaraṁ tripter anupalambho 'sti*). The answer given to the earlier of these objections is that the discrepant injunctions and prohibitions are respectively applicable to people belonging to different Śākhās or Vedic schools; just as things forbidden to a man in one state of life (*āśrama*) are permitted to one who is in another. It is thus the difference of persons which gives rise to the apparent opposition between the precepts (*tathā jarttilūdi-vidhir attra nindyamāno 'pi kvachit śākhāntare bhaved iti chet | bhavatu nāma | prāmānyam api tach-chhākhādhyāyinam prati bhavishyati | yathā grihasthāśrame nishiddham api parānna-bhōjanam āśramāntareshu prāmānikaṁ tad-vat | unena nyāyena sarvatra parasparaviruddhau vidhi-nishedhau puruṣa-bhedena vyavasthāpanīyau yathā mantreshu pāṭha-bhedaḥ*). In the same way, it is remarked, the different Śākhās adopt different readings in the mantras. As regards the objection raised to the authoritativeness of the revelations of things hitherto unknown, which are made in the *Brahma-kāṇḍa*, that they are mutually contradictory—as when the Aitareyins say, *Ātmā vai idam ekaḥ eva agre āsīt*, "This was in the beginning soul only;" whilst the Taittirīyakas on the other hand affirm, *asad vai idam agre āsīt*, "This was in the beginning non-existent;"—the answer is given that it is determined by a particular aphorism (which is quoted)⁷¹ that in the latter passage the word *asat* does not mean absolute vacuity or nothingness, but merely an

⁷⁰ Compare the quotation given above, p. 54, from the *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa*, iv. 1, 2, 19.

⁷¹ *Brahma Sūtra*, ii. 1, 7, appears to be intended; but the text of it as given by Śāyaṇa does not correspond with that in the *Bibliotheca Indica*.

undeveloped condition (. . . *iti sūtre Taittirīya-gata-vākyasya asach-ohhabdasya na śūnya-paratvaṃ kintu avyaktāvasthā-paratvam iti nīrṇātam* |).⁷² Sāyana accordingly concludes (p. 19 of his Preface) that the authority of the whole Veda is proved.

II.—The second passage which I shall quote is from the Vedārtha-prakāśa of Mādhava Āchāryya on the Taittirīya Yajur-veda (p. 1 ff. in the Bibliotheca Indica). Mādhava was the brother of Sāyana,⁷³ and flourished in the middle of the 14th century (Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 301):

Nanu ko 'yaṃ vedo nāma ke vā asya viśhaya-prayojana-sambandhādhi-kāriṇaḥ kathaṃ vā tasya prāmāṇyam | na khalv etasmin sarvasminn asati vedo vyākhyāna-yogyo bhavati | Atra uchyaते | Ishṭa-prūpti-anishṭa-parihārayor alaukikam upāyaṃ yo grantho vedayati sa vedaḥ | Alaukika-pādēna pratyakshānumāne vyāvartyete | Anubhūyamānasya sraak-chandāna-vanītādēr ishṭa-prūpti-hetutvam aushadhā-sevāder anishṭa-parihāra-hotutvaṃ cha pratyaksha-siddham | Svenūnubhavishyamānasya purushāntara-gatasya cha lathātvaṃ anumāna-gamyam | "Evaṃ tarhi bhāvi-janma-gata-sukhādīkam anumāna-gamyam" iti chot | na | tad-viśeshasya anavagamāt | Na khalv jyotishṭomādir ishṭa-prūpti-hetuḥ kalanja-bhākshana-varjanādir anishṭa-parihāra-hetur ity amum artham veda-vyatirekeṇa anumāna-sahasrenāpi tūrkika-śiromanir apy asyāvaganṭuṃ saknoti | Tasmād alaukiko-pāya-bodhako vedaḥ iti lakṣhanasya na ativyūptaṃ | ata evoktam | "Pratyakshenānumitīyā vā yas tūpāyo na budhyate | Etaṃ vindanti vedena tasmād vedasya vedatā" iti | sa eva upāyo vedasya viśhayaḥ | tad-bodhaḥ eva prayojanam | tad-bodhārthi cha adhikāri | tena saha upakāryyopakā-raka-bhāvāḥ sambandhaḥ | nanu "evaṃ sati strī-śūdra-sahitūḥ sarve vedā-dhikāriṇaḥ syur 'ishṭam me syād anishṭam mā bhūd' iti ūśishāḥ sūrva-janīnatvāt" | maivam | strī-śūdrayoḥ saty upāye bodhārthitve hetv-untareṇa vedādhikārasya pratibaddhatvāt | upanītasya eva adhyayanādhikāram

⁷² Compare with this the passages quoted from the Śatapatha and Taittirīya Brāhmaṇas in the First Volume of this work, pp. 19 f., 24 f., 27 f., and from the Taitt. Saṃh. and Brāh. in pp. 52 and 63; and see also the texts referred to and commented upon in the Journ. of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1864, p. 72, and in the No. for 1865, pp. 345-348

⁷³ Whether either of these two brothers, who were ministers of state, were the actual writers of the works which bear their names, or whether the works were composed by Pundits patronized by the two statesmen, and called after the names of their patrons, is a point which I need not attempt to decide.

*bruvat śāstram anupanītayoh strī-sūdrayor vedādhyayanam anishṭa-prāp-
ti-hetur iti bodhayati | katham tarhi tayos tad-upāyāvagamah | purānā-
dibhir iti brīmah | ata evoktam | “strī-sūdra-dvijabandhūnām trayi na
śruti-gc sharā | ‘ti Bhāratam ākhyānam muninā kṛipayā kṛitam” (Bhāg.
Pur. i. 4, 25) | iti | tasmād upanītair eva. traivarnīkair vedasya sam-
bandhaḥ | tat-prāmānyaṁ tu bodhakatvāt svataḥ eva siddham | pauru-
sheya-vākyaṁ tu bodhakam api sat puruṣa-gata-bhrānti-mūlatva-sam-
bhāvanayā tat-parihārāya mūla-pramāṇam apekshate na tu vedāḥ | tasya
nityatvena vaktrī-dosha-śaṅkānudayāt | . . . Nanu vedo ‘pi Kālidā-
sādi-vākya-vat paurusheyah eva Brahma-kāryyatva-śraṇāt | “rīchah
sāmāni jajnīre | chhāndāmīsi jajnīre tasmād yajus tasmād ajāyata” iti
śruteḥ | ata eva Bādarāyaṇah (i. 1, 3) “śūtra-yonitvād” iti sūtreṇa Brah-
maṇo veda-kāraṇatvam avochat | maivam | śruti-smṛitibhyāṁ nityatvā-
gamāt | “vāchā Virūpa nityayā” (R. V. viii. 64, 6) iti śruteḥ | “anādi-
nidhanā nityā vāg utśriṣṭū svayambhuvā” iti smṛiteḥ cha | Bādarā-
yaṇo ‘pi decatādīkaraṇe sūtrayāmāsa (i. 3, 29) “ata eva cha nityatvam”
iti | tarhi “paraspara-virodhaḥ” iti chot | na | nityatvasya vyavahāri-
katvāt | śriṣṭer ūrdhvaṁ saṁhārāt pūrvam vyavahāra-kūlas tasmin ut-
patti-rināsādarśanāt | kūlākāsādayo yathā nityāḥ evaṁ vedo ‘pi vyavahā-
ra-kūle Kālidāsādi-vākya-vat puruṣa-virachitatvābhāvād nityāḥ | ādi-
śriṣṭau tu kūlākāsādi-vad eva Brahmaṇah sakāsād vedotpattir ānā-
yate | ato vishaya-bhedād na paraspara-virodhaḥ | Brahmaṇo nirdoshat-
vena vedasya vaktrī-doshābhāvāt svatas-siddham prāmānyaṁ tad-avas-
tham | tasmād lakṣhaṇa-pramāṇa-sādbhāvād vishaya-prayojana-samban-
dhādīkāri-sādbhāvāt prāmānyasya sūthatvāch cha vedo vyākhyātaryah
eva |*

“Now, some may ask, what is this Veda, or what are its subject-matter, its use, its connection, or the persons who are competent to study it? and how is it authoritative? For, in the absence of all these conditions, the Veda does not deserve to be expounded. I reply: the book which makes known (*vedayati*) the supernatural (*lit.* non-secular) means of obtaining desirable objects, and getting rid of undesirable objects, is the Veda. By the employment of the word “supernatural,” [the ordinary means of information, viz.] perception and inference, are excluded. By perception it is established that such objects of sense, as garlands, sandal-wood, and women are causes of gratification, and that the use of medicines and so forth is the means of getting rid

of what is undesirable. And we ascertain by inference that we shall in future experience, and that other men now experience, the same results (from these same causes). If it be asked whether, then, the happiness, etc., of a future birth be not in the same way ascertainable by inference, I reply that it is not, because we cannot discover its specific character. Not even the most brilliant ornament of the logical school could, by a thousand inferences, without the help of the Vedas, discover the truths that the *jyotishṭoma* and other sacrifices are the means of attaining happiness, and that abstinence from intoxicating drugs⁷⁴ is the means of removing what is undesirable. Thus it is not too wide a definition of the Veda to say that it is that which indicates supernatural expedients. Hence, it has been said, 'men discover by the Veda those expedients which cannot be ascertained by perception or inference; and this is the characteristic feature of the Veda.' These expedients, then, form the subject of the Veda; [to teach] the knowledge of them is its use; the person who seeks that knowledge is the competent student; and the connection of the Veda with such a student is that of a benefactor with the individual who is to be benefitted.

"But, if such be the case, it may be said that all persons whatever, including women and Sūdras, must be competent students of the Veda, since the aspiration after good and the deprecation of evil are common to the whole of mankind. But it is not so. For though the expedient exists, and women and Sūdras are desirous to know it, they are debarred by another cause from being competent students of the Veda. The scripture (*śāstra*) which declares that those persons only who have been invested with the sacrificial cord are competent to read the Veda, intimates thereby that the same study would be a cause of unhappiness to women and Sūdras [who are not so invested]. How, then, are these two classes of persons to discover the means of future happiness? We answer, from the Purāṇas and other such works. Hence it has been said, 'since the triple Veda may not be heard by women, Sūdras, and degraded twice-born men, the Mahābhārata was, in his benevolence,

⁷⁴ *Kalanja-bhukshanam* is mentioned in the Commentary on the Bhūgavata Purāṇa, x. 33, 28. In his translation of the Kusumāñjali, p. 81, note, Professor Cowell says: "Some hold the *Kalanja* to be the flesh of a deer killed by a poisoned arrow—others hemp or bhang,—others a kind of garlic. See Raghunandana's *Ekādāsi tattva*."

composed by the Muni.'⁷⁵ The Veda, therefore, has only a relation to men of the three superior classes who have obtained investiture.

"Then the authority of the Veda is self-evident, from the fact of its communicating knowledge. For though the words of men also communicate knowledge, still, as they must be conceived to participate in the fallibility of their authors, they require some primary authority to remedy that fallibility. But such is not the case with the Veda; for as that had no beginning, it is impossible to suspect any defect in the utterer. . . .

"A doubt may, however, be raised whether the Veda is not, like the sentences of Kālidāsa and others, derived from a personal being,⁷⁶ as it proclaims itself to have been formed by Brahmā, according to the text, 'the Rich and Sāman verses, the metres, sprang from him; from him the Yajush was produced;' ⁷⁷ in consequence of which Bādarāyaṇa, in the aphorism ⁷⁸ 'since he is the source of the śāstra,' has pronounced that Brahma is the cause of the Veda. But this doubt is groundless; for the eternity of the Veda has been declared both by itself, in the text, 'with an eternal voice, o Virūpa,'⁷⁹ and by the Smṛiti in the verse 'an eternal voice, without beginning or end, was uttered by the Self-existent.'⁸⁰ Bādarāyaṇa, too, in his section on the deities (Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 29) has this aphorism; 'hence also [its] eternity [is to be maintained].' If it be objected that these statements of his are mutually conflicting, I answer, No. For [in the passages where] the word eternity is applied to the Vedas, it is to be understood as referring to the period of action [or mundane existence]. This period is that which commences with the creation, and lasts till the destruction of the universe, since, during this interval, no worlds are seen to

⁷⁵ See the quotation from the Bhāgavata Purāna, above, p. 42.

⁷⁶ This seems to be the only way to translate *paurusheya*, as *purusha* cannot here mean a human being.

⁷⁷ R.V. x. 90, 9, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 10; and p. 3, above.

⁷⁸ Brahma Sūtras, i. 1, 3, p. 7 of Dr. Ballantyne's Aphorisms of the Vedānta.

⁷⁹ These words are part of Rig-veda, viii. 64, 6: *Tasmai nūnam abhidyāvo : vechā Virūpa nityayā | vṛishṇe chodusva susṅtutam |* "Send forth praises to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, o Virūpa, with an unceasing voice [or hymn]." The word *nityayā* seems to mean nothing more than "continual," though in the text I have rendered it "eternal," as the author's reasoning requires. Colebrooke (Misc. Ess. i. 306), however, translates it by "perpetual." I shall again quote and illustrate this verse further on.

⁸⁰ This line, from the M.Bh. S'āntip. 8533, has already been cited above, in p. 16.

originate, or to be destroyed. Just as time and æther (space) are eternal,⁸¹ so also is the Veda eternal, because, during the period of mundane existence, it has not been composed by any person, as the works of Kālidāsa and others have been.⁸² Nevertheless, the Veda, like time and æther, is recorded in Scripture to have originated from Brahma at the first creation. There is, therefore, no discrepancy between the two different sets of passages, as they refer to different points. And since Brahma is free from defect, the utterer of the Veda is consequently free from defect; and therefore a self-demonstrated authority resides in it. Seeing, therefore, that the Veda possess a characteristic mark, and is supported by proof, and that it has a subject, a use, a relation, and persons competent for its study, and, moreover, that its authority is established, it follows that it ought to be interpreted.”

SECT. VIII.—*Arguments of the Mimāṃsakas and Vedāntins in support of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.*

I shall now proceed to adduce some of the reasonings by which the authors of the Pūrva Mimāṃsā, and Vedānta, aphorisms, and their commentators, defend the doctrine which, as we have already seen, is held by some of the Indian writers, that the Vedas are eternal, as well as infallible.

I.—*Pūrva Mimāṃsā*.—I quote the following texts of the Pūrva Mimāṃsā which relate to this subject from Dr. Ballantyne's aphorisms of the Mimāṃsā, pp. 8 ff.⁸³ I do not always follow the words of Dr. Ballantyne's translations, though I have made free use of their substance. (See also Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 306, or p. 195 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) The commentator introduces the subject in the following way :

⁸¹ Passages affirming both the eternity of the æther, and its creation, are given in the First Volume of this work, pp. 130 and 506.

⁸² The same subject is touched on by Sāyaṇa, at p. 20 of the introductory portion of his commentary on the Bigveda. The passage will be quoted at the end of the next section.”

⁸³ Since the 1st edition of this Volume was published, the Sanskrit scholar has obtained easy access to a more considerable portion of the Mimāṃsā Sūtras with the commentary of Śābara Svāmīn by the appearance of the first, second, and part of third, Adhyāyus in the Bibliotheca Indica.

S'abdārthayor utpatty-anantaram puruṣheṇa kalpita-sankotātmaka-sambandhasya kalpitatvāt puruṣa-kalpita-sambandha-jñānūpekṣitvāt śabdāsya yathā pratyakṣa-jñānaṁ śūktikūḍau satyatvam vyabhicharati tathā puruṣādhiṇatvena śabde 'pi satyatva-vyabhichāra-sambhavāt na dharme chodanā pramānam iti pūrva-pakṣe siddhāntam āha |

“Since, subsequently to the production of words and the things signified by them, a connection of a conventional character has been established between the two by the will of man, and since language is dependent upon a knowledge of this conventional connection determined by man, [it follows that] as perception is liable to error in respect of mother-of-pearl and similar objects [by mistaking them for silver, etc.], so words also may be exposed to the risk of conveying unreal notions from [their sense] being dependent on human will; and consequently that the Vedic precepts [which are expressed in such words, possessing a merely conventional and arbitrary meaning] cannot be authoritative in matters of duty. Such is an objection which may be urged, and in reply to which the author of the aphorisms declares the established doctrine.”

Then follows the fifth aphorism of the first chapter of the first book of the Mīmāṃsā: *Autpattikas tu^(a) śabdāsya^(b) arthena sambandhas^(c) tasya^(d) jñānam^(e) upadēśo^(f) vyatirekaś cā^(g) arthe 'nupalabdhe^(h) tat⁽ⁱ⁾ pramānam Bādarāyaṇasya anapekṣatvāt |* which may be paraphrased as follows: “The connection of a word with its sense is coeval with the origin of both. In consequence of this connection the words of the Veda convey a knowledge of duty, and impart unerring instruction in regard to matters imperceptible. Such Vedic injunctions constitute the proof of duty alleged by Bādarāyaṇa, author of the Vedānta Sūtras; for this proof is independent of perception and all other evidence.”

I subjoin most of the remarks of the scholiast as given by Dr. Ballantyne, indicating by letters the words of the aphorism to which they refer :

^(a) *Autpattikaḥ | svābhāvikaḥ | nityaḥ iti yāvāt |* “*Autpattika* (original) means natural, eternal in short.”

^(b) *S'abdāsya | nitya-veda-ghaṭaka-padaśya “agnihotraṁ juhuyūt svargakāmaḥ” ityādeḥ |* “*S'abda* (word) refers to terms which form part of the eternal Veda, such as, ‘the man who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice.’”

(c) *Sambandha* (connection), "in the nature of power," *i.e.* according to Dr. Ballantyne, depending on the divine will that such and such words should convey such and such meanings.

(d) *Atas tasya | dharmasya |* " 'Hence' is to be supplied before 'this,' which refers to 'duty.' "

(e) *Jñānam | atra karane lyuṭ | jñapter yathārtha-jñānasya karaṇam |* "In the word *jñāna* (knowledge) the affix *lyuṭ* has the force of 'instrument,' 'an instrument of correct knowledge.' "

(f) *Upadeśaḥ | artha-pratipādanam |* "Instruction, *i.e.* the establishment of a fact."

(g) *Aryatirekaḥ | avyabhichārī drīṣyate ataḥ |* " 'Unerring,' *i.e.* that which is seen not to deviate from the fact."

(h) *Nanu "vahnimān iti śabda-śravanānantaram' pratyakshena vahnim drīṣṭvā śabde pramātraṁ gṛhṇāti iti loke prasiddheḥ pratyakshādītara-pramāna-sāpekshatvāt śabdasya sa kathān dharme pramānam ata āha "anupalabdhe" iti | anupalabdhe pratyakshādi-pramānair ajnāte'rthe |* "Since it is a matter of notoriety that any one who has heard the words ' [the mountain is] fiery ' uttered, and afterwards sees the fire with his own eyes, is [only] then [thoroughly] convinced of the authority of the words, it may be asked how words which are thus dependent [for confirmation on] perception and other proofs, can themselves constitute the proof of duty? In reference to this, the word *anupalabdhe* ('in regard to matters imperceptible') is introduced. It signifies 'matters which cannot be known by perception and other such proofs.' "

(i) *Tat | vidhi-ghaṭita-vākyaṁ dharme pramānam Bādarāyaṇāchāryasya sammatam | ayam āśayaḥ | 'parvato vahnimān' iti doshavat-puruṣa-prayuktam vākyaṁ artham vyabhicharati | ataḥ pramānya-niśchaye pratyakshādikam apekshate | tathā 'gnihotraṁ juktō iti vākyaṁ kāla-traye 'py artham na vyabhicharati | ata itara-nirapekṣam dharme pramānam |* "This, *i.e.* a [Vedic] sentence consisting of an injunction, is regarded by Bādarāyaṇa also as proof of duty. The purport is this. The sentence, 'the mountain is fiery,' when uttered by a person defective [in his organ of vision], may deviate from the reality; it therefore requires the evidence of our senses, etc. to aid us in determining its sufficiency as proof. Whereas the Vedic sentence regarding the performance of the Agnihotra sacrifice can never deviate from the truth in any time, past, present, or future; and is therefore a proof of duty, independently of any other evidence."

The commentator then proceeds to observe as follows: *Pūrva-sūtre śabdārthayoḥ sambandho nityaḥ ity uktam | tach cha śabda-nityatvādhānam iti tat sisādhayishkur ādau śabdānityatva-vādi-matam pūrva-paksham upādayati |* "In the preceding aphorism it was declared that the connection of words and their meanings [or the things signified by them] is eternal. Desiring now to prove that this [eternity of connection] is dependent on the eternity of words [or sound], he begins by setting forth the first side of the question, viz. the doctrine of those who maintain that sound is not eternal."

This doctrine is accordingly declared in the six following aphorisms (*sūtras*), which I shall quote and paraphrase, without citing, in the original, the accompanying comments. These the reader will find in Dr. Ballantyne's work.

Sūtra 6.—Karma eke tatra darśanāt | "Some, *i.e.* the followers of the Nyāya philosophy, say that sound is a product, because we see that it is the result of effort, which it would not be if it were eternal."

Sūtra 7.—Asthānāt | "That it is not eternal, on account of its transitoriness, *i.e.* because after a moment it ceases to be perceived."

Sūtra 8.—Karoti-śabdāt | "Because, we employ in reference to it the expression 'making,' *i.e.* we speak of 'making' a sound."

Sūtra 9.—Sattvāntare yaugapadyāt | "Because it is perceived by different persons at once, and is consequently in immediate contact with the organs of sense of those both far and near, which it could not be if it were one and eternal."

Sūtra 10.—Prakṛiti-vikṛityoś cha | "Because sounds have both an original and a modified form; as *e.g.* in the case of *dadhi atra*, which is changed into *dadhy atra*, the original letter *i* being altered into *y* by the rules of permutation. Now, no substance which undergoes a change is eternal."

Sūtra 11.—Vṛiddhiś cha karṭri-bhāmā 'sya | "Because sound is augmented by the number of those who make it. Consequently the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas, who say that sound is merely manifested, and not created, by human effort, is wrong, since even a thousand manifesters do not increase the object which they manifest, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps."

These objections against the Mīmāṃsaka theory that sound is manifested, and not created, by those who utter it, are answered in the following *Sūtras*:

Sūtra 12.—*Samañ tu tatra darśanam* | “But, according to both schools, viz. that which holds sound to be created, and that which regards it as merely manifested, the perception of it is alike momentary. But of these two views, the theory of manifestation is shown in the next aphorism to be the correct one.”

Sūtra 13.—*Sataḥ param adarśanañ viśhayānūgamāt* | “The non-perception at any particular time, of sound, which, in reality, perpetually exists, arises from the fact that the utterer of sound has not come into contact with his object, *i.e.* sound. Sound is eternal, because we recognise the letter *k*, for instance, to be the same sound which we have always heard, and because it is the simplest method of accounting for the phenomenon to suppose that it is the same. The still atmosphere which interferes with the perception of sound, is removed by the conjunctions and disjunctions of air issuing from a speaker’s mouth, and thus sound (which always exists, though unperceived) becomes perceptible.⁶⁴ This is the reply to the objection of its ‘transitoriness’ (*Sūtra 7*).”

An answer to *Sūtra 8* is given in

Sūtra 14.—*Prayogasya param* | “The word ‘making’ sounds, merely means employing or uttering them.”

The objection made in *Sūtra 9* is answered in

Sūtra 15.—*Āditya-vaḍ yaugapadyam* | “One sound is simultaneously heard by different persons, just as one sun is seen by them at one and the same time. Sound, like the sun, is a vast, and not a minute object, and thus may be perceptible by different persons, though remote from one another.”

An answer to *Sūtra 10* is contained in

Sūtra 16.—*Varṇāntaram avikārah* | “The letter *y*, which is substituted for *i* in the instance referred to under *Sūtra 10*, is not a modification of *i*, but a distinct letter. Consequently sound is not modified.”

The 11th *Sūtra* is answered in

Sūtra 17.—*Nāda-ṛiddhiḥ parā*⁶⁵ | “It is an increase of ‘noise,’ not

⁶⁴ “Sound is unobserved, though existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air emitted from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound by their appulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the hollow of the ear; for want of such appulse, sound, though existent, is unapprehended).”—Colebrooke, i. 306.

⁶⁵ The text as given in the Bibliotheca Indica has *nāda-ṛiddhi-para*.

of sound, that is occasioned by a multitude of speakers. The word 'noise' refers to the 'conjunctions and disjunctions of the air' (mentioned under Sūtra 13) which enter simultaneously into the hearer's ear from different quarters; and it is of these that an increase takes place."

The next following Sūtras state the reasons which support the Mīmāṃsaka view :

Sūtra 18.—Nityas tu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt | "Sound must be eternal, because its utterance is fitted to convey a meaning to other persons. If it were not eternal [or abiding], it would not continue till the hearer had learned its sense, and thus he would not learn the sense, because the cause had ceased to exist."

Sūtra 19.—Sarvatra yaugapadyāt | "Sound is eternal, because it is in every case correctly and uniformly recognized by many persons simultaneously; and it is inconceivable that they should all at once fall into a mistake."

When the word *go* (cow) has been repeated ten times, the hearers will say that the word *go* has been ten times pronounced, not that ten words having the sound of *go* have been uttered; and this fact also is adduced as a proof of the eternity of sound in

Sūtra 20.—Sankhyābhāvāt | "Because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated."

Sūtra 21.—Anapekshatvāt | "Sound is eternal, because we have no ground for anticipating its destruction."

"But it may be urged that sound is a modification of air, since it arises from its conjunctions (see Sūtra 17), and because the Śikshā (or Vedāṅga treating of pronunciation) says that 'air arrives at the condition of sound;' and as it is thus produced from air, it cannot be eternal." A reply to this difficulty is given in

Sūtra 22.—Prakhyābhāvāch cha yogyasya | "Sound is not a modification of air, because, if it were, the organ of hearing would have no appropriate object which it could perceive. No modification of air (held by the Naiyāyikas to be tangible) could be perceived by the organ of hearing, which deals only with intangible sound."

Sūtra 23.—Linga-darśanāch cha | "And the eternity of sound is established by the argument discoverable in the Vedic text, 'with an eternal voice, o Virūpa.' (See above, p. 69.) Now, though this sentence had another object in view, it, nevertheless, declares the eternity of language, and hence sound is eternal."

“But though words, as well as the connection of word and sense, be eternal, it may be objected—as in the following aphorism—that a command conveyed in the form of a sentence is no proof of duty.”

Sūtra 24.—*Utpattau vā rachanāḥ syur arthasya a-tan-nimittatvāt* | “Though there be a natural connection between words and their meanings, the connection between sentences and their meanings is a factitious one, established by human will, from these meanings (of the sentences) not arising out of the meanings of the words. The connection of sentences with their meanings is not (like the connection of words with their meanings) one derived from inherent power (see *Sūtra 5*, remark ^(c), above, p. 72), but one devised by men; how, then, can this connection afford a sufficient authority for duty?”

An answer to this is given in

Sūtra 25.—*Tad-bhūtanām kriyārthena samūnnāyo 'rthasya tan-nimittatvāt* | “The various terms which occur in every Vedic precept are accompanied by a verb; and hence a perception (such as we had not before) of the sense of a sentence is derived from a collection of words containing a verb. A precept is not comprehended unless the individual words which make it up are understood; and the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is nothing else than the comprehension of the exact mutual relation of the meanings arising out of each word.”

Sūtra 26.—*Loke sanniyamāt prayoga-sannikarshah syāt* | “As in secular language the application of words is known, so also in the Veda they convey an understood sense, which has been handed down by tradition.”

The author now proceeds in the next following *Sūtras* to state and to obviate certain objections raised to his dogmas of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.

Sūtra 27.—*Vedāmś cha eke sannikarsham purushākhyāḥ* | “Some (the followers of the *Nyāya*) declare the Vedas to be of recent origin, *i.e.* not eternal, because the names of men are applied to certain parts of them, as the *Kāṭhaka* and *Kauthuma*.”

This *Sūtra*, with some of those which follow, is quoted in *Sāyana's* commentary on the *R.V.* vol. i. pp. 19 and 20. His explanation of the present *Sūtra* is as follows:

Yathā Raghavañśādayaḥ idānīntonās tathā vedāḥ api | na tu vedāḥ anādayaḥ | ataḥ eva veda-karṭṛitvena purushāḥ ākhyāyante | Vaiyāsikam

Bhārataṁ Vālmikīyaṁ Rāmāyaṇam ity atra yathā Bhāratādi-karṭṭritvena Vyāsādayaḥ ākhyāyante tathā Kāṭhakaṁ Kauthumaṁ Taittirīyakam ity evaṁ tat-tad-veda-śākhā-karṭṭritvena Kāṭhādīnāṁ ākhyātātvaṁ pauruṣheyāḥ | Nanu nityānāṁ eva vedānāṁ upādhyāya-vat sampradāya-pravarttakatvena Kāṭhakaḍi-sāmākhyaṁ syād ity āsankya yukty-antaraṁ sūtrayati | . . . kṁ tarhi Kāṭhakaḍy-ākhyāyikāyāḥ gatir ity āsankya sampradāya-pravarttanāt sā iyam upapadyate |

“Some say, that as the Raghuvāṁśa, etc., are modern, so also are the Vedas, and that the Vedas are not eternal. Accordingly, certain men are named as the authors of the Vedas. Just as in the case of the Mahābhārata, which is called Vaiyāsika (composed by Vyāsa), and the Rāmāyaṇa, which is called Vālmikīya (composed by Vālmiki), Vyāsa and Vālmiki are indicated as the authors of these poems; so, too, Kāṭha, Kuthumi, and Tittiri are shown to be the authors of those particular Śākhās of the Vedas which bear their names, viz. the Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, and Taittirīya; and consequently those parts of the Vedas are of human composition. After suggesting that the Vedas, though eternal, have received the name of Kāṭhaka, etc., because Kāṭha and others, as teachers, handed them down; he adduces another objection in the next Sūtra.”

The explanation here indicated is accepted a little further on, in the remarks on one of the following Sūtras: “What, then, is the fact in reference to the appellations Kāṭhaka, etc.? It is proved to have arisen from the circumstance that Kāṭha, etc., handed down the Vedas.” I proceed to

Sūtra 28.—Anitya-darśanāch cha | “It is also objected that the Vedas cannot be eternal, because we observe that persons, who are not eternal, but subject to birth and death, are mentioned in them. Thus it is said in the Veda ‘Babara Prāvahaṇi desired,’ ‘Kusuruvinḍa Auddālaki desired.’ Now, as the sentences of the Veda, in which they are mentioned, could not have existed before these persons were born, it is clear that these sentences had a beginning, and being thus non-eternal, they are proved to be of human composition” (‘Babaraḥ Prāvahaṇir akāmayata’ ‘Kusuruvinḍaḥ Auddālakir akāmayata’ ityādi (vākyaṇām?) vedeshu darśanāt teshāṁ janunāt prāg imāni vākyaṇi nāsann iti sādītvaḍ anityatvam pauruṣheyatvaṁ cha siddham).

These objections are answered in the following aphorisms :

Sūtra 29.—Uktaṁ tu śabda-pūrvatvam | “But the priority—eternity—of sound has been declared, and, by consequence, the eternity of the Veda.”

Sūtra 30.—Ākhyā pravachanāt | “The names, derived from those of particular men, attached to certain parts of the Vedas, were given on account of their studying these particular parts. Thus the portion read by Kaṭha was called *Kāṭhaka*, etc.”

Sūtra 31.—Parantu śruti-sāmānya-mātram | “And names occurring in the Veda, which appear to be those of men, are appellations common to other beings besides men.”

“Thus the words *Babara Prāvahaṇi* are not the names of a man, but have another meaning. For the particle *pra* denotes ‘pre-eminence,’ *vaḥana* means ‘the motion of sound,’ and the letter *i* represents the agent; consequently the word *prāvahaṇi* signifies that ‘which moves swiftly,’ and is applied to the wind, which is eternal. *Babara* again is a word imitating the sound of the wind. Thus there is not even a semblance of error in the assertion that the Veda is eternal” (*Yadyapi Babaraḥ Prāvahaṇir ity asti parantu śrutiḥ prāvahaṇy ādi-śabdah sāmānyam | anyārthusyāpi vāchakam | tathā hi | “pra” ity asya utkarshāśrayaḥ | “vahaṇaḥ” śabdasya gatiḥ | i-kāraḥ karttā | tathā cha utkrishṭagaty-āśrayo vāyu-paraḥ | sa cha anūdiḥ | Babaraḥ iti vāyu-śabdānukaraṇam | iti na anupapatti-gandho ’pi*).

Before proceeding to the 32nd Sūtra, I shall quote some further illustrations of the 31st, which are to be found in certain passages of the Introduction to Sāyana’s Commentary on the Rig-veda, where he is explaining another section of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras (i. 2, 39 ff.). The passages are as follows (p. 7):

Anitya-saṁyogaḥ mantrānarthakyaṁ | “*kiṁ te kṛṇvanti Kīkaṭeṣhv*” *iti mantrō Kīkaṭo nāma janapadaḥ āmnātāḥ | Tathā Naichaśūkaḥ nāma nagaram Pramagando nāma rājū ity ete ’rthāḥ anityāḥ āmnātāḥ | Tathā cha sati prāk Pramagandād na ayam mantrō bhūta-pūrvaḥ iti gamyate* | And in p. 10: *Yad apy uktam Pramagandādy-anityārtha-saṁyogād mantrasya anūditeaṁ na syād iti tatottaram sūtrayati* | “*Uktaś chānitya-saṁyogaḥ*” *iti | prathama-pāda-sya antimādhikarāṇe so ’yam anitya-saṁyoga-doshoh uktoḥ parihṛitaḥ | Tathā hi | tatra pūrva-pakṣe Vedānām pauruṣhyatvaṁ vaktuṁ Kuṭhakaṁ Kālupakam ity-ādi-puruṣa-sambandhābhīdhānaṁ ketūkritya “anitya-darśanūch cha” iti hetv-antaram*

sūtritam | “*Babaraḥ prāvāhaṇīr akāmayata*” *ity anityānām Babarādīnām arthānām darśanāt kṛtāḥ pūrvam asattvāt paurusheyo vedaḥ iti tasya uttarām sūtritam* “*paraṁ tu śruti-sāmānya-mātram*” *iti* | *tasya ayam arthaḥ* | *yat Kāṭhākādi-samākhyānāṁ tat pravachana-nimittam* | *yat tu param Babarūdy-anitya-darśanaṁ tat śabda-sāmānya-mātraṁ na tu tatra Babarākhyāḥ kaśchit puruṣo vivakṣitāḥ* | *kintu* “*babara*” *iti śabdaṁ kurvan vāyur abhidhīyate* | *sa cha prāvāhaṇīḥ* | *prakarshena vahana-śīlāḥ* | *Evam anyatrāpy ūhanīyam* |

“It is objected that the mantras are useless, because they are connected with temporal objects. Thus in the text, ‘what are thy cows doing among the Kikaṭas?’⁸⁶ a country called Kikaṭa is mentioned, as well as a city named Naicāśākha, and a king called Pramaganda, all of them non-eternal objects. Such being the case, it is clear that this text did not exist before Pramaganda.” The answer to this is given in p. 10: To the further objection that the mantras cannot be eternal, because such temporal objects as Pramaganda, etc., are referred to in them, an answer is given in the following Sūtra: ‘The connection with non-eternal objects has been already explained.’ In the last section of the first chapter, this very objection of the hymns being connected with non-eternal things has been stated and obviated (see above, Sūtras 28–31). For in the statement of objections, after it has first been suggested as a proof of the human origin of the Vedas, that they bear names, Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc., denoting their relation to men, a further difficulty is stated in a Sūtra, viz., that ‘it is noticed that non-eternal objects are mentioned in the Vedas;’ as, for example, where it is said that ‘Babara Prāvāhaṇī desired.’ Now, as it specifies non-eternal objects of this kind, the Veda, which could not have existed before those objects, must be of human composition. The answer to this is given in the aphorism, ‘any further names are to be understood as common to other things.’ The meaning is this: the names Kāṭhaka, etc., are given to the Vedas because they are expounded by Kāṭha, etc.; and the further difficulty arising from the names of Babara and other objects supposed to be non-eternal, is removed by such names being common to other objects [which are eternal in their nature]. No persons called Babara, etc., are intended by those names, but the wind, which makes the sound babara, is so designated. And prāvāhaṇī refers

⁸⁶ See the First Volume of this work, p. 342, and the Second Volume, p. 362.

to the same object, as it means that which carries swiftly. The same method of explanation is to be applied in other similar cases."

I proceed to the 32nd Sūtra. It is asked how the Veda can constitute proof of duty when it contains such incoherent nonsense as the following: "An old ox, in blanket and slippers, is standing at the door and singing benedictions. A Brāhman female, desirous of offspring, asks, 'Pray, o king, what is the meaning of intercourse on the day of the new moon?' or the following: 'the cows celebrated this sacrifice'" (*Nanu "Jaradgavo kambala-pādūkābhyāṃ dvāri sthito gāyati mangalāni⁶⁷ | tam brāhmaṇī prichhati puttra-kāmā rājann amāyāṃ labhanāsya ko'rthaḥ" | iti | "gāvo vai etat sattram āsatṣ" ity-ādīnām asambaddha-pralāpānāṃ vede sattvāt kathaṃ sa dharme' pramāṇam*). A reply is contained in

Sūtra 32.—Kṛite vā viniyogaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ sambandhāt | "The passages to which objection is taken may be applicable to the duty to be performed, from the relation in which they stand to the ceremony" (as eulogistic of it).

As a different reading and interpretation of this Sūtra are given by Sāyana in his commentary, p. 20, I shall quote it, and the remarks with which he introduces and follows it:

Nanu vede kvachid evaṃ śrūyate "vanaspatayaḥ satram āsata sarpāḥ satram āsata" iti | tatra vanaspatīnām achetanatvāt sarpānām chetanatve 'pi vidyā-rahitatvād na tad-anuśṭhānaṃ sambhavati | Ato "Jaradgavo gāyati madrakāni" ityādy-unmatta-bāla-vākya-sadṛśatvāt kenachit kṛito vedaḥ ity āsankya uttaraṃ sūtrayati | "Kṛite cha aviniyogaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ samatvāt" | Yadi jyotiḥśṭomādi-vākyaṃ kenaohit puruḣeṇa kriyeta tadānīm kṛite tasmin vākya svarga-sādhanatve jyotiḥśṭomasya viniyogaḥ na syāt | sādhyā-sādhana-bhāvāsyu puruḣeṇa jñātum āsakyatvāt | śrūyate tu viniyogaḥ | "jyotiḥśṭomena svarga-kāmo yajeta" iti | na cha etat unmatta-vākya-sadṛśaṃ laukika-vidhi-vākya-vaḍ bhāvya-karaṇeti-kartavyatā-rūpais tribhir aṃsair upetūyāḥ bhāvanūyāḥ avagamāt | loke hi "brāhmaṇān bhojayed" iti vidhav kiṃ kena katham ity ākāṅkṣhāyām

⁶⁷ In his commentary on the following aphorism S'abara Svāmin gives only a part of this quotation, consisting of the words *Jaradgavo gāyati mattakāni*, "An old ox sings senseless words;" and adds the remark: *kathaṃ nāma jaradgavo gāyēt*, "How, now, can an old ox sing?" We must not therefore with the late Dr. Ballantyno take *jaradgava* for a proper name.

triptim uddīśya odanena dravyeṇa sāka-sūpādi-pariveshaṇa-prakāreṇa iti yathā uchyate jyotishṭoma-vidhāv api svargam uddīśya somena dravyeṇa dikshaṇyādya-angopakāra-prakāreṇa ity ukte katham unmatta-vākya-sadrīśam bhaved iti | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyaṃ api na tat-sadrīśam tasya satra-karmano jyotishṭomādinā samatvāt | yat-paro hi śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ iti nyāya-vidāḥ āhuḥ | jyotishṭomādi-vākyaśya vidhāyakatvād anuśṭhāne tatparyam | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyaśya arthavādatvād praśaṃsāyām tātparyam | sū cha avidyamānenāpi karttuṃ śakyate | ahetanāḥ avidvāṃso 'pi satram anuśṭhitavantaḥ kim punaś chetanāḥ vidvāṃso brāhmaṇāḥ iti satra-stutiḥ |

“ But it will be objected that the Veda contains such sentences as this: ‘trees and serpents sat down at a sacrifice.’ Now, since trees are insensible, and serpents, though possessing sensibility, are destitute of knowledge, it is inconceivable that either the one or the other should celebrate such a ceremony. Hence, from its resembling the silly talk of madmen and children, as where it says, ‘An old ox sings songs (fit only for the Madras?)’ (see the Second Volume of this work, pp. 481 ff.), the Veda must have been composed by some man. The answer to this doubt is contained in the following Sūtra (which I can only render by a paraphrase): ‘If prescribed by mere human authority, no rite can have any efficacy; but such ceremonies as the jyotishṭoma rest on the authority of the Veda; and narrative texts such as that regarding the trees and serpents have the same intention as precepts, *i.e.* to recommend sacrifice.’ If the sentence enjoining the jyotishṭoma sacrifice had been composed by any man then, as the sentence was so composed, the sacrifice so enjoined would not have been applicable as a means of attaining paradise; for no man could know either the end, or the means of accomplishing it. But the application in question is prescribed in the Veda by the words ‘let him, who seeks paradise, sacrifice with the jyotishṭoma.’ Now this injunction does not resemble the talk of a madman, since we recognize in it, as in injunctions of a secular kind, the contemplation of the three characteristics of the action to be performed, *viz.* its end, means, and mode. For, as when a question is put in regard to the object for which, the instrument through which, and the manner in which the precept, ‘to feed Brahmans,’ is to be fulfilled, we are told that the object is to be their satisfaction, the instrumental substance boiled rice, and the manner, that it is to be served up with

vegetables and condiments;—in the same way, in the Vedic injunction regarding the jyotishṭoma, we are told that paradise is the object, that soma is the instrumental substance, and that the application of the introductory and other portions of the ritual is the manner. And when this is so, how can this precept be compared to the talk of a madman? Nor does the sentence regarding trees, etc., celebrating a sacrifice, admit of such a comparison, since the sacrifice in question is similar to the jyotishṭoma and other such rites. For logicians say that the meaning of a word is the sense which it is intended to intimate. The purport of the sentence regarding the jyotishṭoma, which is of a preceptive character, is to command performance. The object of the sentence regarding trees, etc., attending at a sacrifice, which is of a narrative character, is eulogy; and this can be offered even by a thing which has no real existence. The sacrifice is eulogized by saying that it was celebrated even by insensible trees and ignorant serpents: how much more, then, would it be celebrated by Brāhmins possessed both of sensation and knowledge!''

The following passage from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, a treatise containing a summary of the doctrines of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā of Jaimini, by Mādhava Āchāryya, the brother of Sāyana Āchāryya (see above, p. 66) repeats some of the same reasonings contradicting the idea that the Veda had any personal author (i. 1, 25, 26):

Paurusheyam na vā veda-vākyaṃ syāt paurusheyatā | Kāthakādi-samākhyanād vākyatrāch chōnya-vākya-vat | Samākhya 'dhyāpakatvena vākyatvōṃ tu parāhatam | Tatkartr-anupalambhena syāt tato 'paurusheyatā | Kāthakam Kauthumam Taittirīyakam ityādi samākhya tat-tad-veda-riskayā loke dṛishṭū | taddhita-pratyayas cha tena proktam ityasminn arthe varttate | tathā sati Gyāsenā proktam Vaiyāsikam Bhāratam ity-ādāv iva paurusheyatvam pratīyote | kincha | vimatām veda-vākyaṃ paurusheyam | vākyatrāt | Kālidāsādi-vākya-vad itī prāpte brūmah | adhyayana-sampradāya-pravarttakatvena samākhya upapadyate | Kālidāsādi-grantheshu tat-sargūrasāne kartārah upalabhyante | tathā vedasyāpi paurusheyatve tat-kartū upalabhyeta na cha upalabhyate | ato vākyatra-hetuḥ pratikūla-tarka-parāhataḥ | tasmād apaurusheyo vedaḥ | tathā sati purushu-buddhi-kṛitasya aprāmānyasya anāsankaniyatvād vidhi-vākyaṃ dharma-prāmānyam sushthilam |⁸⁵

⁸⁵ I have extracted this passage from Prof. Goldstücker's text of the Nyāya-mālā-

“[Verses] ‘Is the word of the Veda derived from a personal author or not? It must (some urge) be so derived, since (1) it bears the names of Kāṭhaka, etc., and (2) has the characters of a sentence, like other sentences. No (we reply); for (1) the names arose from particular persons being teachers of the Vedas, and (2) the objection that the Vedic precepts have the characters of common sentences is refuted by other considerations. The Veda can have no personal author, since it has never been perceived to have had a maker.’ [Comment] It is objected (1) that the names Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, Taittiriyaka, etc., are applied in common usage to the different Vedas; and the taddhita affix by which these appellations are formed, denotes ‘uttered by’ [Kaṭha, Kuthumi, and Tittiri] (comp. Pāṇini, iv. 3, 101). Such being the case, it is clear that these parts of the Vedas are derived from a personal author, like the Mahābhārata, which is styled Vaiyāsika, because it was uttered by Vyāsa, etc. And further (2), the sentences of the Veda, being subject to different interpretations, must have had a personal author, because they have the properties of a sentence, like the sentences of Kālidāsa, etc. To this we reply (1), the name applied to any Veda originates in the fact that the sage whose name it bears, was an agent in transmitting the study of that Veda. But (2) in the books of Kālidāsa and others, the authors are discoverable [from the notices] at the end of each section. Now if the Veda also were the composition of a personal author, the composer of it would, in like manner, be discoverable; but such is not the case. Hence, the objection that the Veda partakes of the nature of common sentences is refuted by opposing considerations. Consequently the Veda is not the work of a personal author. And such being the case, as we cannot suspect in it any fallibility occasioned by the defects of human reason, the preceptive texts of the Veda are demonstrated to be authoritative in questions of duty.”

II.—*Vedārtha-prakāśa*. The verses just quoted are repeated in the *Vedārtha-prakāśa* of Mādhava on the Taittirīya Saṁhitā (p. 26), with a various reading at the beginning of the third line, viz. “*samākhyānam pravachanāt*” instead of “*samākhyā dhyāpakatvena*.” The comment by which the verses are explained in the same work, is as follows:

Vālmikīyaṁ Vaiyāsikīyaṁ ityādi-samākhyānād Rōmāyaṇa-Bhāratā-
vistara; and I am indebted to the same eminent scholar for some assistance in my translation of it.

*dikaṁ yathā paurusheyāṁ tathā Kāṭhakaṁ Kauthumaṁ Taittirīyam ity-
ādi-samākhyanād vedaḥ paurusheyah | kincha veda-vākyaṁ paurusheyāṁ
vākyatvāt Kālidāsādi-vākya-vad iti chet | maivam | sampradāya-pravṛiti-
tyā samākhyaopapattēh | Vākyatva-hetus tv anupalabdhi-viruddha-kālātya-
yāpadishṭah | Yathā Vyāsa-Vālmiki-prabhṛitayas tad-grantha-nirmāṇā-
vasare kaiśchid upalabdhaḥ anyair apy avichhinna - sampradāyena upa-
labhyante | na tathā veda-karttā puruṣaḥ kaiśchid upalabdhaḥ | prat-
yuta vedasya nityatvaṁ śruti-smṛitibhyām pūrvam udāhṛitam | Para-
māhā tu veda-karttā 'pi na laukika-puruṣaḥ | tasmāt karttṛi-doshā-
bhāvād nāsty aprāmānya-sankū |*

“It may be said (1) that as the Rāmāyana, the Mahābhārata, and other such books, are regarded as the works of personal authors from the epithets Vālmikiya (composed by Vālmiki), Vaiyāsikiya (composed by Vyāsa), etc., which they bear, so too the Veda must have had a similar origin, since it is called by the appellations of Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, Taittirīya, etc.; and further (2), that the sentences of the Veda must have had this origin, because they possess the properties of a common sentence, like those of Kālidāsa and others. But these objections are unfounded, for (1) the appellations of those parts of the Veda are derived from the sages who were agents in transmitting the study of them; and (2) the objection about the Veda having the properties of a common sentence is opposed to the fact that no author was ever perceived, and so proceeds upon an erroneous generalization.⁶⁹ For though Vyāsa and Vālmiki, etc., when employed in the composition of their respective works, were perceived by some persons to be so en-

⁶⁹ This phrase thus translated (*kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*) is a technical term in the Nyāya philosophy, denoting one of the *hetu-abhāsas*, or “mere semblances of reasons,” and is thus defined in the Nyāya-sūtras, i. 49, *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭah kālātītaḥ*, which Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Nyāya, p. 42) thus explains: “That [semblance of a reason] is mis-timed, which is adduced when the time is not [that when it might have availed]. [For example, suppose one argues that] fire does not contain heat, because it is factitious, [his argument is mis-timed if we have already ascertained by the superior evidence of the senses that fire does contain heat].” It does not, however, appear, how the essential validity of an argument can depend at all on the time when it is adduced, as, is justly observed by Professor Goldstücker, who has favoured me with his opinion on the sense of the phrase. After consulting the commentary of Vātsyāyana in loco, he thinks the aphorism (which is not very distinctly explained by the commentators) must denote the erroneous transference of a conclusion deduced from the phenomena happening at one “time,” i.e. belonging to one class of cases, to another class which does not exhibit, or only apparently exhibits, the same phenomena; in short, a vicious generalization.

gaged, and are known by others also [in after ages] to be the authors, from the existence of an unbroken tradition to that effect;—no human author of the Veda has ever been perceived. On the contrary, we have formerly shown that the eternity of the Veda is declared both by itself and by the Smṛiti. And even if the Supreme Spirit be the maker of it, still he is not a mundane person; and consequently, as no defect exists in the maker, there is no reason to suspect fallibility in his work.”

No notice has been taken by these commentators of an objection which might have been raised to the validity of this reasoning, viz. that the hymns of the R̥ich and other Vedas are all set down in the Anukramaṇīs, or indices to those works, as being uttered by particular rishis; the rishis being, in fact, there defined as those whose words the hymns were—*yasya vākyaṃ sa rishiḥ*.⁹⁰ (See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 26, or p. 12 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) Though, however, this objection has not been alluded to in any of the preceding passages, an answer has been provided to it in the well-known assertion of the orthodox Indian writers that the rishis did not compose, but only saw and afterwarūs repeated the hymns and other parts of the Vedas, which had in reality pre-existed from eternity.

Thus, in the Vedārtha-prakāsa on the Taittiriya Sanhitā, p. 11, it is said: *Atindriyārtha-draśtūrah̥ ṛishayah̥ | Teshāṃ veda-draśṭritvaṃ smaryate | Yugānte 'ntarhitān*⁹¹ *Vedān setihāsān maharshayah̥ | Lebhire tapasā pūrvam anujātāḥ svayambhuvā |* (Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, verse 7660. See above, p. 49.) “The rishis were seers of things beyond the reach of the bodily senses. The fact of their seeing the Vedas is recorded in the Smṛiti: ‘The great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, formerly obtained, through devotion, the Vedas and the Itihāsas which had disappeared at the end of the [preceding] Yuga.’”

So, too, Manu (as already quoted, Vol. I. p. 394) says, in similar, although more general language: *Prajāpatir idam̥ sāstraṃ tapasaivā-srijāt prabhuh̥ | Tathaiva vedān ṛishayas tapasā pratipedire |* “Prajāpati created this Sāstra (the Institutes of Manu) by austere-fervour (*tapas*); and by the same means the rishis obtained the Vedas.”

⁹⁰ Some passages from the Nirukta on this subject will be quoted in a later part of this volume.

⁹¹ The text of the Biblioth. Ind. reads *tarhi tān*. I have followed the M. Bh., which evidently gives the true reading.

The following extract from the account of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā philosophy, given in the Sarva-darśana-sangraha of Mādhava Ācharyya (Bibliotheca Indica, pp. 127 ff.), contains a fuller summary of the controversy between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas respecting the grounds on which the authority of the Veda should be regarded as resting :

Syād etat | vedasya katham apaurusheyatvam abhidhīyate | tat-pratipādaka-pramāṇābhāvāt katham manyethāḥ apaurusheyāḥ vedāḥ | sampradāyāvichchhedo saty asmaryyamāna-karttrikatvād ātma-vaḍ iti | tad etad mandaṁ viśeṣhaṇāsiddheḥ | paurusheyā-veda-vādibhiḥ pralayo sampradāya-vichchhedasya kakṣhīkaraṇāt | kincha kim idam asmaryyamāna-karttrikatvaṁ nāma | apratīyamāna-karttrikatvam asmarāṇa-gochara-karttrikatvaṁ vū | na prathamāḥ kalpaḥ Paramesvarasya karttuḥ pramīter abhyupagamāt | na dvitīyo vikalpāsahatvāt | tathā hi | kim ekena asmarāṇam abhipreyato sarvair vū | na ādyaḥ | “yo dharmā-sīlo jīta-māna-roshaḥ” ityādīshu muktakoktīshu vyabhichārāt | na dvitīyaḥ | sarvāsmarāṇasya asarvajna-durjñānavāt |

Paurusheyatvo pramāṇa-sambhavāch cha veda-vākyaṇi paurusheyāṇi | vākyaṇvāt | Kālidāsādi-vākya-vaṇ | veda-vākyaṇi āpta-praṇītāṇi | pramāṇatvo sati vākyaṇvād Manv-ādi-vākya-vaḍ iti |

Nanu | “Vedasyādhyayanaṁ sarvaṁ gurv-adhyayana-pūrvakam | vedādhyayana-sāmānyād adhunā ’dhyayanaṁ yathā” | ity anumānam prati sādhanam pragalbhatv itī chet | tad api na pramāṇa-koṭim praveshṭum īshṭe | “Bhāratādhyayanaṁ sarvam gurv-adhyayana-pūrvakam | Bhāratādhyayanatvena sāmpratādhyayanaṁ yathā” itī ābhāsa-sāmāna-yoga-kshematvāt | nanu tatra Vyāsaḥ karttū itī smaryyato “ko hy anyāḥ Puṇḍarikākshāḍ Mahābhārata-kṛīḍ bhavet” ity-ādāv itī chet | tad asāram | “ṛichāḥ sāmāni jajnīre | chhandāmīsi jajnīre tasmād yajus tasmād ājyata” itī purushu-sūkte vedasya sa-karttrikatā-pratīpādanāt |

Kincha anityāḥ śabdāḥ sāmānyavattve sati asmaḍ-ādi-vāhyendriya-grāhyatvād ghaṭa-vaṇ | nanv idam anumānaṁ sa evāyaṁ ga-kārah ity pratyabhijñā-pramāṇa-pratīhatam itī chet | tad atī phalgu “lūna-punarjāta-keśa-dalīta-kund”-ādāv itī pratyabhijñāyāḥ sāmānya-vishayatvena bādhatvābhavāt |

*Nanv asarīrasya Paramesvarasya tālv-ādi-sthānābhāvena varṇochchō-
raṇāsambhavāt kathāṁ tat-praṇītatvaṁ vedasya syād itī chet | na tad
bhadraṁ svabhāvato ’sarīrasyāpi tasya bhaktānugrahārthaṁ tālv-vigraha-*

grahana-sambhavāt | tasmād vedasya apaurusheyatva-vācho yuktir na yuktā iti chet |

Tatra samādhānam abhidhīyate | Kim idam paurusheyatvaṁ sisādhayi-shitam | purushād utpannatva-mātram | yathā asmad-ādibhir ahar ahar uchchāryyamānasya vedasya | pramānāntarcṇa artham upalabhya tat-prakāsanāya rachitatvaṁ vā | yathā asmad-ādibhir iva nibadhyamānasya prabandhasya | prathame na vipratipattih | charame kim anumāna-balāt tat-sāadhanam āgama-balād vā | na ādyaḥ | Mūlati-mādhavādi-vākyeshu savyabhichāratvāt | atha pramānatve sati iti viśishyate iti chet | tad api na vipāśchito manasi vaiśadyam āpadyate | pramānāntarāgocharārtha-pratipādakaṁ hi vūkyam Veda-vākyaṁ | tat pramānāntara-gocharārtha-pratipādakam iti sādhyamāne “mama mātā bandhyā” iti vad vyāghātāpātāt | kincha Paramśvarasya līlā-vigraha-parigrahābhyupagame 'py atīndriyārtha-darśanaṁ na sanjāghaṭīti deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakriṣhṭārtha-grahanopāyābhāvāt | na cha tach-chakshur-ādikam eva tūdrīk-pratīti-jānana-kshamam iti mantavyam | drishṭānusāreṇaiva kalpanāyāḥ āsrayanīyatvāt | tad uktaṁ Gurubhiḥ sarvajña-nirākaraṇa-relāyām “yatrapy atīśayo drishṭaḥ sa svārthānatīlāghanāt | dūra-sūksmādi-drishṭau syād na rūpe śrotra-vṛttitā” iti | atah eva na āgama-balāt tat-sāadhanam |

“Tena proktam” iti Pāṇiny-anusāsane jāgraty api Kūṭhaka-Kālāpa-Taittirīyam ityādi-samākhya adhyayana-sampradāya-pravartitaka-vishaya-tvena upapadyate | tad vad atrāpi sampradāya-pravartitaka-vishaya-trenāpy upapadyate | na cha anumāna-balāt śabdasya anityatva-siddhiḥ | pratyabhijñā-irodhāt | . . .

Nav idam pratyabhijñānam gatvādi-jāti-vishayaṁ na gādi-vyakti-vishayaṁ tāsām prati-purusham bhedopalambhād | anyathā “Somusarmā 'dhīte” iti vibhāgo na syād iti chet | tad api sobhām na bibharti gādi-vyakti-bhede pramānābhāvena gatvādi-jāti-vishaya-kalpanāyām pramānābhavāt | Yathā gatvam ajānataḥ ekam eva bhinna-deśa-parimāṇa-sūstihūna-vyukty-upadhāna-vasād bhinna-deśum iva alpam iru mahat iva dirgham iva vāmanam iva prathate tathā ga-vyaktim ajānataḥ ekū 'pi ryanjaka-bhedāt tat-tad-dharmānubandhinī pratibhāsat | eteva viruddha-dharmādhyāsād bheda-pratibhāsaḥ iti pratyuktam | tatra kiṁ svābhūtriko viruddha-dharmādhyāso bheda-sādhakatvena alkimutāḥ prātītiko vā | prathame asiddhiḥ | aparatkā svābhūtrika-bheda-bhūtrikāpagame daśa ga-kūrān udachārayat Chaitra iti pratipattih syād na tu dusa-

kṛitvo ga-kāraḥ iti | dvitīye tu na svābhāvika-bheda-siddhiḥ | na hi paropādhi-bhedena svābhāvikam aikyaṁ vihanyate | mā bhūd nabhaso 'pi kumbhādy-upādhi-bhedāt svābhāviko bhedaḥ | . . . tad uktam āchāryayaiḥ | 'prayojanaṁ tu yaj jātes tad varṇād eva labhyate | vyakti-labhyaṁ tu nādebhyaḥ iti gatvādi-dhīr vṛithā" iti | tathā cha "pratyabhijñā yadā śabdo jāgartti niravagrahā | anityatvānumānāni saiva sarvāṇi bādhatē" | . . . tatas̄ cha vedasya apauruṣheyatayā nirasta-samasta-sankū-kalankānkuratvena svataḥ siddhaṁ dharmo prāmāṇyam iti susthitam |

“Be it so. But how [the Naiyāyikas may ask] is the Veda alleged to be underived from any personal author? How can you regard the Vedas as being thus underived, when there is no evidence by which this character can be substantiated? The argument urged by you Mīmāṃsakas is, that while there is an unbroken tradition, still no author of the Veda is remembered, in the same way as [none is remembered] in the case of the soul (or self). But this argument is very weak, because the asserted characteristics [unbrokenness of tradition, etc.] are not proved; since those who maintain the personal origin [*i.e.* origin from a person] of the Veda, object that the tradition [regarding the Veda] was interrupted at the dissolution of the universe (*pralaya*).⁹² And further: what is meant by the assertion that no author of the Veda is remembered? Is it (1) that no author is believed? or (2) that no author is the object of recollection? The first alternative cannot be accepted, since it is acknowledged [by us] that God (*Paramēśvara*) is proved to be the author. Nor can the second alternative be admitted, as it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, *viz.* Is it meant (*a*) that no author of the Veda is recollected by some one person, or (*b*) by any person whatever? The former supposition breaks down, since it fails when tried by such detached stanzas as this, ‘he who is religious, and has overcome pride and anger,’ etc.⁹³ And the latter supposition is inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any person whatever.

⁹² This objection occurs in a passage of the *Kusumāñjali*, which I shall quote further on.

⁹³ I do not know from what work this verse is quoted, or what is its sequel. To prove anything in point, it must apparently go on to assert that such a saint as is here described remembers the author of the Veda, or at least has such superhuman faculties as would enable him to discover the author.

“ And moreover, [the Naiyāyikas proceed], the sentences of the Veda must have originated with a personal author, as proof exists that they had such an origin, since they have the character of sentences, like those of Kālidāsa and other writers. The sentences of the Veda have been composed by competent persons, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

“ But [ask the Mīmāṃsakas] may it not be assumed that, ‘ All study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil’s preceptor, since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character, which was the same in former times as now ;’⁹⁴ and that this inference has force to prove [that the Veda had no author or was eternal] ? Such reasoning [the Naiyāyikas answer] is of no force as proof, [for it might be urged, with an equal show of reason, that] ‘ All study of the Mahābhārata was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil’s preceptor, since the study of the Mahābhārata, from the mere fact of its being such, [must have had the same character in former times] as it has now ;’ and the advantage of such an argument is simply illusory. But the [Mīmāṃsakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases of the Veda and the Mahābhārata, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishṇu incarnate as] Vyāsa was the author of the latter,—according to such texts as this, ‘ Who else than Puṇḍarikāksha (the lotus-eyed Vishṇu) could be the maker of the Mahābhārata ?’ (see above, p. 39),—[whilst nothing of this sort is recorded in any Sāstra in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is powerless, since it is proved by these words of the Purushasūkta, ‘ From him sprang the Rich and Sāman verses and the metres, and from him the Yajush verses,’ (above, p. 3) that the Veda had a maker.

“ Further [proceed the Naiyāyikas] we must suppose that sound [on the eternity of which the eternity and uncreatedness of the Veda depend] is not eternal, since, while it has the properties belonging to a

⁹⁴ The purport of this verse is, that as every generation of students of the Veda must have been preceded by an earlier generation of teachers, and as there is no reason to assume any variation in this process by supposing that there ever had been any student who taught himself; we have thus a *regressus ad infinitum*, and must of necessity conclude that the Vedas had no author, but were eternal.

genus, it can, like a jar, be perceived by the external organs of beings such as ourselves. But [rejoin the Mīmāṃsakas], is not this inference of yours refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letter G [for example] as the same we have heard before? This argument [replies the Naiyāyika] is extremely weak, for the recognition in question having reference to a community of species,—as in the case of such words as ‘hairs cut and grown again, or of full-blown jasmine,’ etc.,—has no force to refute my assertion [that letters are not eternal].

“But [asks the Mīmāṃsaka] how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara (God), who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot be conceived to have pronounced the letters [of which it is composed]? This objection [answers the Naiyāyika] is not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet, by way of sport, assume a body, in order to shew kindness to his devoted worshippers. Consequently, the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive.

“I shall now [says the Mīmāṃsaka] clear up all these difficulties. What is meant by this *pauruṣeya* (‘derivation from a personal author’) which it is sought to prove? Is it (1) mere procession (*utpannatva*) from a person (*puruṣa*), like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, in the sense in which persons like ourselves compose a treatise? If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute. If the second sense be meant, I ask whether the Veda is proved [to be authoritative] in virtue (a) of its being founded on inference, or (b) of its being founded on supernatural information (*āgama-balāt*)? The former alternative (a) [*i.e.* that the Veda derives its authority from being founded on inference] cannot be correct, since this theory breaks down, if it be applied to the sentences of the Mālatī Mādhava or any other secular poem [which may contain inferences destitute of authority]. If, on the other hand, you say (b), that the contents of the Veda are distinguished from those of other books by having authority, this explanation also will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the word of the Veda is [defined to be] a word which proves things that are not

provable by any other evidence. Now if it could be established that this Vedic word did nothing more than prove things that are provable by other evidence, we should be involved in the same sort of contradiction as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even if we conceded that Parameśvara might in sport assume a body, it would not be conceivable that [in that case] he should perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature. Nor is it to be thought that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, since men can only attain to conceptions corresponding with what they have perceived. This is what has been said by the Guru (Prabhākara) when he refutes [this supposition of] an omniscient author: 'Whenever any object is perceived [by the organ of sight] in its most perfect exercise, such perception can only have reference to the vision of something very distant or very minute, since no organ can go beyond its own proper objects, as *e.g.* the ear can never become cognizant of form.' Hence the authority of the Veda does not arise in virtue of any supernatural information [acquired by the Deity in a corporeal shape].

"Without any contravention"⁹⁵ of the rule of Pāṇini (iv. 3, 101; see above, p. 83) that the grammatical affix with which the words Kāṭhaka, Kālāpa, and Taittirīya are formed, imparts to those derivatives the sense of 'uttered by' Kāṭha, Kālāpa, etc., it is established that the names first mentioned have reference [not to those parts of the Veda being composed by the sages in question, but] to the fact that these sages instituted the practice of studying those parts of the Veda. Here also these appellations ought to be understood in the same manner, as referring to the fact of those sages being the institutors of the study of the Veda; and we are not to think that the eternity of sound [or of the words of the Veda] is disproved by the force of any inference [to be drawn from those names], since this would be at variance with the recognition [of letters as the same we knew before] (see above, Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, i. 19 f., p. 75). . . .

"But [the Naiyāyikas will ask] does not the recognition [of G and other letters as the same we knew before] refer to them as belonging to the [same] species, and not as being the [same] individual letters, since, in fact, they are perceived to be different [as uttered by] each

⁹⁵ Literally "although the rule of Pāṇini be awake."

person,—for otherwise it would be impossible for us to make any distinction [between different readers, as when we say], ‘Somaśarman is reading?’ This objection, however, shines as little as its predecessors, and has been answered in this way, viz. that as there is no proof of any distinction of individuality between G’s, etc., there is no evidence that we ought to suppose any such thing as a species of G’s, etc. [*i.e.* of G’s and other letters each constituting a species]. Just as to the man who is ignorant that G’s constitute a species, [that letter], though one only, becomes, through distinction of place, magnitude, form, individuality, and position, variously modified as distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, or as short, in the same way, to the man who is ignorant of an individuality of G’s, [*i.e.* of G’s being numerically different from each other], this letter, though only one, appears, from the distinction existing between the different persons who utter it, to be connected with their respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way erroneously ascribed [to the letter G], there is a fallacious appearance of distinctness [between different G’s]. But does this ascription of contrary characters which is thus regarded as creating a difference [between G’s] result from (1) the nature of the thing, or (2) from mere appearance? There is no proof of the first alternative, as otherwise an inherent difference being admitted between different G’s, it would be established that Chaitra had uttered ten (different] G’s, and not [the same] G ten times. But on the second supposition, there is no proof of any inherent distinction [between G’s]; for inherent oneness (or identity) is not destroyed by a difference of extrinsic disguises [or characteristics]. We must not conceive, from the merely apparent distinctness [occasioned by the separation of its parts] by jars, etc., that there is any inherent distinctness in the atmosphere itself. . . . It has been said by the Āchāryya ‘The object which the Naiyāyikas seek, by supposing a species, is in fact gained from the letter itself; and the object at which they aim by supposing an individuality in letters, is attained from audible sounds (*i.e.* the separate utterances of the different letters), so that the hypothesis of species, etc., is useless.’ And he thus reaches the conclusion that, ‘since, in respect of sounds (letters), recognition has so irresistible a power, [literally, wakes, unrestrained], it alone repels all inferences against the eternity [of sound, or the Veda].’ After some further

argumentation the Mīmānsaka arrives at the conclusion that "as every imputation of doubt which has germinated has been set aside by the underived character of the Veda, its authority in matters of duty is shewn to be self-evident."

I shall not attempt to carry further my translation of this abstruse discussion, as the remainder of it contains much which I should find great difficulty in comprehending.⁹⁶

[Although not directly connected with the subject in hand, the following passage from S'ankara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, iii. 2, 40,⁹⁷ will throw some further light on the doctrines of the Mīmānsā. In the two preceding Sūtras, as explained by S'ankara, it had been asserted, both on grounds of reason and on the authority of the Veda, that God is the author of rewards. In the 40th Sūtra a different doctrine is ascribed to Jaimini :

Dharmañ Jaiminir atah eva | Jaiminis tv āchāryyo dharmam phalasya dātāram manyate | ata eva hetoḥ śruter upapattēś cha | śrūyate tūvad ayam arthaḥ "svarga-kāmo yajeta" ity evam ādishu vālyeshu | tatra cha vidhi-śruter viśhaya-bhāvopagamād yāgaḥ svargasya utpādakah iti gamyate | anyathā hy ananushthātriko yāgaḥ āpadyeta tatra asya upadeśasya vaiyarthyañ syāt | nanv anukshana-vināśinah karmanah phalañ na upadyate iti parityakto 'yam pakshaḥ | na esha doshaḥ śruti-prāmānyāt | śrutiś chet pramānañ yathā 'yam karma-phala-sambandhaḥ śrutah upadyate tathā kalpayitar yaḥ | na cha anutpādyā kimapy apūrvāñ karma vinaśyat kālāntaritam phalañ dātuñ śuknoti ity atah karmaṇo vū sūksmā kāchid uttarāvasthā phalasya vū pūrvāvasthā apūrvāñ nūma asti iti tarkyate | upadyate cha ayam arthaḥ uktena prakāreṇa | Īśvaras tu phalañ dadāti ity unvpapannam avichitrasya kāraṇasya vichitra-kāryyānupapattēś vaiśhāmya-na'irghṛiṇya-prasangād anushthāna-vaiyarthyaḥ cha | tasmād dharmād eva phalam iti |

"Jaimini says that for this reason virtue [is the giver of reward].' The Āchāryya Jaimini regards virtue [*i.e.* the performance of the prescribed rites and duties] as the bestower of reward. 'For this reason,'

⁹⁶ In fact I have left out some pages of the translation which I had given in the first edition, as well as the corresponding portion of the text. I am indebted to the kindness of Professor Goldstücker for various suggestions towards the improvement of my translation. But two of the passages on which he had favoured me with his opinion are, to my own apprehension, so obscure, that I have omitted them.

⁹⁷ It is partly quoted in Prof. Banerjea's work on Hindu Philosophy.

and because it is proved by the Veda. This is the purport of the Vedic text, 'Let the man who seeks paradise, sacrifice,' and others of the same kind. As from this Vedic injunction we must infer the existence of an object [to be sought after] it is concluded that sacrifice has the effect of producing heavenly bliss; for otherwise we should be involved in the absurdity of a sacrifice without a performer [since no one would care to sacrifice without an object], and thus the injunction would become fruitless. But may it not be said that it is not conceivable that any fruit should result from a ceremony which perishes every moment, so that this view must be abandoned? No, this defect does not attach to our Mīmāṃsaka statement, since the Veda is authoritative. If the Veda be authority, this connection of the reward with the ceremony must be supposed to exist just as is proved by the Veda. But as a ceremony which perishes without generating any unseen virtue, cannot produce a reward at a distant time, it must be concluded that there is either a certain subtle ulterior form of the ceremony, or a certain subtle anterior form of the reward, which is called 'unseen virtue.' And this result is established in the manner before mentioned. But it is not proved that God bestows rewards, because it is inconceivable that a uniform Cause [such as He is] should produce various effects, and because the performance of ceremonies would be useless, owing to the partiality and unmercifulness which would attach [to the supposed arbiter of men's deserts]. Hence it is from virtue alone that reward results."

How far this passage may be sufficient to prove the atheism of the Mīmāṃsā, I will not attempt to say. Before we could decide on such a question, the other Sūtras of that school which refer to this question (if there be any such) would have to be consulted.

Professor Banerjea also quotes the following text from the popular work, the Vidvan-moda-taranginī, in which the Mīmāṃsakas are distinctly charged with atheism :

Devo na kaśchid bhuvanasya karttā bharttā na harttā 'pi cha kaśchid āste | karmānurūpāni subhāsubhāni prapnoti sarvo hi janah phalāni | vedasyā karttā na cha kaśchid āste nityāḥ hi śabdāḥ rachanā hi nityā | prāmānyam asmīn svataḥ eva siddham anādi-siddheḥ parataḥ katham tat |

"There is no God, maker of the world; nor has it any sustainer or destroyer; for every man obtains a recompence in conformity with his

works. Neither is there any maker of the Veda, for its words are eternal, and their arrangement is eternal. Its authoritativeness is self-demonstrated, for since it has been established from eternity, how can it be dependent upon anything but itself?"

I learn from Professor Banerjea that the Mīmāṃsaka commentator Prabhākara and his school treat the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as an atheistic system, while Kumārila makes it out to be theistic. In fact the latter author makes the following complaint at the commencement of his Vārttika, verse 10: *Prāyeṇaiva hi Mīmāṃsā loke lokāyatikṛitā | tām āstika-pathe karttum ayaṁ yatnaḥ kṛito mayā* | "For in practice the Mīmāṃsā has been for the most part converted into a Lokāyata⁹⁸ (atheistic) system; but I have made this effort to bring it into a theistic path." See also the lines which are quoted from the Padma Purāṇa by Vijnāna Bhikshu, commentator on the Sāṅkhya aphorisms, in a passage which I shall adduce further on.]

It appears from a passage in Patanjali's Mahābhāṣya, that that great grammarian was of opinion that, although the sense of the Veda is eternal, the order of the words has not continued uniform; and that it is from this order having been variously fixed by Kaṭha, Kalāpa, and other sages, that different portions of the Indian scriptures are called by their names.

The following passages from the Mahābhāṣya, and from the Commentaries of Kaiyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa thereon, are extracted from the fuller quotations given by Professor Goldstücker in pp. 147 f. of the Preface to his Mānava-kalpa-sūtra.

Patanjali: *Nanu cha uktaṁ "na hi chhandāmsi kriyante nityāni chhandāmsi" iti | yadyapy artho nityaḥ | yā tv asau varṇānupūrṇvī sā anityā tad-bhedāc cha etad bhavati Kāṭhakaṁ Kālāpakam Maudakam Puippalādakam ityādi . . .* | Kaiyaṭa: "*Nityāni*" iti | *karttur asmaranāt teshāṁ iti bhāvaḥ* | "*yā tv asāv*" iti | *mahāpralayādīshu varṇānupūrṇvīvinūṣe punar utpādya rishayaḥ saṁskārātīśayād vedārthaṁ smṛitvā śabdārachanāḥ vidadhāti ity arthaḥ* | "*tad-bhedād*" iti | *ānupūrṇvī-bhedād ity arthaḥ* | *tataś cha Kāṭhādūyo vedānupūrṇvyāḥ karttārāḥ eva ityādi* | Nāgojibhaṭṭa: *Añśena vedasya nityatvaṁ svīkṛitya añśena anityatvam āha "yadyapy arthaḥ" iti | anena vedutvam śabdārthobhu ya-vṛitti-dhva-nitvam | nanu "dhātā yathā pūrvam akalpayād" ityādi-śruti-balana*

⁹⁸ See Colcbrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 402 ff., or p. 259 ff. of Williams and Norgate's ed.

ānupūrvī api sū eva iti navya-pūrva-mīmāṃsā-siddhāntāt sū nityā iti ayuktam ata āha "mahāpralayādīshv" iti | ānupūrvyās tat-tat-kṣhaṇa-ghaṭitatvena anityatvam iti bhāvaḥ iti kechit | tan na | "yadyapy artho nityaḥ" ityādi-vākya-śeṣa-virodhāt | arthasyāpi jyotiṣṭomāder anityatvāt | pravāhāvichchedena nityatvam tu ubhayor api tasmād manvantara-bhedena ānupūrvī bhinnā eva "prati-manvantaram chaishā śrutir anyā vidhīyate" ity ukter ity anye | paro tu | "artho nityaḥ" ity atra kṛitakatva-virodhya-anityatvasya eva abhyupagamaḥ pūrva-pakṣiṇā tādrīśa-nityatvasya eva cchhandassu ukteḥ | evaṃ cha artha-śabdena atra īśvaraḥ | mukhyatayā tasya eva sarva-veda-tātparyya-vishayatvāt | "vedaiś cha sarvair aham eva vedyaḥ" iti Gitokter, ity āhūḥ | varṇānupūrvyāḥ anityatve mānam āha "tad-bhedāc cha" iti | anityatva-vyūpya-bhedena tat-siddhiḥ | bhedo 'tra nāpātavam | Īsvaro tu na nānātavam | bhede mānam vyavahāram āha | "Kāṭhaka" ityādi | arthaikyē 'py ānupūrvī-bhedād eva Kāṭhaka-kālāpakādi-vyavahāraḥ iti bhāvaḥ | atra ānupūrvī anityā ity ukteḥ padāni tāny eva iti dhvanitvam | tad āha "tataś cha Kāṭhodayaḥ" ityādi |

As Professor Goldstücker has only given (in p. 146 of his Preface) a translation of the above extract from Patanjali, and has left the passages from Kaiyyāṭa and Nāgōjibhaṭṭa untranslated, I shall give his version of the first, and my own rendering of the two last.

Patanjali: "Is it not said, however, that 'the Vedas are not made, but that they are permanent (i.e. eternal)?' (Quite so); yet though their sense is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same; and it is through the difference in this latter respect that we may speak of the versions of the Kāṭhas, Kalāpas, Mudakas, Pippalādakas, and so on." *Kaiyyāṭa on Patanjali*: "'Eternal;' by this word he means that they are so, because no maker of them is remembered. By the words, 'the order of their letters,' etc., it is meant that, the order of the letters being destroyed in the great dissolutions of the universe, etc., the rishis, when they are again created, recollecting, through their eminent science, the sense of the Veda, arrange the order of the words. By the phrase, 'through the difference of this,' is meant the difference of order. Consequently, Kāṭha and the other sages [to whom allusion was made] are the authors of the order of the Veda." *Nāgōjibhaṭṭa on Patanjali and Kaiyyāṭa*: "Admitting in part the eternity of the Veda, he, Patanjali, declares in

the words, 'though the sense is eternal,' etc., that it (the Veda) is also in part not eternal. By this clause it is implied that the character of the Veda as such is constituted both by the words and by the sense.⁹⁹ But is not the order also eternal, since it is a settled doctrine of the modern Mīmāṃsakas, on the strength of such Vedic texts as this, 'the creator made them as before,' etc., that the order also is the very same? No; this is incorrect, and in consequence, he (Kaiyyaṭa) says, 'in the great dissolutions,' etc. Some say the meaning of this is, that the order is not eternal, inasmuch as it is formed in particular moments. But this is wrong, because it is opposed to the conclusion of the sentence, 'though their sense is eternal,' etc., and because the objects signified also, such as the jyotishṭoma sacrifice, are not eternal. Others say that both the sense and the order of the words are eternal [or permanent], owing to the continuity of the tradition; and that, consequently, it is in different manvantaras that the order of the words is different, according to the text, 'in every manvantara this śruti (Veda) is made different.' Others again think that in the words, 'the sense is eternal,' etc., an admission is made by an objector of an eternity opposed to the idea of production, since it is only such a [qualified] eternity that is mentioned in the Veda; and that thus the word 'sense,' or 'object' (*arthah*), here refers to Īśvara, because he is the principal object which is had in view in the whole of the Veda, according to the words of the Bhagavad-gītā (xv. 15), 'It is I whom all the Vedas seek to know.' He next states the proof of the assertion that the order of the letters is not eternal, in the words, 'through the difference of this,' etc. The difference in the order is proved by the difference in the things included under the category of non-eternity. Difference here means variety. But in Īśvara (God), there is no variety. He declares current usage to be the proof of difference, in the words 'Kāṭhaka,' etc., which mean that, though the sense is the same, we use the distinctions of Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc., in consequence of the difference of arrangement. Here by saying that the order is not eternal, it is implied that the words are the same. And this is what is asserted in the words [of Kaiyyaṭa], 'consequently Kāṭha and the other sages,' etc.

⁹⁹ I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for a correction of my former rendering of this sentence, and of several others in this passage of Nāgajibhaṭṭa.

After quoting these passages at greater length than I have given them, Professor Goldstücker goes on to remark in his note: "I have quoted the full gloss of the three principal commentators, on this important Sūtra [of Pāṇini] and its Vārttikas, because it is of considerable interest in many respects. . . . We see Kaiyyāṭa and Nāgōjibhaṭṭa writhing under the difficulty of reconciling the eternity of the Veda with the differences of its various versions, which, nevertheless, maintain an equal claim to infallibility. Patanjali makes rather short work of this much vexed question; and unless it be allowed here to render his expression *varṇa* (which means 'letter'), 'word,' it is barely possible even to understand how he can save consistently the eternity or permanence of the 'sense' of the Veda. That the modern Mīmāṃsists maintain not only the 'eternity of the sense,' but also the 'permanence of the text,' which is tantamount to the exclusive right of one single version, we learn, amongst others, from Nāgōjibhaṭṭa. But as such a doctrine has its obvious dangers, it is not shared in by the old Mīmāṃsists, nor by Nāgoji, as he tells us himself. He and Kaiyyāṭa inform us therefore that, *amongst other* theories, there is one, according to which the order of the letters (or rather words) in the Vaidik texts got lost in the several Pralayas or destructions of the worlds; and since each manvantara had its own revelation, which differed only in the expression, not in the sense of, the Vaidik texts, the various versions known to these commentators represent these successive revelations, which were 'remembered,' through their 'excessive accomplishments,' by the Rishis, who in this manner produced, or rather reproduced, the texts current in their time, under the name of the versions of the Kāṭhas, Kalāpas, and so on. In this way each version had an equal claim to sanctity. There is a very interesting discussion on the same subject by Kumārila, in his *Mīmāṃsā-vārttika* (i. 3, 10)."

III. *The Vedānta*.—I proceed to adduce the reasonings by which Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the *Brahma*, *S'ārīraka*, or *Vedānta Sūtras*, as expounded by Śankara Āchāryya in his *S'ārīraka-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya*, or commentary on those Sūtras, defends the eternity and authority of the Veda. His views, as we shall see, are not by any means identical with those of Jaimini and his school. After discussing the question whether any persons but men of the three highest tribes are qualified for divine knowledge, the author of the Sūtras comes to the conclusion

that Sūdras, or persons of the fourth tribe, are incompetent, while beings superior to man, the gods, are competent¹⁰⁰ (Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 348, or p. 223 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) In Sūtra, i. 3, 26, the author determines that the gods have a desire for final emancipation, owing to the transitoriness of their glory, and a capacity for attaining it, because they possess the qualities of corporeality, etc.; and that there is no obstacle which prevents their acquiring divine knowledge. A difficulty, however, having been raised that the gods cannot be corporeal, because, if they were so, it is necessary to conceive that they would be corporeally present (as priests actually are) at the ceremonial of sacrifice, in which they are the objects of worship,—a supposition which would not consist with the usual course of such ceremonies, at which the gods are not seen to be corporeally present, and would, in fact, involve an impossibility, since Indra, for example, being but one, could not be corporeally present at numerous sacrifices at once;—this difficulty is solved (under Sūtra i. 3, 27) in two ways, either by supposing (1) that the gods assume different forms, and are present at many sacrifices at once, although invisible to mortals; or by considering (2) that, as a sacrifice is offered to (and not, by) a deity, many persons may present their oblations to that deity at once, just as one Brāhman may be saluted by many different persons at the same time. It is, therefore, concluded that the corporeal nature of the gods is not inconsistent with the practice of sacrifice. Having settled these points, Sankara comes to Sūtra i. 3, 28 :

“*S'abde iti chet | na | atah prabhavāt | pratyakshānumānābhyām*” |

Mā nāma vighrahavattve devādīnām abhyupagamyamāno karmani kās-chid virodhaḥ prasanjē | śabde tu virodhaḥ prasajyeta | katham | Aut-pattikāṃ hi śabdasya arthena sambandham āsṛitya “anapekshatvād” iti vedasya prāmānyaṃ sthāpitam | Idānīm tu vighrahavati devatā 'bhyupagamyamānā yadyapy aiśvarya-yogād yugapad aneka-karma-sambandhīni havīmshi bhujīta tathāpi vighraha-yogād āsmad-ādi-vaj janana-maranavati sū iti nityasya śabdasya anityena arthena nitya-sambandho prakṛiyamāne yad vaidike śabde prāmānyaṃ sthītam tasya virodhaḥ syād iti chet | na ayam apy asti virodhaḥ | kasmād “ataḥ prabhavāt” | Atah eva

¹⁰⁰ For a discussion of the different question whether the gods can practise the ceremonies prescribed in the Vedas, see the First Volume of this work, p. 365, note.

hi vaidikāt śabdād devādikāṃ jagat prabhavati | Nanu “janmādi asya yataḥ” (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2) iti brahma-prabhavatvaṃ jagato ’vadhā-ritāṃ katham iha śabda-prabhavatvam uchyate | Apiccha yadi nāma vai-
dikāt śabdād asya prabhavo ’bhyupagataḥ katham etāvata virodhaḥ śabde
parihṛitaḥ | yāvata Vasavo Rudrāḥ Ādityāḥ Viśvedevāḥ Marutaḥ ity ete
’rthāḥ anityāḥ eva utpattimattvāt | Tad-anityatvo cha tad-vāchakānaṃ
vaidikānāṃ Vasv-ādi-śabdānāṃ anityatvaṃ kena vāryyate | Prasiddhaṃ hi
loke Devadattasya putre utpanne Yajnadattaḥ iti tasya nāma kriyate iti |
Tasmād virodhaḥ eva śabde iti chet | na | Gavādi-śabdārtha-sambandha-
nityatva-darśanāt | Na hi gavādi-vyaktinām utpattimattvo tad-ākṛitīnām
apy utpattimattvaṃ syād dravya-guṇa-karmanāṃ hi vyaktayaḥ eva utpad-
yante na ākṛitayaḥ | Ākṛitibhiḥ cha śabdānāṃ sambandho na vyaktibhiḥ |
vyaktinām ānantyāt sambandha-grahanānupapattē | Vyaktishu utpadya-
mānāsv apy ākṛitīnāṃ nityatvād na gavādi-śabdeshu kaśchid virodho dṛśi-
yate | Tathā devādi-vyakti-prabhavābhyupagame ’pi ākṛiti-nityatvād na
kaśchid Vasv-ādi-śabdeshu virodhaḥ iti drashṭavyam | Ākṛiti-viśeṣha tu do-
vādīnām mantrārthavādādibhyo vighrahavattvādy-avagamād avagantavyaḥ |
Sthāna-viśeṣha-sambandha-nimittās cha Indrādi-śabdāḥ senāpatyādi-
śabda-vat | Tatas cha yo yas tat tat sthānam adhitishṭhati sa sa Indrādi-
śabdair abhidhīyate iti na dosho bhavati | Na cha idaṃ śabda-prabhavat-
vam Brahma-prabhavatva-vaḥ upādāna-kāranatvābhīprāyena uchyate |
katham tarhi sthiti-vāchakātmanā nitye śabde nityārtha-sambandhīni
śabda-vyavahāra-yogyārtha-vyakti-nishpattir “ataḥ prabhavaḥ” ity uch-
yate | katham punar avagamyate śabdāt prabhavati jagad iti | “pratya-
kshānumānābhyām” | Pratyakṣhaṃ śrūtiḥ | prāmāṇyam prati anape-
kshatvāt | anumānaṃ smṛitiḥ | prāmāṇyam prati sāpekshatvāt | Te hi
śabda-pūrvāṃ śṛiṣṭim darśayataḥ | “Ēto” iti vai prajāpatir devān
asṛijata “asṛigram” iti manushyān “indavaḥ” iti pitṛīṃs “tirah pav-
tram” iti grahān “āsavaḥ” iti stotraṃ “viśvāni” iti śāstram “abhi
saubhagū” ity anyāḥ prajāḥ iti śrūtiḥ | Tathā ’nyatrāpi “sa manasū
vācham mithunaṃ samabhavaḥ” (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa x. 6, 5, 4, and
Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 50) ityūdinā tatra tatra śabda-pūrvikā
śṛiṣṭiḥ śrūyate | Smṛitir api “anādi-nidhanā nityā vāg utsṛiṣṭā svayam-
bhuvā | ādau vedamayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛittayaḥ” ity utsargo ’py
ayaṃ vāchak sampradāya-pravarttanātmako drashṭavyaḥ anādi-nidhanā-
yāḥ anyūdṛiśasya utsargasya asambhavāt | Tathā “nāma rūpaṃ cha bhū-
tānāṃ karmanāṃ cha pravarttanam | Veda-śabdebhya evādau nirmame sa

mahēśvaraḥ” *iti* | “*sarveśhām cha sa nāmāni karmāṇi cha prithak prithak | Veda-sabdebhya evādau prithak saṁsthās cha nirmame*” *iti cha | Apiccha ohikīrshitam artham anutishṭhan tasya vāchakaṁ śabdāṁ pūrvaṁ smṛitvā paśchāt tam artham anutishṭhati iti sarveśhām naḥ pratyaksham etat | Tathā prajāpater api sraśṭuḥ śriśṭeḥ pūrvaṁ vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ manasi prādurbabhūvuḥ paśchāt tad-anugatān arthān sasarjja iti gamyate | Tathā cha śrutiḥ “ sa bhūr iti vyāharan bhūmim aśrijata ”*¹⁰¹ *ity-evam-ādikā bhūr-ādi-śabdebhyaḥ eva manasi prādurbhūtebhyo bhūr-ādi-lokān prādurbhūtān śriśṭtān darśayati | kim-ātmakam punaḥ śabdāṁ abhipretya idaṁ śabda-prabhavātvam uchyate | sphoṭam ity āha | . . . Tasmād nityāt śabdāt sphoṭa-rūpād abhidhāyakāt kriyā-kāraka-phala-lakṣhaṇāṁ jagad abhidheya-bhūtam prabhavatīti | . . . Tatas cha nityebhyaḥ śabdebhyo devādi-vyaktinām prabhavaḥ ity aviruddham |*

Sūtra i. 3, 29. “*Ata eva cha nityatvam*” | *svatantrasya karttuḥ smaranād eva hi sthite vedasya nityatve devādi-vyakti-prabhavābhyupagamena tasya virodham āśankya “ ataḥ prabhavād ” iti pariḥṛitya idānīm tad eva veda-nityatvaṁ śṭhitāṁ draḍḍhayati “ ata eva cha nityatvam ” iti | ataḥ eva cha nityākriter devāder jagato veda-śabda-prabhavātvād eva veda-śabda-nityatvam api pratyetyavyam | Tathā cha mantra-varṇaḥ “ yajnena vāchaḥ padavīyam āyan tām anvavindann ṛishishku pravishṭām ” iti sthitām eva vācham anuvinnām darśayati | Vedavyāśas cha evam eva smarati (Mahābhārata, Vanap. 7660) | “ yugānte ’ntarhitān vedān setihāsān maharshayaḥ | lebhire tapasā pūrvaṁ anyjūtāḥ svayambhuvā ” iti |*

“Sūtra i. 3, 28 : ‘ But it is said that there will be a contradiction in respect of sound (or the word) ; but this is not so, because the gods are produced from it, as is proved by intuition and inference.’

“ Be it so, that though the corporeality of the gods, etc., be admitted, no contradiction will arise in respect of the ceremonial. Still [it will be said that] a contradiction will arise in regard to the word. How ? [In this way.] By founding upon the inherent connection of a word with the thing signified, the authority of the Veda had been established by the aphorism ‘ *anapekshatvāt,*’ etc. (Mīmāṁsā Sūtras i. 2, 21 ; see above, p. 75.) But now, while it has been admitted that the deities are corporeal, it will follow that (though from their possession of divine power they can at one and the same time partake of the oblations

¹⁰¹ Compare S’atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 1, 6, 3.

offered at numerous sacrifices), they will still, owing to their corporality, be subject, like ourselves, to birth and death; and hence, the eternal connection of the eternal word with an object which is non-eternal being lost, a contradiction will arise in regard to the authority proved to belong to the word of the Veda; [for thus the word, not having any eternal connection with non-eternal things, could not be authoritative]. But neither has this supposed contradiction any existence. How? 'Because they are produced from it.' Hence the world of gods, etc., is produced from the Vedic word. But according to the aphorism (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2) 'from him comes the production, etc., of all this,' it is established that the world has been produced from Brahma. How, then, is it said here that it is produced from the word? And, moreover, if it be allowed that the world is produced from the Vedic word, how is the contradiction in regard to the word thereby removed, inasmuch as all the following classes of objects, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Ādityas, Viśvedevas, Maruts, are non-eternal, because produced; and when they are non-eternal, what is there to bar the non-eternity of the Vedic words Vasu, etc., by which they are designated? For it is a common saying, 'It is only when a son is born to Devadatta, that that son receives the name of Yajnadatta,' [*i.e.* no child receives a name before it exists]. Hence a contradiction does arise in regard to [the eternity of] the word. To this objection we reply with a negative; for in the case of such words as cow we discover an eternal connection between the word and the thing. For although individual cows, etc., come into existence, the species to which they belong does not begin to exist, as it is individual substances, qualities, and acts, which begin to exist, and not their species. Now it is with species that words are connected, and not with individuals, for as the latter are infinite, such a connection would in their case be impossible. Thus as species are eternal (though individuals begin to exist) no contradiction is discoverable in the case of such words as cow, etc. In the same way it is to be remarked that though we allow that the individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist, there is no contradiction [to the eternity of the Vedic word] in the [existence of the] words Vasu, etc. [which denote those individual gods], since the species to which they belong are eternal. And the fact that the gods, etc., belong to particular species may be learned from this, that we discover their corporality and other attributes in

the hymns and arthavādas (illustrative remarks in the Vedas), etc. The words Indra, etc., are derived from connection with some particular post, like the words 'commander of an army' (*senūpati*), etc. Hence, who-soever occupies any particular post, is designated by the words Indra, and so forth; [and therefore Indra and the other gods belong to the species of occupants of particular posts]. Thus there is no difficulty. And this derivation from the word is not, like production from Brahma, meant in the sense of evolution from a material cause. But how, since language is eternal and connected with eternal objects, is it declared in the phrase 'produced from it' that the production of individual things, corresponding to the ordinary sense of words, is effected by a thing (sound or language), the very nature of which it is to denote continuance [and not such change as is involved in the idea of production?]¹⁰² How, again, is it known that the world is produced from the word? The answer is, [it is known] 'from intuition and inference.' 'Intuition' means the Veda, because it is independent of any (other authority). 'Inference' means the smṛiti, because it is dependent on another authority (the Veda). These two demonstrate that the creation was preceded by the word. Thus the Veda says, 'at (or with) the word *ete* (these) Prajāpati created the gods; at *aṣṛigram* (they were poured out) he created men; at *indavaḥ* (drops of soma) he created the pitṛis; at *tiraḥ pavitram* (through the filter) he created the libations; at *āśavaḥ* (swift) he created hymns; at *viśvāni* (all) he created praise; and at the words *abhi saubhagā* (for the sake of blessings) he created other creatures.'¹⁰³ And in another place it is said 'with his

¹⁰² This sentence is rather obscure.

¹⁰³ According to Govinda Ānanda's Gloss this passage is derived from a Chhandoga Brāhmaṇa. It contains a mystical exposition of the words from Rig-veda, ix. 62, 1 (= Sāma-veda, ii. 180) which are imbedded in it, viz. *ete aṣṛigraṇi indavas tiraḥ pavitram āśavaḥ | viśvāni abhi saubhagā* | "These hurrying drops of soma have been poured through the filter, to procure all blessings." (See Benfey's translation.) It was by the help of Dr. Pertsch's alphabetical list of the initial words of the verses of the Rig-veda (in Weber's Indische Studien, vol. iii.) that I discovered the verse in question in the Rig-veda. Govinda Ānanda gives us a specimen of his powers as Vedic exegete in the following remarks on this passage: *Ity otaṅ-mantra-sthāiḥ padaiḥ smṛitvā Brahmā devādīn aṣṛijata | tatra "ete" iti padam sarvanāmātrvūḍ devānām smārakam aṣṛig rūdhvraṃ tat pradhāne dche ramante iti "aṣṛigrāḥ" manushyāḥ | chandra-sthānām pitṛiṇām indu-śabdāḥ smārakaḥ ityādi* | "Brahmā created the gods, etc., in conformity with the recollections suggested by the various words in this verse. The word *ete* ('these') as a pronoun suggested the gods. The beings who disport

mind he entered into conjugal connection with Vāch (speech).' (S. P. Br. x. 6, 5, 4, Bṛih. Ār. Up. p. 50.) By these and other such texts the Veda in various places declares that creation was preceded by the word. And when the Smṛiti says, 'In the beginning a celestial voice, eternal, without beginning or end, co-essential with the Vedas, was uttered by Svayambhū; from which all activities [proceeded]' (see above, p. 16), the expression 'utterance of a voice' is to be regarded as employed in the sense of the origination of a tradition, since it is inconceivable that a voice which was 'without beginning or end,' could be uttered in the same sense as other sounds. Again, we have this other text, 'In the beginning Maheśvara created from the words of the Veda the names and forms of creatures, and the origination of actions;' and again, 'He created in the beginning the several names, functions, and conditions of all creatures from the words of the Veda.' (See above, pp. 16 and 6.) And it is a matter of common observation to us all, that when any one is occupied with any end which he wishes to accomplish; he first calls to mind the word which expresses it, and then proceeds to effect his purpose. So, too, in the case of Prajāpati the creator, we conclude that before the creation the words of the Veda were manifested in his mind, and that afterwards he created the objects which resulted from them. Thus the Vedic text which says, 'uttering *bhūh*, he created the earth (*bhūmi*), etc,' intimates that the different worlds, earth, and the rest, were manifested, *i.e.* created from the words *bhūh*, etc., manifested in his mind. Of what sort, now, was this word which is intended, when it is said that the world was produced from the word? It was *sphoṭa* (disclosure or expression), we are told."

I shall not quote the long discussion on which Sankara here enters, regarding this term. (See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 305 ff.; Ballantyne's Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy, pp. 192 ff.; the same author's translation of the commencement of the Mahābhāshya, p. 10; and Professor Müller's article on the last-named work in the Journal of the German Or. Soc. vii. 170). Sankara states his conclusion themselves in bodies of which blood (*asrik*) is a predominant element, were *asrigrāh*, 'men.' The word *indu* (which means both the soma plant and the moon) suggested the fathers who dwell in the moon," etc., etc. The sense of *asrigram*, as given above in the text, is "were poured out." Govinda Ānanda, no doubt, understood it correctly, though he considered it necessary to draw a mystical sense out of it.

to be that "from the eternal word, in the form of *sphoṭa*, which expresses [all things], the object signified by it, viz. the world, under the three characters of action, causer, and the results of action, is produced," and finishes his remarks on this Sūtra (i. 3, 28) by observing: "Consequently there is no contradiction in saying that the individual gods, etc., are derived from eternal words." He then proceeds to Sūtra i. 3, 29: "Hence results the eternity of the Vedas." On this he observes, "The eternity of the Veda had been established by the fact of its being described in the Smṛiti as the work of a Self-dependent Maker. But a doubt had been suggested that this eternity is inconsistent with the admission that individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist. This doubt, however, having been set aside by the preceding aphorism, 'Since they are produced from it,' he now confirms the eternity of the Veda (which had been already proved) by the words of the Sūtra before us, which mean that as a result of this very fact that the world, consisting of gods and other beings belonging to fixed species, was produced from the words of the Vedas, the eternity of these Vedic words themselves also must be believed. Accordingly, the words of the hymn, 'by sacrifice they followed the path of Vāch, and found her entered into the rishis' (R. V. x. 71, 3; see the First Volume of this work p. 254, and Volume Second, p. 220) prove that Vāch already existed when she was discovered. And in the very same way Vedavyāsa records that, 'formerly the great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, obtained through devotion the Vedas and Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding yuga.'"

Sāyaṇa refers to the Sūtra just quoted (i. 3, 29), as well as to another of the Vedānta aphorisms (i. 1, 3) in p. 20 of the introduction to his Commentary on the Rig-veda in these words:

Nanu bhagavatā Bādarāyaṇena Vedasya Brahma-kūryyatvaṃ sūtritam |
"śāstra-yonitvād" iti | ṛigvedādi-śāstra-kāranatvād Brahma sarvajnam
iti sūtrārthaḥ | bādham | na etāvatū pauruṣheyatvam bhavati | manushya-
nirmitatvābhāvāt | idṛiṣam apauruṣheyatvam abhipretya vyavahāra-dāśū-
yām akāśādi-vad nityatvam, Bādarāyaṇenaiva devatādhikarane sūtritam |
"ata evaṅca nityatvam" iti |

"But it is objected that the venerable Bādarāyaṇa has declared in the aphorism 'since he is the source of the śāstra (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3), that the Veda is derived from Brahma; the meaning of the aphorism being, that since Brahma is the cause of the Rig-veda and other Sūtras,

he is omniscient. This is true; but it furnishes no proof of the human origin of the Veda, since it was not formed by a man. Bādarāyaṇa had in view such a superhuman origin of the Veda, when in the [other] aphorism 'hence also [its] eternity is to be maintained,' (which is contained in the section on the deities), he declared it to be, like the æther, etc., eternal, during the period of mundane existence."¹⁰⁴

The remarks of Sankāra on the Brahma Sūtra (i. 1, 3) above referred to, begin as follows :

Mahataḥ ṛig-vedādeḥ śāstrasya aneka-vidyā-sthānopabṛimhitasya pradīpa-vat sarvārtha-dyotinas sarvajña-kalpasya yoniḥ kāraṇam Brahma | na hi ṛdṛiśasya śāstrasya ṛigvedādi-lākṣaṇasya sarvajña-guṇānvitasya sarvajñād anyataḥ sambhavo 'sti | Yad yad vistarārthaṁ śāstraṁ yasmāt puruṣa-viśeṣāt sambhavati yathā vyākaraṇādi Pāṇiny-āder jneyaika-dēśārtham api sa tato 'py adhikāra-vijnānaḥ iti prasiddhaṁ loke | kimu vaktavyam aneka-śūkhā-bheda-bhinnasya deva-tiryuṅ-manuṣhya-varṇā-śramādi-pravibhāga-hetor ṛig-vedādy-ākhyasya sarva-jñānākarasya aprayātṇena eva līlā-nyāyena puruṣa-niśvāsa-vad yasmād mahato bhūtād yoneḥ sambhavaḥ ("asya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitam etad yad ṛig-vedaḥ" ity-ādeḥ srutes) tasya mahato bhūtasya niraliśayaṁ sarvajñatvaṁ sarva-saktitvaṁ cha iti |

"Brahma is the source of the great Śāstra, consisting of the Rig-veda, etc., augmented by numerous branches of science, which, like a lamp, illuminates all subjects, and approaches to omniscience. Now such a Śāstra, distinguished as the Rig-veda, etc., possessed of the qualities of an omniscient being, could not have originated from any other than an omniscient being. When an extensive treatise on any subject is produced by any individual, as the works on Grammar, etc., were by Pāṇini and others,—even although the treatise in question have for its subject only a single department of what is to be known,—it is a

¹⁰⁴ See the quotation from the Vedārtha-prakāśa, at the top of p. 70, above. The æther (ākāśa) is uncreated according to the Vaiśeṣikas (Kaṇāda's Sūtras, ii. 1, 28, with S'ankara Miśra's commentary, and S'ankara Āchāryya on Vedānta Sūtra, ii. 3, 3: *Na hy ākāśasya utpattiḥ sambhōvayitūṁ śakyā 'rīmat-Kaṇabhūg-abhiprāyānusārīṣku jīvatsū* | "The production of the æther cannot be conceived as possible, so long as those who follow Kaṇāda's view retain their vitality"). The Vedānta Sūtras, ii. 3, 1-7, on the other hand, assert its production by Brahma, in conformity with the text of the Taittirīyikas which affirms this: *Tasmād vai casmād ātmanāḥ ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ* | "From that Soul the æther was produced."

matter of notoriety that the author is possessed of still greater knowledge than is contained in his work.¹⁰⁵ What then need we say of the transcendent omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being from whom issued without effort, as an amusement, like a man's breathing (according to the Vedic text 'the Rig-veda is the breathing of that great Being'), that mine of universal knowledge called the Rig-veda, etc., which is divided into many śākhās, and which gave rise to the classes of gods, beasts, and men, with their castes and orders?"¹⁰⁶

It is clear from the aphorism last quoted that there is a distinction between the doctrine of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, and the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, or Vedānta, regarding the origin of the Veda, in so far as the former is silent on the subject of its derivation from Brahma, which the latter asserts. It is also to be observed that Sāyana understands the eternity of the Veda as laid down in the Brahma Sūtras in a qualified sense (as limited to the duration of the mundane period) and not as an absolute eternity.

I may remark that in their treatment of the Vedic passages which they cite, the practice of Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma Sūtras, and of his commentator, Śankara Āchāryya, corresponds to their theory of the infallibility of the sacred text. The doctrines inculcated in the Sūtras, and expounded and vindicated by the commentator, profess to be based on the Veda; and numerous texts are cited in their support. Such passages as coincide with the theories maintained in the Sūtras are understood in their proper or literal (*mukhya*) sense;

¹⁰⁵ Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Vedānta, p. 8) renders the last words thus: . . . "that man, even in consideration of *that*, is inferred to be exceedingly knowing." Govinda Ānanda's note, however, confirms the rendering I have given. Part of it is as follows: *Yad yach chhūstraṃ yasmād āptāt sambhavati sa tataḥ sāstrād adhikārtha-jñānaḥ iti prasiddham* | "It is well known that the competent author from whom any treatise proceeds has a knowledge of more than that treatise (contains)." The idea here is somewhat similar to that in the second of Bishop Butler's Sermons "Upon the love of God": "Effects themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would give us but imperfect notions of wisdom and power; much less of his Being in whom they reside." . . . "This is no more than saying that the Creator is superior to the works of his hands."

¹⁰⁶ An alternative explanation of the aphorism is given by the commentator, according to which it would mean: "The body of Scripture, consisting of the Rig-veda, etc., is the source, the cause, the proof, whereby we ascertain exactly the nature of this Brahma" (*athavā yathoktam ṛigvedūdi-śāstraṃ yoniḥ kūraṇam pramāṇam asya Brahmaṇo yathāvat svarūpūdhigame*).

whilst other texts which appear to be at variance with the Vedantic dogmas, and to favour those of the other philosophical schools, are explained as being merely figurative (*gauna* or *bhākta*); or other interpretations are given. See, for example, the Brahma sūtras, i. 1, 6; ii. 4, 2 f., etc., with Sankara's comments. The supposition of any real inconsistency between the different statements of the sacred volume is never for a moment entertained.¹⁰⁷ As, however, the different authors of the Vedic hymns, of the Brāhmanas, and even of the Upanishads, gave free expression to their own vague and unsystematic ideas and speculations on the origin of all things, and the relation of the Deity to the universe, and recognized no fixed standard of orthodox doctrine to which they were bound to conform,—it was inevitable that they should propound a great variety of opinions which were mutually irreconcilable. But as, in later times, the Vedas came to be regarded as supernatural and infallible books, it was necessary that those systematic theologians who sought to deduce from their contents any consistent theory of being and of creation, should attempt to shew that the discrepancies between the different texts were only apparent.

SECT. IX.—*Arguments of the followers of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣhika, and Sāṅkhya Systems in support of the authority of the Vedas, but against the eternity of sound.*

I. *The Nyāya*.—The eternity of sound is, as we have already discovered from the allusions of the Mīmāṃsaka commentator, (above p. 73), denied by the followers of the Nyāya school. The consideration of this subject is begun in the following way in the Nyāya aphorisms of Gotama, as explained by Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭāchārya in the Nyāya-sūtra-ṛitti, ii. 81 :

¹⁰⁷ See Sankara on the Br. Sūtras, iii. 31 (p. 844 of Bibl. Indica), where he says, *yadi punar ekasmin Brahmaṇi bahūni vijnānāni vedāntāntareshu pratipipādayishitāni teshām ekam abhrāntam bhrāntāni itarāṇi ity anaśvūsa-prasango vedānteshu tasmād na tāvat pravēdāntam Brahma-vijnāna-bhedaḥ āsankitum śakyate* | “ If, again, in the different Vedāntas (*i.e.* Upanishads) a variety of conceptions regarding the one Brahma be sought to be established, one of these (conceptions) will be correct, and the others erroneous, and thus the objection of being untrustworthy will attach to the Upanishads. It must not, therefore, be suspected that there is in each of the Upanishads a different conception of Brahma.”

Vedasya prāmānyam āpta-prāmānyāt śiddham | na cha idaṁ yujyate vedasya nityatvād ity āsankāyāṁ varṇānām anityatvāt kathaṁ tat-samudāya-rūpasya vedasya nityatvam ity āśayena śabdānityatva-prakaranam ārabhate | tatra siddhānta-sūtram | “Ādimattvād aindriyakatvāt kṛitakatvād upachārāc̣ cha” | 81. Śabdo ’nityaḥ ityādiḥ | ādimattvāt sakāranakatvāt | nanu na sakāranakatvaṁ kaṅṭha-tālv-ādy-abhighātāder vyanjakatvenāpy upapattor atāḥ āha aindriyakatvād iti sāmānyavattve sati vahir-indriya-janya-laukikika-pratyaksha-vishayatvād ity arthaḥ | Aprayojakatvam āsankya āha kṛitaketi | kṛitake ghaṭādeu yathā upachāro jvānām tathāiva kāryyatva-prakāraka-pratyaksha-vishayatvād ity arthaḥ | tathā cha kāryyatvena anāhāryya-sārvalaukika-pratyaksha-balād anityatvam eva śiddhati |

“It has been proved (in the 68th Sūtra, see below) that ‘the authority of the Veda follows from the authority of the competent person who made it.’ But it may be objected that this is not a proper ground on which to base the authority of the Veda, since it is eternal. With the view of proving, in opposition to this, that since letters are not eternal, the Veda, which is a collection of letters, cannot be so either, the author of the Sūtras commences the section on the non-eternity of sound. The Sūtra laying down the established doctrine, is as follows: ‘Sound cannot be eternal, as (1) it had an origin, as (2) it is cognizable by sense, and (3) it is spoken of as factitious.’ Sound is non-eternal, etc., because (1) it had a beginning, *i.e.* because it had a cause. But it may be said that it had no cause, as, agreeably to the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas (see above, p. 74), the action of the throat and palate in pronunciation may merely occasion a manifestation of sound [without creating it]. In reply to this it is said (2) that sound is cognizable by sense, *i.e.* that though it belongs to a genus, it is an object of ordinary perception through an external sense.” [A different explanation given by other interpreters is next quoted, which I omit.] . . . “Then surmising that the preceding definition may be regarded as not to the point, the author adds the words ‘since it is spoken of as factitious,’ *i.e.* as jars and other such objects are spoken of as—are known to be—products, so, too, sound is distinguishable by sense as being in the nature of a product. And in consequence of this incontrovertible and universal perception of its being produced, it is proved that it cannot be eternal.” [Two other explanations of this last clause of the Sūtra are then added.]

Leaving the reader to study the details of the discussion in Dr. Ballantyne's aphorisms of the Nyāya (Part Second, pp. 77 ff.), I will pass over most of the Sūtras, and merely quote the principal conclusions of the Nyāya aphorist. In Sūtra 86 he says in opposition to the 13th Sūtra of the Mīmāṃsā (above, p. 74):

86. "Prāg uchchāraṇād anupalambhād āvaraṇādy-anupalabdheḥ" | S'abdo yadi nityaḥ syād uchchāraṇāt prāg any upalabhyeta śrotra-sannikarsha-sattvāt | na cha atra pratibandhakam asti ity āha āvaraṇeti āvaraṇādeḥ pratibandhakasya anupalabdhyā bhāva-nirṇayāt | deśāntara-gamaṇāṃ tu śabdasya amūrṭtatvād na sambhāvyaṭe | atīndriyānanta-pratibandhakatva-kalpanām apekshya śabdānityatva-kalpanā eva laghīyasī iti bhāvaḥ |

"Sound is not eternal, because it is not perceived before it is uttered, and because we do not perceive anything which should intercept it.' If sound were eternal, it would be perceived even before it was uttered, from its being in contact with the ear. [Sound, as Dr. Ballantyne explains, is 'admitted to be a quality of the all-pervading æther.'] And in the next words the aphorist says that there is no obstacle to its being so heard, since the non-existence of any hindrance, such as an intercepting medium, is ascertained by our not perceiving anything of that sort. And it is not conceivable that sound should have gone to another place [and for that reason be inaudible], since it has no defined form. The supposition that sound is non-eternal, is simpler than the supposition that there are an infinity of imperceptible obstacles to its perception."

The 89th and 90th Sūtras, with part of the comments on them, are as follows:

89. "Asparśatvāt" | śabdo nityaḥ | asparśatvād gagana-vad iti bhāvaḥ |
90. "Na karmānityatvāt" asparśatvaṃ na śabda-nityatva-sūdhakam karmanī vyabhichārāt |

89. "It may be said that sound is eternal, from its being, like the sky, intangible. 90. But this is no proof, for the intangibility of sound does not establish its eternity, since these two qualities do not always go together; for intangibility, though predicable, e.g. of action, fails to prove its eternity."

The 100th and following Sūtras are as follows:

100. "Vināśa-kāraṇānupalabdheḥ" | 101. "Āsraṇa-kāraṇānupalab-

dhoḥ satata-sravaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ” | *Yady apratyakṣhād abhāva-siddhis tadā 'śravaṇa-kāraṇasya apratyakṣatvād asravaṇam na syād iti satata-sravaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ iti bhāvaḥ* | 102. “*Upalabhyamāne cha anupalabdher asattvād anapadeśaḥ*” | *Anumānādinā upalabhyamāne vināśa-kāraṇe anupalabdher abhāvāt tvādīyo hetur anapadeśaḥ asādhakaḥ asiddhatvāt | janya-bhāvatvena vināśa-kalpanam iti bhāvaḥ* |

“It is said (100) that ‘sound must be eternal, because we perceive no cause why it should cease.’ The answer is (101), first, ‘that if the non-existence of any such cause of cessation were established by the mere fact of its not being perceived, such non-perception would occasion our hearing continually, which is an absurdity.’ And (102), secondly, ‘since such non-perception is not a fact, inasmuch as [a cause of the cessation of sound] is perceived, this argument falls to the ground.’ Since a cause for the cessation of sound is discovered by inference, etc., and thus the non-perception of any cause is seen to be untrue, this argument of yours proves nothing, because its correctness is not established. The purport is that we suppose, from sound being produced, that it must also be liable to perish.”

Sūtras 106–122 are occupied with a consideration of the question (above treated, pp. 73, 74, in Sūtras 10 and 16 of the Mīmāṃsā) whether letters can change or not. The conclusion at which Gotama arrives is, that the substance of letters cannot undergo any alteration, though they may be said to change when they are modified in quality by being lengthened, shortened, etc.

In a preceding part of the Second Book (Sūtras 57–68) Gotama treats of the Veda, and repels certain charges which are alleged against its authority. I shall quote most of these aphorisms, and cite the commentary more fully than Dr. Ballantyne has done. (See Ballantyne's Nyāya Aphorisms, Part ii. pp. 56 ff.)

Śabdasya dṛiṣṭādṛiṣṭārthakatvona dvaividhyam uktam tatra cha adṛiṣṭārthaka-śabdasya vedasya prāmāṇyam parikṣhitum pūrva-pakṣahyati | 57. “*Tad-aprāmāṇyam anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshabhyah*” | *Tasya dṛiṣṭārthaka-vyatirikta-śabdasya vedasya aprāmāṇyam | kutaḥ | anṛitatvādi-doshāt | tatra cha putreshṭi-kāryūdan kvachit phalanutpattidarśanād anṛitatvam | vyāghātaḥ pūrvāpara-cirodhaḥ | yathā “udite juhōti anudite juhōti samayādhyushite juhōti | śyāvo'sya āhutim abhyavaharati ya udite juhōti śavalo'sya āhutim abhyavaharati yo 'nudite juhōti*

syāva-savalāv asya āhutim abhyavaharato yaḥ samayādhyushite juhōti”
atra cha uditādi-vākyaṇām nindānumitānīṣṭa-sādhanatā-bodhaka-vākya-
virodhaḥ | paunaruktyād aprāmāṇyam | Yathā “trīḥ prathamām anvāha |
trīḥ uttamām anvāha” | ity atra uttamatvasya prathamatva-paryavasānāt
trīḥ kathānena cha paunaruktyam | eteshām aprāmāṇye tad-dṛishṭāntena
tad-eka-karttrikatvena tad-eka-jātīyatvena vā sarva-vedāprāmāṇyaṁ sādha-
nīyam iti bhāvah | siddhānta-sūtram | 58. “Na karma-karttri-sādhana-
vaigūṇyāt” | Na vedāprāmāṇyaṁ karma-karttri-sādhana-vaigūṇyāt pha-
lābhāvopapatteḥ | karmanah kriyāyāḥ vaigūṇyam ayathāvidhitvādi | kart-
tur vaigūṇyam avivattvādi | sādhanasya havir-āder vaigūṇyam āprokṣi-
tatvādi | Yathokta-karmanah phalābhāve hy anṛitatvam | na cha evam
asti iti bhāvah | vyāghātam pariharati | 59. “Abhyupetya kāla-bhede
dosha-vachanāt” | na vyāghātaḥ iti śeṣah | Agny-ādāna-kāle uditā-
homādīkam abhyupetya svīkrītya anudita-homādi-karaṇe pūrvokta-dosha-
kathānād na vyāghātaḥ ity ārtahaḥ | paunaruktyam pariharati | 60.
“Anuvādotopapattēḥ cha” | chaḥ punar-arthe | anuvādotopattēḥ punar na
paunaruktyam | nishprayojanatve hi paunaruktyaṁ doshaḥ | ukta-sthale
tv anuvādasya upapattēḥ prayojānasya sambhavāt | ekādaśa-sāmīdhenīnām
prathamottamayos trīḥ abhidhāne hi panchadaśatvaṁ sambhavati | tathā-
cha panchadaśatvaṁ śrūyate | “Imam aham bhrātṛivyaṁ panchadaśāva-
rena vāg-vajrena cha bādhe yo ’smān dveshṭi yaṁ cha vayam dvishmaḥ”
iti | Anuvādasya sārthakatvaṁ loka-prasiddham iti āha | 61. “Vākya-
vibhāgasya cha artha-grahanāt” | Vākya-vibhāgasya | anuvādatvena
vibhaktā - vākyaṣya artha-grahanāt prayojana - svīkārāt | śiṣṭair iti
śeṣah | śiṣṭāḥ hi vidhāyakānūvadakādi-bhedena vākyaṁ vibhāgya anu-
vādakasyāpi saprayojanatvam manyante | Vedo ’py evam iti bhāvah | . . .
Evam aprāmāṇya-sādhakāṁ nīrasya prāmāṇyaṁ sādhayati | 68. “Man-
trāyurveda-vach cha tat-prāmāṇyam āpta-prāmāṇyāt” | Āptasya veda-
karttuḥ prāmāṇyād yathārthopadeśakatvād vedasya tad-uktatvam arthāl-
labdham | tena hetunā vedasya prāmāṇyam anumeyam | tatra dṛishṭāntam
āha mantrāyurveda-vad itī | mantrō vishādi-nāsakaḥ | āyurveda-bhāgas
cha veda-sthaḥ eva | tatra saṁvādena prāmāṇya-grahāt tad-dṛishṭāntena
vedatvāvachhedena prāmāṇyam anumeyam | āptaṁ gṛihitam prāmāṇyaṁ
yatra sa vedas tādriṣena vedatvena prāmāṇyam anumeyam iti kechit |

“It had been declared (Nyāya Sūtras, i. 8) that verbal evidence is of two kinds, (1) that of which the subject-matter is seen, and (2) that of which the subject-matter is unscen. With the view, now, of testing

the authority of that verbal evidence which refers to unseen things, viz. the Veda, Gotama states the first side of the question. Sūtra 57. 'The Veda has no authority, since it has the defects of falsehood, self-contradiction, and tautology.' That verbal evidence, which is distinct from such as relates to visible objects, *i.e.* the Veda, has no authority. Why? Because it has the defects of falsehood, etc. Of these defects, that of 'falsehood' is established by the fact that we sometimes observe that no fruit results from performing the sacrifice for a son, or the like. 'Self-contradiction' is a discrepancy between a former and a later declaration. Thus the Veda says, 'he sacrifices when the sun is risen; he sacrifices when the sun is not yet risen; he sacrifices' [I cannot explain the next words]. 'A tawny [dog?] carries away the oblation of him who sacrifices after the sun has risen; a brindled [dog?] carries off the oblation of him who sacrifices before the sun has risen; and both of these two carry off the oblation of him who sacrifices.' . . . Now here there is a contradiction between the words which enjoin sacrifices, and the words which intimate by censure that those sacrifices will occasion disastrous results. Again, the Veda has no authority, owing to its 'tautology,' as where it is said, 'he repeats the first thrice, he repeats the last thrice.' For as the lastness ultimately coincides with [?] the firstness, and as there is a triple repetition of the words, this sentence is tautological. Now since these particular sentences have no authority, the entire Veda will be proved by these specimens to stand in the same predicament, since all its other parts have the same author, or are of the same character, as these portions."

Here follows the Sūtra which conveys the established doctrine. "58. 'The Veda is not false; it is owing to some fault in the ceremonial, or the performer, or the instrument he employs, that any sacrifice is not followed by the promised results.' Faults in the ceremonial are such as its not being according to rule. Faults in the performer are such as ignorance. Faults in the instrument, *i.e.* in the clarified butter, etc., are such as its not being duly sprinkled, etc. For falsehood might be charged on the Veda, if no fruit resulted from a sacrifice when duly performed as prescribed; but such failure never occurs."

Gotama next repels the charge of self-contradiction in the Vedas. "59. 'There is no self-contradiction, for the fault is only imputed in case the sacrifice should be performed at a different time from that

at first intended.' The fault imputed to these sacrifices in the text in question would [only] be imputed if, after agreeing, at the time of placing the sacrificial fire, to perform the sacrifice after sunrise, one were to change it to a sacrifice before sunrise; there is, therefore, no self-contradiction in the passage referred to."

He next rebuts the charge of tautology. "60. 'The Veda is not tautological because repetition may be proper.' The particle *cha* means 'again.' 'Again, since repetition may be proper, there is no tautology.' For repetition is only a fault when it is useless. But in the passage referred to, since repetition is proper, its utility is apparent. For when the first and the last of the eleven *sāmidhenīs* (forms of prayer used on throwing fuel into the fire) are each repeated thrice, the whole number of verses will be made up to fifteen.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, this number of fifteen is mentioned in these words of the Veda, 'I smite this enemy who hates us, and whom we hate, with the last of the fifteen verses, and with the thunderbolt of my words.'"

He next observes that the advantage of repetition is commonly recognised. "61. 'And the Veda is not tautological, because the utility of this division of discourse is admitted,' *i.e.* because the necessity for such a division of language, that is, of a description of language characterized as reiterative, is acknowledged, *viz.* by the learned. For by dividing language into the different classes of injunctive, reiterative, etc., learned men recognise the uses of the reiterative also. And this applies to the Veda."

The author of the aphorisms then proceeds to state and to define (in Sūtras 62-67) the different sorts of discourse employed in the Veda, and to defend the propriety of reiteration. "Having thus refuted the arguments which aim at showing that the Veda is of no authority, he goes on to prove its authority. 68. 'The authority of the Veda, like that of the formulas, and the *Āyur-veda* (treatise on medicine) follows from the authority of the competent [persons from whom they proceeded].' Since the competent maker of the Veda possesses authority, *i.e.* inculcates truth, it results from the force of the terms that the Veda was uttered by a person of this character; and by this reasoning the au-

¹⁰⁸ If there are in all eleven formulas, and two of these are each repeated thrice, we have ($2 \times 3 =$) six to add to the nine (which remain of the original eleven), making ($6 + 9 =$) fifteen. See Müller's *Anc. Sansk. Lit.* pp. 89 and 333.

thority of the Veda is to be inferred. He illustrates this by the case of the formulas and the Āyur-veda. By formulas (*mantra*) are meant the sentences which neutralize poison, etc., and the section containing the Āyur-veda forms part of the Veda. Now as the authority of these two classes of writings is admitted by general consent, the authority of everything which possesses the characteristics of the Veda must be inferred from this example. Some, however, explain the aphorism thus: a Veda is that in which authority is found or recognised. From such vedicity (or possession of the character of a Veda) the authority of any work is to be inferred.”

I add the greater part of the more detailed and distinct exposition of this aphorism given by the commentator Vātsyāyana (*Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 91): ¹⁰⁹

Kim punar āyurvedasya prāmāṇyam | yad āyurvedena upadiśyate idam kṛitvā ishṭam adhigacchhati idam varjjayitvā 'nishṭam jahāti tasya anusṭhīyamānasya tathā - bhūvaḥ satyārthatā - 'viparyyayaḥ | mantra - padānām cha visha - bhūtāsani - pratishedhārthānām prayoge 'rthasya tathā - bhūvaḥ etat prāmāṇyam | kim - kṛitam etat | āpta - prāmāṇya - kṛitam | kim punar āptānām prāmāṇyam | sākshāt - kṛita - dharmatā bhūta - dayā yathā - bhūtārtha - chikhyāpayishā iti | āptāḥ khalu sākshāt - kṛita - dharmāṇaḥ idam hātavyam ayam asya hāni - hetur idam asya adhigantavyam ayam asya adhigamāna - hetur iti bhūtāny anukampanto | teshām khalu vai prāna - bhṛitām svayam anavabudhyamānānām na anyad upadeśād avabodha - kāraṇam asti | na cha anavabodhe samāhā varjjanām vā | na vā akṛitvā svasti - bhūvaḥ | nā 'py asya anyāḥ upakārako 'py asti | hanta vāyam ebhvyo yathā - darsanaṁ yathā - bhūtān upadiśāmaḥ | te ime śrutvā pratipadyamānāḥ heyāṁ hāsyanty adhigantavyam eva adhigamishyanti iti | evam āptopadeśaḥ etena tri - vidhena āpta - prāmāṇyena parigrihīto 'nusṭhīyamāno 'rthasya sādhaḥ bhavati | evam āptopadeśaḥ pramāṇam evam āptāḥ pramāṇam | drishṭārthena āptopadeśena āyurvedena adriṣṭārtho veda - bhājo 'numātavyaḥ pramāṇam iti | āpta - prāmāṇyasya hotoḥ samānatvād iti | asya api cha eka - deśo " grāma - kāmo yajeta " ity evam - ūdi - drishṭārthas tena anumātavyam iti | loka cha bhūyān upadeśāśrayo vya - vahārah | laukikasya apy upadeśeṣṭur upadeśāvayūrtha - jñānena parānyū - ghrikshayā yathā - bhūtārtha - chikhyāpayishayā cha prāmāṇyam | tat - pari -

¹⁰⁹ A small portion of this comment, borrowed from Professor Banerjea's *Dialogues on Hindu philosophy*, was given in the 1st edition of this vol. p. 210.

grahād āptopadeśah pramāṇam iti | drashṭri-pravaktṛi-sāmānyāch cha anumānam ye eva āptāḥ vedārthānāṁ drashṭārah pravaktūras cha te eva āyurveda-prabhṛitinām | ity āyurveda-prāmānya-vad veda-prāmānyam anumālavyam iti | nityatvād veda-vākhyānām pramānatve tat-prāmānyam āpta-prāmānyād ity ayuktam | śabdasya vāchakatvād artha-pratīpatlau pramānatvaṁ na nityatvāt | nityatve hi sarvasya sarveṇa vachanāch chhabdārtha-vyavasthā 'nupapattiḥ | na anityatve vāchakatvam iti chet | na | laukikeshv adarśanāt | to 'pi nityāḥ iti chet | na | anāptopadeśād artha-visaṁvādo 'nupapannaḥ | . . . Manvantara-yugāntareṣu cha atītānāgateshu sampradāyābhyāsa-prayogāvichhedo vedānāṁ nityatvam āpta-prāmānyāch cha prāmānyam | laukikeshu śabdesu cha etat samānam |

“On what then does the authority of the Āyur-veda depend? The Āyur-veda instructs us that to do so and so, is the means of attaining what is desirable, and to avoid so and so is the means of escaping what is undesirable: and the fact of such action having been followed by the promised result coincides with the supposition that the book declares what is true. So, too, the authority of the formulæ for neutralizing poison, repelling demons, and arresting lightning, is shewn by their application fulfilling its object. How is this result obtained? By the authoritativeness of competent persons. But what is meant by the authoritativeness of competent persons? It means their intuitive perception of duty, their benevolence to all creatures, and their desire to declare the truth of things. Competent persons are those who have an intuitive perception of duty; and they shew their benevolence to all creatures by pointing out that so and so is to be avoided, and that such and such are the means of avoiding it, and that so and so is to be attained, and that such and such are the means of attaining it. ‘For these creatures,’ they reflect, ‘being themselves unaware of such things, have no other means of learning them except such instruction; and in the absence of information they can make no effort either to attain or avoid anything; whilst without such action their welfare is not secured; and there is no one else who can help in this case: come let us instruct them according to the intuition we possess, and in conformity with the reality; and they hearing, and comprehending, will avoid what should be avoided, and obtain what should be obtained.’ Thus the instruction afforded by competent persons according to this threefold character of their authoritativeness [viz. (1) intuition, (2)

benevolence, and (3) desire to teach], being received, and acted upon, effects the object desired. And so the instruction given by competent persons is authority, and these competent persons are authorities. From the Āyur-veda, which conveys instruction given by competent persons in reference to objects perceptible by the senses, it is to be inferred that that part also of the Veda which is concerned with imperceptible objects¹¹⁰ is authoritative, since the cause, the authoritativeness of competent persons, is the same in both cases; and the same inference is to be drawn from the fact that a portion of the injunctions of the last mentioned part of the Veda also have reference to perceptible objects, as in the case of the precept, 'Let the man who desires landed property sacrifice,' etc., etc. In common life, too, men usually rely upon instruction. And the authority of an ordinary instructor depends (1) upon his knowledge of the matter to be taught, (2) upon his disposition to shew kindness to others, and (3) upon his desire to declare the truth. From its being accepted, the instruction imparted by competent persons constitutes proof. And from the fact that the seers and declarers are the same in both cases, viz. that the competent seers and declarers of the contents of the (rest of the) Veda are the very same as those of the Āyur-veda, etc., we must infer that the authoritativeness of the former is like that of the latter. But on the hypothesis that the authority of the Vedic injunctions is derived from their eternity, it will be improper to say that it arises from the authoritativeness of competent persons, since the authority of words as exponents of meanings springs from their declarative character, and not from their eternity. For on the supposition of the eternity of words, every (word) would express every (thing), which would be contrary to the fixity of their signification. If it be objected that unless words are eternal, they cannot be declarative, we deny this, as it is not witnessed in the case of secular words. If it be urged again that secular words also are eternal, we must again demur, since the discrepancy of purport arising from the injunctions of incompetent persons would be at variance with this." After some further argumentation Vātsyāyana concludes: "The eternity of the Vedas [really] consists in the unbroken continuity of their tradition, study, and application, both in the Manvantaras and

¹¹⁰ Compare the commentator's remarks introductory to the Nyāya aphorism ii. 57, quoted above, p. 112.

Yugas which are past, and those which are to come; whilst their authority arises from the authoritativeness of the competent persons (who uttered them). And this is common to them with secular words."

The phrase *sākshāt-kṛita-dharmāṇaḥ*, "possessing an intuitive perception of duty," which is employed by Vātsyāyana in the preceding extract as a definition of *āptāḥ*, "competent persons," is one which had previously been applied by Yāska (Nirukta, i. 20) to describe the character of the rishis: *Sākshāt-kṛita-dharmāṇaḥ ṛishayo bābhāvuh | te 'varebhyo 'sākshāt-kṛita-dharmabhyah upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ | upadeśūya glāyanto 'vare bilma-grahanāya imān granthān samāmnāsishkur vedān cha vedāngāni cha |* "The rishis, who had an intuitive perception of duty, handed down the hymns by (oral) instruction to men of later ages, who had not that intuitive perception. These, declining in their power of giving instruction, compiled this work (the Nirukta), the Veda, and the Vedāngas, in order to facilitate the comprehension of details."

The Vaiśeṣika.—Among the aphorisms of this system also there are some which, in opposition to the Mīmāṃsakas, assert, 1st, that the Vedas are the product of an intelligent mind; and 2nd (if the interpretation of the commentator is to be received) that they have been uttered by God.¹¹¹

The second aphorism of the first section of the first book is as follows:

Yato 'bhyudaya-niśśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmāḥ |

"Righteousness is that through which happiness and future perfection¹¹² are attained."

After explaining this the commentator proceeds to introduce the next aphorism by the following remarks:

Nanu nirvṛitti-lakṣhaṇo dharmas tattva-jñāna-dvārā niśśreyasa-hetur ity

¹¹¹ Of the aphorisms, which I am about to quote, the first has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne (who published a small portion of these Sūtras with an English version in 1851); and it, as well as the others, is briefly commented upon by the Rev. Prof. Banerjea, in his Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, pp. 474 ff., and Pref. p. ix., note. See my article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. xx. for 1862, entitled "Does the Vaiśeṣika philosophy acknowledge a Deity or not?" from which the translations now given have been transferred with but little alteration and a few additions. And compare Dr. Roer's German translation of the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms in the Journal of the German Oriental Society for 1867, pp. 309 ff.

¹¹² The Commentator explains *abhyudaya* as = *tattva-jñānam*, "a knowledge of the reality," and *niśśreyasa* as *ātyantiki duḥkha-nivṛittiḥ*, "the complete cessation of suffering."

*attra śrutih pramānam | śruter eva prāmānye vacyam vipratipadyāmahe
 "anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ" | . . . na cha āmnāya-pra-
 tipādakaṁ kinchid asti nityatve vipratipattau | nitya-nirdoshatvam api
 sandigdham | paurusheyatve tu bhrama-pramāda-vipratipatti-karaṇūpā-
 ṭavādi-sambhāvanayā ūptoktatvam api sandigdham eva iti na niśśreyasam
 na vā tattva-tattva-jñānam dvāraṁ na vā dharmāḥ iti sarvam etad āku-
 lam | atah āha "tad-vachanād āmnāyasya prāmānyam" | "tad" ity
 anupakrāntam api prasiddhi-siddhatayā īśvaram parāmṛśati | yathā
 "tad-aprāmānyam anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ" iti Gāuta-
 miya-sūtre tach-chhabdena anupakrānto 'pi vedāḥ parāmṛśyate | tathā
 cha tad-vachanāt tena īśvareṇa prañayanād āmnāyasya vedasya prāmā-
 nyam | yadvā "tad" iti sannihitaṁ dharmam eva parāmṛśati | tathā cha
 dharmasya "vachanāt" pratipādanād "āmnāyasya" vedasya prāmā-
 nyam | yad hi vākyam prāmāṇikam artham pratipādayati tat pramānam
 eva yataḥ ity arthaḥ | īśvaras tad-ūptatvam cha sādhayishyate |*

"But may it not be objected here that it is the Veda which proves that righteousness, in the form of abstinence from action, is, by means of the knowledge of absolute truth, the cause of future perfection; but that we dispute the authority of the Veda because it is chargeable with the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology¹¹³ And further, there is nothing to prove the authority of the Veda, for its eternity is disputed, its eternal faultlessness is doubted, and if it have a personal author, the fact of this person being a competent utterer is questioned, since there is an apprehension of error, inadvertence, contradiction, and want of skill in composition attaching to him. Thus there is neither any such thing as future perfection, nor is either a knowledge of absolute truth the instrument thereof, or righteousness. Thus everything is perplexed."

In answer to all this the author of the aphorism says:

"The authority of the sacred record arises from its being uttered by Him."

"Here," says the commentator, "the word *tad* (His) refers to Īśvara (God); as, though no mention of Him has yet been introduced, He is proved by common notoriety to be meant; just as in the aphorism of Gautama: 'Its want of authority is shown by the faults of falsehood,

¹¹³ Here the same illustrations are given as in the commentary on the Nyāya aphorisms, quoted above, pp. 113 ff.

contradiction, and tautology,' the Veda, though not previously introduced, is intended by the word *taḍ*.¹¹⁴ And so [the meaning of the aphorism is that] the authority of the sacred record, *i.e.* the Veda, is proved by its being spoken by Him, composed by Him, by Īśvara. Or, *taḍ* (its)¹¹⁴ may denote *dharmā* (duty) which immediately precedes; and then [the sense will be that] the authority of the sacred record, *i.e.* the Veda, arises from its declaring, *i.e.* establishing, duty, for the text which establishes any authoritative matter must be itself an authority. The proof of Īśvara and his competence will be hereafter stated." The commentator then goes on to answer the charges of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology alleged against the Veda.

The next aphorism which I shall quote (vi. 1, 1) is thus introduced by the commentator :

*Buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kṛitir vede | saṁsāra-mūla-kāraṇayor dharmādhar-
mayoḥ parīkshā śhaśṭhādhyāyārthaḥ | dharmādharman cha "svarga-
kāmo yajeta" "na kalanjam bhakshayed" ityādi-vidhi-nishedha-bala-
kalpanīyau vidhi-nishedha-vākyaayoḥ prāmāṇye sati syātām | tat-prāmāṇ-
yaṁ cha vaktur yathārtha-vākyaārtha-jñāna-lakṣhaṇa-guṇa-pūrvakatvād
upapadyato | svataḥ prāmāṇyasya nishedhāt | ataḥ prathamam veda-prā-
māṇya-prayojaka-guṇa-sādhanam upakramate | "vākya-kṛitir" vākya-
rathanā | sā buddhi-pūrvā vaktri-yathārtha-vākyaārtha-jñāna-pūrvā |
vākya-rathanāvāt | "nādi-tīre pancha phalāni santi" ity asmad-ūdi-
vākya-rathanāvat | "vede" iti vākya-samudāye ity arthaḥ | tatra samu-
dāyīnām vākyaṇām kṛitih pakṣaḥ | na cha asmad-ūdi-buddhi-pūrvaka-*

¹¹⁴ For the sake of the reader who does not know Sanskrit, it may be mentioned that *taḍ* being in the crude, or uninflected form, may denote any of the three genders, and may be rendered either 'his,' 'hers,' or 'its.' I may observe that the alternative explanation which the commentator gives of the Aphorism, i. 1, 3, viz. that the authority of the Veda arises from its being declarative of duty, is a much less probable one than the other, that its authority is derived from its being the utterance of God; for it does not clearly appear how the subject of a book can establish its authority; and, in fact, the commentator, when he states this interpretation, is obliged, in order to give it the least appearance of plausibility, to assume the authoritative character of the precepts in the Veda, and from this assumption to infer the authority of the book which delivers them. I may also observe that Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapanḥānana, the author of the Gloss on S'ankara Mīśra's Commentary, takes no notice of this alternative interpretation; and that in his comment on the same aphorism when repeated at the close of the work (x. 2, 9) S'ankara Mīśra himself does not put it forward a second time. Dr. Roer (Journ. Germ. Or. Soc. for 1867, p. 310) argues in favour of the former of the two interpretations as the true one.

tvena anyathā-siddhiḥ | “svarga-kāmo yajeta” ityādāv iṣṭa-sādhana-tāyāḥ kuryatāyāḥ vā asmad-ādi-buddhy-agocharatvāt | tena svatantra-puruṣha-pūrvakatvaṁ vede siddhyati | vedatvaṁ cha śabda-tad-upajīvi-pramāṇātirikta - pramāṇa-janya-pramity-aviśayārthakatve sati śabda-janya-vākya-rtha-jñānājanya-pramāṇa-śabdatvam |

“An examination of righteousness and unrighteousness, which are the original causes of the world,¹¹⁵ forms the subject of the 6th section. Now, righteousness and unrighteousness are to be constituted by virtue of such injunctions and prohibitions as these: ‘The man who desires paradise should sacrifice,’ ‘Let no one eat garlic,’ etc., provided these injunctions and prohibitions be authoritative. And this authoritative-ness depends upon the fact of the utterer [of these injunctions or prohibitions] possessing the quality of understanding the correct meaning of sentences, for the supposition of inherent authoritativeness is untenable. The author, therefore, first of all enters upon the proof of that quality which gives rise to the authoritativeness of the Veda.

“Aphorism vi. 1. 1.—‘There is in the Veda a construction of sentences which is produced (*lit.* preceded) by intelligence.’”

“The ‘construction of sentences,’ the composition of sentences, ‘is produced by intelligence,’ *i.e.* by a knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences on the part of the utterer [of them]; [and this is proved] by the fact of these sentences possessing an arrangement like the arrangement of such sentences as ‘There are five fruits on the river side,’ composed by such persons as ourselves. ‘In the Veda,’ *i.e.* in the collection of sentences (so called). Here the construction of the sentences composing the collection is the subject of the proposition which is asserted. And this construction must not be ascribed to a wrong cause by assuming that it was the work of a [limited] intelligence such as ours. [Because it was not a limited intelligence which produced these sentences]. For it is not an object of apprehension to the understandings of persons like ourselves that such injunctions as, ‘He who desires paradise should sacrifice,’ are the instruments of obtaining what we desire, or that they are obligatory in themselves. Hence in the case of the Veda the agency of a self-dependent person is

¹¹⁵ This, I suppose, means that the existence of the world in its present or developed form, is necessary in order to furnish the means of rewarding righteousness and punishing unrighteousness.

established [since these matters could be known by such a person alone.] And while the contents of the Veda are not the subjects of a knowledge produced by any proof distinct from verbal proof and the proofs dependent thereon, Vedicity, or the characteristic nature of the Veda, consists in its being composed of (authoritative) words, whose authority does not spring from a knowledge of the meaning of sentences arising from words [but depends on the underived omniscience of its author].” “Or, Vedicity consists in being one or other of the four collections, the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, or Atharvan.”¹¹⁶

I will introduce the next aphorism (x. 2, 9) which I propose to cite (and which is a repetition of aphorism i. 1, 3), by adducing some remarks of the commentator on the one which immediately precedes it, viz. x. 2, 8 :

Nanu śruti-prāmāṇye sati syād evam | tad eva tu durlabham | na hi mīmāṃsakānām iva nitya-nīrdoshatvena śruti-prāmāṇyaṃ trayā ishyate paurusheyatvenābhīyupagamāt purushasya cha bhrama-pramāda-vipralipsādi-sambhavāt | atah āha “drishṭābhāve” iti | drishṭam purushāntaro ’smad-ūdaḥ bhrama-pramāda- [viprati?] lipsādikaṃ puruṣa-dūṣhaṇaṃ tad-abhāve sati ity arthaḥ | kṣhiti-kartṭritvena veda-vaktrītena vā ’numitasya puruṣa-dhāureyasya nīrdoshatvena eva upasthiteḥ | tathā cha tad-rachasām na nirabhidheyatū na viparītābhidheyatū na nishprayojanābhidheyatū | bhūtendriya-manasām doṣhād bhrama-pramāda-kārṇānāpāṭarūdi-prayuktāḥ eva rachasām avīśuddhayaḥ sambhūyante | na cha īśvara-vachasi tāsām sambhavaḥ | tad uktam “rūgājnānādiḥhir vaktā grastatvād anṛitaṃ vadet | te cheśvare na vidyante sa brūyāt katham anyathā” | nanu tena īśvareṇa vedaḥ praṇītoḥ ity atra eva viprapattir atah āha | “tad-vachanāt āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam” | iti śāstra-purīsamāptau “tad-vachanāt” tena īśvareṇa vachanāt praṇayanād “āmnāyasya” vedaṣya prāmāṇyam | tathā hi | vedāḥ tāt paurusheyāḥ vākyatvād iti sādhitam | na cha asmad-ūdayas teshām sahasra-śūkhārachchinnānām vaktārah sambhūyante atīndriyārthatvāt | na cha atīndriyārtha-darśino ’smad-ūdayaḥ | kincha āptoktāḥ vedāḥ mahājana-parigṛihitatvāt | yad na āptoktāṃ na tad mahājana-parigṛihitāṃ | mahājano-parigṛihitāṃ cha idam | tasmād āptoktam | sra-tantra-puruṣa-praṇītatvaṃ cha āptoktatvam | mahājana-parigṛihitatvaṃ cha sarva-darśanāntahpāli-puruṣhōnushṭhīyam mūnārthatvam | kvachit phalābhāvāḥ karma-kurṭṭri-sādhanā-raigunyatvād

¹¹⁶ The last words are a translation of the conclusion of Jayamāryāna's gloss.

*ity uktam | karttṛi-smaraṇābhavād na evam iti chet | na | karttṛi-smara-
nasya pūrvam eva sādhitatvāt | tat-praṇītatvaṁ cha sva-tantra-purusha-
praṇītatvād eva siddham | na tv asmad-ādīnāṁ sahasra-sūkha-veda-pra-
nayane svātantryaṁ sambhavati ity uktatvāt | kincha pramāyāḥ guṇa-
janyaatvena vaidika-pramāyāḥ api guṇa-janyaatvam āvāśyakam | tatra cha
guṇo vaktṛi-yathārtha-vākyārtha-juṇam eva vāchyāḥ | tathā cha tād-
rīśaḥ eva vede vaktā yaḥ svargūpūrvādi-vishayaka - sūkshātkāravān |
tādrīśaś cha na īśvarād anyāḥ iti sushṭhu |*

“Now all this will be so, provided the Veda is authoritative: but this condition is the very one which is difficult to attain; for you do not hold, like the Mīmāṃsakas, that the authority of the Veda arises from its eternal faultlessness; since you admit that it has a personal author, and error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive are incident to such a person. It is with a view to this objection that the writer says in his aphorism, ‘In the absence of what is seen,’ *i.e.* in the absence of those personal faults which are seen in other persons like ourselves,¹¹⁷ such as error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive: for the Supreme Person who is inferred from the creation of the world, or the authorship of the Veda, can only exist in a state of freedom from fault; and, consequently, neither want of meaning, nor contradiction of meaning, nor uselessness of meaning, can be predicated of his words. Incorrectnesses in words are to be apprehended as the results of error, inadvertence, or unskilfulness in composition, arising from some defect in the elements, the senses, or the mind. But none of these things is to be imagined in the word of *Īśvara* (the Lord). And this has been expressed in the following verse: ‘A speaker may utter falsehood, from being possessed by affection, ignorance, and the like; but these [defects] do not exist in God; how then can he speak what is otherwise [than true]?’

“But may not the fact that the Veda is composed by God be disputed? In consequence of this, the author says (in the next aphorism):

x. 2, 9. ‘The authority of the Vedic record arises from its being uttered by *Him*.’

¹¹⁷ A different interpretation is given by the commentator to this phrase *drīṣṭābhāve*, in an earlier aphorism in which it occurs, viz. vi. 2, 1. He there understands it to mean that where there is no visible motive for a prescribed action, an invisible one must be presumed (*yattra drīṣṭam prayojanaṁ nopalabhyat. tatra adrīṣṭam prayojanaṁ kalpanīyam*).

“Thus at the end of his treatise [the writer lays it down that] the authority of the Veda is derived from its being His word, viz. from its being spoken, *i.e.* composed by Him, *i.e.* by Īśvara. As thus: The Vedas are derived from a person, because they are formed of sentences. This has been proved. And persons like ourselves cannot be conceived as the utterers of these Vedas, which are distinguished by having thousands of Sākhās (recensions), because their objects are such as lie beyond the reach of the senses; and persons like us have no intuition into anything beyond the reach of the senses. Further, the Vedas [are not only derived from a personal author, but they] have been uttered by a competent author (*āpta*), because they have been embraced by great men. Whatever has not been uttered by a competent person is not embraced by great men: but this (book) is embraced by great men: therefore it has been uttered by a competent person. Now, composition by a self-dependent person is utterance by a competent person; and the reception (of the Veda) by great men is the observance of its contents by persons who are adherents of all the different philosophical schools: and (the infallibility of the Veda is defended by that which) has been already said, viz. that any occasional failure in the results (of ceremonies prescribed in the Veda) is owing to some defect in the rite, or in the performer, or in the instruments employed [and not to any fallibility in the Veda].

“If it be objected to this reasoning, that no author (of the Veda) is recollected, we rejoin, that this is not true, because it has been formerly proved that the author is remembered. And that it was composed by Him is proved by the simple fact of its being composed by a self-dependent person; and because it has been said that the self-dependence [or unassisted ability] of people like us in the composition of the Veda, consisting, as it does, of a thousand Sākhās, is inconceivable. And since authority (in a writing in general) springs from a quality [in its author], it necessarily follows that the authority of the Veda also springs from a quality. And there the quality in question must be declared to be the speaker's knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences. And thus (we have shewn that) there is such an utterer of the Veda, who possesses an intuitive knowledge of paradise, and of the yet unseen consequences of actions, etc., and such an utterer is no other than Īśvara. Thus all is satisfactory.”

The ultimate proofs, then, of the binding authority of the Veda are, according to the commentator, 1st, its extent and subject-matter, and 2ndly, its unanimous reception by great men, adherents of all the different orthodox systems. Of course these arguments have no validity except for those who see something supernatural in the Veda, and on the assumption that the great men who embraced it were infallible; and therefore as against the Bauddhas and other heretics who saw nothing miraculous in the Vedas, and consequently regarded all their adherents as in error, they were utterly worthless. But possibly it was not the object of the commentator (for the greater part of the argumentation is his, not that of the author of the Aphorisms) to state the ultimate reasons on which the authority of the Vedas would have to be vindicated against heretics, but merely to explain the proper grounds on which the orthodox schools who already acknowledged that authority ought to regard it as resting; *i.e.* not, as the Mīmāṃsakas held their eternal faultlessness, but the fact of their being uttered by an intelligent and omniscient author; whose authorship, again, was proved by the contents of the Vedas having reference to unseen and future matters of which only an omniscient Being could have any knowledge; while the fact of these revelations in regard to unseen things having actually proceeded from such a Being, and being therefore true, was guaranteed by the unanimous authority of the wisest men among the faithful.

As it is a matter of some interest to know what is the nature of inspiration, or supernatural knowledge, as conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas, I shall quote some passages bearing on this subject from the aphorisms, or from their expounder, Śaṅkara Miśra. In his remarks on Aphorism viii. 1, 2 (p. 357), the commentator states that opinion (*juāna*) is of two kinds, true (*vidyā*) and false (*avidyā*); and that the former (*vidyā*) is of two descriptions, arising from perception, inference, recollection, and the infallible intuition "peculiar to rishis" (*Tach cha juānaṁ dvividhaṁ vidyā cha avidyā cha | vidyā chaturvidhā pratyaksha-laukika-smṛity-ārsha-lakṣhṇā*). Perception or intuition, again, is of different kinds or degrees (Aphorism ix. 1, 11-15, pp. 385 ff.). Aphorism ix. 1, 11 (p. 386), is as follows:

Tad evam bhāvābhāva-vishayakaṁ laukika-pratyakṣaṁ nirūpya yogi-pratyakṣaṁ nirūpayitum prakaraṇāntaram ārabhate | ix. 1, 11. "Ātmany ātma-manasoḥ saṁyoga-viśeṣhād ātma-pratyakṣam" | juānam ut-

*padyate iti śeṣaḥ | dvividhās tāvad yoginaḥ samāhitāntaḥkaraṇāḥ ye
 "yuktāḥ" ity abhidhīyante asamāhitāntaḥkaraṇās cha ye "viyuktāḥ"
 ity abhidhīyante | tatra yuktāḥ sākshātkartavye vastunyo ādareṇa mano
 nidhāya nididhīyāsanavantaḥ | teshām ātmani svātmani parātmani cha
 jñānam utpadyate | "ātma-pratyakṣam" iti | ātmā sākshātkāra-viśayā
 yatra jñāne tat tathā | yadyapy asmad-ādinām api kadūchid ātma-
 jñānam asti tathāpy avidyā-tiraskṛitatvāt tad asat-kalpam ity uktam |
 "ātma-manasos sannikarsha-viśeṣād" iti yoga-ja-dharmānugrahaḥ ātma-
 manasoḥ sannikarsha-viśeṣas tasmād ity arthaḥ |*

“Having thus defined ordinary perception which has for its objects existence and non-existence, the author, with the view of determining the character of the intuition of yogins, says: ‘From a particular concentration of both the soul and the mind¹¹⁸ on the soul, arises the perception (of intuition) of soul.’ On this the commentator remarks: ‘There are two kinds of *yogins* (intent, or contemplative, persons), (1) those whose inner sense is fixed *samāhitāntaḥkaraṇāḥ*, who are called (*yuktāḥ*) united (*i.e.* with the object of contemplation), and (2) those whose inner sense is no longer fixed, and who are called disunited (*viyuktāḥ*).¹¹⁹ Of these the first class, who are called ‘united,’ fix their minds with reverence on the thing which is to be the object of intuition, and contemplate it intently. In this way knowledge arises in their souls regarding their own souls, and the souls of others. ‘Intuition of soul,’ that is, a knowledge in which soul is the perceptible object of intuition. Now, although persons like ourselves have sometimes a knowledge of soul, yet from this knowledge being affected by ignorance, it has been said to be like what is unreal. ‘From a particular concentration of the soul and the mind;’ that is, from a particular conjunction of the soul and the mind which is effected by means of the virtue derived from yoga.” See also Aphorism xv. p. 390.

At the conclusion of his remarks (Bibl. Ind. p. 408) on the third sort of true knowledge (referred to in p. 357, Bibl. Ind.), viz. recollection, the commentator remarks that the author of the aphorisms does not make any separate mention of the fourth kind of knowledge, viz. infallible intuition :

¹¹⁸ The “mind” (*manas*) is regarded by the Indian philosophers as distinct from the soul, and as being merely an internal organ.

¹¹⁹ This class is the more perfect of the two, as appears from the gloss of Jayanāraṇya: *ayam api viśiṣṭa-yogavattvād viyuktāḥ ity uchyate.*

ix. 2, 6. . . . *Ārshaṁ jñānam sūtra-kṛitā pṛithaṅ na lakṣhitam | yogi-pratyakṣhāntarbhāvitam | padārtha-pradeśūkhyo tu prakaraṇe tad uktam | tad yathā |* “*āmnāya-vidhātṛiṇām ṛishīṇām atītānāgata-varṭta-māneshv atīndriyārtheshv artheshu dharmādīshu granthopanibaddheshu vā lingādy-anapekshād ātma-manasoḥ sāmyogād dharmā-viśeshāch cha pṛātibhaṁ jñānaṁ yad utpadyate tad ārsham iti | tach cha kadāchil laukikānām api bhavati yathā kanyakā vadati “śvo me bhrātā gantū iti hri-dayam me kathayati” iti |*

“Rishis’ (*ārsha*) knowledge,” he says, “is not separately defined by the author of the aphorisms, but is included in the intuition of *yogins*.¹²⁰ But the following statement has been made (in reference to it) in the section on the categories: ‘Rishis’ (*ārsha*) knowledge is that which, owing to a conjunction of the soul and the mind, independent of inference, etc., and owing to a particular species of virtue, illuminates those rishis who have composed the record of the Vedas (*āmnāya-vidhātṛiṇām*), in reference to such matters, whether past, future, or present, as are beyond the reach of the senses, or in reference to matters of duty, etc., recorded in books,’ etc. And this sort of knowledge is also sometimes manifested by ordinary persons, as when a girl says, ‘my heart tells me that my brother will go to-morrow.’” See also Aphorism ix. 2, 13 (Bibl. Ind. pp. 414, 415).

The Tarka-sangraha, another Vaiśeshika work, also affirms the divine authorship of the Veda in these words: ¹²¹ *Vākyaṁ dvividhaṁ laukikaṁ vaidikaṁ cha | vaidikam Īśvaroktatvāt sarvam eva pramāṇam laukikaṁ tu āptoktam pramāṇam anyad apramāṇam |* “Sentences are of two kinds, Vedic and secular. Vedic sentences, from being uttered by Īśvara, are all proof [or authoritative]. Of secular sentences, those only which are uttered by competent persons (*āpta*) are proof; the rest are not proof.”

In this text, the authority of the Veda is founded on its being uttered by Īśvara; and this characteristic is regarded as limited to the Veda.

¹²⁰ It had been already noticed by Professor Max Müller in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vii. p. 311, that “the Vaiśeshikas, like Kapila, include the intuition of enlightened rishis under the head of *pratyakṣha* (intuition), and thus separate it decidedly from *aitihya*, ‘tradition.’” He also quotes the commentator’s remark about a similar intuition being discoverable among ordinary persons, which he thinks is not “without a certain irony.”

¹²¹ See Dr. Ballantyne’s ed. with Hindī and English Versions, p. 40 of the Sanskrit.

On the other hand, such secular works as proceed from competent persons (*āpta*) are also declared to possess authority. Here, therefore, a distinction is drawn between the authority of the Veda and that of all other writings, however authoritative, inasmuch as the former was uttered by *Īśvara*, while the latter have only been uttered by some competent person (*āpta*). But in the Nyāya aphorism, ii. 68, quoted and commented upon above (p. 114), the authority of the Veda itself is made to rest on the authority of the wise, or competent persons (*āpta*), from whom it proceeded.¹²² In this aphorism, therefore, either the word “*āpta*” must mean “*Īśvara*,” or we must suppose a difference of view between the author of the aphorism on the one hand, and the writers of the Vaiśeṣhika aphorisms and the Tarka-sangraha on the other. We shall see from the next extract that the Kusumāñjali coincides with the latter.

I quote from the work just named (of which Udayana Āchārya is the author), and its commentary,¹²³ some statements of the doctrine maintained by the author regarding the origin and authority of the Veda. Mr. Colebrooke (Misc. Ess. i. 263, or p. 166 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) speaks of this treatise as being accompanied by a commentary of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha; but the one which is printed in the Calcutta edition, as well as in Professor Cowell's, is by Haridāsa Bhaṭṭāchārya. The object of the work is to prove the existence of a personal god (*Īśvara*), in opposition to various other antagonistic theories.

I. Kusumāñjali, 2nd Stavaka, at the commencement: *Anyathā 'pi paraloka-sādhanānushṭhāna-sambhavād iti dvitīya-vipratipattiḥ | Anyathā Īśvaraṁ vinā 'pi paraloka-sādhanā-yāgyādy-anushṭhānaṁ sambhavati yāgyādeḥ svarga-sādhanatvasya veda-gamyatvāt | nitya-nirdoshatayā cha vedasya prāmāṇyam | mahājana-parigrahāc cha prāmāṇyasya grahaḥ iti veda-kāranatayā na Īśvara-siddhiḥ | yogardhi-sampādita-sārvajnya-Kāpi-*

¹²² The following words are put by the author of the Vishṇu Purāṇa (ii. ch. 18; Wilson, vol. iii. p. 212) into the mouth of the deluder who promulgated the Bauddha and other heresies: *Na hy āpta-vādāḥ nabhaso nipatanti mahāsuraḥ | yuktimaḥ eachanaṁ grāhyam mayā 'nyais cha bhavad-vidhaiḥ |* “Words of the competent do not, great Asuras, fall from the sky. It is only words supported by reasons that should be admitted by me and others like yourselves.”

¹²³ This book was published at the Sanskrit Press, Calcutta, in the Śaka year, 1769. A new edition was published by Professor Cowell in 1864, accompanied by an English translation. I have availed myself of this excellent version to correct a good many mistakes in my own.

lādi-pūrvakaḥ eva vā vedo 'stv ity atra āha | "pramāyāḥ paratantratvāt sarga-pralaya-sambhavāt | tad-nyasminn aviśvāsād na vidhāntara-sambhavaḥ" | S'ābdi pramā vaktṛi-yathārtha-vakyārtha-dhī-rūpa-guṇa-janyā iti guṇādharatayā Īsvara-siddhiḥ | nanu sakartrike 'stu yathārtha-vāk-yārtha-dhīr guṇaḥ | akartrike cha vede nirdoshatvam eva prāmānya-prajojakam astu mahājana-parigraheṇa cha prāmānya-grahaḥ ity ata āha | "sarga-pralaya-sambhavād" iti | pralayottaram pūrva-veda-nāsād uttaravedasya katham prāmānyam mahājana-parigrahasyāpi tadā abhāvāt | śabdasya anityatvam utpanno ga-kārah iti pratīti-siddham | pravāhāvichcheda-rūpa-nityatvam api pralaya-sambhavād nāsti iti bhāvāḥ | Kapilādayaḥ eva sargādau pūrva-sargābhyasta-yoga-janya-dharmānubhavāt śakṣhāt-kṛita-sakalārthāḥ karttārah santu | ity ata āha | "tad-nyasminn" iti | viśva-nirmāna-samarthāḥ aṇimādi-śakti-sampannāḥ yaḍi sarvajnās tadā lāghavād eka eva tādrīśaḥ svīkṛiyatām | sa eva bhagavān Īsvaraḥ | anityāsarva-vishayaka-jnānavati cha viśvāsāḥ eva nāsti | iti vaidika-vyavahāra-vilopaḥ | iti na vidhāntara-sambhavaḥ Īsvarānangī-kartri-naye iti śeśhaḥ |

“The second objection is that [there is no proof of an Īsvara], since the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of any such Being. That is to say, the celebration of sacrifices, etc., which are the instruments of obtaining paradise, can take place otherwise, *i.e.* even without an Īsvara (God). For the fact that sacrifices, etc., are the instruments of obtaining paradise is to be learned from the Veda, while the authority of the Veda rests upon its eternal faultlessness; and the [immemorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by illustrious men. Now in this way there is no proof of the existence of a God to be derived from the idea that he is the cause of the Veda. Or let it be supposed that the Veda was preceded [composed] by Kapila and other sages, who by their wealth in devotion had acquired omniscience.

“In answer to all this the author says: [verse] ‘Since truth depends on an external source, since creation and dissolution occur, and since there is no confidence in any other than God, therefore no other manner can be conceived [in which the Veda originated, except from God].’ [Comment] Verbal truth [or authoritative] is derived from the attribute, possessed by its promulgator, of comprehending the true sense of words [*i.e.* in order to constitute the Veda an authoritative

rule of duty, it must have proceeded from an intelligent being who understood the sense of what he uttered]; and since God is the substratum of this attribute [of intelligence], there is proof of his existence.

“But it may be said that if the Veda had a maker, then, indeed, such comprehension of the true sense of words as you insist upon may be a quality belonging to him; but if the Veda had no maker, let it be its faultlessness which imparts to it its authority, while the [immemorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by illustrious men.

“In answer to this the author says: ‘Since creation and dissolution occur.’ Since the previous Veda [the one which existed during the former mundane period] perished after the dissolution of the universe, how can the subsequent Veda [*i.e.* the one supposed by our opponents to have existed during the dissolution] be authoritative, since there was not then even any reception of it by illustrious men [who also had all become extinct at the dissolution]. And further, the non-eternity of sound is proved by the conviction we have that letters such as G are produced, [and not eternal]: and even that eternity (or perpetuity) of the Veda which consists in unbroken continuity of tradition, does not exist, as there is probable proof of a dissolution.¹²⁴ But, again, it is urged that Kapila and other saints—who, from their perception of duty, springing from the practice of devotion during the former mundane period, had acquired an intuitive knowledge of every subject—may at the creation have been the authors of the Veda. This is answered in the words, ‘since there is no confidence in any other but God.’ If persons capable of creating the universe and possessing the faculty of minuteness be omniscient, then, for the sake of simplicity, let one such person only be admitted, namely, the divine Īśvara.¹²⁵ And no confidence can be reposed in any person who is not eternal, and who is not possessed of a knowledge which extends to all objects. Thus the Vedic tradition disappears. And so he concludes that no other manner [of the origination of the Veda] can be conceived [except

¹²⁴ The writers on the other side seem to reply to this Naiyāyika objection about the interruption of the tradition of the Veda through the dissolution of the universe, by saying that the Veda was retained in the memory of Brahmā or the Rishis during the interval while the dissolution lasted. See Kullūka on Manu, i. 23, above, p. 6; and the passage of Kaiyyāta on the Mahābhāshya, above, p. 96.

¹²⁵ “The law of parsimony bids us assume only one such,” etc.—Cowell.

from Īśvara]; that is, in the system of those who deny an Īśvara [no way is pointed out].”

II. Kusumānjali, iii. 16.—“*Na pramāṇam anāptoktir nādrishṭe kvachid āptatā | adriśya-driśṭau sarvajno na cha nityāgamah kshamah*” | *ayaṁ hi sarva-karṭṛitvābhāvavedakah śabdaḥ anāptoktāś ched na pramāṇam | āptoktāś ched etad-artha-gochara-jnānaviṣṭo nitya-sarva-vishayaka-jnānavat-tvam indriyādy-abhāvāt | āgamasya cha nityatvaṁ dūshitam eva prāg iti veda-kāro nityaḥ sarvajnaḥ siddhyati* |

[Verse] “The word of an incompetent person is not authoritative; nor can there be any competency in regard to a thing unseen [by the speaker]. To perceive invisible things, a person must be omniscient; and an eternal scripture is impossible. [Comment] This [supposed] scriptural testimony, denying the fact of there being a creator of all things, if uttered by an incompetent person, would be no proof. If it was uttered by a competent person, then the person who possessed an acquaintance with this circumstance [that there was no creator] would be master of a knowledge which was eternal, and universal in its range, since he would not be limited by any bodily organs. And we have previously disproved the eternity of any scripture (see the first extract from the Kusumānjali, above). Consequently an omniscient and eternal author of the Veda is established.”

III. Kusumānjali, v. 1.—“*Kāryyāyojana-dhṛityādeḥ padāt pratyaya-taḥ śruteḥ | vākyaṭ sankhyā-viśeshāch cha sādhyo viśvaviḍ avyayaḥ*” | . . . *Pratyayataḥ pramāṇyāt | veda-janya-jnānaṁ kāraṇa-guṇa-janyam pramātvāt | pratyakshādi-pramā-vat | śruter vedāt | vedaḥ paurusheyo veda-tvād āyurveda-vat | kincha vedaḥ paurusheyo vākyatvād bhāratādi-vat | veda-vākyaṇi paurusheyāṇi vākyatvād asmād-ādi-vākya-vat* |

✕ [Verse] “An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be proved from [the existence of] effects, from the conjunction of [atoms], from the support [of the earth in the sky], etc., from ordinary usages, from belief [in revelation], from the Veda, from sentences, and from particular numbers.”

The following is so much of the comment as refers to the words *pratyaya*, *śruti*, and *vākya*: “From belief, *i.e.* from authoritativeness. The knowledge derived from the Veda is derived from the attributes of its Cause; since it is true knowledge, like the true knowledge derived from perception. From the *śruti*, *i.e.* the Veda. The Veda is [shewn

to be] derived from a person, by its having the characters of a Veda, like the Āyur-veda. It is also [shewn to be] derived from a person, by having the character of sentences, like the Mahābhārata. The words of the Veda are [shewn to be] derived from a person, by their having the character of sentences, like the sentences of persons such as ourselves."

IV. Kusumāñjali, v. 16.—“*Syām*” “*abhūvam*” “*bhaviṣyāmi*” ‘*tyādaṁ sankhyā pravakṛi-gū | samākhyā ’pi cha śākhānām nāḍya-pravachanād ṛite | Vaidikottama-purushena svatantrachārāyituh sankhyā vāchyā | “tad aikshata eko ’ham bahu syām” ityādi-bahushu uttama-purusha-srutoh | sankhyā-padārtham anyam āha “samākhyā” ityādi | sarvāsām śākhānām hi Kāṭhaka-Kālāpakādyāḥ samākhyāḥ sanjñā-viśeṣāḥ śrūyante | te cha na adhyayana-mātra-nibandhanāḥ | adhyeṭṛiṇām ānantyāt | ādāv anyair api tad-adhyayanāt | tasmād atindriyārtha-darśi bhagavān eva Īśvaraḥ kārūnikāḥ sargādāv asmad-ādy-adṛiṣṭākṛiṣṭa-kāṭhaka-śarīra-viśeṣam adhiṣṭhāya yām śākhām uktvāms tasyāḥ śākhāyās tanmāmnā vyapadeśaḥ iti siddham Īśvara-mananam mokṣa-hetuḥ |*

[Verse | “In the phrases ‘let me be,’ ‘I was,’ ‘I shall be,’ [which occur in the Veda], personal designations have reference to a speaker; and the names of the Śākhās could only have been derived from a primeval utterance. [Comment] The first person (I), when it occurs in the Veda, must be employed to denote a self-dependent utterer. Now there are many instances there of such a use of the first person, as in the words, ‘It reflected, I am one, let me become many.’ The author then specifies another signification of the term *sankhyā* in the clause, ‘and the designations,’ etc. For all the Śākhās of the Veda traditionally bear the names, the special names, of Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc. And these names cannot be connected with the mere study [of these Śākhās by Kāṭha, Kalāpa, etc.] from the infinite multitude of students, since they must have been studied before by others besides the persons just mentioned. Wherefore the particular Śākhās which Īśvara, the beholder of objects beyond the reach of the senses, the compassionate Lord, himself uttered at the beginning of the creation, when he assumed the bodies of Kāṭha, etc., which were drawn on by the destiny (*adṛiṣṭa*) of beings like ourselves—these Śākhās, I say, were designated by the names of the particular sages [in whose persons they were promulgated]. And so it is proved that the contemplation of Īśvara is the cause of final liberation.”

I am unable to say if the ancient doctrine of the Nyāya was theistic, as that of the Vāisheshika Sūtras (at least as interpreted by Sankara Miśra) appears to be, and as that of the Kusumāñjali, the Tarka-saṅgraha,¹²⁶ and the Siddhānta Muktvāvali undoubtedly is (p. 6 of Dr. Ballantyne's ed., or p. 12 of his "Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy," and p. 13 of Dr. Röer's Bhāshā-paricheheda, in Bibl. Ind.). The remarks of Dr. Röer on the subject, in pp. xv., xvi., of the introduction to the last named work, may be consulted. The subject is also discussed by Professor Banerjea in his work on Hindu philosophy, pp. 144-153. The solution of the question may depend much on the interpretation to be given to the aphorisms of Gotama, 19-21 of the fourth book.

III. *The Sāṅkhya*.—The opinions of the author of the Sāṅkhya aphorisms in regard to the authority of the Veda and the principles on which that authority depends, are contained in the 45th to the 51st aphorisms of the Fifth Book, which I extract with the comments of Vijnāna Bhikshu :¹²⁷

45. "Na nityatvaṁ Vedānāṁ kāryatva-sruteḥ" | "Sa tapo 'tapyata tasmāt tapas tepānāt trayo vedā ajāyanta" ity ādi-sruter vedānāṁ na nityatvam ity arthaḥ | veda-nityatvā-vākyaṇi cha sa jātyānupūrvi-pravāhānuchoheda-parāṇi | Tarhi kim paurusheyāḥ vedāḥ | na ity āha | 46. "Na paurusheyatvaṁ tat-kartuḥ purushasya abhāvāt" | śvara-pratishēdād itī śeṣaḥ | sugamam | aparaḥ karttā bhavatu ity ākāṅkshāyām āha | 47. "Muktāmuktayor ayogyatvāt" | Jīvan-mukta-dhurīṇo Viṣṇur viśudha-sattvalayā niratiśaya-sarvajno 'pi vīta-rāgatvāt sahasra-śākha-veda-nirmāṇāyogyāḥ | amuktas tv asarvajnatvād eva ayogyāḥ ity arthaḥ | nanv eram apaurusheyatvād nityatvam eva āgatam | tatrāha | 48. "Na apaurusheyatvād nityatvam ankurādi-vat" | Spashṭam | nanv ankurādishv api kāryatvena ghaṭādi-vat purushyatvam anumeyam | tatrāha | 49. "Tishāṁ api tad-yoge drishṭa-bādhādi-prasaktiḥ" | Yat paurusheyāṁ tach ch'a-

¹²⁶ Jñānādhikaraṇam ātmū | sa drividho jīvūtmā paramūtmā cha | tatra Śvaraḥ sarvajnaḥ paramūtmā eka eva | jīvūtmā prati śarīram bhīmo vibhur nityascha. | "The substratum of knowledge is soul. It is of two kinds, the embodied soul, and the supreme soul. Of these the supreme soul is the omniscient Śvara, one only. The embodied soul is distinct in each body, all-pervading, and eternal."

¹²⁷ Compare Dr. Ballantyne's translation of the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms, books v. and vi., published at Mirzapore in 1856, pp. 26 ff., as well as that which subsequently appeared in the Bibliotheca Indica (in 1865), pp. 127 ff.

rīra-janyam iti vyāptir loke dṛishṭū tasyāḥ bādhūdir evam sati syād iti arthah | nanv Ādi-purushocharitatvād Vedāḥ api paurusheyāḥ eva ity āha | 50. "Yasmin adriṣṭe 'pi kṛita-buddhir upajūyate tat paurusheyam" | Driṣṭe iva adriṣṭe 'pi yasmin vastuni kṛita-buddhir buddhipūrvakatva - buddhir jūyate tad eva paurusheyam iti vyavahriyate ity arthah | etad uktam bhavati | na purushocharitatā-mātreṇa paurusheyatvaṃ svāsa-prasvāsayoḥ sushupti-kālinayoḥ paurusheyatva-vyavahārā-bhāvāt kintu buddhi-pūrvakatvena | Vedās tu niḥsvāsa-vad eva adriṣṭa-vasād abuddhi-pūrvakāḥ eva Svayambhuvaḥ sakāsāt svayam bhavanti | ato na to paurusheyāḥ | tathā cha śrutih "tasyaitasya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitam etad yad ṛigvedo ity ādir" iti | nanv evam yathārtha-vākyaṛthajnānāpūrvakatvāt śuka-vākyaśyeva vedānām api prāmānyaṃ na syāt tatrāha | 51. "Nija-śakty-abhvyakteḥ svataḥ prāmānyam" | Vedānām nijā svābhāviki yā yathārthā-jnāna-janana-śaktis tasyāḥ mantrāyurvedādāv abhivyakter upalambhād akhila-vedūnām eva svataḥ eva prāmānyaṃ siddhyati na vaktri-yathārtha-jnāna-mūlakatvādīnā ity arthah | tathā cha Nyāya-sūtram | "mantrāyurveda-prāmānya-vach cha tat-prāmānyam" iti |

"Sūtra 45. 'Eternity cannot be predicated of the Vedas, since various texts in these books themselves declare them to have been produced.' The sense is this, that the Vedas are proved not to be eternal by such texts as the following: 'He performed austerity; from him, when he had thus performed austerity, the three Vedas were produced.' [See above, p. 4.] Those other texts which assert the eternity [or perpetuity] of the Vedas refer merely to the unbroken continuity of the stream of homogeneous succession [or tradition]. Are the Vedas, then, derived from any personal author? 'No,' he replies in Sūtra 46. 'The Vedas are not derived from any personal author (*paurusheya*), since there is no person to make them.' We must supply the words, 'since an *Īsvara* (God) is denied.' The sense is easy. In answer to the supposition that there may be some other maker, he remarks, Sūtra 47, 'No; for there could be no fit maker, either liberated or unliberated.' Vishṇu, the chief of all those beings who are liberated even while they live,¹²⁸ although, from the pure goodness of his nature, he is possessed of perfect omniscience, would, owing to his impassiveness, be unfit to compose the Veda consisting of a thousand śūkhās (branches),

¹²⁸ See Colebrooke's Essays, i. 369, or p. 241 of Williams and Norgate's ed.

while any unliberated person would be unfit for the task from want of omniscience. (See Sankara's comment on Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3; above, p. 106.) But does not, then, the eternity of the Vedas follow from their having no personal author? He replies (48), 'Their eternity does not result from their having no personal author, as in the case of sprouts, etc.' This is clear. But is it not to be inferred that sprouts, etc., since they are products, have, like jars, etc., some personal maker? He replies (49), 'If such a supposition be applied to these (sprouts, etc.) it must there also be exposed to the objection that it is contrary to what we see, etc.' Whatever is derived from a personal author is produced from a body; this is a rule which is seen to hold invariably. But if we assert that sprouts are derived from a personal author, we contradict the rule in question, [since they evidently did not spring from any embodied person]. But are not the Vedas, too, derived from a person, seeing that they were uttered by the primeval Purusha? He answers (50), 'That object only (even though it be an invisible one), which its maker is conscious of having made, can be said to be derived from [or made by] such a person.' It is only those objects, be they seen or unseen, in regard to which a consciousness of design arises, that are ordinarily spoken of as made by a person. The sense is, that it is not mere utterance by a person which constitutes formation by that person (since we do not ordinarily speak of the inspirations and expirations of any person during the time of sleep, as being formed by that person), but only utterance with conscious design. But the Vedas proceed of their own accord from Svayambhū (the self-existent), like an expiration, by the force of *adrishṭa* (destiny), without any consciousness on his part. Hence they are not formed by any person. Thus the Veda says, 'This Rig-veda, etc., is the breath of this great Being, etc.' [See above, p. 8.] But will not the Vedas, also, be in this way destitute of authority, like the chatter of a parrot, since they did not result from any knowledge of the correct meaning of the words of which they are made up? In reference to this, he says (51), 'The Vedas have a self-proving authority, since they reveal their own inherent power.' The self-evidencing authority of the entire Vedas is established by the perception of a manifestation in certain portions of them, viz. in the formulas and the Āyur-veda, etc., of that inherent power which they (the Vedas) possess of generating correct knowledge, and does not depend on

its being shown that they (the Vedas) are founded on correct knowledge in their utterer,¹²⁹ or on any other ground of that sort. And to this effect is the Nyāya Sūtra, that 'their authority is like the authority of the formulas and the Āyur-veda.' (See above, p. 114.)

In reference to the 46th Sūtra I add here the 98th aphorism of the 1st book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed :

Nanu chet sadā sarvajñaḥ īśvaro nāsti tarhi vedānta-mahāvākyaṛthasya vivekasya upadeśo 'ndha-paramparāsankayā aprāmānyam prasajyeta | tatra āha | 98. Siddha-rūpa-bodhritvād vākyaṛthopadeśaḥ | Hiranyagarbhādīnām siddha-rupānām¹³⁰ yathārthārthasya bodhritvāt tad-vaktṛikāyurvedādi-prāmānyena avadhritāch cha eśhām vākyaṛthopadeśaḥ pramānam iti śeśhaḥ |

"But may it not be said that if there be no eternally omniscient Īśvara, the charge of want of authority/will attach to the inculcation of discriminative knowledge which is the subject of the great texts of the Upanishads, from the doubt lest these texts may have been handed down by a blind tradition. To this he replies : 86. 'From the fact that beings perfect in their nature understood them, it results that we have an (authoritative) inculcation of the sense.' *As Hiranyagarbha (Brahmā) and other beings who were perfect in their nature understood the true sense, and are ascertained to have done so by the authoritativeness of the Āyur-veda, etc., which they uttered, their inculcation of the sense of the texts is authority ;—such is the complete meaning of the aphorism."

In the 57th and following Sūtras of the fifth book, Kapila denies that sound has the character of *sphoṭa*, or that letters are eternal :

57. "*Pratity-apratitibhyām na sphoṭātmakāḥ śabdaḥ*" | *Pratyekavarṇebhyo 'tiriktaṁ kalasaḥ ityādi-rūpam akhaṇḍam eka-padam sphoṭaḥ iti yogair abhyupagamyate | kambu-grīvādy-avayavobhyo 'tirikto ghaṭādy-avayavīva | sa cha śabda-viśeṣo padābhyo 'rtha-sphuṭikaraṇāt sphoṭaḥ ity uchyate | sa śabdo 'prāmānikāḥ kulaḥ | "pratity-apratitibhyām" | sa śabdaḥ kim pratīyate na vā | ādye yena varṇa-samudāyena ānupurvī-*

¹²⁹ This directly contradicts the doctrine enunciated in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras and the Kusumāñjali. See above, pp. 121, 123, and 129 f.

¹³⁰ This is a various reading given by Dr. Hall in the appendix to his edition of the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya ; and I have adopted it in preference to *siddha-rūpasya* which he gives in his text, as the former seems to afford a better sense.

viśeṣha-viśiṣṭena so 'bhivyaḥyate tasya eva artha-pratyāyakatvam astu | kim antargaḍunā tena | antye tv ajñāta-sphoṭasya nāsty artha-pratyāyana-saktir iti vyarthū sphoṭa-kalpanā ity arthaḥ | Pūrvaṁ vedūnām nityatvam pratishiddham | idanīm varṇa-nityatvam api pratishedati | 58. "Na śabda-nityatvaṁ kāryatū-pratiteḥ" | Sa eva ayaṁ ga-kāraḥ ityādi-pratyabhijñā - balād varṇa-nityatvaṁ na yuktam | utpanno ga-kāraḥ ityādi-pratyayena anityatva-siddher ity arthaḥ | pratyabhijñā taj-jātiyatā-viśayiṇi | anyathā ghaṭāder api pratyabhijñāyāḥ nityatāpatter iti | śankate | 59. "Pūrva-siddha-sattvasya abhivyaḥyati dipeneva ghaṭasya" | Nanu pūrva-siddha-sattākasyaiva śabdasya dhvany-ādibhir yā 'bhivyaḥyatis tan-mātram utpattiḥ pratīter viśayaḥ | abhivyaḥyatu dṛiṣṭānto dipeneva ghaṭasya iti | Pariharati | 60. "Sat-kāryya-siddhāntaś chet siddha-sādhanam" | Abhivyaḥyati yady anūgatāvasthā - tyāgena varttamānāvasthā-lābhaḥ ity uchyate tadā sat-kāryya-siddhāntaḥ | tādrīśa-nityatvaṁ cha sarva-kāryūnām eva iti siddha-sādhanam ity arthaḥ | yodi cha varttamānatayā sataḥ eva jñāna-mātra-rūpiṇy abhivyaḥyati uchyate tadā ghaṭādīnām api nityatvōpattir ityādi |

“ ‘Sound has not the character of *sphoṭa*, from the dilemma that the latter must be either apparent or not apparent.’ A modification of sound called *sphoṭa*, single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words like *kulaśa* (jar), distinguished also from parts of words like *kambu-grīva* (striped-neck) and forming a whole like the word *ghaṭa* (jar), is assumed by the Yogas. And this species of sound called a word (*pada*) is designated *sphoṭa* from its manifesting a meaning. But the existence of this form of sound is destitute of proof. Why? ‘From the dilemma that it must be either apparent or not apparent.’ Does this form of sound appear or not? If it appears, then let the power of disclosing a meaning [which is ascribed by our opponents to *sphoṭa*] be regarded as belonging to that collection of letters arranged in a particular order, by which the supposed *sphoṭa* is manifested. What necessity is there then for that superfluous *sphoṭa*? If, on the contrary, it does not appear, then that unknown *sphoṭa* can have no power of disclosing a meaning, and consequently it is useless to suppose that any such thing as *sphoṭa* exists.

“The eternity of the Vedas has been already denied. He now denies the eternity of letters also. 58. ‘Sound is not eternal, since it is clear that it is a production.’ The meaning is, that it is not reasonable to

infer on the strength of the recognition of the letter G as the same that we knew before (see *Mīmāṃsā Aphorisms* i. 13; above, p. 74), that letters are eternal; since it is clear that G and other letters are produced, and therefore cannot be eternal. The recognition of these letters has reference to their being of the same species as we have perceived before; since otherwise we are landed in the absurdity that, because we recognize a jar or any other such object to be the same, it must therefore be eternal.

“He expresses a doubt: 59. ‘What we hear may be merely the manifestation of a previously existing thing, as a jar is manifested (not created) by the light of a lamp.’ (See *Mīmāṃsā Aphorisms* i. 12, 13; above, p. 74.) Is it not the fact that it is merely the manifestation of previously existing language by sounds, etc., which we perceive as originating? An illustration of such manifestation is that of a jar by means of a lamp.

“He repels this doubt: 60. ‘If the axiom that an effect exists in its cause be here intended, this is merely proving what is already admitted.’ If by manifestation is meant the relinquishment by any substance of its past (?) condition, and the attainment of its present state, then we have merely the recognized principle of an effect virtually existing in its cause (see *Sāṅkhya Kārika Aph.* ix.); and as such eternity is truly predicable of all effects whatever, it is proving a thing already proved to assert it here. If, on the other hand, by manifestation be merely meant the perception of a thing actually existing, then we shall be involved in the absurdity of admitting that jars, etc., also are eternal, etc.”

SECT. X.—On the use which the authors of the different Darśanas make of Vedic texts, and the mode of interpretation which they adopt.

I have already (in p. 107) touched on the mode of interpretation applied by the author of the *Brahma Sūtras*, or his commentator *Saṅkara Āchārya*, to the Vedic texts, derived chiefly from the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upanishads*, on which the Vedāntic doctrines are based, or by which they are defended, or with which, at least, they are asserted to be consistent. It will, however, be interesting to enquire a little more in detail into the extent to which the Indian scriptures are appealed to, and the manner in which they are treated by the authors or expounders of the different

Darśanas. The object proposed by the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is an enquiry into duty (*dharma-jijnāsā*—Aph. i.). Duty is defined as something enjoined by the Veda (*chodanā-lakṣhaṇo 'rtho dharmah*—Aph. ii.); and which cannot be ascertained to be duty except through such injunction.¹⁵¹ The first six lectures of the Mīmāṃsā, according to Mr. Colebrooke, “treat of positive injunction;” the remaining six concern “indirect command.” “The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture: its differences and varieties, its parts, . . . and the purpose of performance, are successively considered in the three next. . . . The order of performance occupies the fifth lecture; and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth. The subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally, and in the eighth particularly. Inferable changes, adapting to the variation or copy what was designed for the type or model, are discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth.” . . . “Other matters are introduced by the way, being suggested by the main topic or its exceptions” (Misc. Essays, i. 304 f.). It appears, therefore, that the general aim of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is (1) to prove the authority of the Veda, and then to (2) deduce from it the duties, whether enjoined directly or indirectly, which are to be performed, the manner and conditions of their performance, and their results. It is also termed the Karma-mīmāṃsā, “as relating to works or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends” (Colebrooke, i. 296, 325).

The Brahma-mīmāṃsā, or Vedānta, is, according to the same author, the complement of the Karma-mīmāṃsā, and “is termed *uttara*, later, contrasted with *pūrva*, prior, being the investigation of proof deducible from the Vedas in regard to *theology*, as the other is in regard to *works* and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of the Vedas, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later Mīmāṃsā is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but differing on many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as well as a philosophical view” (Misc. Ess. i. 325). In fact the Brahma-mīmāṃsā proceeds upon a depreciation of the value of the objects aimed at by the Karma-mīmāṃsā,

¹⁵¹ See Ballantyne's Mīmāṃsā aphorisms, p. 7.

since the rewards which the latter holds out even in a future state are but of temporary duration; and according to Sankara it is not even necessary that the seeker after a knowledge of Brahma should first have studied the Karma-mīmāṃsā before he conceives the desire to enter upon the higher enquiry (*nanv iha karmābodbhānantaryyaṃ viśe-
shah | na | dharma-jijnāsāyāḥ prāg apy adhīta-vedāntasya Brahma-jijnā-
sopapattē*). (Sankara on Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 1, p. 25 of Bibl. Ind.) This is distinctly expressed in the following passage, p. 28 :

*Tasmāt kim api vaktavyam yad-anantaram Brahma-jijnāsā upadiśyate
iti | uchyaते | nityānitya-vastu-vivekaḥ ihāmūtrārtha-phala-bhoga-virā-
gaḥ śama-damādi-sādhanā-sampad munukshatraṃ cha | teshu hi satsu
prāg api dharma-jijnāsāyāḥ ūrdhvaṃ cha śakyaते Brahma jijnāsāyitūṃ
jñātūṃ cha na viparyyaye | tasmād "atha" śabdena yathokta-sādhanā-
sāmpatty-ānantaryyam upadiśyate | "ataḥ" śabdo hetu-arthah | yasmād
vedaḥ eva agnihotrādīnāṃ śreyas-sādhanānām anitya-phalatāṃ darśayati
" tad yathā iha karma-chīto lokaḥ kshiyate eva eva amuttra punya-chīto
lokaḥ kshiyate" ity-ādi | tathā Brahma-vijnānād api param puruṣār-
thaṃ dar- ti Brahma-vid āpnoti param" ity-ādi | tasmād yathokta-
sādhanā-sāmpatty-ānantaram Brahma-jijnāsā kartavyā |*

The author is explaining the word *atha* 'now,' or 'next,' with which the first Sūtra begins; and is enquiring what it is that is referred to as a preliminary to the enquiry regarding Brahma: "What, then, are we to say that that is after which the desire to know Brahma is enjoined?" The answer is, 'it is the discrimination between eternal and non-eternal substance, indifference to the enjoyment of rewards either in this world or the next, the acquisition of the means of tranquillity and self-restraint, and the desire for final liberation. For if these requisites be present, a knowledge of Brahma can be desired, and Brahma can be known, even before, as well as after, an enquiry has been instituted into duty. But the converse does not hold good (*i.e.* without the requisites referred to, though a man may have a knowledge of duty, *i.e.* of ceremonial observances, he possesses no preparation for desiring to know Brahma). Hence by the word *atha* it is enjoined that the desire in question should follow the possession of those requisites.' The next word *ataḥ*, 'hence,' denotes the reason. Because the Veda itself,—by employing such words as these, 'Wherefore just as in this life the world which has been gained by works

perishes, so too in a future life the world gained by merit perishes'—points out that the rewards of the agnihotra sacrifice and other instruments of attaining happiness are but temporary. And by such texts as this, 'He who knows Brahma attains the highest exaltation,' the Veda further shews that the highest end of man is acquired by the knowledge of Brahma. Hence the desire to know Brahma is to be entertained after the acquisition of the means which have been already referred to."

In the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, i. 1, 5, as we have seen above (p. 71), Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the Brahma Sūtras, is referred to as concurring in the doctrine there laid down. But in many parts of the Brahma Sūtras, the opinions of Jaimini are expressly controverted, both on grounds of reason and scripture, as at variance with those of Bādarāyaṇa.¹³²

I adduce some instances of this difference of opinion between the two schools :

We have seen above, p. 99, that according to the Brahma Sūtras the gods possess the prerogative (*adhikāra*) of acquiring divine science. This, however, is contested by Jaimini (see Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 31), who objects (1) that in that case (as all divine sciences possess the characteristic of being science) the gods would also have the prerogative of becoming adepts in the science called Madhvidyā, etc., which would be absurd, because the sun (Āditya), being the virtual object of worship in the ritual connected with that science, could not be worshipped by another sun, who, according to the supposition, would be one of the deities skilled in it, and one of the worshippers. Similar difficulties are furnished by other cases, as, for instance, that on the hypothesis referred to, the Vasus, Rudras, and three other classes of gods, would be at once the objects to be known and the knowers. In the next Sūtra the further objection is made (2) that the celestial luminaries, commonly called gods, are in reality destitute of sensation and desire; and on this ground also the prerogative in question is denied to the supposed deities. Bādarāyaṇa replies in the 33rd Sūtra (1) that although

¹³² Dr. Ballantyne refers to the Mīmāṃsakas as being the objectors alluded to by Śaṅkara in his remarks which introduce and follow Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 4: but as Jaimini is not expressly mentioned there, I shall not quote this text in proof of my assertion. See Ballantyne's Apherisms of the Vedānta, p. 12.

the gods cannot concern themselves with such branches of knowledge as the Madhuvidyā, with which they themselves are mixed up, yet they do possess the prerogative of acquiring pure divine science, as that depends on the desire and capacity for it, and the non-existence of any obstacle to its acquisition (*tathāpy asti hi śuddhāyām brahma-vidyāyām sambhavo 'rthitva-sāmarthyāpratishedhādy-apekshatvād adhikārasya*). An exception in regard to a particular class of cases cannot, he urges, set aside a rule which otherwise holds good; for if it did, the circumstance that the generality of men belonging to the three highest castes are excluded from the performance of particular rites, such as the Rājasūya, would have the effect of rendering them incapable of performing any sacrifice whatever. And he goes on to cite several Vedic texts which prove that the gods have both the capacity and the desire for divine knowledge. Thus: *Tad yo yo devānām pratyabudhyata sa eva tad abhavat tathā rishinām tathā manushyānām* | “Whosoever, whether of gods, rishis, or men, perceived That, he became That.” Again: *To ha ūchur ‘hanta tam ātmānam anvichhāmo yam ātmānam anvishya sarvān lokān āpnoti sarvāns cha kāmān’ iti* | *Indro ha vai devānām abhi pravavrāja Vīrochano 'svrānām iti* | “They said, ‘come, we shall enquire after that Soul, after investigating which, one obtains all worlds, and all objects of desire.’ Accordingly Indra among the gods, and Virochana among the Asuras, set out” (“to go to Prajāpati the bestower of divine knowledge,” according to Govinda Ānanda). And in reply to the second objection, Śankara maintains that the sun and other celestial luminaries are each of them embodied deities possessed of intelligence and power; an assertion which he proceeds to prove from texts both of the Veda and the Smṛiti. He then replies to a remark of the Mīmānsakas, referred to under Sūtra 32, that allusions in the Vedic mantras and arthavādas (illustrative passages) cannot prove the corporeality of the gods, as these texts have another object in view: and his reply is that it is the evidence, or the want of evidence, derivable from any texts which occasions us to believe or disbelieve in the existence of anything; and not the circumstance that such a text was or was not primarily intended to prove that particular point. The Mīmānsaka is represented as still unsatisfied: but I need not carry my summary further than to say that Śankara concludes by pointing out that the precepts which enjoin the offerings to certain gods imply that these gods have a particular form which the wor-

shipper can contemplate; and that in fact such contemplation is enjoined in the text, "Let the worshipper when about to repeat the Vashaṅkara meditate on the deity to whom the oblation is presented" (*yasyai devatāyai havir grihītaṁ syāt tām dhyāyed vashaṅkarishyan*).¹³³

In Brahma Sūtras, iii. 4, 1, it is laid down as the principle of Bādarāyaṇa that the knowledge of Soul, described in the Upanishads, is the sole means of attaining the highest end of man, *i.e.* final liberation; that it is not to be sought with a view to, and that its operation is altogether independent of, ceremonial observances (*ataḥ | asmāt vadānta-vihītād ātma-jñānāt svatantrāt purushārthaḥ siddhyati iti Bādarāyaṇaḥ ācharyo manyate*). This he proves by various texts (*ity-evaṁ-jātiyakā śrutir vidyāyāḥ kevalāyāḥ purushārtha- hetutvaṁ srāvayati*), such as *Tarati śokam ātma-vit | sa yo ha vai tat param Brahma veda Brahma eva bhavati | Brahma-vid āpnoti param |* "He who knows soul overpasses grief" (Chhāndogya Up. see above, p. 33); "He who knows that Brahma becomes Brahma;" "He who knows Brahma obtains the highest (exaltation);" etc. In the following Sūtra (2) Jaimini is introduced as contesting this principle, and as affirming that the knowledge of soul is to be acquired with a view to the performance of ceremonial works. The Sūtra in question, as explained by Sankara, means that "as the fact that soul is an agent in works implies an ultimate regard to works, the knowledge of soul must also be connected with works by means of its object" (*kartṛitvena ātmanaḥ karma-śeshatvāt tad-rijñānam api . . . vishaya-dvāreṇa karma-sambandhy eva iti*). The same view is further stated in the following Sūtras 3-7, where it is enforced by the example of sages who possessed the knowledge of Brahma and yet sacrificed (Sūtra 3), by a text which conjoins knowledge and works (Sūtra 5), by a second which intimates that a person who knows all the contents of the Veda has a capacity for ceremonial rites (Sūtra 6), and by others (7). Sankara replies under Sūtra 8 to the view set forth in Sūtra 2, which he declares to be founded on a mistake, as "the soul which is proposed in the Upanishads as the object of knowledge is not the embodied soul, but the supreme Spirit, of which agency in regard to rites is not predicable. That knowledge, he affirms, does not promote, but on the

¹³³ The passage in which S'ankara goes on to answer the objection that in cases like this the Itihāsas and Purāṇas afford no independent evidence, will be quoted below.

contrary, puts an end to all works" (*na cha tad-vijnānaṁ karmanām pravarttakam bhavati pratyuta tat karmāny uchchhinatti*), and under Sūtra 16 he explains how this takes place, viz. by the fact that "knowledge annihilates the illusory conceptions of work, worker, and reward, which are caused by ignorance, and are necessary conditions of capacity for ceremonial observances" (*Api cha karmādhikāra-hetoḥ kriyā-kāraka-phala-lakṣhaṇasya samastasya prapanchasya avidyā-kṛitasya vidyā-sūmarthyāt svarūpopamarddam āmananti*). To Sūtra 3 Bādarāyaṇa replies that the ceremonial practice of sages is the same whether they do or do not acquire knowledge with a view to works; to Sūtra 5, by saying that in the text in question works and knowledge are not referable to one and the same person, but works to one and knowledge to another; and to Sūtra 6, by declaring that it is merely the reading of the Veda, and not a knowledge of all its contents that is referred to in the text in question. Another reason assigned in Sūtra 17 to shew that divine knowledge is not dependent on, or subservient to works, is that ascetics who practise no Vedic ceremonies are yet recognized in the Veda as competent to acquire it (*ūrdhvarētassu cha āśrameshu vidyā śrūyate na cha tatra karmāṅgatcaṁ vidyāyūḥ upapadyate karmābhāvāt | na hy agnihotrādīni vaidīkāni karmāṇi teshāṁ santi*). In the following Sūtra (18) Jaimini is introduced as questioning the validity of this argument on the ground that the Vedic texts, which are adduced in support of it, merely allude to the existence of ascetics, and do not recognize such an order as consistent with Vedic usage, or that they have another object, or are ambiguous; while another text actually reprehends the practice of asceticism. To this Bādarāyaṇa rejoins in Sūtra 19, that the texts in question prove the recognized existence of the ascetic order as much as that of any other; and that the alleged ambiguity of one of the passages is removed by the consideration that as two of the three orders referred to, viz. those of the householder and brahmachārin, are clearly indicated, the third can be no other than that of the ascetic. The subject is further pursued in the next Sūtra 20, where the author and his commentator (who adduces additional texts) arrive at the conclusion that the practice of asceticism is not only alluded to, but enjoined in the Veda, and that consequently knowledge, as being inculcated on those who practise it, is altogether independent of works (*tosmāt siddhā ūrdhvarōtasah āśramāḥ siddham cha ūrdhvarētassu vidhānād vidyāyūḥ svātuntryam*).

Again in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 3, 7-14, the question is discussed whether the words *sa etān Brahma gamayati*, "He conducts them to Brahman," refer to the supreme Brāhmā, or to the created Brāhmā. Bādari (Sūtra 7) holds that the latter is meant, whilst Jaimini (in Sūtra 12) maintains that the former is intended. The conclusion to which the commentator comes at the close of his remarks on Sūtra 14 is that the view taken by Bādari is right, whilst Jaimini's opinion is merely advanced to display his own ability (*tasmāt "kāryyam Bādarir" ity esha eva pakshaḥ sthītaḥ | "param Jaiminir" iti cha pakshāntara-pratipādana-mūtra-pradarśanam prajñā-vikāśanāya iti drashṭavyam*).

Further, in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 4, 10, it is stated to be the doctrine of Bādari that the sage who has attained liberation no longer retains his body or bodily organs, but his mind (*manas*) alone, whilst in the following Sūtra (11) it is declared to be Jaimini's opinion that he retains his body and senses also. In the 12th Sūtra it is laid down as the decision of Bādarāyaṇa that either of the two supposed states may be assumed at will by the liberated spirit.

Jaimini and his opinions are also mentioned in Brahma Sūtras i. 2, 28, and 31; i. 4, 18; and iv. 4, 5.

I shall now adduce some illustrations of the claims which the founders of the other philosophical schools put forward on behalf of their own principles as being in conformity with the Vedas. I begin with a passage on this subject from Sankara's note introductory to Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 5 ff. :

Brahma cha sarvajñaṁ sarvasakti jagad-utpatti-sthiti-nāśa-kāraṇam ity uktam | Sāṅkhyādayas tu parinishṭhitaṁ vastu pramāṇāntara-gamyam eva iti manyamānāḥ pradhānādīni kāraṇāntarāṇi anumimānās tat-paratayā eva vedānta-vākyāni yojayanti | sarveshū eva tu vedānta-vākyeshū śiṣṭi-vishayeshū anumānena eva kāryyena kāraṇam lilakshayishitam | Pradhāna-puruṣa-saṅyogāḥ nityānumeyāḥ iti Sāṅkhyāḥ manyante | Kāṇādās tu etebhyaḥ eva vākyebhyaḥ Īśvaraṁ nimitta-kāraṇam anumimate aṅgīs cha samavāyi-kāraṇam | evam anye 'pi tārikikāḥ vākyābhāsa-yuktyābhāsavasāṣṭambhāḥ pūrva-paksha-vādināḥ iha uttishṭhante | tatra pada-vākya-pramāṇa-jnena āchāryyena vedānta-vākyānām Brahmāvagati-paratva-pradarśanāya vākyābhāsa-yuktyābhāsa-pratipattīyāḥ pūrvapakṣī-kṛitya nirākriyante | tatra Sāṅkhyāḥ pradhānam triguṇam akṣtanāṁ jagataḥ kāraṇam iti manyamānāḥ āhur "yāni vedānta-vākyāni sarvajña-

sya sarvasakter Brahmaṇo jagat-kāraṇatvam pratipādayanti ity avochas
 tāni pradhāna-kāraṇa-pakshe 'pi yojayitum śakyante | sarvasaktitvaṁ
 tāvat pradhānasyāpi sva-vikāra-vishayam upapadyate | evaṁ sarvajnu-
 tvam upapadyate | katham | yat tvaṁ jñānam manyaso sa sattva-dharmaḥ
 "sattvāt sanjāyate jñānam" iti smṛiteḥ | tena cha sattva-dharmaṇa
 jñānena kāryya-kāraṇavantah purushāḥ sarvajnāḥ yoginaḥ prasiddhāḥ |
 sattvasya hi niratīsayotkarṣhe sarvajnatvam prasiddham | na cha kevalasya
 akāryya-kāraṇasya purushasya upalabdhi-mātrasya sarva-jnatvaṁ kin-
 chij-jnatvaṁ vā kalpayitum śakyam | trigunatvāt tu pradhānasya sarva-
 jñāna-kāraṇa-bhūtaṁ sattvam pradhānāvasthāyām api vidyate iti pradhā-
 nasya achetanasya eva sataḥ sarvajnatvam upacharyyate vedānta-vāk्यeshu |
 avaśyaṁ cha tvayā 'pi sarvajnam Brahmaḥ abhyupagachhatū sarva-jñāna-
 śaktimattvena eva sarvajnatvam abhyupagantavyam | na hi sarva-vishayaṁ
 jñānaṁ kurvad eva Brahma varttate | tathā hi jñānasya nityat. o jñāna-
 kriyām prati svāntantryaṁ hīyeta | atha anityaṁ tad iti jñāna-kriyāyāḥ
 uparame uparameta api Brahma | tadā sarva-jñāna-śaktimattvena eva
 sarvajnatvam ūpatati | api cha prāg utpatteḥ sarva-kāraka-sūnyam Brahma
 ishate tvayā | na cha jñāna-sādhanānām śarīrendriyādīnām abhavo
 jñānoḥpattih kasyachid upapannā | api cha pradhānasya anokātmakasya
 pariṇāma-sambhavāt kāraṇatvopapattir nṛid-ādī-vaḥ | na asaṁhataḥ
 ekātmakasya Brahmaṇaḥ | ity evaṁ prāpte idam sūtram ūrabhyate | 5. "Īk-
 shater na | asabdam" | na Sūnkhya-parikalpitaṁ achetanam pradhānaṁ ja-
 gataḥ kāraṇaṁ śakyaṁ vedānteshu āśrayitum | asabdam hi tat | katham
 asabdam | "īkshiteḥ" | īkshīritva-śravanāt kāraṇasya | katham | evaṁ hi
 śrūyate "Sad eva saumya idam agro āsīt ekam eva advītyam" ity upakra-
 mya "tad aikshata 'bahu syām prajāyeya' iti tat tejo 'sṛijata" iti | tatra
 idam-śabda-vāchyaṁ nāma-rūpa-vyākṛitaṁ jagat prāg utpatteḥ sad-āt-
 manā 'vūhāryya tasya eva prakṛitasya sach-chhabda-vāchyasya īkshāna-
 pūrvakam tejaḥ-prabhṛiteḥ eśaḥkṛitvaṁ darśayati | tathā cha anyatra
 "ātmā vai idam ekaḥ eva agro āsīt | na anyat kinchana mishat | sa aik-
 shata 'lokān nu sṛijai' iti sa imān lokān asṛijata" iti īkshā-pūrvikam eva
 sṛiḥṣṭim āchashṭe | . . . ity evam-ādīny api sarvajnośvara-kāraṇa-parāṇi
 vākyaṇy udāhartavyāni | yat tu uktam "sattva-dharmaṇa jñānena sar-
 vajnam pradhānam bhaviṣyati" iti tad na upapadyate | na hi pradhā-
 nāvasthāyām guṇa-sūmyāt sattva-dharmo jñānaṁ sambhavati | nanu
 uktam "sarva-jñāna-śaktimattvena sarvajnam bhaviṣyati" iti tad api na
 upapadyate | yadi guṇa-sūmye sati sattva-vyapākṛayām jñāna-śaktim

*āsṛitya sarvajnam pradhānam uchyeta kāmāṃ rajas-tamo-vyapūśrayām
 api jñāna-pratibandhaka-śaktim āsṛitya kinchij-jnatvam uchyeta | api cha
 na asākshikā sattva-vṛittir jānāti na abhidhīyate | na cha achetanasya
 pradhānasya sākshītvam asti | tasmād anupannam pradhānasya sarvajna-
 tvam | yoginām tu chetanatvāt sarvotkarsha-nimittam sarvajnatvam upa-
 pannam ity anudāharanam | atha punaḥ sākshi-nimittam ikshīṭritvam
 pradhānasya kalpyeta yathā agni-nimittam ayah-piṇḍāder dagdhṛitvam
 talhā sati yan-nimittam ikshīṭritvam pradhānasya tad eva sarvajnam mukh-
 yam Brahma jagataḥ kāraṇam iti yuktam | yat punar uktam Brahmaṇo
 'pi na mukhyam sarvajnatvam upapadyate nitya-jñāna-kriyatve jñāna-
 kriyām prati svātantryāsambhavād ity attra uchyate | idaṃ tāvad bhavān
 prashṭavyaḥ " kalhām nitya-jñāna-kriyatve sarvajnatva-hānir " iti | yasya
 hi sarva-vishayāvabhāsana-kshamaṃ jñānam nityam asti so 'sarvajnaḥ iti
 vipratishiddham | anityatve hi jñānasya kadāchij jānāti kadāchid na jānāti
 ity asarvajnatvam api syāt | na asau jñāna-nityatve doṣo 'sti | jñāna-
 nityatve jñāna-vishayaḥ svātantrya-vyapadeśo na upapadyate iti chet |
 na | pratataushṇa-prakāśe 'pi savitari dahati prakāśayati iti svātantrya-
 vyapadeśa-darśanāt | nanu savitur dūhya-prakāśya-saṃyoge sati dahati
 prakāśayati iti vyapadeśaḥ syāt | na tu Brahmaṇaḥ prūḡ utpatter jñāna-
 karma-saṃyogo 'sti iti viśhamo dṛishṭāntaḥ | na | asaty api karmaṇi savitū
 prakāśato iti kartṛitva-vyapadeśa-darśanāt | evam asaty api jñāna-kar-
 maṇi Brahmaṇas " tad aikshata " iti kartṛitva-vyapadeśopapatter na vai-
 shamyam | karmūpekshāyām tu Brahmaṇi ikshīṭritva-srutayaḥ suturām
 upapannāḥ | kim punas tat karma yat prūḡ utpatter īśvara-jñānasya
 viśhayābhavati iti | tattvānyatrābhyām anirrachanīye nāma-rūpe aṃyā-
 kṛite vyāchikīrshite iti brūmaḥ | yat-prasādād hi yoginām apy atītānā-
 gata-viśhayam prutyakṣam jñānam ichhanti yoga-śāstra-vidāḥ kimu vak-
 tavyam tasya nitya-śuddhasya īśvarasya spīshṭi-sthiti-saṃhṛiti-viśhayam
 nitya-jñānam bhavati iti | yad apy uktam prūḡ utpatter Brahmaṇaḥ sarī-
 rādi-sambandham antareṇa ikshīṭritvam anupannam iti nā'tach chūdyam
 avatarati savitṛi-prakāśa-vaḍ Brahmaṇo jñāna-svarūpa-nityatvena jñāna-
 sādhanāpekshānupaputteḥ | . . . yad apy uktam " pradhānasya a . . . it-
 makatvād mṛid-ūdi-vaḍ kāraṇatvopapattir na asūmhatasya Brahmaṇaḥ
 ity itaḥ pradhānasya aśabdātrena eva pratyuktam | yathā tu tu koṃpī Brah-
 maṇaḥ eva kāraṇatvam nirrodhūḥ śakyate na pradhānādīn vā talhā pra-
 panchayishyate " na vilakṣhaṇatvād asya " ity-evam-ādīn (Brahma Sū-
 tras ii. 1, 4) |*

Attra ūha yad uktam "na achetanam pradhānam jagat-kāraṇam ikshitrīva-śraṇād" iti tad anyathā 'py upapadyate | achelane 'pi chetanavad upachāra-darśanāt | pratyāsanna-pātanatām kālasya ālakshya kūlam pipatishali ity achetane 'pi kūle chetana-vaḍ upachāro drishṭas tad-vaḍ achotane 'pi pradhāne pratyāsanna-sarge chetana-vaḍ upachāro bhaviṣhyati "tad aikshata" iti | yathā loke kaśchich chetanaḥ snātvā bhuktvā cha "aparāhne grāmaṁ rathena gamiṣyāmi" iti ikshitvā anantaraṁ tathaiḍa niyameṇa pravarttate tathā pradhānam api mahad-ūdy-ākāreṇa niyameṇa pravarttate | tasmāch chetana-vaḍ upacharyyate | kasmāt punaḥ kāraṇād viḥāya mukhyam ikshitrītvam aupāchārikam kalpyate | "tat tejaḥ aikshata" "tāḥ āpaḥ aikshanta" iti oha achetanayor apy ap-tejasos chetana-vaḍ upachāra-darśanāt | tasmāt sat-karṭṭrikam api ikshānam aupachārikam iti gamyate upachāra-prūye vachanād ity evam prāpto idaṁ sūtram ārabhyate | 6. "Gauṇās chet | na | ātma-śabdāt" | yad uktam pradhānam achetanam sach-ohkhabda-vāchyam tasminn aupachārikī ikshitir ap-tejasor iḍa iti tad asat | kasmāt | ātma-śabdāt | "sad eva saumya idam agre asid" ity upakramya "tad aikshata tat tejo 'srijata" iti cha tejo 'b-annānām sṛiṣṭim uktvā tad eva prakṛitam sad ikshitrī tūni cha tejo 'b-annāni devatā-śabdena parāmṛiṣya ūha "sū iyaṁ devatā aikshata hanta aham imās tisro devatāḥ anena jīveṇa ātmanū 'nupraviṣya nāma-rūpe vyākaraḍvāni" iti | tatra yadi pradhānam achetanam guṇa-vṛittyū ikshitrī kalpyeta tad eva prakṛitatvāt sū iyaṁ devatā parāmṛiṣyeta | na tadā devatā jīvam ātma-śabdena abhidadyāt | jīvo hi nāma chetanaḥ śarīrādhyakṣaḥ prānānām āhārayitī prasiddher nīrvachanūch cha | sa katham achetanasya pradhānasya ātmā bhavet | ātmā hi nāma svrūpam | na achetanasya pradhānasya chetano jīvaḥ svrūpam bhavitum arhati | atra tu chetanam Brahma mukhyam ikshitrī parigrīhyate | tasya jīva-viṣayaḥ ātma-śabda-prayogaḥ upapadyate | tathā "sa yaḥ esho 'nimū eladūtmyam idam sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ sa ātmā tat tvam asi Svetaketo" ity atra "sa ātmā" iti prakṛitam sad-aṇimānam ātmānam ātma-śabdena upadiṣya "tat tvam asi Svetaketo" iti chetanasya Svetaketor ātmatvena upadiṣati | ap-tejasos tu viṣayatvād achetanatvam nāma-rūpa-vyākaraṇādau cha prayojyatvena eva nirdeṣāt | na cha ātma-śabda-vat kinchid mukhyatve kāraṇam asti iti yuktaṁ kūla-vaḍ gauṇatvam ikshitrītvasya | tayor api cha sad-adhiṣṭhitatvāpekṣham eva ikshitrītvam | satas tv ātma-śabdāt na gauṇam ikshitrītvam ity uktam | aṭha uchyaṭe | achetane 'pi pradhāne bhavaty ātma-śabdaḥ | ātmanaḥ sarvārtha-kāritvāt |

yathā rājñāḥ sarvārtha-kārini bhṛityo bhavaty ātma-śabdo "mama ātmā Bhadrasonaḥ" iti | pradhānaṁ hi puruṣhātmano¹³¹ bhogāpavargau kurvād upakaroti rājñāḥ iva bhṛityaḥ sandhi-vigrahādīshu varitamānaḥ | athavā ekaḥ eva ātma-śabdāś chetanāchetana-vishayo bhavishyati "bhūtātmā" "indriyātmā" iti cha prayoga-darsanād yathā ekaḥ eva jyotiḥ-śabdaḥ kratu-jvalana-vishayaḥ | tatra kutāḥ etad ātma-śabdādikṣhiter agaunatvam ity atra uttaram paṭhati | 7. "Tan-nishṭhasya mokshopadeśūt" | na pradhānam achetanam ātma-śabdālambanam bhavitum arhati "sa ātmā" iti prakṛitāṁ sad animānam ādāya "tat tvam asi S'vetaketo" iti chetanasya S'vetaketor mokshayitavyasya tan-nishṭhām upadiśya "Āchāryyavān puruṣho veda tasya tāvad eva chiraṁ yūvad na vimokshye atha sampatsye" iti mokshopadeśūt | yadi hy achetanam pradhānaṁ sach-chhabda-vāchyaṁ "tad asi" iti grāhayed mumukshuṁ chetanaṁ santam "achetano 'si" iti tadā viparīta-vādi śāstram puruṣhasya anarthāya ity apramānaṁ syāt | na tu nirdoṣkṁ śāstram apramānaṁ kalpayituṁ yuktaṁ | yadi cha ajnasya sato mumukshor achetanam anātmānam "ātmā" ity upadiśet pramāna-bhūtaṁ śāstrāṁ sa śraddadhānatayā 'ndha-go-lūngūla-nyāyena tad-ātma-dṛishṭiṁ na parityajet tad-vyatiriktaṁ cha ātmānaṁ na prati-padyeta | tathā sati puruṣhārthād vihanayeta anarthāṁ cha richhet | tasmād yathā svargādy-arthino 'gnihotrādi-sādhanāṁ yathā-bhūtam upadiśati tathā mumukshor api "sa ātmā | tat tvam asi S'vetaketo" iti yathā-bhūtam eva ātmānam upadiśati iti yuktaṁ | evaṁ cha sati tapta-paraṣu-grahana-moksha-dṛishṭāntena satyābhisaṁdhasya mokshopadeśaḥ upapadyato | . . . tasmād na sad-animāny ātma-śabdasya gaunatvam | bhṛitye tu svāmi-bhṛitya-bhedasya pratyakshatvād upapanno gaunāḥ ātma-śabdo "mama ātmā Bhadrasonaḥ" iti | api cha kvachid gaunāḥ śabdo dṛishṭaḥ iti na etāvutā śabda-pramānako 'rtho gaunā kalpanā nyāyā sarvattra anūsvāsa-prasangāt | yat tu uktaṁ chetanāchetanayor sādharanāḥ ātma-śabdaḥ kratu-jvalanayor iva jyotiḥ-śabdaḥ iti | tad na | anekārthatvasya anyāyyatvāt | tasmāich chetana-vishayaḥ eva mukhyaḥ ātma-śabdāś chetanatvopachārād bhūtādīshu pratyujyate "bhūtātmā" "indriyātmā" iti cha | sādharanatre 'py ātma-śabdasya na prakaraṇam upapadaṁ vā kinchid niśchayakam antaraṇa anyatara-vrittītā nirdhārayitūṁ śakyate | na cha atra achetanasya niśchayakam kinchit kāraṇam asti prakṛitāṁ tu sad ikṣhitṛi sannihitāś chu chetanaḥ S'vetaketuḥ | na hi chetanasya S'vetaketor achetanaḥ ātmā sam-

¹³¹ The edition printed in Bengali characters reads *puruṣhasya ātmānaḥ*.

bhavati ity avoohāma | tasmāch chetana-vishayaḥ iha ātma-sabdaḥ iti niśchīyate |

“And it has been declared that Brahma, omniscient and omnipotent, is the cause of the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world. But the Sāṅkhyas and others, holding that an ultimate (*parinīṣṭhita*)¹²⁸ substance is discoverable by other proofs, and inferring the existence of Pradhāna or other causes, apply the texts of the Upanishads as having reference to these. For (they assert that) all the texts of the Upanishads which relate to the creation, design inferentially to indicate the cause by the effect. The Sāṅkhyas think that the conjunctions of Pradhāna and Purusha (Soul) are to be inferred as eternal. From the very same texts the followers of Kaṇāda (the Vaiśeṣikas) deduce that Īśvara is the instrumental cause and atoms the material cause¹²⁹ (of the world). So, too, other rationalizing objectors rise up who rely on fallacies founded on texts or reasoning. Here then our teacher (*āchāryya*), who understood both words and sentences and evidence, with the view of pointing out that the texts of the Upanishads have for their object the revelation of Brahma, first puts forward and then refutes the fallacies founded by those persons on texts or reasoning. The Sāṅkhyas regarding Pradhāna, consisting of the three qualities (*guṇas*, viz. *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, or “Goodness,” “Passion,” and “Darkness”), and inanimate, as the cause of the world, tell us: (a) ‘Those texts in the Upanishads which, as you say, declare that an omniscient and omnipotent Brahma is the cause of the world, can be applied to support the view that Pradhāna is the cause. For omnipotence in regard to its own developments is properly predicable of Pradhāna also; and omniscience too may be rightly ascribed to it. You will ask, how? We answer (b), What you call knowledge is a characteristic of ‘Goodness’ (*sattva*), according to the text of the Smṛiti, ‘From Goodness springs knowledge.’ And (c) through this knowledge, which is a characteristic of Goodness, Yogins, who are men

¹²⁸ Compare Sāṅkhya Sūtras, i. 69: *pāramparyye 'py okatra parinīṣṭhā*, etc., which Dr. Ballantyne renders, “Even if there be a succession, there is a halt (*parinīṣṭhā*) at some one point,” etc.

¹²⁹ The phrase so translated is *samavāyi-kāraṇam*. The word *samavāya* is rendered by Dr. Ballantyne, in his translation of the Bhāṣya-parichheda (published January, 1851), p. 22, by “intimate relation” (the same phrase as Dr. Roer had previously employed in 1850); and in the translation of the Tarka saugraha (published in September of the same year), pp. 2 and 4, by “co-inherence.”

with bodily organs,¹³⁷ are reputed to be omniscient; for owing to the transcendent excellence of Goodness its omniscience is matter of notoriety. Nor is it only of a person (*puruṣha*) whose essence is mere perception, and who is devoid of corporeal organs, that either omniscience or partial knowledge can be predicated: but from Pradhāna being composed of the three qualities, Goodness, which is the cause of omniscience, belongs to it too in the condition of Pradhāna. And so in the texts of the Upanishads omniscience is figuratively ascribed to it, although it is unconscious. And (*d*) you also, who recognize an omniscient Brahma, must of necessity acknowledge that His omniscience consists in His possessing the power of omniscience. For He does not continually exercise knowledge in regard to all objects. For (*e*) if His knowledge were continual. His self-dependence (or voluntary action) in reference to the act of knowledge would be lost. But if knowledge be not continual, then when the act of knowledge ceases Brahma must cease (to know). And so omniscience results from the possession of the power of omniscience. Further (*f*) you, too, hold that before the creation Brahma was devoid of any impulse to action. Nor can knowledge be conceived to arise in anyone who has no bodily organs or other instruments of knowledge. Moreover (*g*) causality can properly be ascribed to Pradhāna (as it can to earth, etc.) owing to the variety in its nature,¹³⁸ and the consequent possibility of its development, but not to Brahma whose essence is simple and uniform.' These arguments having been urged, the following Sūtra is introduced: 5. 'No; for in consequence of the word 'beholding' being employed, your view is contrary to the Veda.' (*a*) The unconscious Pradhāna, imagined by the Sūnkhya as the cause of the world, can find no support in the Upanishads. For it is unscriptural. How so? From its beholding, *i.e.* because the act of 'beholding' (or 'reflecting') is in scripture ascribed to the cause. How? Because the Veda contains a text which begins thus: 'This, o fair youth, was in the beginning' 'Existent, one without a second' (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 1); and proceeds: 'It beheld, let

¹³⁷ The epithet *kāryya-karaṇavantaḥ* is rendered *dehāndīya-vaḥ* in the Bengali translation of S'ankara's comment, which forms part of the edition of the S'ūtraka-sūtras, with comment and gloss, published at Calcutta in 1784 of the S'aka æra. This translation is useful for ascertaining the general sense, but it does not explain all the difficult phrases which occur in the original.

¹³⁸ The meaning of this is that Pradhāna, as cause, possesses in its nature a variety corresponding to that exhibited by the different kinds of objects which constitute the visible creation; whilst Brahma is one and uniform.

me multiply, and be propagated.' 'It created light' (3). By these words the scripture, having first determined that the world, denoted by the word 'this' and now developed as Name and Form, subsisted before the creation in the form of the 'Existent,' then goes on to shew that this very subject of the text, denoted by the word 'Existent,' became, after 'beholding,' the creator of light and other objects. And accordingly another text (Ait. Up. i. 1) declares in the following words that the creation was preceded by 'beholding: 'This was in the beginning Soul, one only: there was nothing else which saw.'¹³⁹ It beheld, Let me create worlds; it created these worlds.'” After quoting two other texts Sankara proceeds: “These and other passages may also be adduced which shew that an omniscient Īśvara was the cause (of all things). And (b) the opinion which has been referred to, that Pradhāna will be omniscient in virtue of the knowledge which is an attribute of Goodness, is groundless. For since the three qualities are in a state of equilibrium as long as the state of Pradhāna lasts, knowledge as an attribute of Goodness cannot then belong to it. And the assertion (d) that Pradhāna will be omniscient from possessing the power of omniscience is equally untenable. If (b) in reliance on the power of knowledge residing in Goodness during the state of equilibrium, it be maintained that Pradhāna is then omniscient, a merely partial knowledge may with equal reason be ascribed to it on the strength of the power to obstruct knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness (the other two qualities which constitute it). Besides, no function of Goodness can either be, or be called, knowledge, unless it be accompanied by the power of observing (or witnessing). But Pradhāna, being unconscious, possesses no such power. Consequently the omniscience of Pradhāna is untenable. And the omniscience of Yogins, (c) springing from their eminence in every attribute, becomes possible in consequence of their being conscious creatures; and therefore cannot be adduced as an illustrative argument in the case before us. If, again, you ascribe to Pradhāna a power of reflection derived from an observer (like the power of burning possessed by iron balls, etc., which is derived from fire) then it will be right to say that the source from which that power of reflection comes to Pradhāna, viz. the omniscient Brahma in the proper sense, and nothing else, is the cause of the world. Once more, (e) it is

¹³⁹ This is the sense assigned in Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon to the word *mishat*. The commentators render it “moving” (*chalat*).

urged that omniscience cannot in the literal sense be properly attributed even to Brahma himself, because if the cognitive acts were continual, His self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to the act of cognition, would be no longer conceivable: we reply, that we must ask you how the supposition that cognitive acts are continual, interferes with the existence of omniscience. Because it is a contradiction to say that he who possesses a perpetual knowledge which can throw light upon all subjects can be otherwise than omniscient. For although on the hypothesis that knowledge is not continual, a negation of omniscience would result, as in that case the person in question would sometimes know and sometimes not know,—the same objection does not attach to the supposition of a perpetuity of knowledge. If you reply that on that supposition, self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to knowledge can no longer be attributed, we deny this, because we observe that spontaneity, in regard to burning and illuminating, is attributed to the sun, although he continually burns and shines. If you again object that this illustration does not hold good, because the power in question is ascribed to the sun only when his rays are in contact with the objects to be burnt or illuminated, whereas before the creation, Brahma has no contact with the object of knowledge;—we reply that the parallel is exact, because we observe that agency in shining is attributed to the sun even when there is no object [for his beams]; and in the same way agency in regard to ‘beholding,’ is justly ascribed to Brahma, even when there is no object of knowledge. But the texts which record the fact of ‘beholding’ will be applicable to Brahma with still greater propriety if that ‘beholding’ have had reference to a positive object. What then is the object which is contemplated by Brahma before the creation? We reply, the undeveloped Name and Form which were not describable either in their essence or differences, and which He wished to develop. For what need we say to prove the perpetual knowledge, relating to the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world, which belongs to Īśvara, the perpetually pure, from whose grace it is that the intuitive knowledge of things past and future, which men learned in the Yoga doctrine attribute to Yogins, is derived? And as regards the further objection (*f*) that Brahma, who before the creation was without body or organs of sense, could not be conceived to ‘behold,’—that argument cannot be sustained, as from

Brahma's existence in the form of knowledge being, like the sun's lustre, perpetual, he cannot be supposed dependent upon any (bodily organs as) instruments of knowledge." . . . "Then as regards the assertion (g) that Pradhāna, from its multiformity of character can (like earth, etc.,) be readily conceived as the cause (of the manifold products which we see around us), whilst such causality cannot be ascribed to the simple and uniform Brahma,—that has been answered by the remark that the existence of Pradhāna is not established by scripture. And that the causality of Brahma, but not that of Pradhāna, etc., can be established by reasoning will hereafter be shewn in the Sūtras, 'Brahma, you say, cannot be the material cause of this world, because it differs from him in its nature,' etc. (Brahma Sūtras, ii. 1, 4 ff.). Here the Sāṅkhyas remark: 'As regards your objection that the unconscious Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world, because the Veda describes that cause as 'beholding,' we observe (h) that that text, if otherwise explained, will be consistent with our view. For we find that even unconscious objects are figuratively spoken of as conscious. Thus we notice that any one who perceives that the bank of a river is on the point of falling, speaks in a figurative way of that unconscious bank as intending to fall.¹⁴⁰ In the same way when Pradhāna is on the point of creating, it can be figuratively said of it, although unconscious, as of a conscious being, that it 'beheld.'¹⁴¹ Just as any conscious person, after bathing and eating, resolves that on the following day he will proceed to his village in a car, and afterwards acts according to that plan, so too Pradhāna (becoming developed) in the form of Mahat (intellect), etc., acts according to a law, and therefore is figuratively spoken of as conscious. If you ask us, why we abandon the proper sense of 'beholding,' and adopt a figurative one, we answer that we do so because we find the term figuratively applied to Water and to Light, though unconscious objects, in the Vedic texts, 'The Light beheld,' 'the Waters beheld' (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 3f.). Hence from the fact that the expression is for the most

¹⁴⁰ *Kulam pipatishati*, literally, "The bank wishes to fall;" but, as is well known, a verb, or verbal noun, or adjective, in the desiderative form, often indicates nothing more than that something is about to happen. Here, however, the Sāṅkhyas are introduced as founding a serious argument on this equivocal form of speech.

¹⁴¹ See Vijnāna Bhikshu's remarks on the Sankhya Sūtra, i. 96, where the same illustration is given.

part figuratively employed, we conclude that the act of beholding,' performed by the 'Existent' also was a figurative one." These objections having been brought forward, the following Sūtra is introduced: 6. "If you say that the act of 'beholding' is figuratively ascribed to Pradhāna, it is not so, because the word Soul also is applied to the cause." (A) "The assertion that the unconscious Pradhāna is designated by the word 'Existent,' and that 'beholding' is figuratively ascribed to it, as to Water and Light, is incorrect. Why? Because the word Soul also is employed. The text which begins with the words, 'This, o fair youth, was in the beginning Existent,' and goes on 'It beheld, it created light,' after relating the creation of Light, Water, and Food, refers to that 'Existent,' the 'beholder,' which is the subject of the text, and to Light, Water, and Food, under the appellation of deities, thus: 'This deity beheld (or resolved), come let me enter into these three deities with this living Soul, and make manifest Name and Form' (vi. 3, 2). Here if the unconscious Pradhāna were regarded as being, through the function of the quality (of Goodness), the 'beholder,' it would from the context be referred to in the phrase 'that deity;' and then the deity in question could not denote a 'living being' by the term 'Soul.' For the principle of life is both according to common usage, and interpretation, the conscious ruler of the body, and the sustainer of the vital breaths. How could such a principle of life be the Soul of the unconscious Pradhāna? For Soul means the essential nature, and a conscious principle of life cannot be the essence of the unconscious Pradhāna. But in reality the conscious Brahma is understood in this text as the 'beholder' in the proper sense of the term; and the word Soul, as relating to the principle of life, is rightly applied to Him. And thus in the sentence 'This entire universe is identical with this subtile particle; it is true; it is Soul: Thou art it, o Svetaketu,' (Chh. Up. vi. 8, 6 f.) the author by employing the words 'it is Soul' designates the subtile particle, the Existent, which is the subject of the text, as Soul, by the term Soul, and so in the words 'thou art it, o Svetaketu,' describes the conscious Svetaketu as being Soul. But Water and Fire are unconscious things, because they are objects of sense,¹⁴² and because it is pointed out that they were employed in the manifestation of Name and Form; and so there is no reason, as in the

¹⁴² *Vishayatvāt = dṛig-vishayatvāt*, "from their being objects of the sense of sight."—Govinda Ānanda.

case of Soul, to describe them as 'beholders' in the proper sense: that term must be applied to them by a figure, as in the case of the 'river bank.' And their act of 'beholding' was dependent on their being governed by the 'Existent.' But, as we have said, the act of 'beholding' is not figurative in the case of the 'Existent,' because the word Soul is applied to it. But it is now urged (*i*), that the term Soul does apply to Pradhāna, though unconscious, because it fulfils all the objects of soul; just as it is applied by a king to his servant who accomplishes all his designs, when he says 'Bhadrasena is my soul.' For Pradhāna renders aid to a man's soul by obtaining for it both celestial enjoyment, and final liberation, as a king's servant assists him by acting in peace and war, etc. Or (*j*) the one word Soul may apply both to conscious and unconscious objects, as we see it employed in the phrases 'soul of the elements,' 'soul of the bodily organs;' just as the same word *jyotis* means both sacrifice and light. Why then, the Sāṅkhyas conclude, should you infer from the word 'Soul' that the term 'beholding' cannot be figuratively used?

"This is answered in the 7th Sūtra ('Soul cannot denote Pradhāna), because it is declared that the man who fixes his thoughts upon it obtains final emancipation.' Unconscious Pradhāna must not be understood to derive any support from the word 'Soul;' for after referring in the words 'it is Soul' to the 'Existent,' the 'very subtile thing,' which is the subject of the passage, and indicating in the words 'thou art it, o Svetaketu,' that the conscious Svetaketu, who was about to obtain emancipation, was intent upon it, the text above adduced declares his emancipation in the words 'the man who has an instructor knows, "this will only last until I am liberated; I shall then be perfected."' (Chh. Up. vi. 14, 6) For if the unconscious Pradhāna were denoted by the term 'Existent,' the words 'thou art it,' would cause the conscious person, who was seeking after emancipation, to understand (of himself) 'Thou art unconscious;' and in that case the Śāstra which declared what was contradictory would be unauthoritative, because injurious to the person in question. But we cannot conceive a faultless Śāstra to be unauthoritative. And if a Śāstra esteemed authoritative should inform an ignorant seeker after emancipation, that a thing which was not soul was soul, he (the ignorant seeker) would in consequence of his faith, persist in regarding it as soul, as in the case of

the blind man and the bull's tail,¹⁴³ and would fail of attaining to soul which was quite different from it; and would in consequence lose the object of its efforts, and suffer injury. It is therefore proper to conclude that just as the Vedic precept, that he who desires paradise should perform the agnihotra sacrifice is conformable to truth, so, too, the text which says to the man seeking after emancipation, 'this is soul, thou art that, o Svetaketu,' declares to him soul in conformity with the reality. And so,—as in the case of the man (charged with theft) who takes into his hand the red-hot axe, and (in consequence of the truth of his protestation of innocence) is delivered (Chh. Up. vi. 16, 2),—the promise of final emancipation will hold good in the case of the man whose thoughts are fixed on the true Brahma. . . . Consequently the application of the word 'soul' to the 'existent subtle thing' is not figurative. Whereas (i) the use of the same word when applied to a servant (as when it is said 'Bhadrasena is my soul'), is shown to be figurative by the manifest distinctness of a servant from his master. And the fact that a word is sometimes observed to be employed figuratively does not justify the supposition that it is so used in cases where the (proper) sense is established by the words; because that would give rise to doubt in every instance. Again, (j) it is incorrect to say that the word soul is common to things conscious and unconscious, (as the term *jyotis* means both sacrifice and flame), because the assertion that it has a variety of significa-

¹⁴³ The story or fable here alluded to is told at length by Ānanda Giri, and more briefly by Govinda Ānanda as follows: *Kaśchit kila duṣṭātāmā mahāranya-mūḷge patitam andhaṁ sva-bandhu-nagaraṁ jigamishum babhāshe* "kim atra āpūshmatā duḥkhitena sthīyate" iti | *sa cha andhaḥ sukka-vānīm ākarṇya tam ūptam matrū uvūcha* "aho mad-bhāgudhayaṁ yud atra bhavān mān dīnāṁ svābhīṣīṭa-n-nara-prūptya-asamartham bhūshate" iti | *sa cha vipralipsor duṣṭa-go-yuvānam ānṛṇu tad-ḍīya-lāngulam andhaṁ gūḥayīmāsa vpadideśa cha enam andham* "kṣo go-yuvā tvān nagaraṁ neshyati mā tyaḗa lāngulam" iti | *sa cha andhaḥ sradhdhōtayaḥ tad atyaḗan svābhīṣīṭam aprūpya anartha-parauparīm prūptus tena vṇūyena ity a' thuh* | "A certain malicious person said to a blind man who was lying on the road through a forest, and wishing to proceed to the city of his friends, 'Why, distressed old man, do you stay here?' The blind man hearing the agreeable voice of the speaker, and regarding him as trustworthy, replied: 'O how great is my good fortune that you have needed me who am helpless, and unable to go to the city which I desire to reach!' The other, wishing to deceive him, brought a vicious young bull, and made the blind man lay hold of his tail, and told him that the young bull would conduct him to the city, enjoining him not to let go the tail. Trusting to the speaker, the blind kept his hold, but did not attain the object of his desire, and encountered a series of mishaps;—such is the illustration."

tions is unreasonable. Hence the word soul, which properly refers to conscious things, is applied to the elements, etc., by a figurative ascription to them of consciousness, as when we say, 'the soul of the elements,' or 'the soul of the bodily organs.' And even if it were admitted that the word soul was common to different things, it could not be ascertained whether it had reference to one thing or another unless the context or some auxiliary word determined the point. But in the case before us there is nothing to determine that it denotes anything unconscious; on the contrary, the subject of the sentence is the 'Existent, the beholder,' and in immediate connection with it is the conscious Svetaketu; for as we have already said an unconscious thing cannot be conceived as the soul of the conscious Svetaketu. Thus it is settled that the word 'soul' refers to a conscious being," etc.

In the fourth section (*pāda*) of the 1st Book, the author of the Sūtras returns to his controversy with the Sūkhya, and Śankara, after alluding to the aphorisms in which they had previously been combated, proceeds as follows (p. 334):

Idaṁ tv idānīm avasiṣṭam āsankyate | yad uktam pradhānasya āśabdatvaṁ tad asiddhaṁ kūsucijī śākhāsu pradhāna-samarpanābhāsānām śabdānām śrūyamānatvāt | atah pradhānasya kāraṇatvaṁ veda-prasiddham eva mahadbhiḥ paramarśibhiḥ Kapilādibhiḥ parigrhitam iti prasaṅgyate | tad yāvat teshām śabdānām anya-paratvaṁ na pratipādyate tāvat sarvajnam Brahma jagataḥ kāraṇam iti pratipāditam apy ākulībhavet | atas teshām anya-paratvaṁ darśayitum paraḥ sandarbhaḥ pravarttate | "ānumānikam api" (Br. Sūtra i. 4, 1) anumāna-nirūpitam api pradhānam "ekeshām" śākhinām śabdavad upalabhyate | Kāṭhako hi paṭhyate "mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt puruṣaḥ puraḥ" iti | tatra yo eva yan-nimāno yat-kramakāś cha mahad-avyakta-puruṣhāḥ smṛiti-prasiddhāś te eva iha pratyaḥhijñāyante | tatra "avyaktam" iti smṛiti-prasiddheḥ śabdādi-kīnatvāc cha na vyaktam avyaktam iti vyutpatti-sambhavāt smṛiti-prasiddham pradhānam abhidhīyate | atas tasya śabdavatvāc āśabdatvam anupapannam¹⁴⁴ | tad eva cha jagataḥ kāraṇam śruti-smṛiti-prasiddhibhyaḥ iti cchet | na etad oṣam | na hy etat Kāṭhaku-vākyam smṛiti-prasiddhyoṛ mahad-avyaktoṛoṛ astitva-param | na hy atra yādṛiṣāṁ smṛiti-prasiddhaṁ svatantṛiṣāṁ kāraṇam triguṇam pradhānam

¹⁴⁴ The text given in the Bibl. Indica has *anupapannam*, but I follow the old edition in Bengali characters in reading *anupapannam*, which seems required by the sense.

tādṛīṣam pratyabhijnāyate | śabda-mātraṁ hy atra avyaktam iti pratyabhijnāyate | sa cha śabdo na vyaktam avyaktam iti yaugikatrūd anyasmim āpi sūkshme durlakshye cha prayujyate na cha ayaṁ kasminschild rūdhaḥ | yā tu pradhāna-vādinām rūdhiḥ sū teshāṁ eva pāribhāshikī satī na vedārtha-nirūpana kāraṇa-bhāvam pratipadyate | na cha krama-mātra-sāmarthyāt samānārtha-pratipattir bhavaty asati tad-rūpa-pratyabhijnāne | na hy asva-sthāne gām paśyann asvo 'yam ity amūḍho 'dhyavasyati | prakaraṇa-nirūpanāyāṁ cha atra na paraparikalpitaṁ pradhānam pratīyate śarīra-rūpaka-vinyasta-grihīteḥ | śarīraṁ hy atra ratha-rūpaka-vinyastam avyakta-śabdena parigrihyate | kutaḥ | prakaraṇāt pariśeṣhāc cha | tathā hy anantarūṭito granthāḥ ātma-śarīrādīnāṁ rathi-rathādi-rūpaka-klīptiṁ darśayati | (Kāṭha Upanishad, i. 3, 3 f.) "ātmānaṁ rathinaṁ viddhi śarīraṁ ratham eva cha | buddhiṁ cha sārathiṁ viddhi manaḥ pragrahaṁ eva cha | 4. Indriyāni hayān āhur viśhayāṁs teshu gocharān | ātmendriya-mano-yuktam bhoktety āhur manīṣiṇāḥ" | taiḥ chaindriyādibhir asaṁyataiḥ saṁsāram adhiḡachchhati | saṁyataiḥ tv adhvanaḥ pāraṁ tad Viśnoḥ paramam padam āpnoti iti darśayitvā kiṁ tad adhvanaḥ pāram Viśnoḥ paramam padam ity asya ākūṅkṣhāyāṁ tebhyaḥ eva prakṛitebhyaḥ indriyādibhyaḥ paratvena paramātmānam adhvanaḥ pāraṁ tad Viśnoḥ paramam padam darśayati | Kāṭha Up. i. 3, 10 f.) "indriyebhyaḥ parāḥ hy arthāḥ arthebhyaḥ cha param manaḥ | manasaḥ tu parā buddhir buddhor ātmā mahān paraḥ | 11. Mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt puruṣhaḥ paraḥ | puruṣhād na paraṁ kinchit sū kāṣṭhū sū parā gatir" iti | . . . "Buddhir ātmā mahān paraḥ" yaḥ sa "ātmānaṁ rathinaṁ viddhi" iti rathiteva upakṣiptaḥ | kutaḥ | ātma-śabdād bhoktuḥ cha bhogopakaraṇāt paratvapatteḥ | mahatram cha asya svāmītvād upapannam | . . . yā prathumajasya Hiraṇyagarbhasya buddhiḥ sū sarvāsām buddhināṁ puramā pratishṭhā sū iha "mahān ātmā" ity uchyate | sū cha pūrvattra budhigrahaṇena eva grihītā satī hirug iha upadiśyate tasyāḥ apy usmo 'ryābhyaḥ buddhibhyaḥ paratvopatteḥ | . . . tad evaṁ śarīrum eva okaṁ pariśiśyate | teshu¹⁴⁵ itarāṇi indriyādīni prakṛitāny eva pāraṇa-pāra-didarsayishayā samanukṛāman pariśiśyamāṇena iha arṇa avyakta-śabdena pariśiśyamāṇam prakṛitāṁ śarīraṁ darśayati iti gamante | . . . tud evam pūrvāparalochanāyāṁ nāsty atra para-paratvapatteḥ | . . . nasya avakāśaḥ | 2. "Sūkshaṁ tu tad-arhatvāt" | vācyaṁ etat prakaraṇa-

¹⁴⁵ The earlier edition above referred to omits the h.

*pariśeśhābhyām śarīram avyakta-śabdaṁ na pradhānam iti | idam
 idānāṁ ūśankyate katham avyakta-śabdārhatvaṁ śarīrasya yāvatā sthū-
 latvāt spashṭataram idaṁ śarīraṁ vyakta-śabdārham aspashṭa-vachanas
 tv avyakta-śabdaḥ iti | atah uttaram uchyate | sūkṣhāṁ tv iha kāra-
 nātmanā śarīraṁ virakshyate sūkshmasya avyakta-śabdārhatvāt | yady-
 api sthūlam idaṁ śarīraṁ na svayam avyakta-śabdāṁ arhati tathāpi
 tasya tv ūrambhakam bhūta-sūksham avyakta-śabdāṁ arhati | . . .
 attra ūha yadi jagad idam anabhivyakta-nāma-rūpaṁ vījātmakam
 prūg-avastham avyakta-śabdārham abhyupagamyeta tad-ātmanā cha
 śarīrasyāpy avyakta-śabdārhatvam pratijnāyeta sa eva tarhi pradhāna-
 kāraṇa-vādaḥ evam saby ūpadyeta asya eva jagataḥ prūg-avasthāyāḥ
 pradhānatvena abhyupagamād iti | attra uchyate | yadi vayāṁ svatantrāṁ
 kāñchit prūg-avasthāṁ jagataḥ kāraṇatvena abhyupagachohema prasanja-
 yema tadā pradhāna-kāraṇa-vādam | Parmeśvarādhiṇā tv iyam asmā-
 bhīḥ prūg-avasthā jagato bhyupagamyate na svatantrā | sā cha avāśyam
 abhyupagantavyā | arthavati hi sā | na hi tayā vinā Parameśvarasya
 sraśṭritvaṁ siddhyati śakti-rahitasya tasya pravṛitty-anupapatteḥ muk-
 tānāṁ cha punar-ūlpattir vidyayā tasyāḥ vīja-śakter dāhāt | avidyātmikā
 hi sā vīja-śaktir avyakta-śabda-nirdēśyā Parameśvarūśrayā māyāmāyī
 mahāśushuptir yasyām svarūpa-pratibodha-rahilāḥ śerate saṁsariṇo
 jīvāḥ | tad etad avyaktāṁ kvachid ākūśa-śabda-nirdiśṭam | “ etasmīn
 nu khalv aksharo Gāgi ākūśaḥ olaś cha protaś cha ” iti śruteḥ | kvachid
 akshara-śabdoditam “ aksharāt parataḥ paraḥ ” iti śruteḥ | kvachid māyā
 iti sūkilam “ māyām tu prakṛitiṁ vidyād māyinaṁ tu mahēśvaram ” iti
 mantra-varṇāt | aryaktā hi sā māyā tattvānyatva-nirūpaṇasya āśakyat-
 vāt | tad idam “ mahataḥ param avyaktam ” ity uktam avyakta-prabha-
 vatvād mahato yadā Hairyāyagarbhī buddhir mahān | yadā tu jīvo ma-
 hāṁś tadā ’py avyaktādhiṇatvā jīva-bhūvasya mahataḥ param avyaktam
 ity uktam | avidyā hy aryaktam avidyāvattvo cha jīvasya sarvaḥ saṁ-
 vyaśhōrah santuto varittate | tach cha aryakta-galām mahataḥ paratvam
 abhedopackārāt tad-vikāre śarīro parikalpyate |*

“ But now this doubt still remains. The assertion that the existence of Pradhāna is not supported by the Veda is, say the Sāṅkhyas, destitute of proof, as certain Vedic Sākhās contain passages which have the appearance of affirming Pradhāna. Consequently the causality of Pradhāna has been received by Kapila and other great rishis on the ground that it is established by the Veda; and this is an objection to the state-

ment which you make to the contrary. Until, therefore, it be established that these passages have a different object, the doctrine that an omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world, even though it has been proved, will be again unsettled; and consequently you bring forward a great array of arguments to shew that these texts apply to something else. In the words 'it may be deduced also,' *i.e.* it is determined by inference,—it is shewn that in the opinion of certain schools the doctrine of Pradhāna is scriptural, for in the Kaṭha Upanishad (i. 3, 11) we read the words 'Above the Great one is Avyakta (the Unmanifested one), and above the Unmanifested one is Purusha (Soul).' Here we recognize 'the Great one,' 'the Unmanifested one,' and Purusha, with the same names and in the same order in which they are known to occur in the Smṛiti (*i.e.* the system of Kapila). Here that which is called Pradhāna in the Smṛiti is denoted by the word 'the Unmanifested one,' as we learn both from its being so called in the Smṛiti, and from the epithet 'unmanifested' (which is derived from the words 'not' and 'manifested') being properly applicable to it in consequence of its being devoid of sound, and the other objects of sense: wherefore, from its having this Vedic authority to support it, its (*i.e.* Pradhāna's) unscriptural character is refuted; and it is proved both by the Veda, the Smṛiti, and common notoriety to be the cause of the world. If the Sāṅkhyas argue thus, we reply that the case is not so; for this text of the Kaṭha Upanishad does not refer to the existence of the 'Great one' and the 'Unmanifested one,' which are defined in the Smṛiti (of Kapila); for here we do not recognize such a self-dependent cause, *viz.* Pradhāna, composed of the three qualities, as is declared in that Smṛiti, but the mere epithet 'unmanifested.' And this word 'unmanifested,' owing to its sense as a derivative from the words 'not' and 'manifested,' is also applied to anything else which is subtile or indistinguishable, and has not properly a conventional meaning in reference to any particular thing. As for the conventional use which the assertors of Pradhāna make of it, that is a technical application peculiar to themselves, and does not afford any means for determining the sense of the Vedas. Nor does the mere identity of the order (of the three words) furnish any proof of identity of meaning unless we can recognise the essential character of the things to be the same. For no man but a fool, if he saw a cow in the place where he expected to see a horse, would falsely

ascribe to it the character of a horse. And if we determine the sense of the context, it will be found that the Pradhāna imagined by our opponents finds no place here, since it is the 'body' which is indicated in the preceding simile. For here the body as represented under the figure of a chariot, etc., is to be understood by the word 'the Unmanifested.' Why? From the context and the remainder of the sentence. For the context which immediately precedes sets forth the soul, the body, etc., under the figure of a rider, a chariot, etc., as follows: 'Know that the soul is the rider, the body the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses are called the horses, and the objects of sense the roads on which they go. The soul accompanied by the senses and the mind is the enjoyer; ¹⁴⁶ so say the wise.' After pointing out (in the following verses) that with these senses, etc., if uncontroled, the soul gains only this world, but if they are kept under controul, it attains to the highest state of Vishṇu, which is the end of its road; the author (in answer to the question 'What is that highest state of Vishṇu which is the end of the road?') shews in the following verses that it is the supreme Spirit who transcends the senses, etc. (which form the subject of the context), who is alluded to as the goal, and the highest state of Vishṇu: 'The objects of sense are higher than the senses; the mind is higher than the objects of sense; the intellect is higher than the mind; the Great soul is higher than the intellect; the Unmanifested one is higher than the Great soul; the spirit (Purusha) is greater than the Unmanifested: there is nothing higher than Spirit, that is the end, that is the highest goal.'" After observing that the various terms in these lines are the same which had been previously introduced in the simile of the chariot, charioteer, rider, horses, etc., Śāṅkara assigns the reason of the superiority attributed to each succeeding object over that which precedes it, and then goes on to say in regard to intellect and soul: "'The Great soul is higher than the intellect,' that soul, namely, which is figuratively described as a rider, in the words 'Know the soul to be the rider.' But why is the Soul

¹⁴⁶ The words of the original, both as given here and in the text of the Katha Upanishad are *ātmenāriya-mano-yuktam bhoktā*, which are not very clear. The commentators understand *ātman* at the beginning of the compound as denoting body, and supply *ātmanam* as the subject. See Dr. Roer's translation of the Upanishads (Bibl. Ind. p. 107).

superior to the intellect? Both from the use of the word Soul and because it aids the enjoyment of the enjoyer, it is shewn to be superior. Its character as the Great soul is proved by its being the master. . . The intellect of Hiranyagarbha, the first-born, is the highest basis of all intellect; and it is that which is here called the 'Great soul.' It had been previously comprehended under the word 'intellect,' but is here separately specified, because it also is superior to our intellects. . . . Thus the body alone remains of the objects referred to in the passage. After going over all the others in order, with the view of pointing out the highest state to be attained, he indicates by the one remaining word, the 'Unapparent,' the one remaining subject of the text, viz. the body—such is our conclusion. . . . Hence after examining both the earlier and later portions of the passage, we find that there is no place for the Pradhāna imagined by our opponents." Going on to interpret the next aphorism (i. 4, 2) 'But the subtile body may also be properly called 'unmanifested,' Sankara begins:

"We have declared that, looking to the context and the only word which remained to be explained, the body, and not Pradhāna, is denoted by the word the 'Unapparent.' But here a doubt arises: 'How can the body be properly designated by the word 'unapparent,' inasmuch as from its grossness it is very distinctly perceptible, and therefore should rather be denoted by the word 'apparent,' while the word 'unapparent' signifies something that is not perceptible? We answer: In this passage the subtile body in its character of cause is intended, since what is subtile is properly designated by the term 'unapparent.' Although this gross body itself cannot properly be described by the word 'Unapparent,' still this term applies to the subtile element which is its originator" . . . Sankara begins his interpretation of the next aphorism (i. 4, 3) as follows: "Here the Sāṅkhyas rejoin: 'If you admit that this world in its primordial condition, before its name and form had been manifested, and while it existed in its rudimentary form, could be properly designated by the word 'Unapparent,' and if the same term be declared applicable to body also while continuing in that state, then your explanation will exactly coincide with our doctrine of Pradhāna as the cause of all things; since you will virtually acknowledge that the original condition of this world was that of Pradhāna. To this we reply: If we admitted any self-dependent original

condition as the cause of the world, we should then lay ourselves open to the charge of admitting that Pradhāna is the cause. But we consider that this primordial state of the world is dependent upon the supreme Deity (Parameśvara) and not self-dependent. And this state to which we refer must of necessity be assumed, as it is essential. For without it the creative action of the supreme Deity could not be accomplished, since, if he were destitute of his Sakti (power), any activity on his part would be inconceivable. And so, too, those who have been emancipated from birth are not born again, because this germinative power (on the destruction,—which implies the previous existence,—of which emancipation depends) is consumed by knowledge.¹⁴⁷ For that germinative power, of which the essence is ignorance, and which is denoted by the word 'Unapparent,' has its centre in the supreme Deity, and is a great illusive sleep, during which mundane souls repose unconscious of their own true nature. This 'Unapparent one' is in some places indicated by the term æther (*ākāśa*), as in the text (Bṛih. Ār. Up. iii. 8, 11) 'On this undecaying Being, o Gārgī, the æther is woven as warp and woof;' in other places by the word 'undecaying' (*akshara*), as in the text, 'Beyond the Undecaying is the Highest;' and is elsewhere designated by the term 'illusion' (*māyā*) as in the line (Śvetaśv. Up. 4, 10) 'Know that Prakṛiti (or matter) is illusion, and the great Deity the possessor of illusion.' For this 'illusion' is 'unapparent,' because it cannot be defined in its essence and difference. This is the 'Unapparent' which is described as above the 'Great one,' since the latter, when regarded as identical with the intellect of Hiraṇyagarbha, springs from the former. And even if the 'Great one' be identified with the embodied soul (*jīva*), the 'Unapparent' can be said to be above it, as the condition of the embodied soul is dependent upon the 'Unapparent.' For the 'Unapparent' is ignorance, and it is during its condition of ignorance that the entire mundane action of the embodied soul is car-

¹⁴⁷ Govinda Ānanda explains this clause as follows: *Dandha-mukti-vyavasthārham api sāvīkārīyā ity āha "muktānām" iti | yan-nāsād muktih sāvīkārīyā tām vinā eva sṛṣṭau muktānām punar bandhāpatir ity arthaḥ |* "In the words 'Those who had been emancipated,' etc., he tells us that this ignorance must be admitted, in order to secure the permanence of emancipation from the bondage (of birth): that is, that ignorance by the destruction of which emancipation is obtained must be admitted; as without it those who had been emancipated would at the creation be again involved in bondage," [because to be released at all, they must be released from something].

ried on. And that superiority of the 'Unapparent' over the 'Great one' is by a figurative description of body as identical with the former attributed to body also."

By these subtle and elaborate explanations Sankara scarcely appears to make out his point. But I cannot follow further the discussion of this question, and now go on to the eighth aphorism (i. 4, 8) where the purport of another Vedic text is investigated :

"*Chamasa-vad avisheshāt* | *punar api pradhāna-vādī asabdatvam pradhānasya asiddham ity āha* | *kasmāt* | *mantra-varnāt* | (S'vetāsvatara Upanishad, iv. 5) "*ajām ekām lohita-sukla-kriṣṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ sri-jamānām svarūpāḥ*"¹⁴⁸ | *ajo hy eko jushamāno 'nuśete jahāty enām bhukta-bhogām ajo 'nyaḥ*" *iti* | *attra hi mantrā lohita-sukla-kriṣṇa-sabdāḥ rajāḥ-sattva-tamāṁsy abhidhīyante* | *lohitaṁ rajo ranjanātmakatvāt suklaṁ sattvaṁ prakāśātmatvāt kriṣṇaṁ tamaḥ āvaranātmakatvāt* | *teshāṁ sāmyāvasthāvayava-dharmair vyapadiśyate lohita-sukla-kriṣṇā ity | na jāyate iti cha "ajā" syād "mūla-prakṛitir avikṛitir" ity abhyupagamāt | nanv ajā-sabdas chhāgāyām rūdhaḥ | vādham | sā tu rūdhir iha na āsrajitūṁ śakyā vidyā-prakaranāt | sā cha bahvīḥ prajāḥ traigunyanvitāḥ janayati . . . tasmāt śruti-mūlā eva pradhānādi-kalpanā Kāpilānām ity evam prāpte brūmaḥ | na anena mantrena śruti-mūlatvaṁ Sāṅkhya-vādasya śakyam āsrajitum | na hy ayam mantrāḥ svātantryeṇa kanchid api vādāṁ samarthayitum utsahate | sarvatrāpi yayā kayāchit kalpanayā ajātvādi-sampādanopapatteḥ Sāṅkhya-vādāḥ eva iha abhipretuḥ iti viśeṣhāvadhāraṇa-kāraṇābhāvāt | "chamasa-vat" |*

" 'Because, as in the case of the spoon, there is nothing distinctive.' The assertor of Pradhāna again declares that Pradhāna is not proved to be unscriptural. Why? From the following verse (Sv. Up. iv. 5): 'One unborn male, loving the unborn female of a red, white, and black colour, who forms many creatures possessing her own character, unites himself with her: another unborn male abandons her after he has enjoyed her.' For in this verse the words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black,' denote (the three Qualities) Passion, Goodness, and Darkness; —Passion, from its stimulating character, being designated by the term

¹⁴⁸ The text of Dr. Rœr's ed. of the Upanishad (Bibl. Ind. vol. vii.) has two various readings in this line, viz. *lohita-kriṣṇa-varṇām* for *lohita-sukla-kriṣṇām* (which latter, however, is the reading referred to by S'ankara in his commentary on that work), and *sarūpām* for *svarūpāḥ*,

‘red,’ Goodness, from its illuminating character, by ‘white,’ and Darkness, from its enveloping character, by ‘black.’ The unborn female is described as red, white, and black, with reference to the characteristics of the three components which make up the state of equilibrium. She must be called ‘unborn’ (*Ajā*), because she is not produced, since it is admitted that ‘original matter’ (*Mūla-Prakṛiti* = *Pradhāna*) is not a modification (of any other substance—*Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, verse 3). But is not *ajā* the conventional name for ‘she-goat?’ True (reply the *Sāṅkhyas*), but that conventional sense cannot be adopted here, because knowledge is the subject of the context. And this unborn female produces many creatures characterized by the three Qualities And from this it is concluded that the theory of Kapila’s followers regarding *Pradhāna*, etc., is based upon the *Veda*. We reply: that it cannot be admitted on the strength of this verse that the theory of the *Sāṅkhyas* is founded on the *Veda*. For the verse in question, if regarded independently, is powerless to sustain any hypothesis whatever; and the reason is that, as this description of the state of the unborn female may be rendered applicable on any hypothesis whatever, there is no ground for determining specifically that the *Sāṅkhya* theory is here intended—‘as in the case of the spoon.’” This aphorism refers to a verse quoted in the *Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad*, ii. 2, 3 (*Bibl. Ind.* p. 413 of the Sanskrit, and p. 174 of Dr. Rocr’s translation), and beginning ‘a cup with its mouth down, and its bottom upwards,’ which, as *Sankara* remarks, cannot, without some further indication, be applied to any one cup in particular; and in the same way, he argues, the unborn female in the passage under discussion cannot, in the absence of anything to restrict the application in any special way be understood as denoting *Pradhāna* (*evam ihāpy aviśesho ’jām ekām ity asya mantrasya | na asmin mantre Pradhānam eva ajā ’bhīpretā iti śakyate niyan-tum*). The question then arises what is meant by this ‘unborn female.’ To this the author of the aphorisms and *Sankara* reply, that the word denotes the material substance of a four-fold class of elements, viz. light, heat, water, and food, all derived from the supreme Deity (*Paramēśvarād utpannā jyotiḥ-pramukhā tejo ’b-anna-lakṣhaṇā chatur-vidha-bhūta-grāmasya prakṛiti-bhūtā iyam ajā pratipattaryā*). These four elements he however seems (p. 357) to identify with three, in the words: *bhūta traya-lakṣhaṇā eva iyam ajā vijneyā na guṇa-traya-lakṣhaṇā* | ‘This

unborn female is formed by three elements, not by the three qualities;’ and the ascription of the three colours in the text to these three elements is supported by a quotation from the Chhândogya Upanishad, vi. 4, 1, which is as follows: *Yad agneḥ rohitam rūpaṁ tejasas tad rūpaṁ yat suklaṁ tad apāṁ yat kṛishṇaṁ tad annasya* | “The red colour of fire is that of heat; its white colour is that of water; and its black colour is that of food (which here means earth, according to the commentator on the Chhândogya Upanishad).¹⁴⁹ In this way, he adds, the words denoting the three colours are used in the proper sense, whereas if applied to the three qualities they would be figuratively employed (*rohitādīnām cha śabdānām rūpa-viśesheshu mukhyatvād bhāktatvāch cha guṇa-viśayatvasya*). Sankara concludes that this verse, descriptive of the unborn female, does not denote any self-dependent material cause called Pradhāna, but is shewn from the context to signify the Divine Power in its primordial state before Name and Form were developed (*na svatantrā kāchit prakṛitih pradhānaṁ nāma ajā-mantrena āmnāyāte iti śakyate vaktum | prakaraṇāt tu sā eva daivi śaktir avyākṛita-nāma-rūpā nāma-rūpayoh prāg avasthānenāpi mantrena āmnāyate ity uchyate*).

Passing over the further questions, which are raised on this subject, I go to the 11th Sūtra and the comment upon it, from which we learn that the words ‘knowing him by whom the five times five men, and the æther are upheld, to be Soul,’ etc. (*yasmin pancha pancha-janāḥ ākāśāś cha pratishṭhitaḥ | tam evānyaḥ ātmānam vidvān ityādi*), are adduced by the Sāṅkhyas in support of their system, as the number of the principles (*tattva*), which it affirms (see Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 3, and Sāṅkhya Sūtras, i. 61), corresponds to the number twenty-five in this text; while the applicability of the passage is denied by the Vedāntins on the ground that the ‘principles’ of the Sāṅkhya are not made up of five homogeneous sets of five each (p. 362); that if the Soul and æther mentioned in the text are added, as they must be, to the twenty-five, the aggregate number will exceed that of the Sāṅkhya ‘principles,’ among which both Soul and æther are comprehended (pp. 364 f.); that the fact of the correspondence of the numbers, if admitted, would not suffice to shew that the ‘principles’ of the Sāṅkhya were referred to, as they are not elsewhere recognized in the Veda, and as the word

¹⁴⁹ See Babu Rajendra Lāl Mitra's translation of this Upanishad, p. 106.

'men' (*janāḥ*) is not usually applied to denote 'principles' (p. 365); and further that the phrase 'the five five men,' signifies only 'five,' and not 'five times five' (p. 366), etc. The conclusion arrived at in the twelfth aphorism is that the breath, and other vital airs, are referred to in the passage under consideration; and that although the word 'men' (*janāḥ*) is not generally applied to 'breath,' etc., any more than to 'principles,' the reference is determined by the context. Others, as Śankara observes, explain the term 'the five men' (*pañchajanāḥ*) of the gods, fathers, gandharvas, asuras, and rakshases, and others again of the four castes, and the Nishādas.¹⁶⁰ The Vedāntic teacher (Bādarāyaṇa) however, as his commentator adds, has decided that the breath, etc., are intended.

If we now turn to the Śāṅkhya aphorisms themselves, we shall find that their author constantly refers to texts of the Veda as supporting, coinciding with, or reconcilable with his dogmas. I have noticed the following instances, viz. Sūtras i. 5, 36, 51, 54, 78, 84, 148, 155; ii. 20-22; iii. 14, 15, 80; iv. 22; v. 1, 12, 15, 21; vi. 32, 34, 51, 58, 59, which may be consulted in Dr. Ballantyne's translation. I can only refer more particularly to a few of these with the commentator's remarks.

I begin with Sūtra i. 155,¹⁶¹ in which the author of the Aphorisms maintains that the great distinctive dogma of the Vedānta, the oneness of Soul, is not supported by the Veda. In Sūtra 150 he had laid it down as his own conclusion, established by the fact of the variety observable in the conditions of birth, etc., that there is a multitude of souls, and he now defends this as conformable to Scripture.

"*Na advaita-śruti-virodho jāti-paratvāt*" | *ātmaikya-śrutinām virodhas tu nāsti tāsām jāti-paratvāt* | *jātiḥ sāmānyam eka-rūpatvaṁ tatra advaita-śrutinām tōtparyād na tv akhandate prayojanābhāvād ity arthaḥ* | . . . *yathā-śruti-jāti-sābdasya ādare tv "ūtmā idam ekaḥ eva agre asīt"* "*śad eva saumya idam agre asīt ekam eva advīṭyam*" (Chhānd. Up. vi. 2, 1) *ity-ōdy-advaita-śruty-upapādakatayā eva sūtraṁ ryākheyam* | "*jāti-paratvāt*" | *vijātiya-dvaita-nishedha-paratvād ity arthaḥ* | *tutra ādya-vyākhyāyām ayam bhāvāḥ* | *ātmaikya-śruti-smṛtiḥv ekādi-sābdās chid-*

¹⁶⁰ See the First Volume of this work, pp. 176 ff.

¹⁶¹ i. 154 in Dr. Hall's edition in the Bibl. Ind.

ekarūpatū-mātra-parāḥ bhedādi-śabdās cha vaidharmya-lakṣhaṇa-bheda-parāḥ |

“155. ‘This is not opposed to the Vedic doctrine of non-duality, since that merely refers to genus.’ Our doctrine that souls are numerous does not conflict with the Vedic texts which affirm the oneness of Soul, since these passages refer to oneness of genus. Genus means sameness, oneness of nature; and it is to this that the texts regarding non-duality relate, and not to the undividedness (or identity) of Soul; since there is no occasion for the latter view. The Sūtra must be explained with due regard to the sense of the word genus as it occurs in the Veda, so as (thereby) to bring out the proper meaning of such texts, expressing non-duality, as these, ‘This was in the beginning Soul, one only;’ ‘This was in the beginning, o fair youth, Existing, one without a second.’ The words ‘since that merely refers to genus,’ mean ‘since that is merely intended to deny a duality denoting a difference of genus.’ The first of two interpretations given of the Sūtra is as follows: In the texts of the Śruti and Smṛiti relating to the oneness of Soul, the words ‘One,’ etc., denote simply that Spirit is one in its nature; whilst the words, ‘distinction,’ etc., designate a distinction defined as difference of nature.” At the close of his remarks the commentator gives a second explanation of the Sūtra.

The author returns to this subject in the 61st Sūtra of the fifth Book:

“Na advaitam ātmano lingāt tad-bheda-pratīcḥ” | yadyapy ātmanām anyonyam bheda-vākya-vad abheda-vākyaṇy api santi tathāpi na advaitam | na atyantam abhedaḥ | ajādi-vākya-sthaiḥ prakṛiti-tyāgātyaḡādi-lingair bhedasyaiva siddher ity arthaḥ | na hy atyantābhedo tāni lingāny upapadyante |

“‘Soul is not one; for a distinction of souls is apparent from various signs.’ Although there are texts affirming that there is no distinction, just as there are others which assert a distinction, of souls, still non-duality, *i. e.* an absolute absence of distinction must be denied; because a distinction is established by signs, such as the abandonment and non-abandonment of Prakṛiti, etc., mentioned in such texts as that about the ‘unborn female,’ etc. (See above, p. 165.) For these signs are inconsistent with the hypothesis of an absolute absence of distinction,” etc.

A kindred subject is introduced in the next Sūtra, the 62nd:

“Na anātmanā’pi pratyakṣa-būd’hāt” | anātmanā’pi bhogyā-prapan-

*chena ātmano na advaitam pratyakshenāpi bādhat | ātmanaḥ sarva-bhog-
yābhede ghaṭa-paṭayor apy abhedaḥ syāt | ghaṭādeḥ paṭādy-abhinnātmā-
bhedaḥ | sa cha bheda-grāhaka-pratyaksha-bādhitah |*

“Further, there is not an absence of distinction (*i.e.* identity) between Soul and non-soul, as this is disproved by the evidence of sense.’ That is: non-duality (*i.e.* identity) is not predicable of Soul on the one hand, and non-soul, *i.e.* the perceptible objects by which our senses are affected, on the other, because this is opposed to the evidence of sense. For if soul were identical with all that is perceptible, there would also be no distinction between a jar and cloth, inasmuch as jars, etc., would not be distinct from soul which is not distinct from cloth, etc.; and such identity (of jars, etc., with cloth, etc.) is opposed to the evidence of sense which obliges us to perceive a distinction.”

But how is this to be reconciled with such Vedic texts as ‘this is nothing but soul’ (*ātmā eva idam*)? An answer is given in Sūtra 64, which seems to admit that the passages in question do at least on a *prima facie* view convey the sense ascribed to them by the Vedāntins:

*“Anyā-paratvam avivekānām tatra” | avivekānām aviveki-purushān
prati tatra advaite ‘nyā-paratvam upāsanārthakānurūdah ity arthaḥ |
loke hi śarīra-śarīriṇor bhogyā-bhoktrōḥ cha avivekena abhedo vyavahāriyate
“hañ gauro” “mama ātmā Bhadrāsenaḥ” ityādīḥ | atas tam eva vya-
vahāram anūdyā tūn eva prati tathā upāsanām śrutir vidadhāti sattva-
śuddhy-ādy-artham iti |*

“These texts have another object, with a view to those who have no discrimination.’ That is: in the passages which affirm non-duality another object is intended, viz. a reference (to vulgar ideas) with a view to stimulate devotion. For it commonly occurs that indiscriminating persons confound the body and the soul, the object to be experienced, and the person who experiences it, as when they say ‘I am white,’ ‘Bhadrasena is myself.’ The Veda, therefore, referring to this mode of speaking, inculcates on such undiscerning people the practice of devotion with a view to the promotion of goodness, purity, etc.”

The author returns to the subject of non-duality in Sūtra vi. 51, which is introduced by the remark:

*Nanv evam pramāṇādy-anurodhena dvaita-siddhāḥ advaita-śruteḥ kā
gatir iti |*

“But if duality be thus established in accordance with proofs, etc., what becomes of the Vedic texts declaring non-duality?”

The answer is as follows :

“*Na śruti-virodho rāginām vairāgyāya tat-siddheḥ*” | *advaita-śruti-virodhas tu nāsti rāginām puruṣhātirikte vairāgyāya eva śrutibhir advaita-sādhanāt* |

“Our view is not opposed to the Veda, as the texts in question establish non-duality with a view to produce apathy in those who are actuated by desire.’ That is to say : There is in our doctrine regarding non-duality nothing contrary to the Veda, as the passages referred to affirm this principle with the view of producing in those who have desire an indifference in regard to everything except Soul.”

The 12th aphorism of the fifth Book asserts that according to the Veda, Pradhāna, and not Īśvara, is the cause of the world. The details of the reasoning on which this view is founded, as here stated by the commentator, differ in some respects from those which Sankara puts into the mouth of the Sāṅkhyas :

“*Śrutir api pradhāna-kūryyatvasya*” | *prapanche pradhāna-kūryyatvasya eva śrutir asti na chetana-kāranatve* | *yathā “ajām ekām lohita-śukla-kriṣṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjānānām sarūpāḥ*” | “*tad ha idam tarhy avyākṛitam asit tad nāma-rūpābhyām vyākṛiyata*” | *ity-adir ity arthaḥ* | *yā cha “tad aikshata bahu syām*” | *ityādis chetana-kāranatā-śrutih sā sargādāv utpannasya mahat-tattvopādḥikasya mahāpuruṣhasya janya-jñāna-parā* | *kiṁvā bahu-bhavanānurodhāt pradhāne eva “kūlam pipatishati” iti-vad gauṇī* | *anyathā “sākṣi chetāḥ kevalō nirguṇas cha”* (Śvctāsvatara Upanishad, vi. 11) | *ity-ādi-śruty-uktāpariṇāmitvasya puruṣhe ’nupapatter iti* | *ayaṁ cha īśvara-pratishedhaḥ aīsvaryye vairāgyārtham īśvara-jñānām vinā ’pi moksha-pratipādanārtham cha praudhi-vāda-māttram iti prāg eva vyākhyātam* |

“There are also Vedic texts to support the doctrine that the world has sprung from Pradhāna, as its cause.’ That is: There are Vedic texts to shew that the phenomenal world has sprung from Pradhāna, and that it has not had a conscious being for its cause. They are such as these : ‘An unborn female, red, white, and black in hue, producing many creatures like herself, etc. ;’ ‘This was once undeveloped : it was developed with Name and Form.’ As regards those other texts which affirm the causality of a conscious being, such as ‘It reflected, let me become many,’ they refer to the knowledge which sprang up in the great Male who was produced at the beginning of the creation pos-

sessing the attributes of the principle of Intellect (*Mahat*). Or, in accordance with the idea of becoming multiplied, the expression (indicating consciousness and will) is figuratively applied to Pradhāna, as when it is said of the bank of a river that it 'intends to fall.' For on any other supposition the incapability of any modification which is ascribed to Purusha in such texts as 'He who is the witness, the conscious, the sole being, free from the Qualities,' could not properly be applied to him (since if he were the material cause of the creation he must become modified). And it has been before explained¹⁵² that this denial of an Īśvara is a mere display of ingenuity, introduced for the purpose of producing apathy in regard to glory, and of propounding a method of final liberation even independently of the knowledge of an Īśvara."

The following is the 34th Sūtra of the sixth Book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed :

*Nanu " bahvīḥ prajāḥ puruṣāt samprasūtāḥ " ity-ādi-śruteḥ puru-
shasya kāraṇatvāgamād vivarttādi-vādāḥ āsrayaṇīyāḥ ity āsankya
āha | " śruti-virodhād na kutarkāpasādasya ātma-lābhaḥ " | puruṣa-
kāraṇatāyām ye ye pakṣhāḥ sambhāvitā te sarve śruti-viruddhāḥ iti |
atas tad- abhyupagantrīnām kutārkikādy- adhamānām ātma- svarūpa-
jnānām na bhavati ity arthaḥ | etena ātmani sukha-ḍuḥkhādi-guṇopādā-
natva-vādino 'pi kutārkikāḥ eva | teshām apy ātma-yathārtha-jnānām
nāsti ity uvagantaryam | ātma-kāraṇatā-śrutayaś cha śakti-śaktimad-
abhedena upāsānārthāḥ eva " ajām ekām " ity-ādi-śrūtibhiḥ pradhāna-
kāraṇatā-siddheḥ | yadi cha ākāśasya abhrādy-adhishṭhāna-kāraṇatā-vad
ātmanah kāraṇatvam uchyate tadā tad na nirākurmah parināmasya pra-
tishedhāt |*

"But must we not adopt the theories of an illusory creation, etc., because the causality of Purusha (soul) is to be learned from such texts as the following 'many creatures have been produced from Purusha?' To this difficulty he replies: 'From his opposition to Scripture the illogical outcaste does not attain to Soul.' The sense of this is, that all the propositions, affirming the causality of Soul, which have been devised, are contrary to the Veda; and consequently the low class of bad logicians, etc., who adopt them have no knowledge of the nature of

¹⁵² See Vijnāna Bhikṣhu's remarks, introductory to the Sūtras (p. 5, at the foot), which will be quoted in the next Section, and his comment on Sūtra i. 92. He is, as we shall find, an eclectic, and not a thorough-going adherent of the Sāṅkhya.

Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those also who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities of pleasure and pain, etc., are incompetent reasoners: they too are destitute of the true knowledge of Soul. The Vedic texts which declare its causality are intended to inculcate devotion on the ground that there is no distinction between Power (*S'akti*) and the possessor of Power (*S'aktimat*); for the causality of Pradhāna is established by such texts as that relating to the 'one unborn female,' etc. But if it be affirmed that Soul is the cause of the world merely in the same sense in which the æther is the cause of clouds, etc., viz. by affording them a receptacle, we do not object to that, since we only deny the transformation (of Soul into material productions)."¹⁵³

In regard to the question whether the principles of the Vedānta or those of the Sāṅkhya are most in harmony with the most prevalent doctrine of the Upanishads, I shall quote some of the remarks of Dr. Röer, the translator of many of these treatises. In his introduction to the Taittirīya Upanishad he observes that we there find "the tenets peculiar to the Vedānta already in a far advanced state of development; it contains as in a germ the principal elements of this system." "There are, however," he adds, "differences" (*Bibliotheca Indica*, vol. xv. p. 5). The same nearly is the case with the Aitareya Upanishad (*ibid.* p. 27). In reference to the *S'vetāśvatara* Upanishad he remarks: "Sāṅkara in his commentary on this Upanishad generally explains its fundamental views in the spirit of the Vedānta. He is sometimes evidently wrong in identifying the views of some of the other Upanishads with the tenets of the Vedānta, but he is perfectly right to do so in the explanation of an Upanishad which appears to have been composed for the express purpose of making the principle of the Vedānta agreeable to the followers of the Sāṅkhya" (*ibid.* pp. 43 f.). Of the *Kaṭha* Upanishad Dr. Röer says (*ibid.* p. 97): "The standing point of the *Kaṭha* is on the whole that of the Vedānta. It is the absolute spirit which is the foundation of the world. . . . In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absolute spirit it deviates, however, from that adopted by the other Upanishads and by the later Vedānta, and is evidently more closely allied to the Sāṅkhya. The order is here: The unmanifested (*avyakta*), the great soul (*mahātma*, or *mahat*), intellect

¹⁵³ See Dr. Ballantyne's translation, which I have often followed. He does not, however, render in extenso all the passages which I have reproduced.

(*buddhi*), mind, the objects of the senses, and the senses," etc.¹⁵⁴ The reader who wishes to pursue the subject further may consult the same author's remarks on the other Upanishads. On the whole question of the relation of the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya respectively to the Veda, Dr. Röer thus expresses himself in his introduction to the *Svetāśvatara* Upanishad (p. 36): "The Vedānta, although in many important points deviating from the Vedas, and although in its own doctrine quite independent of them, was yet believed to be in perfect accordance with them, and being adopted by the majority of the Brāhmins, it was never attacked on account of its orthodoxy. The same cannot be said of the Sāṅkhya; for it was not only frequently in opposition to the doctrine of the Vedas, but sometimes openly declared so. Indeed, the Vedānta also maintained that the acquisition of truth is independent of caste (1) or any other distinction, and that the highest knowledge which is the chief end of man cannot be imparted by the Vedas (vide *Kaṭha* ii. 23); yet it insisted that a knowledge of the Vedas was necessary to prepare the mind for the highest knowledge (2). This the Sāṅkhya denied altogether, and although it referred to the Vedas, and especially to the Upanishads, still it did so only when they accorded with its own doctrines, and it rejected their authority (3) in a case of discrepancy."

I make a few remarks on some points in this quotation indicated by the figures (1), (2), and (3). (1) We have already learned above, p. 99, that, according to the *Brahma Sūtras* (see i. 3, 34 ff., and Sankara's explanation of them), at least, a *Sūdra* does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge. (2) It appears from Sankara's argument against Jaimini that he does not consider a knowledge of the ceremonial part of the Veda as necessary for the acquisition of divine knowledge, but he seems to regard the Upanishads as the source from which the latter is derived. (3) I do not know on what authority this statement that the Sāṅkhyas ever actually rejected the authority of the Vedas is founded. Their attempts to reconcile their tenets with the letter of the Veda may often seem to be far-fetched and sophistical; but I have not observed that Sankara, while arguing elaborately against the interpretations of the Sāṅkhyas, anywhere charges them either with denying the authority of the Veda, or with insincerity in the appeals which they make to the sacred texts.

¹⁵⁴ See above, p. 161.

On the subject of the Upanishads the reader may also consult Prof. Max Müller's *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*.

I subjoin in a note some extracts from this work.¹⁵⁵

The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣhika Sūtras do not appear to contain nearly so many references to Vedic texts as the Sāṅkhya; but I have noticed the following: Nyāya iii. 32 (= iii. 1, 29 in the *Bibl. Ind.*); Vaiśeṣhika ii. 1, 17; iii. 2, 21; iv. 2, 11; v. 2, 10.

The author of the Vaiśeṣhika Sūtras affirms, in iii. 2, 20, the doctrine that souls are numerous; and in the 21st Sūtra, which I quote, along with the comment of Śankara Miśra, and the gloss of the editor Paṇḍit Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapanchānana, he claims Vedic authority for this tenet:

21. "Sūtra-sāmarthyāch cha" | (Śankara Miśra) Sāstraṁ śrutīḥ |

¹⁵⁵ "They (the Upanishads) contain, or are supposed to contain, the highest authority on which the various systems of philosophy in India rest. Not only the Vedānta philosopher, who, by his very name, professes his faith in the ends and objects of the Veda, but the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣhika, the Nyāya, and Yoga philosophers, all pretend to find in the Upanishads some warranty for their tenets, however antagonistic in their bearing. The same applies to the numerous sects that have existed and still exist in India. Their founders, if they have any pretensions to orthodoxy, invariably appeal to some passage in the Upanishads in order to substantiate their own reasonings. Now it is true that in the Upanishads themselves there is so much freedom and breadth of thought that it is not difficult to find in them some authority for almost any shade of philosophical opinion." (p. 316 f.) Again: "The early Hindus did not find any difficulty in reconciling the most different and sometimes contradictory opinions in their search after truth; and a most extraordinary medley of oracular sayings might be collected from the Upanishads, even from those which are genuine and comparatively ancient, all tending to elucidate the darkest points of philosophy and religion, the creation of the world, the nature of God, the relation of man to God, and similar subjects. That one statement should be contradicted by another seems never to have been felt as any serious difficulty." (p. 320 f.) Once more: "The principal interest of the older Upanishads consists in the absence of that systematic uniformity which we find in the later systems of philosophy; and it is to be regretted that nearly all the scholars who have translated portions of the Upanishads have allowed themselves to be guided by the Brahmanic commentators," etc. (p. 322). "In philosophical discussions, they (the Brahmins) allowed the greatest possible freedom; and although at first three philosophical systems only were admitted as orthodox (the two Mīmāṃsās and the Nyāya), their number was soon raised to six, so as to include the Vaiśeṣhika, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga schools. The most conflicting views on points of vital importance were tolerated as long as their advocates succeeded, no matter by what means, in bringing their doctrines into harmony with passages of the Veda, strained and twisted in every possible sense. If it was only admitted that besides the perception of the senses and the induction of reason, revelation also, as contained in the Veda, furnished a true basis for human knowledge, all other points seemed to be of minor importance." (p. 78 f.)

tayā 'py ātmano bheda-pratipādanāt | śruyate hi . . . (Jayanārāyaṇa)
ito 'py jīvasya īśvara-bhinnatvam ity āha | śāstrasya śruteḥ sāmāthyāj
jīveśvarayor bheda-bodhakatvāt | tathā hi | "dve brahmaṇī vedīlavye"
(Maitrī Up. vi. 22) | "dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānāṃ vṛikṣam
pariśhasvajāto | tayor anyañ pippalaṃ svādu atti anaśnann anyo abhichā-
kaṣīti" (Rig-veda Saṃhitā, i. 164, 20; Svetāśv. Up. vi. 6; Muṇḍaka
Up. i. 3, 1, 1) ity-ādi-śruter jīveśvarayor bhedo 'vaśyam angikāryyaḥ |
na cha "tat tvam asi Svetaḥketo" "Brahma-vid Brahma eva bhavati"
ity-ādi-śrutinām kā gatir iti vāchyaṃ | "tat tvam asi" iti śrutes tad-
abhedena tadīyatva-pratipādanena abheda-bhāvanā-paratvāt | "Brahma-
vid Brahma eva" iti śrutiś cha nirduḥkhatvādinā īśvara-sāmyaṃ jīvasya
abhidhatte na tu tad-abhedam | "nirājanāḥ paraṃ sāmyam upaiti" iti
śruter gaty-antarāsambhavāt | asti hi laukika-vākyeṣu "sampaḍ-ādhiḥkṛye
purohito 'yaṃ rājā saṃvṛittāḥ" ity-ādīṣu sādṛīśya-pareṣu abhedopa-
chārah | na cha mokṣā-dāśāyām ajnāna-nivṛittāv abhedo jāyat | iti
vāchyaṃ bhedasya nityatvena nāśāyogād bheda-nāśāngīkāro 'pi vyakti-
dvayārasthānasya āvaśyakatvāch cha iti saṅkṣepaḥ | bheda-sādhakāni
yukty-antarāṇi śruty-antarāṇi cha grantha-gaurava-bhīyā parityaktāni |

"And this opinion is confirmed by the Śāstra." (Sankara Miśra)

The Śāstra means the Veda; by which also a distinction of Souls is established. For it is said," etc. [He then quotes two texts which are repeated by Jayanārāyaṇa, the author of the gloss, whose remarks are as follows:] "There is another proof of the Soul being distinct from Īśvara; viz. this, that it is confirmed by the Śāstra, the Veda, which declares the distinctness of the two; and this principle must of necessity be admitted from such texts as these: 'Two Brāhmās are to be known;' ¹⁰⁶ and 'Two birds, united, friends, attach themselves to the same tree; one of them eats the sweet fruit of the pippala tree, while the other, without eating, looks on.' Nor are we to ask what will then become of such other texts as (1) 'Thou art that, o Svetaḥketo;' (2) 'He who knows Brahma becomes Brahma;' for the former of these two passages (1) tends to convey the idea of identity by representing as identity with That, the fact of Svetaḥketo's entirely belonging to That; whilst

¹⁰⁶ The full text is: *Dve brahmaṇī vedīlavyo kābila-brahma paraṃ cha yat—śabdā-brahmaṇī nishyātāḥ paraṃ brahmādhigachhati |* "Two Brāhmās are to be known, the verbal and the supreme. He who is initiated in the former attains the latter." Here, however, by the verbal Brāhmā, the Veda must be intended.

the second (2) affirms the equality of the Soul with Īśvara, in consequence of its freedom from pain and other weaknesses, and not its identity with Him; for it is shewn by another Vedic text, viz. 'The passionless man attains the highest state of equality,' that any other destiny would 'be inconceivable. In secular modes of speaking also, such as the following, 'From the abundance of his wealth the domestic priest has become the king,' we find a figurative assertion of identity. Nor can it be said that distinction disappears on the cessation of ignorance in the state of final emancipation, because distinction, from its eternity, cannot be destroyed, and because, even if its destructibility were admitted, two separate personalities must still continue to exist. Such is a summary of our argument: further proofs from reasoning, and further texts of the Veda, are omitted from a dread of making the book too bulky."

The charge of open contempt of the Veda is brought by Sankara against S'āṅḍilya, the author of the Bhāgavata heresy, as the orthodox Vedāntin considers it.¹⁶⁷ Of that doctrine Sankara thus speaks in his remarks on Brahma Sūtra ii. 2, 45 :

Veda-vipratishedhas cha bhavati | chaturshu vedeshu param sreyo 'labdhvā S'āṅḍilyaḥ idaṁ sāstram adbhigatavān ity-ādi-veda-nindā-darśanāt | tasmād asangatā eshā kalpanā iti siddham |

"And it also contradicts the Veda: for we see such an instance of contempt of the Vedas as this, that S'āṅḍilya, not finding the means of attaining the highest good in the whole four of them, devised this Sūtra. Hence it is established that these imaginations are absurd."

The points of the Bhāgavata doctrine objected to by Sankara do not however appear to be those which are principally insisted on in the Bhakti Sūtras of S'āṅḍilya, published by Dr. Ballantyne in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1861. I will notice some of these doctrines. The leading principle of the system is that it is not knowledge (*jñānu*) but devotion (*bhakti*) which is the means of attaining final liberation (Sūtra 1). Devotion is defined in the 2nd Sūtra to be a supreme love of God (*sā parā anuraktīr Īśvare*). Knowledge cannot, the author considers, be the means of liberation, as it may co-exist with hatred of the object known (Sūtra 4). Neither the study of the Veda nor the acqui-

¹⁶⁷ See Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. 413: "A passage quoted by Sankara Āchārya seems to intimate that its promulgator was S'āṅḍilya," etc., etc.

tion of such qualities as tranquility of mind is a necessary preliminary to devotion. The only requisite is a desire of emancipation, according to the commentator (remarks on Sūtra 1). Ceremonial works, too, have no bearing upon devotion (Sūtra 7), which may be practised by men of all castes, and even by Chāṇḍālas, since the desire to get rid of the evils of mundane existence is common to all (Sūtra 78). The commentator explains that the authority of the Vedas as the only source of supernatural knowledge is not denied, nor the fact that only the three highest castes have the right to study them: but it is urged that women, Sūdras, etc., may attain by means of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, etc., to knowledge founded on the Vedas, whilst Chāṇḍālas, etc., may acquire it by traditional instruction based on the Smṛiti and the practice of virtuous men. Those whose devotion is not matured in the present world, will find the opportunity of perfecting it in Sveta-dvīpa, the world of the divine Being (Sūtra 79). Even the wicked may have a penitential devotion (*ārti-bhaktāv eva adhikārah*), and after they are freed from their guilt, they may attain to full devotion. The Bhagavad Gītā is much quoted by the commentator on these Sūtras; but the Veda is also sometimes adduced in proof of their doctrines; as e.g. the following words of the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 25, 2, are cited to prove that devotion is the chief requisite, and knowledge, etc., subservient to it:

“*Ātmā eva idaṁ sarvaṁ iti | sa vai. esha evaṁ paśyann evaṁ manvānaḥ evaṁ vijānann ātma-ratir ātma-kriḍaḥ ātma-mithunaḥ ātmānandaḥ sa svatūḍ bhavati*” | tattra “*ātma-rati-*”*rūpāyāḥ para-bhakteḥ “paśyann” iti darśanam aprīyatvādi-bhrama-nirāsa-mukhena angam bhavati |*

“All this is Soul. He who perceives this, thinks this, knows this, delights in Soul, sports with Soul, consorts with Soul, takes pleasure in Soul; he becomes self-resplendent.’ Here the sight expressed in the words ‘perceiving,’ etc., is by removing all errors regarding disagreeableness, etc., an adjunct of supreme devotion in the form of ‘de-light in Soul.’”

In his remarks on Sūtra 31 the commentator quotes another passage of the same Upanishad, iii. 14, 4, in which a Sāṅḍilya is referred to as the author of a statement. Śāṅkara in his commentary on the Upanishad calls him a rishi. He cannot, however, have been the same person as the author of the Sūtras; although, even if he had been so reputed,

Sankāra would have had little difficulty in denying that they could have been written by a rishi, as we shall see in the next section that he contradicts the opinion that the rishi Kapila, referred to in the Svetāśvatara Upanishad, was the author of the Sāṅkhya aphorisms.

SECT. XI.—*Distinction in point of authority between the Veda and the Smṛitis or non-Vedic S'āstras, as stated in the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, and by the Commentators on Manu, and the Vedānta, etc.; difference of opinion between S'ankara and Madhusūdana regarding the orthodoxy of Kapila and Kanāda, etc.; and Vijnāna Bhikshu's view of the Sāṅkhya.*

A distinct line of demarcation is generally drawn by the more critical Indian writers between the Vedas, and all other classes of Indian Sāstras, however designated. The former, as we have seen, are considered to possess an independent authority and to be infallible, while the latter are regarded as deriving all their authority from the Veda, and (in theory at least) as infallible guides only in so far as they coincide with its dicta. This will be clear from the following passages :

I. *Nyāya-mālā-vistara*.—The first text which I adduce has been already quoted in the Second Volume of this work, but is repeated here for facility of reference. It is from the treatise just named, i. 3, 24 :

Baudhāyanāpastambāśvalāyana-kātyāyana-ādi-nāmānkitāḥ kalpa-sūtrādi-granthāḥ nigama-nirukta-shaḍ-anga-granthāḥ Manu-ādi-smṛitayaś cha apaurusheyāḥ dharmabuddhi-janakatvāt veda-vat | na cha mūla-pramāṇa-sāpekshatvena veda-vaishamyam iti śānkanīyam | utpunnōyāḥ buddheḥ svataḥ-pramāṇyāṅgikāreṇa nirapekshotvāt | Maivam | uktānumānasya kālātyāyāpadishṭatvāt | Baudhāyana-sūtram Āpastamba-sūtram ity evam puruṣa-nāmnā te granthāḥ uchyante | na cha Kāṭhaka-ādi-samākhya-vat pravachana-nimittatvaṃ yuktam | tad-grantha-nirmāṇa-kāle tadānīntanaiḥ kaischid upalabdhatvāt | tach cha avichhinna-pāramparyeṇa anuvarṭtate | tataḥ Kālidāsa-ādi-grantha-vat paurusheyāḥ | tathāpi veda-mūlutrāt pramāṇam | . . . kalpasya vedatvaṃ nādyāpi siddham | kintu prayatnena sādhanīyam | na cha tat sādhanītuṃ śakyam | paurusheyatvasya samākhya-yayā tat-karttur upalambhena cha sādhitatvāt |

“It may be said that the Kalpa Sūtras and other works designated by the names of Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Āśvalāyana, Kātyāyana, etc.,

and the Nigama, Nirukta, and six Vedāngas, together with the Smṛitis of Manu and others, are superhuman, because they impart a knowledge of duty, as the Vedas do; and that they should not be suspected of inferiority to the Vedas on the ground that they depend upon a primary authority, since the knowledge which they impart is independent, because it is admitted to be self-evidencing. But this view is incorrect, for the inference in question proceeds upon an erroneous generalization. The books referred to are called by the names of men, as 'the Sūtras of Baudhāyana,' 'the Sūtras of Āpastamba;' and these designations cannot correctly be said to originate in the exposition of the works by those teachers whose names they bear (as is really the case in regard to the Kāthaka, and other parts of the Veda); for it was known to some of the contemporaries of these men, at the time when they were composing these Sūtras, Smṛitis, etc., that they were so engaged; and this knowledge has descended by unbroken tradition. Hence these books are, like the works of Kālidāsa and others, of human origin. Nevertheless, they possess authority, as being founded on the Veda." . . . The following additional remarks represent the opinion of the Guru (Prabhākara) on the same question: "It is not yet proved that the Kalpa Sūtras possess the character of the Veda; it would require great labour to prove it; and, in fact, it is impossible to prove it. For the human origin of these books is established by the names which they bear, and by their being observed to have had authors."

II. *Kullūka*.—The same thing is admitted by Kullūka, the commentator on Manu, who (in his remarks on i. 1) thus defines the relation of his author to the Vedas:

Paurusheyatve 'pi Manu-vākyaṇām aviḡīta-mahājana-parigrahāt śruty-upagrahāc̣ha veda-mūlakatayā prāmāṇyam | Tathā c̣ha c̣hkhāndogya-brāhmaṇe śrūyate "Manur vai yat kinchid acadat tad bheshajam bheshajātūyai" iti | Vṛihaspatis apy āha "Vedārthopanibandhṛitvāt prādhānyam hi Manoh smṛitam | Manv-ārtha-ripavitā tu yā smṛitiḥ sā na śasyate | Tāvach c̣hkhāstrāṇi śobhante tarka-vyākaraṇāni c̣ha | Dharmārtha-moksho-padeshtā Manur yōvad na dṛiṣyate" | Mahābhārate 'py uktam "Purāṇam Mānavo dharmah sāngo vedaṣ chikitsitam | ājñā-siddhāni chatvāri na hantaryāni hetubhiḥ" | virodhi-Bauddhādi-tarkair na hantaryāni | anukūlas tu mīmāṃsādi-tarkah pravarttanīyuḥ ora | ata eca rakshyati "ārsham dharmopadesaṃ c̣ha veda-śāstrāc̣irodhinū | yas larkenānusandhatte sa dharmaṃ veda netaraḥ" iti |

“Though the Institutes of Manu had a personal author, still, as their reception by illustrious men of unimpeached [orthodoxy], and their conformity to the Veda, prove that they are based upon the latter, they are authoritative. Accordingly it is recorded in the Chhândogya Brâhmaṇa that, ‘Whatever Manu said is a medicine for remedial purposes.’ And Vṛihaspati says: ‘As Manu depends upon the contents of the Veda, he is traditionally celebrated as pre-eminent. But that Smṛiti which is contrary to the sense of Manu, is not approved. Scriptures and books on logic and grammar are all eclipsed as soon as Manu, our instructor in duty, and in the means of attaining both earthly prosperity, and final liberation, is beheld.’ And it is said in the Mahâbhârata: ‘The Purâṇas, the Institutes of Manu, the Veda with its appendages, and treatises on medicine, these four, which are established by authority, are not to be assailed by rationalistic arguments;’ that is, they are not to be attacked by hostile reasonings, such as those of the Bauddhas. But friendly arguments, such as those of the Mîmâṃsakas, are to be employed. And accordingly we shall find below (Manu xii. 106) that he says, ‘the man who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the rules of duty by reasoning which is agreeable to the Veda, he, and he only, is acquainted with duty.’” (See above, p. 24, note 29.)

III. *Nyâya-mâlâ-vistara*.—But the precepts of the Smṛiti are not considered useless or superfluous. On the contrary, an authority is attributed to them corresponding to the antiquity, elevated position, and sacred character of their supposed authors. Thus the author of the *Nyâya-mâlâ-vistara* says (i. 3, 3):

*Vimatâ smṛitir veda-mûlâ | vaidika-manv-âdi-pranîta-smṛititvât | upa-
nayanâdhyayanâdi-smṛiti-vat | na cha vaiyarthyaṃ śankaniyam | asmad-
âdinâm pratyaksheshu paroksheshu nânâ vedeshu viprakîrṇasya anushṭhe-
yârthasya ekatra sankshipyamânât |*

“The variously understood Smṛiti is founded on the Veda, because the traditions, such as those regarding investiture, study, etc., have been compiled by Vedic men, such as Manu and others. Nor is it to be surmised that the Smṛiti is useless, since it throws together in a condensed form a variety of injunctions regarding matters to be observed, which are scattered through different Vedas, both such as are visible and such as are invisible to us.” (This last expression appears

to refer to the supposition that some parts of the Veda which Manu and others had before them when compiling their own works have now been lost. See Müller's *Anc. Sansk. Lit.* pp. 103-107.)

Accordingly the Smṛitis have an authority superior to that founded merely on the practice of learned men of modern date, who have no intuition into the past and invisible. Thus the Nyāya-mālā-vistara says (i: 3, 19):

*Na hi idānīntanāḥ śiṣṭāḥ Manv-ādi-vad deśa-kāla-viprakṛiṣṭaṁ vedaṁ
divya-jñānena śakṣhātkarttuṁ śakuvanti yena śiṣṭāchāro mūla-vedam
anumāpayet |*

“For learned men of the present day do not possess the power, which Manu and others had, of placing before their minds, through divine knowledge, the Veda which is far removed from them both in place and time, so as to justify us in regarding the practice of these moderns as a sufficient ground for inferring the existence of a Veda as its foundation.”

But as learned men, in any particular country or at any particular time, may be able to consult some Smṛiti which authorizes their particular observances, “these observances may serve as ground for inferring the existence of some Smṛiti on which they are founded, but not for inferring a Veda (*tasmāch chhishṭāchāreṇa smṛitir anumātuṁ śakyate na tu śrutih*). But a Smṛiti which is thus merely inferred to exist is set aside by any visibly existing Smṛiti of contrary import (*anumitā cha smṛitir viruddhayā pratyakṣhayā smṛityā bādhyate*).”

IV. *Sankara*.—The above passages, by assuming that Manu and other eminent sages had the power of consulting Vedic texts now no longer accessible, make them practically almost infallible. The same view is taken by Sankara Āchāryya. (See, however, the passage quoted from him above, in note 67, p. 62; but there he has the author of the Sāṅkhya in view, whose tenets he regarded as contrary to the Veda.) In answer to the remark of a Mīmāṃsaka objector stated in the comment on the Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 32, that the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, being of human origin, have only a derived and secondary authority (*‘itihāsa-purāṇam api pauruṣheyatvāt pramāṇāntara-mūlatām akāṅkṣhate’*), Sankara argues in his explanation of the following Sūtra (i. 3, 33) that they have an independent foundation:

Itihāsa-purāṇam api vyākhyātena mārgeṇa sambhavad mantrārthavāda-

mūlatvāt prabhavati devatā-vigrahādi prapanchayitum | pratyaksha-mūlam api sambhavati | bhavati hi asmākam apratyaksham api chirantanānām pratyaksham | tathā cha Vyāsādayo devatābhiḥ pratyakshaṁ vyavaharanti iti smaryato | yas tu brūyād idānīntanānām iva pūrveshām api nāsti devādibhir vyavaharttuṁ sāmārthyam iti sa jagad-vaichitryam pratishedet | idānīm iva cha na anyadā 'pi sūrvabhāumāḥ kshatriyo 'sti iti brūyāt tatas cha rājasūyādi-chodanāḥ uparundhyāt | idānīm iva cha kālāntare 'py aryavasthita-prāyān varṇāsrama-dharmān pratijānīta tatas cha vyavasthā-vidhāyī sūstram anarthakam kuryāt | Tasmād dharmotkarsha-vasāt chirantanāḥ devādibhiḥ pratyakshaṁ vyajhrur iti śliṣhyate | api cha smaranti "svādhyāyādishṭa-devatā-samprayogaḥ" ityādi | yogo 'py animādy-aīsvarya-prāpti-phalakaḥ smaryamāno na śakyate sāhasa-mātreṇa pratyākhyātum | śrutiś cha yoga-māhātmyam prakhyāpayati | "pṛithvy-ap-tejo-'nila-khe samut-thite panchātmake yoga-guṇe pravṛitte | na tasyo rogo na jurā na mṛityuḥ prāptasya yogād¹⁵⁸ nimishaṁ sarīram" iti | rishīnām api mantra-brāhmaṇa-darsīnām sāmārthyam na asmadīyena sāmārthyena upamātum yuk-tam | tasmāt sa-mūlam itihāsa-purāṇam |

"The Itihāsas and Purāṇas also, having originated in the way which has been explained, have power, as being based on the hymns and arthavādas, to evince the corporality, etc., of the gods. It is also reasonable to suppose that they are founded upon intuition. For there were things palpable through intuition to the ancients, though they are not thus palpable to us.¹⁶⁰ Accordingly it is recorded in the Smṛiti that Vyāsa and others associated face to face with the gods.¹⁶⁰ Any man

¹⁵⁸ Instead of *yogād nimisham* the text of the Biblioth. Indica reads *yogñinimayam*

¹⁶⁰ See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127; and also Prof Müller's article on the Vaiśe-shika Philosophy in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. vii. p. 311, where it is remarked that the Vaiśeśhikas, like Kapila, include the intuition of rishis under the category of *pratyaksha* (*ārshaṁ jñānām sūtra-kṛitū pṛithak na lakshitaṁ yogi-pratyakshē 'ntar-bhūvāt*).

¹⁶⁰ Compare with this R. V. i. 179, 2: *Ye chiū hi pūrvo rītasūpaḥ āsan sūkāṁ devebhir avadann rītāni | te chiū avāsura ityādi |* "The pious sages who lived of old and who conversed about sacred truths with the gods,—they led a conjugal life," etc. See also the passages quoted from the Vāna-parvan of the Mahābhārata, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, and Plato in the First Volume of this work, p. 147: and compare Hesiod, fragment 119: *ξυυαλ γάρ τότε δαίτες ἔσαν, ξυυαλ δε θόωκοι θβαυ-τοισι θεοῖσι κατα-θῆτοισι τ'ἀνθρώποις*.

"Immortal gods, not unfamiliar, then

Their feasts and converse shared with mortal men."

And Herodotus writes of the Egyptians, ii. 144: *Τὸ δὲ πρότερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῦτων*

who should maintain that the ancients, like his own contemporaries, were destitute of power thus to associate with superhuman beings like the gods, would be denying all variety in the history of the world. Such a person would in like manner affirm that as now there is no Kshattriya possessed of universal sovereignty, so neither was there ever such a prince; and would thus impugn the scriptural injunctions regarding the *rājasūya* sacrifice [which was only to be performed by a universal monarch]. He would also allege that in former times, as now, the duties of castes and of orders were scarcely at all in force, and would thus render fruitless the scriptures by which the rules relating to them are prescribed. By these considerations it is intimated that the ancients, in consequence of their eminent holiness, were admitted to associate immediately with the gods, etc. And the Smṛiti¹⁰¹ says that nearness to, and converse with the gods is gained by reading the Veda, etc. Again, when the Smṛiti talks of the practice of Yoga resulting in the acquisition of superhuman faculties, such as minuteness, this assertion cannot be impugned through mere audacity, [*i.e.* it must have had some good foundation]. The Veda, too, declares the immense power of devotion in these words: 'When the fivefold influence of Yoga, connected with the elements of earth, water, fire, air, and æther, has begun to act, and a man has attained an æthereal [or fiery] body, he is no longer affected by disease, decay, or death.' And it is unreasonable to estimate, by the analogy of our own power, the power of the rishis, the seers of the Vedic hymns and Brāhmaṇas. Wherefore the Itihāsas and Purāṇas have an (independent) foundation.'"

Sāṅkara does not, however, treat all the ancients in this way. Like many other systematizers, he finds no difficulty in rejecting or explaining away any authorities which come into conflict with his views. It is thus that he deals with Kapila, the author of the Sāṅkhya. That eminent sage is thus spoken of in the Svetāśvatara Upanishad, v. 2:

Yo yoniṃ yoniṃ adhitishṭhaty eko viśvāni rupāṇi yoniś cha sarvāḥ |

θεοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν Ἀγύπτῳ ἄρχοντας, δικάοντας ἅμα τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι, "And [the Egyptian priests said] that before these men the gods were the rulers in Egypt, dwelling together with men."

¹⁰¹ It appears from the gloss of Govinda Ānanda that one of the Yoga Sūtras is here quoted. I give the sense according to his explanation: *mantra-japād deva-saṅgāt śhaṅ tat-sambhāṣhaṇāṃ cha iti sūtrārthāḥ.*

rishim prasūtam Kapilam yas tam agre jñānair bibhartti jāyamānam cha pasyēt |

“The god who alone superintends every source of production and all forms, who formerly nourished with various knowledge his son the rishi Kapila, and beheld him at his birth, etc.”¹⁶³

Towards the close of his comment on Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 1, which I shall cite at some length, Sankara makes some remarks on this passage of that Upanishad. After stating the points that had been established in the first Book (*adhyāya*) of the Brahma Sūtras, and alluding to the objections which had been urged against the Sāṅkhya and other hostile doctrines as contrary to the Veda, Sankara goes on to explain the object of the second book, and the purport of the aphorism with which it begins, as follows :

Idānīm sva-pakṣhe smṛiti-nyāya-virodha-parihārah pradhānādi-vādānām cha nyāyābhāsopabṛīṃhītatvam prativedāntām śrīṣṭy-ādi-prakriyāyāḥ avigītatvam ity asya artha-jātasya pratipādanāya dvitīyo 'dhyāyāḥ ārabhyate | tatra prathamam tāvat smṛiti-virodham upanyasya pariharati | yad uktam Brahma eva sarvajnam jagataḥ kāraṇam tad ayuktam | kutaḥ “smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangāt” | smṛitis cha tantrākhyā paramarshi-praṇtū śiṣṭa-parigrīhitā | anyās cha tad-anusārīnyāḥ smṛitayāḥ | evam saty anavakāśaḥ prasajyeran | tāsu hy achetanam pradhānam svatantram jagataḥ kāraṇam upanibadhyate | Manv-ādi-smṛitayo tāvach chodanā-lakṣaṇena agnihotrādinā dharmajātāna apokṣitam artham samarpayantyaḥ sāvakāśāḥ bhavanti asya varṇasya asmin kāle 'nena vidhānena upanayanam idṛśās cha āchārah ittham vedādhyayanam ittham samāvarttanam ittham suha-dharma-chārīnī-samyoguh 'ti tatkā puruṣhūrthamś chatur-varṇāsrama-dharmān nānā-vidhān vidudhati | nī evam kāpilādi-smṛitīnam anuṣṭheye vishaye 'vakāśo 'sti moksha-sādhanam eva hi samyag-darśanam adhikṛitya tūḥ praṇtūḥ | yadi tatra apy anavakāśāḥ syur anarthakyam eva āsām prasajyeta | tasmāt tad-avirod'na vedāntāḥ vyākhyātavyāḥ | katham punar “īkṣity-”ādībhyo hetubhyo Brahma eva sarvajnam jagataḥ kāraṇam ity avadhāritāḥ śruty-arthaḥ | “smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangena” punar ākṣ'pyati | bhaved ayam anākṣhepaḥ sva-tantra-prajñānam | para-tantra-prajñās tu pūrya janūḥ

¹⁶³ See Sankara's commentary on this passage in *Bibl. Ind.* vii. 351, and Dr. Ruer's translation, p. 62, with the note ; also Dr. Hull's note in p. 19 of the preface to his edition of the Sāṅkhya Sūtra, in the *Bibl. Ind.*

svātantryeṇa śruty-artham avadhārayitum āsakuṃvantaḥ prakhyāta-pra-
 netrikāsu smṛitishv avalambaran tad-balena cha śruty-artham pratipat-
 serann asmat-kṛite cha vyākhyāne na viśvasyur bahu-mānāt smṛitīnām
 pranetrishu | kapila-prabhṛitīnām cha ārshaṃ jñānam apratihataṃ sma-
 ryyate śrutiś cha bhavati “ṛishim prasūtaṃ kapilaṃ yas tam agre jñānair
 bibhartti jāyamānaṃ cha paśyed” iti | tasmād na eshām matam ayathār-
 thaṃ śakyāṃ sambhāvayitum | tarkāvashṭambhena cha te 'rtham pratish-
 ṭhāpayanti | tasmād api smṛiti-balena vedāntāḥ vyākhyeyāḥ iti punar
 ākshepaḥ | tasya samādhir “na | anya-smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasan-
 gād” iti | yadi smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangena īśvara-kūraṇa-vādāḥ
 ākshipyeta evam apy anyūḥ īśvara-kūraṇa-vādinyaḥ smṛityo 'navakāśāḥ
 prasajyeran | tāḥ udāharishyāmaḥ | . . . evam anekasaḥ smṛitishv api
 īśvaraḥ kūraṇatvena upādānatvena cha prakāśyate | smṛiti-balena praty-
 vatishṭhamānasya smṛiti-balena eva uttaram pravakshyāmi ity ato 'yam
 anya-smṛity-anavakāśa-doshopanyāsaḥ | darsitaṃ tu śrutiṇam īśvara-
 kūraṇa-vādam prati tātparyyam | vipratipattau cha smṛitīnām avāśya-
 kartavyo 'nyatara-parigrāhe 'nyatarasyāḥ parityāge cha śruty-anusārin-
 yaḥ smṛitayaḥ pramāṇam anapekshyāḥ itaraḥ | tad uktam pramāṇa-la-
 kṣaṇe “virodhe tv anapekshaṃ syād asati hy anumānam” iti (Mīmāṃsā
 Sūtras i. 3, 3) | na cha atīndriyān arthān śrutim antareṇa kāśchid upa-
 labhate iti śakyāṃ sambhāvayitum nimittlābhāvāt | śakyāṃ kapilādīnām
 siddhānām apratihata-jñānatvād iti chet | na | siddher api sāpekshatvāt |
 dharmānushṭhānāpekshā hi siddhiḥ sa cha dharmas chodanā-lakṣaṇaḥ |
 tatas cha pūrva-siddhāyās chodanāyāḥ artho na paśchima-siddha-purusha-
 vachana-vaśona atīśankitūṃ śakyate | siddha-vyapāśraya-kalpanāyām api
 bahutvāt siddhānām pradarsīlena prakāreṇa smṛiti-vipratipattau satyīṃ
 na śruti-vyapāśrayād anyad nirṇaya-kāraṇam asti | para-tantra-prajna-
 sya api na akasmāt smṛiti-viśeṣa-vishayaḥ pakṣhapāto yuktāḥ | kasyachit
 kvachit tu pakṣhapāto sati purusha-mati-vaiśvarūpyeṇa tattvavyasthāna-
 prasangāt | tasmāt tasya api smṛiti-vipratipatty-upanyāseṇa śruty-anu-
 sārānanusāra-vivechanena cha san-mārgo prajñā sangrahaṇīyā | Yā tu
 śrutiḥ Kapilasya jñānātīśayaṃ darsayanti pradarsitā na tayā śruti-
 viruddham api Kāpilam mataṃ śraddhātūṃ śakyūṃ “Kapilam” iti
 “śruti-sāmānya-mātratvād”¹⁰³ anyasya cha Kapilasya Sagara-putrāṇām
 prataptur Vāsudeva-nāmnāḥ smaranāt | anyārtha-darsanasya cha prāpli-
 rahitasya asādhakatvāt | Bhavati cha anyā Manor māhātyam prakhyā-

¹⁰³ Mīmāṃsā-sūtra i. 1, 31. See above, pp. 78 f.

payantī śrutīr "yad vai kincha Manur avadat tad bhashajam" 161 iti | Manunā cha (xii. 91) "sarva-bhūteshu chātmanāṃ sarva-bhūtāni chātmani | samam paśyann ātma-yājī svārājyam adhiḡachchhati" iti sarvātmatva-darśanam praśaṃsatā Kāpilam mataṃ nindyato iti gamyate | Kāpilo hi na sarvātmatva-darśanam anumānyate ātma-bhedābhyupagamāt | . . . atās cha ātma-bheda-kalpanayū 'pi Kāpilasya tantrasya veda-viruddhatvaṃ vodānusāri-Manu-vachana-viruddhatvaṃ cha na kevalaṃ svatantra-prakṛiti-parikalpanayū eveti siddham | vodasya hi nirapokshaṃ svārthe prāmānyaṃ raver iva rūpa-vishaye puruṣa-vachasāṃ tu mūlantarāpekshaṃ svārthe prāmānyaṃ vaktṛi-smṛiti-vyavahitaṃ cha iti viprakarṣhaḥ | tasmād veda-viruddhe viśhaye smṛity-anatakāśa-prasungo na dośhaḥ |

“But now the second chapter is commenced with the view of effecting the following objects, viz. (a) to refute, in our own favour, the charge of contradicting the reasonings of the Smṛiti, to shew (b) that the doctrines regarding Pradhāna, etc., have nothing more than an appearance of reason, and (c) that the manner in which the subjects of creation, etc., are treated in each of the Upanishads is unimpeachable. First of all then the author states, and removes, the objection of contrariety to the Smṛiti. Our opponents urge that it is incorrect to say that the omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world. Why? Because, (1) as they allege, that doctrine ‘is chargeable with the objection of setting aside the Smṛiti as useless’ (Br. Sūtra, ii. 1, 1). This term ‘Smṛiti’ denotes a systematic treatise (*tantra*) composed by an eminent rishi, and received by the learned; and there are other Smṛitis in conformity with it. And the alleged difficulty is that (on the theory that Brahma is the cause) all these would be set aside as useless; since they propound an unconscious Pradhāna as the self-dependent cause of the world. The Smṛitis of Manu and others, indeed, which affirm that by means of the agnihotra and other enjoined ceremonies, the objects desired (by those who practise these rites) will be accomplished, will still retain their use, viz. of prescribing the objects to be pursued, viz. the various duties of the four castes and orders,—that such and such a caste shall be initiated at such a time and by such a process, and shall follow such and such a mode of life, that the Veda is to be studied, that the cessation of study is to take place, and that union with a woman following the same rites is to

¹⁶¹ See above, p. 181, and the First Volume of this work, pp. 188, and 510.

celebrated, in such and such ways. But [on the hypothesis of Brahma being the creator] no such room is left for the Smṛitis of Kapila and others, on the ground of any ceremonies to be performed [in conformity with their prescriptions]; for they have been composed as embodying perfect systems affording the means of final liberation. If in this respect also no place be left for them the difficulty will arise that they are quite useless. And hence the conclusion is reached that the Upanishads should be interpreted so as to harmonize with them. But, such being the case, how, it is again objected, have you determined on the strength of the reasons furnished by the texts about 'beholding,' etc., that it is the meaning of the Veda that Brahma is the omniscient cause of the world, thus exposing yourself to the charge of leaving no place for the Smṛiti? 'Although we hold that this charge is harmless as regards those who think for themselves; yet men have for the most part no independent opinion, and are unable by an unassisted act of their own judgment to determine the sense of the Vedas, and will consequently lean upon the Smṛitis composed by renowned authors, and adopt the sense of the Vedas which they enforce: and from their lofty opinion of these authors they will have no confidence in our interpretations. And it is moreover urged (2) that Kapila and the others are declared by the Smṛiti to have possessed an unobstructed intuitive (*ārsha*¹⁶⁵) knowledge; and there is also a Vedic text to the effect 'He who of old sustains with manifold knowledge Kapila when he is produced, and beholds him when born,' etc. (*Svetāsv. Up. v. 2*). Consequently their doctrines cannot be imagined to be untrue. And they further support their tenets by argument. On these grounds also, it is urged, the Upanishads must be interpreted by the aid of the Smṛitis. The questions thus raised are settled by the concluding words of the Sūtra, 'No; for this conclusion is vitiated by the objection that other Smṛitis would in this way be rendered useless.' (1) If the doctrine that God is the cause of the world is chargeable with the objection that it leaves no room for the Smṛiti, in the same way the difficulty will arise (on the other theory) that other texts of the Smṛiti which affirm that God is the cause will be set aside. These we shall adduce." After quoting some passages, Śaṅkara proceeds: "In the same manner in numerous texts of the Smṛiti God is shewn to be both the instrumental and the material cause. I must answer on the

¹⁶⁶ See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127.

strength of the Smṛiti the person who opposes me on the same ground, and so I just indicate this objection against his views as having the effect of setting aside other Smṛitis. But it has been shown that the sense of the Vedic texts is in favour of the causality of God. And since, if the Smṛitis are at variance with each other, we must of necessity accept the one set and reject the other, those of them which are conformable to the Veda will be authoritative, and the rest will deserve no attention: for it has been said in the section (of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā) on proof (i. 3, 3), that 'if it (the Smṛiti) be contrary (to the Veda) it must be disregarded; but if there be no (contrariety) it must be inferred (that the former is founded on the latter).' And it is inconceivable that anyone should discover things beyond the reach of the senses without the aid of the Veda, since the means of doing so are wanting. If it be urged that we can conceive such discovery (of imperceptible things without the help of the Veda) as possible in the case of Kapila and other perfect persons (*siddhānam*), because there was nothing to obstruct their knowledge;—we reply, No; because perfection (*siddhi*) is dependent upon something else, viz. on the practice of duty. Now duty is defined as something which is enjoined. And the subject-matter of an injunction which was previously promulgated cannot be called into doubt on the strength of the words of a man who became perfect at a subsequent period. And even on the supposition that confidence could be placed in such 'perfect' persons, yet, as they are numerous, and as such a mutual contradiction as we have already pointed out exists between the Smṛitis of different 'perfect' persons, there is no means left of determining the truth, but reliance on the Veda. Causeless partiality to any particular Smṛiti, on the part even of a man who has no independent opinion, is improper; but if anyone ever does exhibit such partiality, the charge of depriving truth of all fixity attaches to his procedure, because the opinions of men (which he takes as the standard of his belief) assume all sorts of forms. Consequently his judgment also should be directed into the right path by indicating the mutual contradictions between the different Smṛitis, and by distinguishing those of them which are conformable to, from those which are at variance with, the Veda. And (2) the Vedic text which has been pointed out, showing the transcendent character of Kapila's knowledge, cannot be a warrant for believing the doctrine of Kapila, though con-

trary to the Veda, since the word Kapila 'has, in this text, a general sense' [applicable to others besides the author of the Sāṅkhya] (Mīm. Sūtra, i. 1, 31), and another Kapila called Vāsudeva, the consumer of Sagara's sons, is also mentioned in the Smṛiti; and since the indication of something which has a different object in view, and is therefore irrelevant to the matter in question, can prove nothing.¹⁶⁶ There is, besides, another text of the Veda which sets forth the eminent dignity of Manu in these terms, 'Whatever Manu said is medicine.'¹⁶⁷ And Manu—when he employs the words (xii. 91), 'He who, with impartial eye, beholds himself in all beings, and all beings in himself, thus sacrificing his own personalty, attains to self-refulgence;' and, by saying this commends the tenet that everything is one with the supreme Spirit—must be understood as censuring Kapila's doctrine. For Kapila does not assent to the identity of Brahma and the universe, since he holds a diversity of souls." . . . (After quoting one passage from the Mahābhārata, and another from the Veda, to prove that Kapila is wrong, Sankara proceeds): "Hence it is proved that Kapila's system is at variance with the Veda and with the words of Manu, who follows the Veda, not only in supposing an independent Prakṛiti (nature), but also in supposing a diversity of souls. Now the Veda has an independent authority in regard to its own contents, as the sun has (an inherent power) of manifesting forms; whilst the words of men have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent on another source (the Veda), and which is distinguished (from the authority of the Veda) by the fact of their authors being remembered. Consequently it forms no objection to a doctrine that it sets aside a Smṛiti on a point which is contrary to the Veda."

¹⁶⁶ The words thus translated are explained as follows in the Gloss of Govinda Ānanda: *Kincha "yaḥ Kapilam jñānair bibharti tam īśvaram paśyed" iti vidhīyate tathā oha anyūrthasya īśvara-pratipatti-śeṣasya Kapila-sarvajñatvasya darśanam anuvādas tasya mānāntareṇa prāpti-śūnyasya svārtha-sādhakatṛyogād na anuvādamātrād sarvajñatva-siddhir ity āha* | "And it is enjoined (in the text of the S'vetāsvatara Upanishad): 'Let him behold that Īśvara who nourishes Kapila with various knowledge;' and so since this 'indication' of, this reference to, the omniscience of Kapila, which has another object in view, and ends in the establishment of an Īśvara, and which on other grounds is shewn to be irrelevant, cannot prove its own meaning,—this mere reference does not suffice to evince Kapila's omniscience:—This is what S'ankara means to say."

¹⁶⁷ See the First Volume of this work, pp. 188 and 510.

See also Sankara's commentary on the Taittirīya Upanishad, Bib. Ind. vii. pp. 136, 137, where he says :

Kāpila-kāṇāḍādi-tarka-sāstra-virodhaḥ iti chet | na | toshām mūlābhāve veda-virodhe cha bhrāntyopapattē |

“If it be objected that this is contrary to the rationalistic doctrines of Kapila and Kaṇāda [and therefore wrong], I answer no, since these doctrines are proved to be erroneous, as having no foundation, and as being in opposition to the Veda.”

His remarks on a passage of the Praśna Upanishad, which are as follows, afford a curious specimen of the contemptuous manner in which this orthodox Vedāntist treats the heretical Sāṅkhyas, etc. (Praśna Up. vi. 4 ; Bib. Ind. viii. 244) :

Sāṅkhyās tu avidyā-dhyāropitam eva puruṣo kartṛitvaṁ kriyā-kārikam phalaṁ cha iti kalpayitvā āgama-vāhyatvāt punas tatas trasyantaḥ paramārthataḥ eva bhokṛitvam puruṣasya ichchhanti | tattvāntaram cha pradhānam puruṣāt paramārtha-vastu-bhūtam eva kalpayanto 'nya-tārkika-kṛita-buddhi-vishayāḥ santo vihanyante | Tathā itare tārkikāḥ sāṅkhyair ity evam paraspara-viruddhārtha-kalpanātaḥ āmishārthinaḥ iva prāṇino 'nyonyaṁ viruddhamūnāḥ artha-darśitvāt paramārtha-tattvāt tad-dūram eva apakṛishyante | atas tan-matam anūdritya vedāntārthataṭṭvam ekatva-darśanam prati ādaravanto mumukshavaḥ syur iti tārkikamato dosha-darśanaṁ kinchid uchyate 'smābhīr na tu tārkika-tātparyyona |

“The followers of the Sāṅkhya imagine that the functions of action, and the enjoyment of reward which causes action, become erroneously attributed to the soul (*puruṣa*) in consequence of supervening ignorance; but as this doctrine differs from that of Scripture, they become afraid of it, and seek to ascribe to the soul enjoyment in the proper sense. And supposing another principle distinct from soul, viz. Pradhāna (or nature), which they regard as substance in the proper sense, they become the objects of correction by other rationalists, and are crushed. Thus, in consequence of the contrariety between the conceptions of the Sāṅkhyas and those of other freethinkers, the two parties quarrel with each other like animals fighting for flesh; and thus, from their having an (exclusive) regard to (their own) views, they are all drawn away to a distance from the essential truth. Wherefore let men, disregarding their tenets, seek for final liberation by paying honour to the principles of the Vedantic doctrine, which maintains the unity of all being. We

have thus pointed out something of the errors of the rationalists, and have said nothing in accordance with their views."

IV.—In thus depreciating Kapila, Sankara is in direct opposition to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (which, however, may be a work of later date than his¹⁶⁸), in which the author of the Sāṅkhya is spoken of with the greatest reverence. Thus in Bhāg. Pur. i. 3, 10, he is described as the fifth incarnation of Viṣṇu :

*Panchamaḥ Kapilo nāma siddhesaḥ kāla-viplutam | provāchāsūraye
sāṅkhyāṁ tattva-grāma-vinirṇayam |*

"In his fifth manifestation, he [in the form of] Kapila, and lord of saints, declared to Āsuri the Sāṅkhya which defines the series of principles, and which had been lost through the lapse of time."

And again, in Bhāg. Pur. ix. 8, 12, 13, Kapila is made the subject of eulogy. A legend narrates that the sixty thousand sons of king Sagara, conceiving Kapila to be the robber of a horse which had been carried away from their sacrifice, advanced to slay him, when they were burnt up by fire issuing from his body. The author of the Purāṇa, however, denies that this was in any degree owing to passion on the part of the sage :

*Nā sādhu-vādo muni-kopa-bhāṛjitāḥ nṛpendra-putrāḥ iti sattva-dhā-
mani | kathaṁ tamo roṣamayaṁ nibhāryate jagat-pavitratmani khe rajo
bhūvaḥ | yasyeritā sāṅkhyamayi dṛidhīha naur yayā mumukshus tarate
duratyayam | bhovārnavam mṛityu-pathaṁ vipāśchitāḥ parātma-bhūtasya
katham prithāmatik |*

"It is not an assertion befitting a good man to say that the king's sons were burnt up by the wrath of the sage ; for how is it conceivable that the darkness (*tamas*) of anger should reside in the abode of goodness (*sattva*), or that the dust (or passion, *rajas*) of the earth should ascend into the sky, the region of purity? How could that sage, one with the supreme Spirit, by whom the strong ship of the Sāṅkhya was launched, on which the man seeking emancipation crosses the ocean of existence, hard to be traversed, and leading to death,—how could he entertain the idea of any distinction between himself and others [and so treat any one as an enemy]?"

It is not necessary for me to quote any further passages in praise of the author of the Sāṅkhya. There is a great deal about this system

¹⁶⁸ See Wilson's Vish. Pur., preface, pp. xlv. and li.

in the Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan, verses 11,037 ff. See Colebrooke's Essays, i. 236 (p. 149 of Williams and Norgate's ed.); Wilson's Vishṇu Purāṇa, pref. p. xciv. and text, pp. 18 ff. with notes; Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iii. chapters 24–30; Weber's Ind. Stud. passim; Dr. Rōer's Introduction to Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, Bibl. Ind. xv. 35 ff.; and Dr. Hall's preface to the Sāṅkhya-sāra in the Bibl. Ind. p. 19, note.

We have thus seen that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the most accurate and critical of the Indian writers, between the Śruti, which they define to be superhuman and independent, and the Smṛiti, which they regard as of human origin, and as dependent for its authority on its conformity with the Śruti. Śāṅkara, indeed, as we have also observed (above, p. 183 f.), goes very nearly, if not altogether, so far as to assign an independent foundation to the Smṛitis; but he confines this distinction to such of these works as coincide in doctrine with the Śruti or Veda, according to his own Vedāntic interpretation of its principles, while all other speculators are denounced by him as heterodox. It is, however, clear from the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavad Gītā, the Vishṇu, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇas, etc., that the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya must have been very prevalent in ancient times, and that Śāṅkara, when he condemned them as erroneous, must have done so in the face of many powerful opponents.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ I quote the following passage from Dr. Rōer's Introduction to the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, pp. 36 f.: "At the time of the composition of the Śvetāśvatara, the Sāṅkhya was not a new system, which had to overcome the resistance of old received opinions, and the prejudices of men in power, whose interest might be opposed to the introduction of a doctrine by which their authority could be questioned. It had found many adherents; it was the doctrine of Manu, of some parts of the Mahābhārata, and to its founder divine honour had been assigned by general consent. It was a doctrine whose argumentative portion demanded respect, and as it was admitted by many Brāhmans (*sic*), distinguished for their knowledge of the Vedas, it could not be treated as a heresy. The most learned and eminent of the Brāhmans were evidently divided among themselves with reference to the truth of the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta, and this must have afforded to the opponents of the Vedaic system a most powerful weapon for attacking the Vedas themselves. If both the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta are divine revelations, both must be true; but if the doctrine of the one is true, the doctrine of the other is wrong; for they are contradictory among themselves. Further, if both are derived from the Vedas, it is evident that also the latter cannot reveal the truth, because they would teach opposite opinions about one and the same point. Such objections to the Vedas had been made already in ancient times, as is clear from the Upanishads, from several passages of Manu, from Yaska, etc.; and under these circumstances it cannot be wondered at, if early attempts were made to reconcile the

It is not necessary for me here to inquire with any accuracy what the relation was in which the different philosophical systems stood to each other in former ages. It may suffice to say that the more thoroughgoing adherents of each—of the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya, etc.—must, according to all appearance, have maintained their respective principles with the utmost earnestness and tenacity, and could not have admitted that any of the rival systems was superior to their own in any particular. It is impossible to study the Sūtras of the several schools, and come to any other conclusion. The more popular systems of the Purāṇas, on the other hand, blended various tenets of the different systems syncretically together. In modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta seems to be generally admitted. But even some who hold this opinion refuse to follow the example of Śaṅkara in denouncing the founders of the rival schools as heretical. On the contrary, they regard them all as inspired Munis, who, by adapting their doctrines to the capacities or tendencies of different students, have paved the way for the ultimate reception of the Vedāntic system. Such is the view taken in the Prasthāna-bheda of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who gives the following lucid summary of the leading principles of the different schools of speculation (Weber's Indische Studien, i. 23):

Sarveshāṁ cha sankshepeṇa trividhāḥ eva prasthāna-bhedāḥ | tatra ārambha-vādāḥ okaḥ | pariṇāma-vādo dvitīyaḥ | vivartta-vādas tritīyaḥ | pūrthvivṛtṭya-taijasa-vāyavītyās chaturvidhāḥ paramānāvo dvya-anukūḍi-krameṇa brahmāṇḍa-paryantaṁ jagad ārambhante | asad eva kāryyaṁ kāraka-vyāpārād utpadyate iti prathamā tārkhikānām mīmāṃsā-kānāṁ cha | satka-rajas-tamo-guṇātmakam pradhānam eva mahad-ahankārādi-krameṇa jagad-ākāreṇa pariṇamate | pūrvam api sūkshma-rūpeṇa sad eva kāryyaṁ kārana-vyāpāreṇa abhivyajyate iti dvitīyaḥ pakshaḥ Sāṅkhya-Yoga-Pātanjala-Pāsupatānām | Brahmanāḥ pariṇāmo jagad iti Vaiśṇavānām | eva-prakāśa-paramānandādvitīyam Brahma eva-māyā-vaśād mithyaiva jagad-ākāreṇa kalpate iti tritīyaḥ paksho

tenets of the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya to save the uniformity of the doctrine, and thereby the sacredness of the Vedas as the Scriptures derived from the immediate revelation of God. So, for instance, it is recorded that Vyāsa, the reputed author of the Brahma Sūtras, wrote also a commentary to Pātanjali's Yoga-sāstra, which is still extant under his name. In the same manner composed Gauḍapāda, the eminent Vedāntist, and teacher of Śaṅkara's teacher, Govinda, a commentary to Īśvara Kṛishṇa's Sāṅkhya Kārikā; and the Bhagavad Gītā has also the same object."

*Brahma-vādinām | sarveshām prasthāna-karttṛiṇām muninām vivartita-vāda-paryavasānena advītiye Paramesvare eva pratipādye tātparyam | na hi te munayo bhrāntāḥ sarvajnatvāt teshām | kintu vahir-vishaya-pra-
nānām āpātataḥ purushārthe praveśo na sambhavati iti nāstikya-vāra-
nāya taiḥ prakāra-bhedāḥ pradarsitāḥ | tatra teshām tātparyam abuddhvā
veda-viruddhe 'py arthe tātparyam utprekshamānās tan-malam eva upā-
deyatvena gṛhṇanto janāḥ nānā-patha-jusho bhavanti | iti sarvam ana-
vādyam |*

“The difference in principle between these various schools is, when briefly stated, three-fold. The first doctrine is that of a commencement of the world; the second is that of an evolution; the third is that of an illusion. Atoms of four descriptions—earthy, aqueous, igneous, and aerial—beginning with compounds of two atoms, and ending in the egg of Brahmā (the world), originate the universe: and effects, previously non-existent, come into being from the action of a causer. This is the first theory, that of the Logicians and Mīmāṃsakas. The second theory, that of the Sāṅkhyas, Yogas, Pātanjalas, and Pāsupatas, is that *Pradhāna* (or *Prakṛiti* = nature), consisting of the three *guṇas* (qualities), *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, is evolved, through the successive stages of *mahat* (intellect), and *ahankāra* (consciousness), etc., in the form of the world; and that effects, which had previously existed in a subtile form, are [merely] manifested by the action of their cause. Another form of this theory is that of the Vaishṇavas [the Rāmānujas], who hold the universe to be an evolution of Brahma. The third view, that of the Brahma-vādins (Vedāntists), is, that Brahma, the self-resplendent, the supremely happy, and the one sole essence, assumes, unreally, the form of the world through the influence of his own illusion (*Māyā*).

The ultimate scope of all the Munis, authors of these different systems, is to support the theory of illusion, and their only design is to establish the existence of one Supreme God, the sole essence; for these Munis could not be mistaken [as some of them must have been, if they were not all of one opinion, or, as those of them must have been who did not hold Vedāntic principles], since they were omniscient. But as they saw that men, addicted to the pursuit of external objects, could not all at once penetrate into the highest truth, they held out to them a variety of theories, in order that they might not fall into atheism. Misunderstanding the object which the Munis thus had in view, and

representing that they even designed to propound doctrines contrary to the Vedas, men have come to regard the specific doctrines of these several schools with preference, and thus become adherents of a variety of systems. Thus all has been satisfactorily stated."

I find that Vijnāna Bhikshu, the commentator on the Sāṅkhya aphorisms, takes very nearly the same view as is here quoted from Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in regard to the superiority of the Brahma Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta over the other Darśanas.

In his Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣhya (Bibliotheca Indica, pp. 3 ff.), he thus writes :

Syād etat | Nyāya-vaiśeṣikābhyām atra avirodho bhavatu | brahma-mīmāṃsā-yogābhyām tu virodho 'sty eva | tābhyām nityeśvara-sādhanaṭ | atra cha Īśvarasya pratishidhyamānatvāt | na cha atrāpi vyāvahārikapāramārthika-bhēdena seśvara-nirīśvara-vādāyor avirodho 'stu seśvara-vādasya upāsanā-paratva-sambhavād iti vāchyam | vinigamakābhāvāt | īśvaro hi durjneyaḥ iti nirīśvaratram api loka-vyavahāra-siddham aiśvarya-vairāgyāya anuvaditum śakyate ātmanaḥ sagunatram iva | na tu kvāpi śruty-ādāv īśvaraḥ sphuṭam pratishidhyate yena seśvara-vādasyaiva vyāvahārikatvam avadhāryeta iti | atra uchyate | atrāpi vyāvahārikapāramārthika-bhāvo bhavati | "asatyam apratishṭham te jagad āhur anīśvaram" ityādi-śāstrair nirīśvara-vādasya ninditatvāt | asmīn eva śāstre vyāvahārikasyaiva pratishṭhasya aiśvarya-vairāgyādy-artham anuvadatvauchityāt | yadi hi laukāyatika-matānusāreṇa nityaiśvaryaṁ na pratishidhyeta tadā paripūrṇa-nitya-nirīśvaiśvarya-darśanena tatra chittōveśato vivekābhyaśa-pratibandhaḥ syād iti sāṅkhyāchāryānām āśayaḥ | seśvara-vādasya na kvāpi nindādikam asti yena upāsanādi-paratayā tat śāstraṁ sankochyeta | yat tu "nāsti sāṅkhya-samaṁ jñānaṁ nāsti yoga-samaṁ balam | atra vaḥ saṁśayo mā bhūj jñānaṁ sāṅkhyam param smritam" ityādi vākyam tad-vivekāṁśe eva sāṅkhya-jñānasya darśanāntarebhyāḥ utkarṣham pratipādayati na tu īśvara-pratishṭhāṁśe 'pi | tathā Parāśarādy-akkhila-śiṣṭa-saṁvādād api seśvara-vādasyaiva pāramārthikatvam avadhāryate | api cha "Akṣhapāda-praṇīte cha Kūṇāde sāṅkhya-yogayoh | tyājyaḥ śruti-virudho 'mśaḥ śruty-eka-śaraṇair nri-bhiḥ | Jaiminīyo cha Vaiyāśe virudhāṁśo na kaśchana | śrutyā vedārthavijnāne śruti-pāraṁ gatau hi tāv" iti Parāśaropapurāṇādibhyo 'pi brahma-mīmāṃsāyāḥ īśvarāṁśe balavatram | yathā | "nyāya-tantrāny anekāni tais tair uktāni vādibhiḥ | hetv-āgama-sadāchārair yod yuktāṁ

*taḍ upāsyaṭām” iti moksha-dharma-vākyaḍ api Parāsarādy-akhila-śiṣṭa-
 vyavahāreṇa brahma-mīmāṃsā-nyāya-vaiśeṣikādy-uktaḥ īśvara-sādhaka-
 nyāyaḥ eva grāhyo balavattvāt | tathā | “Yam na paśyanti yogīndrāḥ
 sūnkhyāḥ api mahēsvaram | anādi-nidhanam brahma tam eva śaraṇam
 vraja” ityādi-kaurmādi-vākyaīḥ sūnkhyānām īśvarājñānasyaiva nārāya-
 ṇādīnā proktatvāch cha | kincha brahma-mīmāṃsāyāḥ īśvaraḥ eva mukhyo
 vishayaḥ upakramāḍibhir avadhṛitaḥ | tatrāmṣe tasya bādhe śāstrasyaiva
 aprāmāṇyam syāt | “yat-paraḥ śabdāḥ sa śabdārthaḥ” iti nyāyāt | sūn-
 khyā-śāstrasya tu puruṣārtha-tat-sādhana-prakṛiti-puruṣa-rivekāv eva
 mukhyo vishayaḥ | iti īśvara-pratiśedhāmśa-bādhe ’pi na aprāmāṇyam |
 “Yat-paraḥ śabdāḥ sa śabdārthaḥ” iti nyāyāt | ataḥ sāvakāsatayā sūn-
 khyam eva īśvara-pratiśedhāmṣe durbalam iti | na cha brahma-mīmāṃ-
 sāyām api īśvaraḥ eva mukhyo vishayo na tu nityaiśvaryaṁ iti vaktuṁ
 śakyate | “smṛity-anavakāśa-doṣa-prasanga”-rūpa-pūrva-pakṣasya anu-
 papattya nityaiśvarya-viśiṣṭatvena eva brahma-mīmāṃsā-vishayaṭrāva-
 dhāraṇāt | brahma-śabdasya para-brahmany eva mukhyatayā tu “athātaḥ
 para-brahma-jijnāsā” iti na sūtritam iti | etena sūnkhyā-virodhād brah-
 ma-yoga-darśanayoḥ kāryyeśvara-paratvam api na sūnkanāyām | prakṛiti-
 svātantryāpattya “rachanānupapattē cha na anumānam” ityādi brahma-
 sūtra-paramparā-’nupapattē cha | tathā “sa purveṣām api guruḥ kāleṇa
 anavachchedād” iti yoga-sūtra-tādīya-vyāsa-bhāṣyābhyaṁ sphuṭam īśa-
 nityatāvagamāch cha iti | tasmād abhyupagama-vāda-praudhī-vādūdinā
 eva sūnkhyasya vyāvahārikeśvara-pratiśedha-paratayā brahma-mīmāṃsā-
 yogābhyaṁ saha na virodhaḥ | abhyupagama-vādaś cha śāstre dṛiṣṭaḥ |
 yathā Viṣṇu-purāṇe (i. 17, 54) | “Ete bhīnna-dṛiṣṭūṁ doityāḥ vikalpāḥ
 kathitāḥ mayā | kṛitvā ’bhyupagamaṁ tatra sankṣepaḥ śṛyatām mama” |
 iti | astu vā pāpinām jñāna-pratibandhārtham āstika-darśaneshv apy
 aṁśataḥ śṛuti-viruddhārtha-vyavasthāpanām tesu teshv aṁśeshv apra-
 māṇyam cha | śṛuti-smṛity-aviruddheshu tu mukhya-viśhayeshu prā-
 māṇyam asty eva | ataḥ eva Padma-purāṇe brahma-yoga-darśanāti-
 riktānām darśanānām nindā ’py upapadyate | Iathā tatra Pārvatim
 prati īśvara-vākyaṁ | “śṛīṇu devī pravakṣyāmi tōmasōṇi yathā-kra-
 mam | yeshām śravaṇa-mātreṇa pātityām jñānīnām api | prachīnām hi
 mayāvoktām Śaivam Pāsupatādīkam | mach-chaḥkty-āreṣitair ripurāḥ sam-
 proktāni tataḥ param | Kanādēna tu samproktām śāstraṁ vaiśeṣīkum
 mahāt | Gautamēna tathā nyāyam sūnkhyāṁ tu Kanīlēna vai | dījan-
 manā Jainīnīnā pūrvaṁ vedamayārthatūḥ | nirīsvareṇ vādēnu kṛitām*

sūtram mahattaram | Dhishanena tathā proktam chārṣvākam ati-garhitam | daityānām nāsanārthāya Viṣṇunā Buddha-rūpiṇā | bauddha-sūtram asat proktaṁ nagna-nīla-patādikam | māyā-vādam asach-chhāstram praohchhannam bauddham eva cha | mayaiṣa kathitam devi kalau brāhmaṇa-rūpiṇā | apārthaṁ śruti-vākyaṇām darsayat loka-garhitam | karma-svarūpa-tyūjyatvam atra cha pratipādyate | sarva-karma-paribhramśād naitikarmyaṁ tatra chochyate | parātma-jīvayor aikyam mayā 'tra pratipādyate | brahmaṇo 'sya paraṁ rūpaṁ nirguṇaṁ darsitam mayā | sarvasya jagato 'py asya nāsanārthaṁ kalau yuge | vedārthavad mahāsūtram māyā-vādam avaidikam | mayaiṣa kathitam devi jagatāṁ nāsa-kāraṇād" iti | adhikaṁ tu brahma-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣhye prapanchitam asmābhīr iti | tasmād āstika-sūtrasya na kasyāpy aprāmānyaṁ virodho vā eva-eva-viśayeshu sarveṣhām abādhitā avirodhāch cha iti | nanv evam puruṣa-bahutvāṁse 'py asya sūtrasya abhyupagama-vādatvaṁ syāt | na syāt | avirodhāt | brahma-mīmāṃsāyām apy "amśo nānū-vyapadesād" ityādisūtra-jātair jīvātma-bahutvasyaiva nirṇayāt | sāṅkhya-siddha-purushāṇām ātmatvaṁ tu brahma-mīmāṃsāyā bādhyate eva | "ātmaṁ iti tu upayanti" iti tat-sūtreṇa paramātmanaḥ eva paramārtha-bhūmāv ātmatvāvadhāranāt | tathāpi cha sāṅkhyasya na aprāmānyam | vyāvahārikātmano jīvasyā itara-viveka-jñānasya moksha-sādhanatve vivakṣhitārthe bādhabhāvāt | etena śruti-smṛiti-prasiddhayor nānātmaikātmatvayor vyāvahārika-paramārthika-bhedena avirodhāḥ |

“Be it so: let there be here no discrepancy with the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣhika. But it will be said that the Sāṅkhya is really opposed to the Brahma-mīmāṃsā (the Vedānta) and the Yoga [of Patanjali]; since both of these systems assert an eternal Īśvara (God), while the Sāṅkhya denies such an Īśvara. And it must not be said (the same persons urge) that here also [as in the former case of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣhika], owing to the distinction between practical [or conventional, or regulative] and essential truths, there may be no [real] contrariety between the theistic and the atheistic theories, inasmuch as the theistic theory may possibly have a view to devotion [and may therefore have nothing more than a practical end in view];—you are not, it will be said, to assert this, as there is nothing to lead to this conclusion [or, distinction]. For as Īśvara is difficult to be known, the atheistic theory also, which is founded on popular opinion, may, indeed, be adverted to for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity,

(just as it is [conventionally] asserted that soul has qualities); but neither the Veda, nor any other śāstra contains a distinct denial of an Īśvara, by which the merely practical [or conventional] character of the theistic theory, could be shewn. [Consequently the theistic theory is not a mere conventional one, but true, and the contradiction between the atheistic Sāṅkhya and the theistic systems is real and irreconcilable].

“To this we reply : in this case also the distinction of practical and essential truths holds. For although the atheistic theory is censured by such texts as the following : ‘They declare a world without an Īśvara to be false and baseless;’ yet it was proper that in this system (the Sāṅkhya), the merely practical (or conventional) denial [of Īśvara] should be inculcated for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity, and so forth. Because the idea of the author of the Sāṅkhya was this, that if the existence of an eternal Īśvara were not denied, in conformity with the doctrine of the Laukāyatikas, men would be prevented by the contemplation of a perfect, eternal, and faultless godhead, and by fixing their hearts upon it, from studying to discriminate [between spirit and matter]. But no censure on the theistic theory is to be found in any work, whereby [the scope of] that system might be restricted, as having devotion, etc., in view as its only end. And as regards such texts as the following : ‘There is no knowledge like the Sāṅkhya, no power like the Yoga; doubt not of this, the knowledge of the Sāṅkhya is considered to be the highest,’ they [are to be understood as] proving the superiority of the Sāṅkhya doctrine over other systems, not in respect of its atheism, but only of its discrimination [between different principles]. It is, moreover, established by the concurrence of Parāśara, and all other well instructed persons, that the theistic theory is that which represents the essential truth. Further, such texts as the following of the Parāśara Upapurāṇa, and other works, shew that the strength of the Brahma-mimāṃsā lies on the side of its theism, viz., ‘In the systems of Akṣhapāda (Gotama) and Kaṇāda, and in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga, that part which is opposed to the Veda should be rejected by all persons who regard the Veda as the sole authority. In the systems of Jaimini and Vṛāsa (the Vedānta) there is no portion contrary to the Veda, since both these sages have attained to a perfect comprehension of its true meaning. In the same way it results from this text of the Mokṣa-dharma (a part of the

Sānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata), viz. : 'Many systems of reasoning have been promulgated by different authors; [in these] whatever is established on grounds of reason, of scripture and of approved custom, is to be respected;' [from this text also, I say, it results] that the theory,—declared in the Brahma-mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣhika, etc., in consonance with the tradition of Parāśara and all other well-instructed men,—which asserts an Īśvara, is alone to be received, in consequence of its strength; and [the same thing follows] from the fact that in such passages as this of the Kaurma-purāṇa, etc., viz.—'Take refuge with that Maheśvara, that Brahma without beginning or end, whom the most eminent Yogins, and the Sāṅkhyas do not behold,'—Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu) and others assert that the Sāṅkhyas are ignorant of Īśvara.

"Moreover, Īśvara is determined to be the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā by the introductory statement, etc., of that system. If it were open to objection on that side [*i.e.* on the side of its principal subject], the entire system would be without authority. For it is a rule that 'the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.' Whereas the principal subjects of the Sāṅkhya are—(1) the grand object of human pursuit, and (2) the distinction between nature (*prakṛiti*) and spirit (*puruṣa*), which is the instrument of attaining that grand object. Thus this system does not lose its authority, even though it be erroneous in so far as it denies an Īśvara. For it is a rule that 'the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.' Hence, as the Sāṅkhya has a certain applicability of its own, it is weak only in so far as it denies an Īśvara.

"Nor can it be alleged that it is Īśvara only, and not the eternity of his existence, that is the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā; since, through the disproof of the objection (*pūrva-pakṣa*) that the theistic theory 'is chargeable with the defect of rendering the Smṛiti inapplicable,'¹⁷⁰ it is ascertained that the assertion of an eternal Īśvara is the main object of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā. But as the word 'Brahma' is properly employed to denote the supreme Brahma, the first aphorism of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā does not run thus, 'Now follows the enquiry regarding the supreme Brahma;' [but thus, 'Now follows the

¹⁷⁰ The aphorism here referred to (Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 1), with most of S'ankara's comment on it, has been already quoted above, pp. 186 ff.

enquiry regarding Brahma.’] Hence we are not to surmise that, as they [would otherwise] contradict the Sāṅkhya, the Brahma-mīmāṃsā and Yoga systems must aim at establishing [not an eternal Deity] but a [secondary] Īśvara, who is merely an effect. For this is disproved (1) by the series of Brahma Sūtras (ii. 2, 1 ff.) which affirm that ‘an un-intelligent cause of the world cannot be inferred, as it is not conceivable that such a cause should frame anything,’ and which would be rendered inconclusive by the assumption of the independent action of Prakṛiti; and (2) by the fact that the eternity of God is clearly understood from the Yoga aphorism [i. 26], viz. ‘He is also the instructor of the ancients, as he is not circumscribed by time,’ as well as from the commentary of Vyāsa thereon.¹⁷¹ Hence, as the Sāṅkhya, arguing on its own special principles, and at the same time making a great display of ingenuity¹⁷² and so forth, has in view a merely practical denial of an Īśvara, it does not contradict the Brahma-mīmāṃsā or the Yoga. The method of reasoning on special principles is referred to in the Śāstra. Thus it is said in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa [i. 17, 54, Wilson, vol. ii. p. 44], ‘These notions, Daityas, which I have described, are the guesses of persons who look on the Deity as distinct from themselves. Accepting them as partially correct, hear from me a summary (of transcendental truth).

“Or let it be [supposed] that even orthodox systems, with the view of preventing sinners from attaining knowledge, lay down doctrines which are partially opposed to the Veda; and that in those particular portions they are not authoritative. Still in their principal contents,

¹⁷¹ I quote the commentary of Bhoja-rājā on this Sūtra, as given by Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Yoga, part first, p. 32): *Pūrveshām | ādyānām Brahmādīnām api sa gurur upadokṣhā yataḥ sa kālena nāvachchhidīyate anūdītāt | teshām punar ādimattvād asti kālena avachchedaḥ |* “Of the ancients, that is, of the earliest [beings], Brahmā and the rest, he is the guru, i.e., the instructor, because He, as having no beginning, is not circumscribed by time; while they, on the other hand, having had a beginning, are circumscribed by time.”

¹⁷² I am indebted to Professor Cowell for a satisfactory interpretation of the first of these two phrases, *abhyupagama-vāda* and *prauḍhi-vāda*, as well as for various other improvements in my translation of this passage. The phrase *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is rendered by Dr. Ballantyne “Implied dogma” (Nyāya aphorisms, i. 31, p. 30, as corrected in MS.). Professor Goldstücker s.v. renders it by “implied axiom.” In Böhtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon the phrase *abhyupagama-vāda* is rendered “a discussion in a conciliatory spirit.” In regard to the sense of *prauḍhi-vāda* see above, p. 172.

which are consonant to the Sruti and the Smṛiti, they possess authority. Accordingly, in the Padma Purāṇa we find a censure passed even upon the several philosophical systems (*Darśanas*), with the exception of the Brahma (the Vedānta) and the Yoga. For in that work Īśvara (Mahādeva) says to Pārvatī, 'Listen, goddess, while I declare to you the Tāmāsa works (the works characterised by *tamas*, or the quality of darkness) in order; works by the mere hearing of which even wise men become fallen. First of all, the Saiva systems, called Pāsupata, etc., were delivered by myself. Then the following were uttered by Brāhmins penetrated by my power, viz. the great Vaiśeshika system by Kaṇāda, and the Nyāya, and Sāṅkhya, by Gotama and Kapila respectively. Then the great system, the Pūrva-[mīmāṃsā], was composed by the Brāhman Jaimini on Vedic subjects, but on atheistic principles. So too the abominable Chārvāka doctrine was declared by Dhishāṇa,¹⁷³ while Viṣṇu, in the form of Buddha, with a view to the destruction of the Daityas,¹⁷⁴ promulgated the false system of the Baud-dhas, who go about naked, or wear blue garments. I myself, goddess, assuming the form of a Brāhman, uttered in the Kali age, the false doctrine of Māyā [illusion, the more modern form of the Vedānta], which is covert Buddhism, which imputes a perverted and generally censured signification to the words of the Veda, and inculcates the abandonment of ceremonial works, and an inactivity consequent on such cessation. In that system I propound the identity of the supreme and the embodied soul, and show that the highest form of this Brahma is that in which he is devoid of the [three] qualities. It was I myself, goddess, by whom this great śāstra, which, composed of Vedic materials and inculcating the theory of illusion, is yet un-Vedic, was declared in the Kali age for the destruction of this entire universe.' We have entered into fuller explanations on this subject in the Brahma-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya. There is, therefore, no want of authority, nor any contradiction, in any orthodox system, for they are all incapable of refutation in their own especial subjects, and are not mutually discrepant. Does, then, this system (the Sāṅkhya) lay down a theory based only on its own assumptions in respect of the multitude of souls also? It does not. For in the Brahma-mīmāṃsā also it is determined by such a kind of texts

¹⁷³ A name of Vṛihaspati, according to Wilson's dictionary.

¹⁷⁴ See Wilson's Viṣṇu Purāṇa, pp. 334 ff.

as the following (Brahma Sūtras, ii. 3, 43), viz. "the embodied spirit is a portion¹⁷⁵ of the supreme soul, from the variety of appellations,' that there is a multitude of embodied spirits. But it is denied by the Brahma-mīmāṃsā that the spirits (*puruṣha*) asserted by the Sāṅkhya have the character of Soul; for it is determined by the Brahma Sūtra (iv. 1, 3), 'they approach Him as one with themselves,'¹⁷⁶ that, on the ground of transcendental truth, the supreme Soul alone has the character of Soul. But, nevertheless, the Sāṅkhya is not unauthoritative; for as the knowledge of its own distinctness from other things, obtained by the embodied spirit in its worldly condition, is instrumental to final liberation, this system is not erroneous in the particular subject matter which it aims at propounding. In this way it results from the distinction of practical and real, that there is no contradiction between the two theories (made known by the Śruti and Smṛiti), of a multitude of souls, and the unity of all soul.

The view taken by Madhusūdana, as quoted above, and partially confirmed by Vijnāna Bhikṣu, of the ultimate coincidence in principle of all the different schools of Hindu philosophy, however mutually hostile in appearance, seems, as I have remarked, to be that which is commonly entertained by modern Pandits. (See Dr. Ballantyne's Synopsis of Science, advertisement, p. iv.) This system of compromise, however, is clearly a deviation from the older doctrine; and it practically abolishes the distinction in point of authority between the Vedas and the Smṛitis, Darśanas, etc. For if the Munis, authors of the six Darśanas, were omniscient and infallible, they must stand on the same level with the Vedas, which can be nothing more.

I return, however, from this digression regarding the hostility of Śāṅkara to the adherents of the Sāṅkhya and other rationalistic schools,

¹⁷⁵ On this, however, Śāṅkara (*in loco*) remarks as follows: *Jīvaḥ Īśvarasya aṁśo bhavītuṃ arhati yathā gner visphulingaḥ | aṁśaḥ iva aṁśaḥ | na hi niravayavasya mukhyo 'nśaḥ sambhavati | kasmāt punar niravayavato'at sa eva nu bhavati | "nānāvayavadeśāt |* "The embodied soul must be 'a portion' of Īśvara, as a spark is of fire (and not merely dependant upon him as a servant on his master). 'A portion' means, 'as it were a portion;' for nothing can be, in the proper sense, 'a portion' of that which has no parts. Why, then, as Īśvara has no parts, is not the embodied soul the very same as he? 'From the variety of appellations,' etc., etc."

¹⁷⁶ The original Sūtra runs thus: *Ātmā iti tu upagaohchchanti grāhayanti oha |* "They approach Him as one with themselves, and [certain texts] cause them to receive Him as one with themselves." This refers to certain texts which Śāṅkara adduces from one of the Upanishads, apparently.

and the opinions of later authors concerning the founders of those several systems. The distinction drawn by the Indian commentators quoted in this section between the superhuman Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa Sūtras, etc., as well as the other Smritis, is not borne out by the texts which I have cited above (pp. 8, 31) from the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka (= Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa), and Muṇḍaka Upanishads. By classing together the Vedic Sanhitās, and the other works enumerated in the same passages, the authors of both the Upanishads seem to place them all upon an equal footing; and the former of the two authorities speaks of them all as having proceeded from the breathing of the Great Being. If the one set of works are superhuman, it may fairly be argued that the others are so likewise. According to the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, neither of them (if we except only the Vedāntas or Upanishads) can be placed in the highest rank, as they equally inculcate a science which is only of secondary importance.

As, however, Sankara (who, no doubt, perceived that it would be inconsistent with modern theories to admit that any of the works usually classed under the head of Smṛiti had been really breathed forth by the Creator, and that such a directly divine origin could, on orthodox principles, be assigned only to writings coming under the designation of Śruti), maintains in his comment on the text of the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad that the whole of the works there enumerated, excepting the Sanhitās of the four Vedas, are in reality portions of the Brāhmaṇas, it will be necessary to quote his remarks, which are as follows (Bibl. Ind. ii. 855 ff.):

. . . *Niśvasitam iva niśvasitam | yathā aprayātṇenaiva puruṣha-niśvāso bhavaty evaṃ vā | are kiṃ tād niśvasitaṃ tato jātam ity uchyate | Yād ṛigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvangirasaś caturvidham mantra-jātam | itihāsaḥ ity Ūrvaśi-Purūravasoḥ saṃvādōdir "Ūrvaśi ha apsarāḥ" ityādi-brāhmaṇam eva | purāṇam "asad vā idam agre āsīd" ityādi | vidyā devajana-vidyā "vedaḥ so 'yam" ityādiḥ | upanishadaḥ "priyam ity etad upāsita" ityādyāḥ | ślokāḥ "brāhmaṇa-prabhuvāḥ mantrās tad ete ślokāḥ" ity ūdayaḥ | sūtrāṇi vastu-saṅgraha-vākyāni vede yathā "ātmā ity eva upāsita" ityāḍīni | anuryākhyānāni mantra-vivaraṇāni | vyākhyānāni arthavādōḥ | . . . evam aṣṭavidhom brāhmaṇam | evam mantra-brāhmaṇayor eva gṛahaṇam | niyata-rachanāvato vidyemānasyaiva vedasya abhivyaktiḥ puruṣha-niśvāsa-vat | na cha puruṣha-buddhi-prayātṇa-pūr-*

*vakaḥ | ataḥ pramāṇam nirapekshaḥ eva svārthe | . . . tena vedasyu aprāmānyam āsankate | tad-āsankū-nivṛitty-artham idam uktam | puru-
sho-nisvāsa-vad aprayatnotthitavāt pramāṇaṁ vedo na yathā 'nyo gran-
thaḥ iti |*

“His breathing,’ means, ‘as it were, his breathing,’ or it denotes the absence of effort, as in the case of a mán’s breathing. We are now told what that breathing was which was produced from him. It was the four classes of mantras (hymns), those of the R̥ich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvāngirases (Ātharvaṇa); Itihāsa (or narrative), such as the dialogue between Urvaśī and Purūravas, viz. the passage in the Brāhmaṇa beginning ‘Urvaśī the Apsaras,’ etc. [S. P. Br. p. 855]; Purāṇa, such as, ‘This was originally non-existent,’ etc.; Vidyā (knowledge), the knowledge of the gods, as, ‘This is the Veda,’ etc.; Upanishads, such as, ‘Let him reverence this, as beloved,’ etc.; Ślokas, such as those here mentioned, ‘The mantras are the sources of the Brāhmaṇas, on which subject there are these ślokas,’ etc.; Sūtras (aphorisms) occurring in the Veda which condense the substance of doctrines, as, ‘Let him adore this as Soul,’ etc.; Anuvyākhyānas, or interpretations of the mantras; Vyākhyānas, or illustrative remarks.” The commentator adds alternative explanations of the two last terms, and then proceeds: “Here, therefore, eight sorts of texts occurring in the Brāhmaṇas are referred to; and consequently the passage before us embraces merely mantras and Brāhmaṇas. The manifestation of the Veda, which already existed in a fixed form of composition, is compared to the breathing of a person. The Veda was not the result of an effort of the intelligence of any person.¹⁷⁷ Consequently, as proof in respect of its own contents, it is independent of everything else.”

Sankara terminates his remarks on this passage by intimating, as one supposition, that the author of the Upanishad means, in the words

¹⁷⁷ Compare Sankara’s Comment on Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 3, as quoted above in p. 106, where this same text of the Brih. Ār. Up. is referred to. As the fuel of Brahma being the author of the Vedas is there adduced to prove the transcendent character of his knowledge, and of his power, we must, apparently (unless we are to charge the great commentator with laying down inconsistent doctrines in the two passages), suppose that in the text before us he does not mean to deny that Brahma was conscious of the procession of the Vedas, etc., from himself, and cognizant of their sense (as the author of the Sāṅkhya aphorisms and his commentator seem to have understood, see above p. 135), but merely that his consciousness and cognizance were not the result of any effort on his part.

on which he comments, to remove a doubt regarding the authority of the Veda, arising from some words which had preceded, and therefore affirms that "the Veda is authoritative, because it was produced without any effort of will, like a man's breathing, and not in the same manner as other books." (See Sāṅkhya Sūtras, v. 50; above, p. 135.)

This attempt to explain the whole of the eight classes of works enumerated in the Upanishad as nothing else than parts of the Brāhmanas, cannot be regarded as altogether satisfactory, since some of them, such as the Sūtras, have always been referred to a distinct class of writings, which are regarded as uninspired (see Müller's *Anc. Ind. Lit.* pp. 75, 86); and the Itihāsas and Purāṇas had in all probability become a distinct class of writings at the period when the Upanishad was composed. And Sāṅkara's explanation is rendered more improbable if we compare with this passage the other from the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, i. 1, 5, already quoted above (p. 31), where it is said, "The inferior science consists of the R̥ich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan Vedas, accentuation (*śikshā*), ritual prescriptions (*kalpa*), grammar, commentary (*nirukta*), prosody (*chhandas*), and astronomy."¹⁷⁸ Here various appendages of the Vedas, which later writers expressly distinguish from the Vedas themselves, and distinctly declare to have no superhuman authority, are yet mentioned in the same category with the four Saṅhitās, or collections of the hymns, as constituting the inferior science (in opposition to the knowledge of the supreme Spirit). From this we may reasonably infer that the author of the Brihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad also, when he specifies the Sūtras and some of the other works

¹⁷⁸ I take the opportunity of introducing here Śāyana's remarks on this passage in his Commentary on the Rig-veda, vol. i., p. 33: *Atigambhīrasya vedasya artham avabodhayitum śikshāntīni shaḍ-angāni pravṛttāni | ata eva teshām apara-vidyā-rūpatvam Muṇḍakopaniśhadī Atharvanīkūḥ ūmananti | "dve vidyā" ityādi | . . . sūdhana-bhūta-dharma-juāna-hetuvāt shaḍ-anga-sakhitānām karma-kāṇḍānām apara-vidyātvam | parama-puruṣhārtha-bhūta-brahma-juāna-hetuvād upaniśhadām para-vidyātvam |* "The Śikshā and other five appendages are intended to promote the comprehension of the sense of the very deep Veda. Hence, in the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, the followers of the Atharva-veda declare that these works belong to the class of inferior sciences, thus: 'There are two sciences,' etc. [see the entire passage in p. 31.] Since the sections of the Veda which relate to ceremonies [including, of course, the hymns], as well as the six appendages, lead to a knowledge of duty, which is an instrument [of something further], they are ranked as an inferior science. On the other hand the Upanishads, which conduct to a knowledge of Brahma, the supreme object of man, constitute the highest science."

which he enumerates, intended to speak of the Vedāngas or appendages of the Vedas, and perhaps the Smritis also, as being the breathing of Brahma. The works which in the passage from the Muṇḍaka are called Kalpa, are also commonly designated as the Kalpa Sūtras.

This conclusion is in some degree confirmed by referring to the passage from the Mahābhārata, Śānti-parvan, 7,660, which has been cited in p. 105, where it is said that the "great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, obtained by devotion the Vedas, and the Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding Yuga." Whatever may be the sense of the word Itihāsa in a Vedic work, there can be no doubt that in the Mahābhārata, which is itself an Itihāsa, the word refers to that class of metrical histories. And in this text we see these Itihāsas placed on a footing of equality with the Vedas, and regarded as having been, like them, pre-existent and supernatural. See also the passage from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 1, 1 ff. (Bibl. Ind., vol. iii. pp. 473 ff.), quoted above (p. 33), where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are spoken of as "the fifth Veda of the Vedas." The same title of "fifth Veda" is applied to them in the Bhāg. Pur. iii. 12, 39: *Itihāsa-purāṇāni pañchamaṇṇī vedam Īśvaraḥ | sarvobhyaḥ ova mukhobhyaḥ saṣṭiḥ sarva-darśanaḥ* | "The omniscient Īśvara (God) created from all his mouths the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, as a fifth Veda." See also the passages quoted above in pp. 27-30, from the Purāṇas and Mahābhārata, where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas themselves are placed on an equality with, if not in a higher rank, than the Vedas. The claims put forward by these popular works on their own behalf are not, indeed, recognized as valid by more critical and scientific authors, who, as we have seen at the beginning of this section, draw a distinct line of demarcation between the Vedas and all other works; but it would appear from the passages I have quoted from the Upanishads that at one time the Vedas were, at least, not so strictly discriminated from the other Śāstras as they afterwards were.

SECT. XII.—*Recapitulation of the Arguments urged in the Darśanas, and by Commentators, in support of the Authority of the Vedas, with some remarks on these reasonings.*

As in the preceding sections I have entered at some length into the arguments urged by the authors of the philosophical systems and their

commentators, in proof of the eternity and infallibility of the Vedas, it may be convenient to recapitulate the most important points in these reasonings; and I shall then add such observations as the consideration of them may suggest.

The grounds on which the apologists of the Vedas rest their authority are briefly these: First, it is urged that, like the sun, they shine by their own light, and evince an inherent power both of revealing their own perfection, and of elucidating all other things, past and future, great and small, near and remote (Śāyana, as quoted above, p. 62; Sankara on Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3, above, p. 190). This is the view taken by the author of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras also, who, however, expressly denies that the Vedas originated from the conscious effort of any divine being (see p. 135). Second, it is asserted that the Veda could have had no (human) personal author, as no such composer is recollected (Mādhava, above, pp. 83 ff), and cannot therefore be suspected of any such imperfection as would arise from the fallibility of such an author (pp. 69 f.; Śāyana p. 106). Third, the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā adds to this that the words of which the Vedas are composed are eternal, and have an eternal connection (not an arbitrary relation depending upon the human will) with their meanings, and that therefore the Vedas are eternal, and consequently perfect and infallible¹⁷⁹ (Mīmāṃsā Sūtras and Commentary, above, pp. 71 ff., and Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, above, pp. 91 f.) Fourth, the preceding view is either explained or modified by the commentator on the Taittirīya Saṁhitā (above, p. 69), as well as by Śāyana in his Introduction to the Rig-veda (above, p. 106), who say that, like time, æther, etc., the Veda is only eternal in a qualified sense, *i.e.* during the continuance of the existing mundane system; and that in reality it sprang from Brahmā at the beginning of the creation. But this origin cannot according to their view affect the perfection of the Veda, which in consequence of the faultlessness of its author possesses a self-demonstrating authority. Fifth, although the Vedānta, too, speaks of the eternity of the Veda (above, p. 105), it also in the same passage makes mention of its self-dependent author; while in another passage (p. 106) it distinctly ascribes the origin of the Indian Scripture to Brahmā as its source or

¹⁷⁹ In the Bṛihad Aranyaka Upaniṣhad (p. 688 of Dr. Rœr's ed.) it is said: *Vāchāiva samrūd Brahma jñāyate vāg vai san it paramam Brahma* | "By speech, o monarch, Brahma is known. Speech is the supreme Brahma."

cause. Brahma here must be taken as neuter, denoting the supreme Spirit, and not masculine, designating the personal creator, as under the fourth head.¹⁸⁰ Sixth, according to the Naiyāyika doctrine the authority of the Veda is established by the fact of its having emanated from competent persons who had an intuitive perception of duty, and whose competence is proved by their injunctions being attended with the desired results in all cases which come within the cognizance of our senses and experience (Nyāya Sūtras, above, pp. 116). Seventh, agreeably to the Vaiśeshika doctrine, and that of the Kusumāñjali, the infallibility of the Veda results from the omniscience of its author, who is God (Vaiśeshika Sūtras, Tarka Sangraha, and Kusumāñjali, pp. 119 ff., 127, and 129 ff., above).

These arguments, as the reader who has studied all their details will have noticed, are sometimes in direct opposition to each other in their leading principles; and they are not likely to seem convincing to any persons but the adherents of the schools from which they have severally emanated. The European student (unless he has some ulterior practical object in view) can only look upon these opinions as matters of historical interest, as illustrations of the course of religious thought among a highly acute and speculative people. But they may be expected to possess a greater importance in the eyes of any Indian readers into whose hands this book may fall; and as such readers may desire to learn in what light these arguments are regarded by Western scholars, I shall offer a few remarks on the subject.

In regard to the first ground in support of the infallibility of the Veda, viz. the evidence which radiates from itself, or its internal evidence, I may observe first, that this is a species of proof which can only be estimated by those who have made the Indian Scripture the object of careful study; and, second, that it must be judged by the reason and conscience of each individual student. This evidence may appear conclusive to men in a certain stage of their national and personal culture, and especially to those who have been accustomed from their infancy to regard the Vedas with a hereditary veneration; whilst to persons in a different state of mental progress, and living under different influences, it will appear perfectly futile. It is quite clear that, ever in India itself, there existed in former ages multitudes of learned

¹⁸⁰ See note in p. 205, above.

and virtuous men who were unable to see the force of this argument, and who consequently rejected the authority of the Vedas. I allude of course to Buddha and his followers. And we have even found that some of those writers who are admitted to have been orthodox, such as the authors of the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gītā, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, while they attach the highest value to the divine knowledge conveyed by the latest portions of the Veda, depreciate, if they do not actually despise, the hymns and the ceremonial worship connected with them.

In regard to the second argument, viz. that the Vedas must be of supernatural origin, and infallible authority, as they are not known to have had any human author, I observe as follows. The Greek historian, Herodotus, remarks (ii. 23) of a geographer of his own day who explained the annual inundations of the river Nile by supposing its stream to be derived from an imaginary ocean flowing round the earth, which no one had ever seen, that his opinion did not admit of confutation, because he carried the discussion back into the region of the unapparent (*ἐς ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνευεϊκας οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον*). The same might be said of the Indian speculators, who argue that the Veda must have had a supernatural origin, because it was never observed to have had a human author like other books;—that by thus removing the negative grounds on which they rest their case into the unknown depths of antiquity, they do their utmost to place themselves beyond the reach of direct refutation. But it is to be observed (1) that, even if it were to be admitted that no human authors of the Vedas were remembered in later ages, this would prove nothing more than their antiquity, and that it would still be incumbent on their apologists to show that this circumstance necessarily involved their supernatural character; and (2) that, in point of fact, Indian tradition does point to certain rishis or bards as the authors of the Vedic hymns. It is true, indeed, as has been already noticed (p. 85), that these rishis are said to have only “seen” the hymns, which (it is alleged) were eternally pre-existent, and that they were not their authors. But as tradition declares that the hymns were uttered by such and such rishis, how is it proved that the rishis to whom they are ascribed, or those, whoever they were, from whom they actually proceeded, were not uttering the mere productions of their own minds? The whole character of these compositions, and the circumstances under which, from internal evi-

dence, they appear to have arisen, are in harmony with the supposition that they were nothing more than the natural expression of the personal hopes and feelings of those ancient bards by whom they were first recited. In these songs the Aryan sages celebrated the praises of their ancestral gods (while at the same time they sought to conciliate their goodwill by a variety of oblations supposed to be acceptable to them), and besought of them all the blessings which men in general desire—health, wealth, long life, cattle, offspring, victory over their enemies, forgiveness of sin, and in some cases also celestial felicity.

The scope of these hymns is well summed up in the passage which I have already quoted (from Colebrooké's Misc. Essays i. 26) in the Second Volume, p. 206: *Arthepśavaḥ ṛiṣayo devatās cchandoḥbhīr abhya-dhūvan* | “The rishis desiring [various] objects, hastened to the gods with metrical prayers.” The Nirukta, vii. 1, quoted in the same place, says: *Yat-kāmāḥ ṛiṣir yasyām devatāyām arthapatyam icchān stutim prayunkte tad-devataḥ sa mantro bhavati* | “Each particular hymn has for its deity the god to whom the rishi, seeking to obtain any object of desire which he longs for, addresses his prayer.” And in the sequel of the same passage from the Nirukta (vii. 3), the fact that the hymns express the different feelings or objects of the rishis is distinctly recognized:

Paroksha-kritāḥ pratyaksha-kritās cha mantrāḥ bhūyishṭhāḥ alpasaḥ ādhyātmiḥ | athāpi stutir eva bhavati na āśīrvādaḥ “*Indrasya nu vīryāni pravocam*” *iti yathā etasmīn sūkte | athāpi āśīr eva na stutiḥ* “*suchakshāḥ aham akshibhyām bhūyāsām suvarchāḥ mukhena suśrut karṇābhyām bhūyāsam*” *iti | tad etad bahulam ādhvaryave yājñeshu cha mantreshu | athāpi śapathābhiśāpau | “adya murīya” ityādi . . . athāpi kasyachid bhāvasya āchikhyāsū | “na mṛityur āsīd” ityādi . . . | athāpi paridovanā kumāchchid bhāvāt | “sudevo adya prapated anāvṛit” ityādi | athāpi nindā-prasāmsē | “kevalāgho bhavati kevalādi” ityādi | evam aksha-sūkte dyūta-nindā cha kṛishi-prasāmsā cha | evam uchchāvachair abhiprāyair ṛiṣiṇām mantra-ṛiṣṭayo bhavanti |*

“[Of the four kinds of verses specified in the preceding section], (a) those which address a god as absent, (b) those which address him as present, and (c) those which address the worshippers as present and the god as absent, are the most numerous, while those (d) which refer to the speaker himself are rare. It happens also that a god is

praised without any blessing being invoked, as in the hymn (R. V. i. 32). 'I declare the heroic deeds of Indra,' etc. Again, blessings are invoked without any praise being offered, as in the words, 'May I see well with my eyes, be resplendent in my face, and hear well with my ears.' This frequently occurs in the Ādhvaryava (Yajur) Veda, and in the sacrificial formulæ. Then again we find oaths and curses, as in the words (R. V. vii. 104, 15), 'May I die to-day, if I am a Yātudhāna,' etc. (See Vol. I. p. 327.) Further, we observe the desire to describe some particular state of things, as in the verse (R. V. x. 129, 2), 'Death was not then, nor immortality,' etc. Then there is lamentation, arising out of a certain state of things, as in the verse (R. V. x. 95, 14), 'The beautiful god will disappear and never return,' etc. Again, we have blame and praise, as in the words (R. V. x. 117, 6), 'The man who eats alone, sins alone,' etc. So, too, in the hymn to dice (R. V. x. 34, 13) there is a censure upon dice, and a commendation of agriculture. Thus the objects for which the hymns were seen by the rishis were very various."¹⁸¹

It is to be observed, however, that although in this passage the author, Yāska, speaks of the various desires which the rishis expressed in different hymns, he nevertheless adheres to the idea which was recognized in his age, and in which he doubtless participated, that the rishis "saw" the hymns.

In the Nirukta, x. 42, the form of the metre in particular hymns is ascribed to the peculiar genius of the rishi Paruchhepa:¹⁸² *Abhyāse*

¹⁸¹ In Nirukta, iv. 6, allusion is made to a rishi Trita perceiving a particular hymn when he had been thrown into a well (*Tritam kūpo vahitam etat sūktam prati babhau*).

¹⁸² A Paruchhepa is mentioned in the Taittirya Sanhitā, ii. 5, 8, 3, as follows: *Nṛimedhas cha Paruchhepas cha brahmavūdyam aradetām "asmin dūrāv ūrdvo 'gnim janayāva yataro nau brahmnyūn"* iti | *Nṛimedho 'bhyavadat sa dhūmam ajanayat | Paruchhepo 'bhyavadat so 'gnim ajanayat | "rishe" ity abravīd "yat samāvadvīdva kathā tvam agnim ajijāno nāham" itī | "sūmidhēnām eva ahañ varṇaṁ veda" ity abravīt | "yud ghrītavat padam anūchyate sa ūsām varṇas 'tañ tvā samidbhīr An-girah' ity ūha sūmidhēnīshv eva taj jyotir janayati" |* Nṛimedha and Paruchhepa had a discussion concerning sacred knowledge. They said, 'Let us kindle fire¹ in this moist wood, in order to see which of us has most sacred knowledge.'² Nṛimedha pronounced (a text); but produced only smoke. Paruchhepa pronounced (a text) and generated fire. Nṛimedha said, 'Rishi, since our knowledge is equal, how is it that thou hast generated fire, while I have not.' Paruchhepa replied, 'I know the lustra

¹ "Without friction."—Comm.

² "In regard to the Sūmidhēnī formulæ."—Comm.

bhūyāmsam artham manyante yathā "aho darśanīya aho darśanīya" iti | *tat Paruchhhepasya śīlam* | "Men consider that by repetition the sense is intensified, as in the words 'o beautiful, o beautiful.' This is Paruchhepa's habit."

In Nirukta, iii. 11, the rishi Kutsa is mentioned as being thus described by the interpreter Aupamanyava: *Ṛishiḥ Kutso bhavati karttā stomānām ity Aupamanyavaḥ* | "Kutsa is the name of a rishi, a maker of hymns,' according to Aupamanyava."

So too the same work, x. 32, says of the rishi Hiraṇyastūpa that "he declared this hymn" (*Hiraṇyastūpaḥ ṛishir idam sūktam pravācha*).

I do not, as I have already intimated, adduce these passages of the Nirukta to show that the author regarded the hymns as the ordinary productions of the rishis' own minds, for this would be at variance with the expression "seeing," which he applies to the mental act by which they were produced. It appears also from the terms in which he speaks of the rishis in the passage (Nirukta, i. 20) quoted above, p. 120, where they are described as having an intuitive insight into duty, that he placed them on a far higher level than the inferior men of later ages. But it is clear from the instances I have adduced that Yaska recognizes the hymns as being applicable to the particular circumstances in which the rishis were placed, and as being the bonâ fide expression of their individual emotions and desires. (See also the passages from the Nirukta, ii. 10 and 24, quoted in Vol. I. pp. 269 and 338, which establish the same point.) But if this be true, the supposition that these hymns, *i.e.* hymns specifically suited to express the various feelings and wishes of all the different rishis, were eternally pre-existent, and were perceived by them at the precise conjunctures when they were required to give utterance to their several aims, is perfectly gratuitous and unnecessary. It might be asserted with nearly the same shew of reason that the entire stock of ordinary language employed by human beings to express their ideas had existed from eternity. ¹⁵³

of the Sâmidhenis. The sentence which contains the word *ghṛita* (butter) forms their lustre. When any one repeats the words, "We augment thee, o Angiras (Agni) with fuel and with butter," he then generates that lustre in the Sâmidhenis."

¹⁵³ A difficulty of the same nature as that here urged, *viz.* that men and objects which existed in time are mentioned in the Vedas which are yet said to be eternal, was felt by Jaimini, as we have already seen (pp. 77 ff.). I recur to this subject in p. 215.

In regard to the third argument for the authority of the Vedas, viz. that they are eternal, because the words of which they are composed are eternal, and because these words have an inherent and eternal (and not a merely conventional) connection with the significations or objects, or the species of objects, which they represent, it is to be observed that it is rejected both by the Nyāya and Sāṅkhya schools.¹⁸⁴ And I am unable (if I rightly comprehend this orthodox reasoning) to see how it proves the authority of the Veda more than that of any other book. If the words of the Veda are eternal, so must those of the Bauddha books be eternal, and consequently, if eternal pre-existence is a proof of perfection, the infallibility of these heretical works must be as much proved by this argument as the divine origin of the Vedas, whose pretensions they reject and oppose. Or if the meaning is that the words of the Veda alone are eternal and infallible, this is an assumption which requires proof. If their reception by great rishis be alleged as evidence, it must be remarked that the authority of these rishis is itself a point which cannot be admitted until it has been established.

In regard to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh of the arguments above stated, as put forward by the representatives of different schools or opinions in favour of the authority of the Veda, it may suffice to say that they for the most part assume the point to be proved, viz. that the Veda did proceed from an omniscient, or at least a competent, author. The only exception to this remark is to be found in the reasoning of the Nyāya and Sāṅkhya aphorisms that the infallibility of the Vedas is shown by the fact that the employment of the formulas or prescriptions of those parts of them which deal with temporal results, such as can be tested by experience, is always found to be efficacious; a premiss from which the conclusion is drawn that those other parts of the Veda, which relate to the unseen world, must be equally authoritative, as the authors of these different parts are the same persons. This argument cannot appear convincing to any but those who admit first, the invariable efficacy of all the formulas and prescriptions

See, however, the comment on Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 30, regarding the perpetual recurrence of the same things in successive creations from, and to, all eternity, which will be quoted in the Appendix.

¹⁸⁴ See Dr. Ballantyne's remarks on this controversy, in pp. 186, 189, 191, and 192 of his "Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy."

of the Veda which relate to such matters as can be tested by experience, and secondly, the identity of the authors of the parts of the Veda which contain these formulas and prescriptions with the authors of the other parts. It would be impossible to prove the former point, and next to impossible to prove the latter.

Against the eternity of the Vedas an objection has been raised, which Jaimini considers it necessary to notice, viz. that various historical personages are named in their pages, and that as these works could not have existed before the persons whose doings they record, they must have commenced to exist in time. This difficulty Jaimini attempts, as we have seen above (pp. 77 ff.), to meet by explaining away the names of the historical personages in question. Thus Babara Prārahiṇi is said to be nothing else than an appellation of the wind, which is eternal. And this method, it is said, is to be applied in all similar cases. Another of the passages mentioned by an objector (see above, p. 79) as referring to non-eternal objects is R.V. iii. 53, 14, "What are the cows doing for thee among the Kikaṭas?" etc. The author of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras would no doubt have attempted to show that by these Kikaṭas we are to understand some eternally pre-existing beings. But Yāska, the author of the Nirukta, who had not been instructed in any any such subtleties, speaks of the Kikaṭas as a non-Āryan nation. (Vol. I. p. 342, and Vol. II. p. 362.) It is difficult to suppose that Jaimini—unless he was an enthusiast, and not the cool and acute reasoner he has commonly proved himself to be—could have seriously imagined that his rule of interpretation could ever be generally received or carried out.¹⁵⁶ The Brāhmaṇas evidently intend to represent the numerous occurrences which they narrate, as having actually taken place in time, and the actors in them as having been real historical personages. See, for instance, the legends from the Satapatha and Aitareya Brāhmaṇas, the Taittiriya Saṃhitā, etc., quoted in the First

¹⁵⁶ In Sāyana's Introduction to R.V. vol. i. p. 23, it is said: *Manuṣya-vṛttānta-pratipādayakāḥ ṛcho nārūṣāṃsyaḥ* | "The Nārūṣāṃsis are verses which set forth the histories of men." Yāska's definition is the same in substance, Nir. ix. 9. If these Nārūṣāṃsis are, as Sāyana says, verses of the hymns (*ṛchāḥ*), and if according to his definition their object is to record events in human history, it follows that they must refer to non-eternal objects. See also the explanation of the words *nārūṣāṃsena stomena* in Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā, 3, 53, given by the Commentator Mahidhara, which will be quoted further on.

Volume of this work, pp. 182, 192, 194, 328, 355, etc. And it is impossible to peruse the Vedic hymns without coming to the conclusion that they also record a multitude of events, which the writers believed to have been transacted by men on earth in former ages. (See the passages quoted from the Rig-veda in the First and Second Volumes of this work, passim; those, for example, in Vol. I. pp. 162 ff., 318 ff., 339 ff., and Vol. II. p. 208.)

We shall, no doubt, be assisted in arriving at a correct conclusion in regard to the real origin and character of the hymns of the Veda, if we enquire what opinion the rishis, by whom they were confessedly spoken, entertained of their own utterances; and this I propose to investigate in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II.

THE RISHIS, AND THEIR OPINIONS IN REGARD TO THE ORIGIN
OF THE VEDIC HYMNS.

I HAVE already shewn, in the preceding pages, as well as in the Second Volume of this work, that the hymns of the Rig-veda themselves supply us with numerous data by which we can judge of the circumstances to which they owed their origin, and of the manner in which they were created. We have seen that they were the natural product and expression of the particular state of society, of the peculiar religious conceptions, and of all those other influences, physical and moral, which prevailed at the period when they were composed, and acted upon the minds of their authors. (Vol. I. pp. 161 f., Vol. II. pp. 205 ff.; and above, pp. 211 f.) We find in them ideas, a language, a spirit, and a colouring totally different from those which characterize the religious writings of the Hindus of a later era. They frequently discover to us the simple germs from which the mythological conceptions current in subsequent ages were derived,—germs which in many cases were developed in so fanciful and extravagant a manner as to shew that the simplicity of ancient times had long since disappeared, to make way for a rank and wild luxuriance of imagination. They afford us very distinct indications of the locality in which they were composed (Vol. II. Pp. 354–372); they shew us the Aryan tribes living in a state of warfare with* surrounding enemies (some of them, probably, alien in race and language), and gradually, as we may infer, forcing their way onward to the east and south (Vol. II. pp. 374 ff., 384 ff., 414 ff.); they supply us with numerous specimens of the particular sorts of prayers, viz. for protection and victory, which men so circumstanced would naturally address to the gods whom they worshipped, as well as of those

more common supplications which men in general offer up for the various blessings which constitute the sum of human welfare; and they bring before us as the objects of existing veneration a class of deities (principally, ~~is~~ not exclusively, personifications of the elements, and of the powers either of nature, or of reason) who gradually lost their importance in the estimation of the later Indians, and made way for gods of a different description, invested with new attributes, and in many cases bearing new appellations.

These peculiarities of the hymns abundantly justify us in regarding them as the natural product and spontaneous representation of the ideas, feelings, and aspirations of the bards with whose names they are connected, or of other ancient authors, while the archaic forms of the dialect in which they are composed, and the references which are made to them, as pre-existent, in the liturgical works by which they are expounded and applied, leave no reason for doubt that they are the most ancient of all the Indian Scriptures.

We can also, as I have shewn, discover from the Vedic hymns themselves, that some of them were newer and others older, that they were the works of many successive generations of poets, that their composition probably extended over several centuries, and that in some places their authors represent them as being the productions of their own minds, while in other passages they appear to ascribe to their own words a certain divine character, or attribute their composition to some supernatural assistance. (Vol. I. p. 4, and II. pp. 206 ff., 219 ff.)

I shall now proceed to adduce further proofs from the hymns of the Rig-veda in support of these last mentioned positions; repeating, at the same time, for the sake of completeness, the texts which I have already cited in the Second Volume.

SECT. I.—*Passages from the Hymns of the Veda which distinguish between the Rishis as Ancient and Modern.* •

The appellations or epithets applied by the authors of the hymns to themselves, and to the sages who in former times had instituted, as well as to their contemporaries who continued to conduct, the different rites of divine worship, are the following: *rishi*, *kavi*, *medhāvin*, *vipra*,

vipaśchit, vedhas, muni, etc. The rishis are defined in Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, to be persons "who, whether singly or in chorus, either on their own behalf or on behalf of others, invoked the gods in artificial language, and in song;" and the word is said to denote especially "the priestly bards who made this art their profession." The word *kavi* means "wise," or "a poet," and has ordinarily the latter sense in modern Sanskrit. *Vipra* means "wise," and, in later Sanskrit, a "Brāhman;" *medhāvin* means "intelligent;" *vipaśchit* and *vedhas*, "wise" or "learned." *Muni* signifies in modern Sanskrit a "sage" or "devotee." It is not much used in the Rig-veda, but occurs in viii. 17, 13 (Vol. II. p. 397).

The following passages from the Rig-veda either expressly distinguish between contemporary rishis and those of a more ancient date, or, at any rate, make reference to the one or the other class. This recognition of a succession of rishis constitutes one of the historical elements in the Veda. It is an acknowledgment on the part of the rishis themselves that numerous persons had existed, and events occurred, anterior to their own age, and, consequently, in time; and it therefore refutes, by the testimony of the Veda itself, the assertion of Jaimini (above, pp. 77 ff.) that none but eternally pre-existing objects are mentioned in that book.

If, under this and other heads of my inquiry, I have cited a larger number of passages than might have appeared to be necessary, it has been done with the intention of showing that abundant evidence of my various positions can be adduced from all parts of the Hymn-collection.¹

R. V. i. 1, 2. *Agniḥ pūrvebhir rishibhir idyo nūtanair uta | sa devān eha vakshati |*

"Agni, who is worthy to be celebrated by former, as well as modern rishis, will bring the gods hither."

The word *pūrvebhiḥ* is explained by Sāyana thus: *Purātanair Bhṛigugirāḥ-prabhṛitibhir rishibhiḥ |* "By the ancient rishis, Bhṛigu, Angiras," etc.; and *nūtanaiḥ* is interpreted by *idānīntanair asmābhir api*, "by us of the present day also." See also Nirukta, vii. 16.

¹ I have to acknowledge the assistance kindly rendered to me by Prof. Aufrecht in the revision of my translation of the passages quoted in this and the following sections. As, however, the texts are mostly quite clear in so far as regards the points which they are adduced to prove, any inaccuracies with which I may be chargeable in other respects are of comparatively little importance.

i. 45, 3. *Priyamedha-vad Atri-raj Jātavedo Virūpa-vat | Angiras-vad mahi-vrata Praskaṇvasya śrudhī havam |* 4. *Mahi-keravaḥ ūtaye Priyamedhāḥ ahūshata |*

“O (god) of great power, listen to the invocation of Praskaṇva, as thou didst listen to Priyamedha, Atri, Virūpa, and Angiras. 4. The Priyamedhas, skilled in singing praises, have invoked thee.”

Here Praskaṇva is referred to, in verse 3, as alive, whilst Priyamedha, Atri, Virūpa, and Angiras belong to the past. In verse 4 the descendants of Priyamedha are however alluded to as existing. The three other names are also, no doubt, those of families. In R.V. iii. 53, 7, (see Vol. I. p. 341) the Virūpas appear to be referred to; while in viii. 64, 6 (which will be quoted below), a Virūpa is addressed. In v. 22, 4, the Atris are spoken of.

i. 48, 14. *Yo chid hi tvām ṛishayaḥ pūrve ūtaye juhūre ityādi |*

“The former rishis who invoked thee for succour,” etc.

i. 80, 16. *Yām Atharvā Manush pitā Dadhyañ dhiyam atnata | tamin brahmāni pūrvathā Indro ukthā samagmata ityādi |*

“In the ceremony [or hymn] which Atharvan, or our father Manu, or Dadhyanch performed, the prayers and praises were, as of old, congregated in that Indra,” etc.

i. 118, 3 (repeated in iii. 58, 3). *Āhur viprasaḥ Aśvinā purājah |*

“O Aśvins, the ancient sages say,” etc.

i. 131, 6. *Ā me asya vedhaso navīyaso manma śrudhī navīyasaḥ |*

“Hear the hymn of me this modern sage, of this modern [sage].”

i. 139, 9. *Dadhyañ ha me janusham pūrvo Angirāḥ Priyamedhaḥ Ānro Atrir Manur vidur ityādi |*

“The ancient Dadhyanch, Angiras, Priyamedha, Kaṇva, Atri, and Manu know my birth.”

i. 175, 6. *Yathā pūrvabhyo jaritṛibhyaḥ Indra mayaḥ iva āpo na triśhyate babhūtha | Tām anu tvā nividañ johūvimi ityādi |*

“Indra, as thou hast been like a joy to former worshippers who praised thee, like waters to the thirsty, I invoke thee again and again with this hymn,” etc.

iv. 20, 5. *Vī yo rarapṣe ṛishibhir navebhir vriksho na pakvaḥ sṛinyo na jetā | maryo na yoshām abhī manyamāno arhā vivakmi puruhūtam Indram |*

“Like a man desiring a woman, I call hither that Indra, invoked by

many, who, like a ripe tree, like a conqueror expert in arms,² has been celebrated by recent rishis."

iv. 50, 1. *Tam pratnāsah ṛishayo dīdhyānāḥ puro viprāḥ dadhire mandra-jihvam |*

"The ancient rishis, resplendent and sage, have placed in front of them [Bṛihaspati] with gladdening tongue."

v. 42, 6. . . . *Na te pūrve Maghavan na aparāso na vīryam nūtanah kaśchana āpa |*

"Neither the ancients nor later men, nor any modern man, has attained to [conceived] thy prowess, o Maghavan."

x. 54, 3. *Ke u nu te mahimānah samasya asmat pūrve ṛishayo antam āpuḥ | yad mātaram cha pitaram cha sākam ajanayathās tanvāḥ svāyāḥ |*

"Who among the rishis who were before us have attained to the end of all thy greatness? for thou didst at once produce from thy own body both the mother and the father (earth and heaven)."

vi. 19, 4. *Yathā chit pūrve jaritārah āsur anodyāḥ anavadyāḥ arishṭāḥ |*

"As [Indra's] former worshippers were, [may we be] blameless, irreproachable, and unharmed."

vi. 21, 5. *Idā hi te vevishataḥ purājāḥ pratnāsah āsuḥ purukṛit sakhūyah | Ye madhyamāsah uta nūtanāsah utāvamasya puruhūta bodhi |*

"For now, o energetic god, men are thy worshippers, as the ancients born of old and the men of the middle and later ages have been thy friends. And, o much-invoked, think of the most recent of all."³

vi. 21, 1. *Sa tu śrūdhi Indra nūtanasya brahmanyato vīra kārudhāyah |*

"Heroic Indra, supporting the poet, listen to the modern [bard] who wishes to celebrate thee."

vi. 22, 2. *Tam u nah pūrve pitaro nanagvāḥ sapta viprāsah abhi vōjāyantaḥ ityādi |*

"To Him (Indra) our ancient fathers, the seven Navagva sages, desiring food, (resorted) with their hymns," etc.

vi. 50, 15. *Evā napāto mama tasya dhībhir Bharadvājāḥ abhyarchanti arkaḥ |*

"Thus do the Bharadvājas my grandsons adore thee with (my?) hymns and praises."

² Prof. Aufrecht thinks *sriṇyo na jetā* may perhaps mean, "like a winner of sickles (as a prize)."

³ This verse is translated in Benfey's Glossary to the Sūma-veda, p. 76, col. i.

vii. 18, 1. *Tve ha yat pitaraś chid naḥ Indra viśvā vāmā jaritāro asan-*
vann ityādī |

“Since, in thee, o Indra, even our fathers, thy worshippers, obtained all riches,” etc.

vii. 29, 4. *Uto gha te purushyāḥ id āsan yeshām pūrveshām aśrinor*
rishinām | adha aham tvā Maghavan johavīmi tvaṁ naḥ Indra asi pramā-
tiḥ piteva |

“Even they were of mortal birth,—those former rishis whom thou didst hear. I invoke thee again and again, o Maghavan; thou art to us wise as a father.”

vii. 53, 1. . . . *Te chid hi pūrve kavayo grīnantaḥ puro mahī dadhire*
devaputre |

“The ancient poets, celebrating their praises, have placed in the front these two great [beings, heaven and earth] of whom the gods are the children.”

vii. 76, 4. *Te id devānām sadhamādaḥ āsann ṛitāvānaḥ kavayaḥ pūr-*
vyāsaḥ | guḥḥam jyotiḥ pitaro anavāndan satya-mantrāḥ ajanayann
ushāsam |

“They shared in the enjoyments of the gods, those ancient pious sages. Our fathers discovered the hidden light; with true hymns they caused the dawn to arise.”

vii. 91, 1. *Kuvid anga namasū ye vṛidhūsaḥ purā devāḥ anavadyāsaḥ*
āsan | te Vāyave Manave bādhitāya avāsayann⁴ ushasāṁ sūryeṇa |

“Certainly those gods who were formerly magnified (or grew) by worship were altogether blameless. They lighted up the dawn and the sun to Vāyu (Āyu?) and the afflicted Manu.” (See Vol. I. p. 172.)

viii. 36, 7. *S'yāvāśvasya sunvatas tathā śṛiṇu yathā aśrinor Atrēḥ*
karmāṇi kṛinvataḥ |

“Listen to S'yāvāśva pouring forth libations, in the same way as thou didst listen to Atri when he celebrated sacred rites.”⁵

ix. 96, 11. *Tvayā hi naḥ pitaraḥ Soma pūrve karmāṇi chakruḥ pavā-*
māna dhurāḥ |

“For through thee, o pure Soma, our wise forefathers of old performed their sacred rites.”

⁴ See Benfey's Glossary to Sāma-veda, under the word *vas* 2.

⁵ Compare viii. 35, 19; and viii. 37, 7.

ix. 110, 7. *Tve Soma prathamāḥ vrikta-varhisho mahe vājāya śravase dhīyām dadhuh |*

“The former [priests] having strewed the sacred grass, offered up a hymn to thee, o Soma, for great strength and food.”

x. 14, 15 (=A.V. xviii. 2, 2). *Idam namah rishibhyaḥ pūrvajebhyaḥ pathikṛidbhyaḥ |*

“This reverence to the rishis, born of old, the ancients, who showed us the road.” (This verse may also be employed to prove that at the end of the Vedic period the rishis had become objects of veneration.)

x. 66, 14. *Vasishthāsaḥ pitṛivad vācham akrata devān ilānāḥ rishivad | ityādi |*

“The Vasishthas, like the forefathers, like the rishis, have uttered their voice, worshipping the gods.”

x. 67, 1—will be quoted in a following section.

x. 96, 5. *Tvam aharyathāḥ upastutaḥ pūrvabhir Indra harikēsa yajvabhīḥ |*

“Indra, with golden hair, thou didst rejoice, when lauded by the ancient priests.”

x. 98, 9. *Tvām pūrve rishayo gīrbhir āyan tvām adhvareṣhu puruhūta viśve |*

“To thee the former rishis resorted with their hymns; to thee, thou much invoked, all men [resorted] at the sacrifices.”

Vājasaneyi Sauhitā, xviii. 52. *Imau te pakṣhāv ajarau patatrināu yābhyām rakshāṁsi apahāṁsi Agne | tābhyām patema sukṛitām u lokāṁ yatra rishayo jagmuḥ prathamajāḥ purāṇāḥ |*

“But these undecaying, soaring pinions, with which, o Agni, thou slayest the Rakshases,—with them let us ascend to the world of the righteous, whither the earliest-born ancient rishis have gone.” (This verse is quoted in the Śatapatha Brūhmaṇa, ix. 4, 4, 4, p. 739.)

The ancient rishis, as Sāyaṇa says in his note on R.V. i. 2, were Bhṛigu, Angiras, and others whom he does not name. In another place we find Atharvan, Manu, Dadhyanch, and others mentioned. I will not here enter into any particulars regarding these ancient sages. For some texts relating to Bhṛigu, I may refer to the First Volume of this work, pp. 443 ff.; and various passages relating to Manu will be found in the same volume pp. 162 ff., and in pp. 324–332 of the Second Volume. In regard to Atharvan, as well as Angiras, Professor Gold-

stücker's Sanskrit and English Dictionary, and in regard to the same personages and Dadhyanch, the Sanskrit and German Lexicon of Boehtlingk and Roth, may be consulted.

SECT. II.—*Passages from the Veda in which a distinction is drawn between the older and the more recent hymns.*

From the passages which I propose to bring forward in the present section, it will be found that the hymns which the rishis addressed to the gods are frequently spoken of as new, while others of ancient date are also sometimes mentioned. The rishis no doubt entertained the idea that the gods would be more highly gratified if their praises were celebrated in new, and perhaps more elaborate and beautiful compositions, than if older, and possibly ruder, prayers had been repeated.

The fact that a hymn is called new by its author, does not, however, by any means enable us to determine its age relatively to that of other hymns in the collection, for this epithet of new is, as we shall see, applied to numerous compositions throughout the Veda; and often when a hymn is not designated as new, it may, nevertheless, be in reality of recent date, compared with the others by which it is surrounded. When, however, any rishi characterizes his own effusion as new, we are of course necessarily led to conclude that he was acquainted with many older songs of the same kind. The relative ages of the different hymns can only be settled by means of internal evidence furnished by their dialect, style, metre, ideas, and general contents; and we may, no doubt, hope that much will by degrees be done by the researches of critical scholars towards such a chronological classification of the constituent portions of the Rig-veda.

The hymns, praises, or prayers uttered by the rishis are called by a great variety of names, such as *ṛich*, *sāman*, *yajush*, *brahman*, *arka*, *uktha*, *mantra*, *manman*, *mati*, *manīshā*, *sumati*, *dhī*, *dhīti*, *dhīshañā*, *stoma*, *stuti*, *sushṛuti*, *prasasti*, *śaṅsa*, *gir*, *vāch*, *vachas*, *nītha*, *nivid*, etc.

R. V. i. 12, 11. *So naḥ stavānaḥ ābhara gāyatrena navīyasā | rayiṁ vīravatīm iśhaṁ |*

“Glorified by our newest⁶ hymn, do thou bring to us wealth and food with progeny.” (Sāyaṇa explains *navīyasā* by *pūrvakair apy asaṃpādītena gāyatrena* | “A hymn not formed even by former rishis.”)

⁶ Compare Psalms, 33, 3; 40, 3; 96, 1; 98, 1; 144, 9; 149, 1; and Isaiah, 42, 10.

i. 27, 4. *Imam ū shu tvam asmākīm saniīm gāyatraīm navyāmsam | Agne deveshu pravočaḥ |*

“Agni, thou hast announced [or do thou announce] among the gods this our offering, our newest hymn.”

i. 60, 3. *Taīm navyasī hṛidaḥ ā jāyamānam asmat sukīrttir madhu-jihvam aśyāḥ | yam ṛitvijo vṛijane mānushāsaḥ prayasvantaḥ āyavo jījananta |*

“May our newest laudation (springing) from (our) heart, reach him, the sweet-tongued, at his birth, (him) whom mortal priests the descendants of Manu, offering oblations, have generated in the ceremonial.” (See iii. 39, 1, in next page, and i. 171, 2 and ii. 35, 2, which will be quoted further on in the next section).

i. 89, 3. *Tān pūrvayā nīvidā hūmahe vayam Bhagam Mitram Aditiīm Daksham Asridham ityādi |*

“We invoke with an ancient hymn Bhaga, Mitra, Aditi, Daksha, Asridh [or the friendly],” etc. (*Pūrvakālīnayā | nityayā | nīvidā | vedātmikayā vāchā |* “With an ancient—eternal, hymn—a Vedic text.”—Sāyana.)

i. 96, 2. *Sa pūrvayā nīvidā kavyatā Āyor imāḥ prajāḥ ajanayad manūnām |*

“Through the ancient hymn, the poetic work, of Āyu he (Agni) generated these children of men.”⁷

i. 130, 10. *Sa no navyebhir vṛisha-karmann ukthais purām dartaḥ pāyubhiḥ pāhi śagmaiḥ |*

“Through our new hymns, do thou, vigorous in action, destroyer of cities, sustain us with invigorating blessings.”

i. 143, 1. *Pra tavyasīm navyasīm dhītim Agnaye vācho matiīm sahasaḥ sūnave bhure |*

“I bring to Agni, the son of strength, a new and energetic hymn, a production of thought uttered by the voice (*vāchāḥ*).”

ii. 17, 1. *Tud asmai navyam Angiras-vad archatu ityādi |*

“Utter to him [Indra] that new [hymn] like Angiras.” (“New, *i.e.* never before seen among other people” *anyeshv adṛiṣṭa-pūrvam*—Sāyana.)

ii. 18, 3. *Harī nu kaīm rathe Indrasya yojam āyai ṛaktena vacasaḥ navena | no shu tvām atra bhavo hi viprāḥ nī ṛitraman yajamān so anyo |*

⁷ See the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, p. 143 of Prof. Haug's translation; and Vol. I. p. 180,

“With this new and well-expressed hymn I have yoked⁸ the steeds in Indra’s car, in order that he may come hither. Let not the other wise sacrificers, who are numerous, stop thee (from coming to me).”

ii. 24, 1. *Sa imām aviddhi prabhṛitīm yaḥ īśishe | ayā vidhema navayā mahā girā |*

“Do thou who rulest receive this, our offering [of praise]: let us worship thee with this new and grand song.”

iii. 1, 20. *Etā to Agne janimā sanāni pra pūrvyāya nūtanāni vocham |*

“These ancient [and these] new productions I have uttered to thee, Agni, who art ancient.” (Comp. R.V. viii. 84, 5, in the next section.)

iii. 32, 13. *Yaḥ stomebhir vāvṛidhe pūrvyebhir yo madhyamebhir uta nūtanebhiḥ |*

“[Indra] who has grown through (or been magnified by) ancient, intermediate, and modern hymns.”

iii. 39, 1. *Indram matir hṛidaḥ ā vachyamānū achhā patiṁ stoma-tashtā jigāti | ā jāgrivir vidathe śasyamānū Indra yat te jāyate viddhi tasya | 2. Divas chid ā pūrvyā jāyamānā vi jāgrivir vidathe śasyamānā | bhadrā vastrāni arjunā vasānā sā iyam asme sanajā pitryā dhīḥ |*

“1. The vigilant hymn, formed of praise, and uttered from the heart, proceeds to Indra the lord, when chaunted at the sacrifice: be cognizant, Indra, of this [praise] which is produced for thee. 2. Produced even before the daylight, vigilant, chaunted at the sacrifice, clothed in beautiful and radiant garments,—this is our ancient ancestral hymn.” (*Pitryā* is rendered by Sāyaṇa as *pitṛi-kramāgatā*, “received by succession from our fathers.”)

iii. 62, 7. *Iyaṁ te Pūshan āghṛiṇe sushṭutir deva navyasī | asmābhis tubhyaṁ śasyate |*

“Divine and glowing Pūshan, this new laudation is recited by us to thee.”

v. 42, 13. *Pra sū mahe suśaraṇāya medhām giram bhare navyasīm jāyamānām |*

“I present to the mighty protector a mental production, a new utterance [now] springing up.”

⁸ Compare the expressions *vacho-yujū harī*, “brown horses yoked by the hymn (R.V. viii. 45, 39; viii. 87, 9); *brahma-yuj*, “yoked by prayer” (i. 177, 2; iii. 35, 4; viii. 1, 24; viii. 2, 27; viii. 17, 2); and *mano-yuj*, “yoked by the mind, or will” (i. 14, 6; i. 51, 10; iv. 48, 4; v. 75, 6; viii. 5, 2).

v. 55, 8. *Yat pūrvyam Maruto yach cha nūtanam yad udyate Vasavo yach cha śasyate | viśvasya tasya bhavatha navedasah |*

“Be cognizant of all that is ancient, Maruts, and of all that is modern, of all that is spoken, Vasus, and of all that is recited.”

vi. 17, 13. . . . *Suvīram tvā svāyudham suvajram ā brahma navyam avase vavṛityāt |*

“May the new prayer impel thee, the heroic, well-accoutred, the loud-thundering, to succour us.” (“New, *i.e.* never made before by others: prayer, *i.e.* the hymn made by us” *Nūtanam anyair akṛita-pūrvam | brahma asmābhiḥ kṛitam stotram—Sāyaṇa.*)

vi. 22, 7. *Tam vo dhiyā navyasyā śaviṣṭham pratnam pratna-vat paritaṃsayadhya |*

“I seek, like the ancients, to stimulate thee, the ancient, with a new hymn.”

vi. 34, 1. *Sam cha tve jagmur girah Indra pūrve vi cha tvad yanti vibhvo manīshah | purā nūnam cha stutayah ṛishīnām paspridhre Indre adhi ukthārkah |*

“Many songs, Indra, are collected in thee; numerous thoughts issue forth from thee; both before and now the praises, texts and hymns of rishis have hastened emulously to Indra.”

vi. 44, 13. *Yah pūrvyābhir uta nūtanābhir gīrbhir vāvṛidhe grīnatām ṛishīnām |*

“He (Indra) who grew through the ancient and modern hymns of lauding rishis.” (Sec R.V. iii. 32, 13, above p. 223.)

vi. 48, 11. *Ā sakhāyah subardughām dhenum ajadhvam upa navyasā vachah |⁹*

“Friends, drive hither the milch cow with a new hymn.”

vi. 49, 1. *Stushe janaṃ svrataṃ navyasībhir gīrbhir Mitrāvaruṇā sumnayantā |*

“With new praises I celebrate the righteous race, with Mitra and Varuna, the beneficent.” (“The well-acting race, *i.e.* the divine race, the company of the gods,” *sukarmāṇam janaṃ daivyaṃ janaṃ deva-sangham—Sāyaṇa.*)

vi. 50, 6. *Abhi tyaṃ vīraṃ girvaṇasam archa Indram brahmanā jaritar navena |*

“Sing, o worshipper, with a new hymn, to the heroic Indra, who delights in praise.”

⁹ Compare the words *ni Agne navyasā vachas tanūshu śaṃsam eṣam*, viii. 39, 2.

vi. 62, 4. *Tā navyaso jaramānasya manma upa bhūshato yuyujūna-sapti ityādi* | 5. *Tā valgū dasrā purusākatamā pratnā navyasū vachasā vivāse* |

“4. These (Aśvins), with yoked horses, approach the hymn of their new worshipper. . . . 5. I adore with a new hymn these brilliant, strong, most mighty, and ancient (gods).”

vii. 35, 14, will be quoted in the next section.

vii. 53, 2. *Pra pūrvaje pitarā navyasibhir gīrbhīḥ kṛiṇudhvam sadane ritasya ityādi* |

“In the place of sacrifice propitiate with new hymns the ancient, the parents” (*i. e.* Heaven and Earth), etc.

vii. 56, 23. *Bhūri chakra Marutaḥ pitryāni ukthāni yā vaḥ śasyante purā chit* |

“Ye have done great things, o Maruts, when our fathers’ hymns were recited of old in your honour.”

vii. 59, 4. . . . *abhi vaḥ āvartt sumatir navīyasī*¹⁰ *tūyaṁ yāta pipīshavaḥ* |

“May the new hymn turn you hither; come quickly, desirous to drink.”

vii. 61, 6. . . . *Pra vām manmāni rīchase navāni kṛitāni brahma jujushann imāni* |

“May the new hymns made to praise you, may these prayers gratify you.”

vii. 93, 1. *S’uchiṁ nu stomaṁ nava-jātam adya Indrāgnī Vṛittra-kanā jushetham* | *ubhā hi vām suhacā jōhavīmi ityādi* |

“Indra and Agni, slayers of Vṛittra, receive with favour the pure hymn newly produced to-day. For again and again do I invoke you who lend a willing ear,” etc.

viii. 5, 24. *Tābhir āyātam ūtibhir navyasibhīḥ susustibhīḥ yad vām vṛishanvasū huve* |

“Come with those same succours, since I invoke you, bountiful [deities], with new praises.” (The epithet *navyasibhīḥ* in this text might possibly be construed with the word *ūtibhīḥ*, “aids.”)

viii. 6, 11. *Aham pratnena manmanā girāḥ sunbhāmi Kanva-vat* | *yena Indrāḥ śushmam id didhe* |

¹⁰ The same words, *sumatir navīyasī*, occur in viii. 92, 9, where they may not have the same sense as here.

"I decorate my praises with an ancient hymn, after the manner of Kaṇva, whereby Indra put on strength."

viii. 6, 43. *Imāñ su pūrvyām dhīyam madhor ghṛitasya pīpyushīm Kaṇvāḥ ukthona vavridhauḥ |*

"The Kaṇvas with their praise have augmented this ancient hymn, replenished with sweet butter."

viii. 12, 10. *Iyañ te ṛitvīyāvati dhītir eti navīyastī saparyantī ityādi |*

"This new and solemn hymn advances to honour thee," etc.

viii. 20, 19. *Yūnaḥ ū su navishṭhayā vṛishṇaḥ pāvakān abhi Sobhare girā | gāya ityādi |*

"Sing, o Sobhari, with a new hymn to these youthful, vigorous, and brilliant (gods).

viii. 23, 14. *Sṛushṭī Agne navasya mo stomasya vira viśpate vi māyinas tapushā rakshaso dāha |*

"Heroic Agni, lord of the people, on hearing my new hymn, burn up with thy heat the deluding Rakshases."

viii. 25, 24. . . . *Kasāvanta viprā navishṭhayā matī | maho vājināv arvanta sachā asanam |*

"I have celebrated at the same time with a new hymn, these two sage and mighty [princes], strong, swift, and carrying whips."

viii. 39, 6. *Agnir veda marttānām apīohyam . . . Agnir dvārā vyūr-
nuto svāhuto navīyasā |*

"Agni knows the secrets of mortals . . . Agni, invoked by a new [hymn], opens the doors."

viii. 40, 12. *Eva Indrāgnibhyām pitṛi - vad navīyo Māndhātṛi - vad Angiras - vad avāohi ityādi |* •

"Thus has a new [hymn] been uttered to Indra and Agni after the manner of our fathers, and of Māndhātṛi, and of Angiras."

viii. 41, 2. *Tam ū shu samanā girā pitṛiṇām cha manmabhiḥ Nābhā-
kasya praśastibhir yaḥ sindhūnām upa udaye sapta-svasā sa madhyamaḥ |*

"[Worship] him (Varuṇa) continually with a song, with the hymns of the fathers,¹¹ and with the praises of Nābhāka. He who dwells at the

¹¹ The expression here employed, *pitṛiṇām cha manmabhiḥ*, occurs also in R.V. x. 57, 3 (=Vāj. S. 3, 53): *Mano nu ā huvāmaho nūrūśaṁsena somena pitṛiṇām cha manmabhiḥ* | "We summon his soul with Soma, accompanied by human praises, and with the hymns of the fathers." The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā reads *stomena*, "hymn," instead of *somena*. The commentator there explains *nūrūśaṁsena stomena* as "a hymn

birth-place of the streams, the lord of the seven sisters, abides in the centre." (This verse is quoted in the Nirukta x. 5. Nābhāka is said by Yāska to have been a rishi (*rishir Nābhāko babhūva*). A translation of the passage is given in Roth's Illustrations of the Nir. p. 135, where reference is also made to two verses of the preceding hymn (viii. 40, 4, 5), in which Nābhāka (the ancestor of Nābhāka) is mentioned thus: (verse 4) *Abhyarcha Nābhāka-vad Indrāgnī yajasū girā . . .* (verse 5) *Pra brahmāni Nābhāka-vad Indrāgnibhyām irajyata* | "Worship Indra and Agni with sacrifice and hymn, like Nābhāka . . . Like Nābhāka, direct your prayers to Indra and Agni." In explanation of the seven sisters, Roth refers to Nir. v. 27 (R. V. viii. 58, 12) where the seven rivers are mentioned. See his Illustrations of Nir. pp. 70, 71.

viii. 44, 12. *Agniḥ pratnena manmanā śumbhānas tanvaṁ svām kaviḥ vipreṇa vavṛidhe* |

"The wise Agni, illuminating his own body at [the sound of] the sage and ancient hymn, has become augmented."

viii. 55, 11. *Vayaṁ gha te apūrvyā Indra brahmāni vṛittrahan | purutamāsaḥ puruhūta vajrivo bhṛitīm na pra bhārāmasi* |

"Indra, slayer of Vṛittra, thunderer, invoked of many, we [thy] numerous [worshippers] bring to thee, as thy hire, hymns which never before existed."

viii. 63, 7, 8. *Iyaṁ te navyasī matir Agne adhāyi asmad ā mandra sujāta sukrato amūra dasma atilhe | sū te Agne śantamū chanishṭhā bhavatu priyā tayā vardhasva sushṭutah* |

"O Agni, joyful, well-born, strong, unerring, and wondrous guest, this new hymn has been offered to (or, made for) thee by us; may it be dear to thee, agreeable and pleasant: lauded by it, do thou increase."

viii. 65, 5, 6. . . . *Indraṁ gīrbhir havāmahe | Indram pratnena manmanā marutrantam havāmahe ityādi* | 12. (=S. V. ii. 340.) *Vācham ashṭāpadīm aham nava-sraktim ṛita-sprīṣam | Indrāt pari tanvam mame* |

"5. We invoke Indra with songs; we invoke Indra, attended by the Maruts, with an ancient hymn. . . 12. I compose for the sake of

in which men are praised," and *pitrūṁ cha manmahīḥ*, as hymns "in which the fathers are revered" (*pitaro yauiḥ stotair manyante te manmū . . . tair ityādi*). See Prof. Max Müller's translation of this hymn in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1883, pp. 449 and 458.

Indra a hymn of eight feet and nine lines, abounding in sacred truth." (This verse is translated and explained by Professor Benfey, *Sâma-veda*, p. 255.)

ix. 9, 8. *Nu navyase navīyase sūktāya sādḥaya pathaḥ | pratna-vaḍ rochaya ruchaḥ |*

"Prepare (o Soma) the paths for our newest, most recent, hymn; and, as of old, cause the lights to shine."

ix. 42, 2. *Esha pratnena manmanā devo devebhyah pari | dhārayā pavate sutaḥ |*

"This god, poured forth to the gods, with an ancient hymn, purifies with his stream."

ix. 91, 5. *Sa pratna-vaḍ navyase viśva-vāra sūktāya pathaḥ kṛinūhi prāchaḥ ityādi |*

"O god, who possessest all good, make, as of old, forward paths for this new hymn."

ix. 99, 4 (= S.V. ii. 983). *Taṁ gāthayā purānyā punānam abhi anūshata | uto kṛipanta dhītayo devānām nāma bibhratīḥ |*

"They praised the pure god with an ancient song; and hymns embracing the names of the gods have supplicated him." (Benfey translates the last clause differently.)

x. 4, 6. . . . *Iyaṁ te Agne navyasī manīshā yukshva rathaṁ na śuchayadbhir angaiḥ |*

"This is for thee, Agni, a new hymn: yoke thy car as it were with shining parts."

x. 89, 3. *Samānam asmai anapāvṛid archā kshmayā divo asamam brahma navyam ityādi |*

"Sing (to Indra) without ceasing a new hymn, worthy of him, and unequalled in earth or heaven."

x. 91, 13. *Imām pratnūya sushṭutiṁ navīyasīm vocheyam asmai usate śṛiṇotu naḥ |*

"I will address to this ancient [deity] my new praises, which he desires; may he listen to us."

x. 96, 11. . . . *Navyaṁ navyaṁ haryasi manma nu priyam ityādi |*

"Thou delightest in ever new hymns, which are dear to thee," etc.

x. 160, 5. *Āsvāyanto gavyanto vājayanto havāmake tvā upa gantavai u | ābhūshantas te sumatau navāyām vāyam Indra tvā śunām huvema |*

"Desiring horses, cattle, and wealth, we invoke thee to approach us."

Paying homage to thee in a new hymn, may we, o Indra, invoke thee auspiciously."

SECT. III.—*Passages of the Rig-veda, in which the rishis describe themselves as the composers of the hymns.*

In this section I propose to quote, first of all, those passages in which the rishis distinctly speak of themselves as the authors of the hymns, and express no consciousness whatever of deriving assistance or inspiration from any supernatural source. I shall then adduce some further texts in which, though nothing is directly stated regarding the composition of the hymns, there is at the same time nothing which would lead the reader to imagine that the rishis looked upon them as anything else than the offspring of their own minds.

I shall arrange the quotations in which the rishis distinctly claim the authorship, according to the particular verb which is employed to express this idea. These verbs are (1) *kri*, "to make," (2) *taksh* (= the Greek *τεκτανομαι*), "to fabricate," and (3) *jan*, "to beget, generate, or produce," with others which are less explicit.

I. I adduce first the passages in which (1) the verb *kri*, "to make," is applied to the composition of the hymns. (Compare R.V. vii. 61, 6 already quoted in the last section.)

R.V. i. 20, 1. *Ayañ devāya janmano stomo viprebhir āsayā*¹² | *akāri ratna-dhātamaḥ* |

"This hymn, conferring wealth, has been *made* to the divine race, by the sages, with their mouth [or in presence of the gods]."

i. 31, 18. *Etena Agne brahmanū vāṛidhasva śakti vā yat te chakṛima vidā vā* |

"Grow, o Agni, by this prayer which we have *made* to thee according to our power, or our knowledge."

i. 47, 2. . . . *Kaṇvaso vām brahma kṛiṅvanti adhvaso teshām su śṛiṅvataṁ havam* |

"The Kaṇvas make a prayer to you : hear well their invocation."

i. 61, 16. *Evā te hariyojanū suvṛikti Indra brahmāṇi Gotamāsah akran* |

"Thus, o Indra, yoker of steeds, have the Gotamas *made* hymns for thee efficaciously."

¹² See the note on vi. 32, 1, below.

i. 117, 25. *Etāni vām Aśvinā vīryāṇi pra pūrvyāṇi āyavaḥ avochan | brahma kṛiṣvanto*¹³ *vṛiṣhaṇā yuvabhyāṃ suvirāso vidatham ā vadema |*

"These, your ancient exploits, o Aśvins, men have declared. Let us, who are strong in bold men, making a hymn for you, o vigorous gods, utter our offering of praise."

i. 184, 5. *Esha vām stoma Aśvināv akāri mānebhīr maghavānā svīktī |*

"This hymn has efficaciously been made to you, o opulent Aśvins, by the Mānas. (Comp. i. 169, 8; 171, 5; 182, 8; 184, 3.)

ii. 39, 8. *Etāni vām Aśvinā vardhanāni brahma stomaṃ Gṛitsama-dāsaḥ akran |*

"These magnifying prayers, [this] hymn, o Aśvins, the Gṛitsamadas have made for you."

iii. 30, 20. *Svavyavo matibhis tubhyaṃ viprāḥ Indrāya vāhaḥ Kuśi-kūsaḥ akran |*

"Aspiring to heaven, the sage Kuśikas have made a hymn with praises to thee, o Indra." (The word *vāhaḥ* is stated by Sāyana to be = *stotra*, "a hymn.")

iv. 6, 11. *Akāri brahma samidhāna tubhyaṃ ityādi |*

"O kindled [Agni], a prayer has been made to thee."

iv. 16, 20. *Eved Indrāya vṛiṣabhāya vṛiṣṇe brahma akarma Bhṛi-yavo na ratham | 21. Akāri te harivo brahma navyaṃ dhīyū syāma rathyaḥ sadāsāḥ |*

"Thus have we made a prayer for Indra, the productive, the vigorous, as the Bhṛigus [fashioned] a car. . . . 21. A now prayer has been made for thee, o lord of steeds. May we, through our hymn (or rite), become possessed of chariots and perpetual wealth."

vi. 52, 2. *Ati vā yo maruto manyate no brahma vā yaḥ kriyamāṇaṃ ninitāt | tapūṃshi tasmai vṛijināni santu brahma-dvisham abhi taṃ śochatu dyauḥ |*

"Whoever, o Maruts, regards himself as superior to us, or reviles the prayer which is being made, may burning injuries be his lot; may the sky scorch the enemy of prayer."¹⁴

¹³ The reader will find Prof. Haug's opinion of the sense of this phrase in p. 11 f. of his German dissertation "on the original signification of the word *brahma*," of which the author has been kind enough to send me a copy, which has reached me as this sheet is passing through the press. Prof. Haug mentions R.V. i. 88, 4; vii. 103, 8, as passages (additional to those I have given) in which the expression occurs.

¹⁴ Translated by Prof. Haug in the Dissertation above referred to, p. 6.

vii. 35, 14. *Ādityāḥ Rudrāḥ Vasavo jushanta* (the Atharva-veda has *jushantām*) *idam brahma kriyamānaṃ navīyaḥ | śṛṇvantu no divyāḥ pār-thivāso gojātāḥ ityādi |*

“The Ādityas, Rudras, and Vasus receive with pleasure this new prayer which is being *made*. May the gods of the air, the earth, and the sky hear us.”

vii. 37, 4. *Vayaṃ nu te dāsvāṃsaḥ syāma brahma kṛṇvantāḥ ityādi |*

“Let us offer oblations to thee, *making* prayers,” etc.

vii. 97, 9. *Iyaṃ vām Brahmaṇaspate svṛiktir brahma Indrāya vajrine akāri |*

“Brahmaṇspati, this efficacious hymn, [this] prayer has been *made* for thee, and for Indra, the thunderer.”

viii. 51, 4. *Āyāhi kṛṇavāma te Indra brahmāṇi varddhanā ityādi |*

“Come, Indra, let us *make* prayers, which magnify thee,” etc.

viii. 79, 3. *Brahma te Indra girvanāḥ kriyante anatiḍbhutā | imā jushasva haryaśva yojanā yā te amanmahi |*

“Unequalled prayers are made for thee Indra, who lovest hymns. Receive favourably, lord of the brown steeds, those which we have thought out for thee, to yoke thy horses.”

x. 54, 6. . . . *Adha priyam śūsham Indrāya manma brahmakṛito*¹⁵ *Vṛihadukthād avāchi |*

“. . . An acceptable and powerful hymn has been uttered to Indra by Vṛihaduktha, *maker* of prayers.”¹⁶

x. 101, 2. *Mandrā kṛṇudhvāṃ dhiyaḥ ā tanudhvāṃ nāvam aritra-paranīm kṛṇudhvam |*

“*Make* pleasant (hymns), prepare prayers, make a ship propelled by oars.”

It is possible that in many of these passages the verb *kṛi* may have merely the signification which the word *make* has in English when we speak of “making supplications,” etc., in which case it of course means to *offer up*, rather than to *compose*. But this cannot be the case in such passages as R. V. iv. 16; 20 (p. 233), where the rishi speaks of making

¹⁵ Compare *ṛishayo mantrakṛito manīshīṇaḥ* in Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 8, 8, 5; and R. V. ix. 114, 2: *Ṛishe mantra-kṛitiṃ stomaḥ Kaśyapodvardhayam giraḥ | somaṃ namasya rājanam yo jagne vīrudhām patih |* “Rishi Kaśyapa, augmenting thy words with the praises of the makers of hymns, reverence King Soma, who was born the lord of plants.”

¹⁶ Prof. Haug thinks the word *brahma-kṛit* here refers to hymns, and mentions other passages in which it occurs: see p. 12 of the Dissertation above referred to.

the hymn as the Bhṛiguḥ made a chariot.¹⁷ And such an interpretation would be altogether inadmissible in the case of the texts which I next proceed to cite.

II. Passages in which the word *taksh*, "to fashion, or fabricate," is applied to the composition of the hymns.

i. 62, 13. *Sanāyate Gotamaḥ Indra navyam atakshad brahma hariyo-
janāya ityādi* |

"Nodhas, descendant of Gotama, *fashioned* this new hymn for [thee], Indra, who art of old, and who yokest thy steeds," etc.

i. 130, 6. *Imāṃ te vāchaṃ vasuyantaḥ āyavo rathaṃ na dhīraḥ svapāḥ atakshishuḥ sumnāya tvām atakshishuḥ* |

"Desiring wealth, men have *fashioned* for thee this hymn, as a skilful workman [fabricates] a car; and thus they have disposed (*lit.* fashioned) thee to (confer) happiness."

i. 171, 2. *Esha vaḥ stoma Maruto namasvān hṛidā tashṭo manasā dhāyī devāḥ* |

"This reverential hymn, o divine Maruts, *fashioned* by the heart, has been presented [or, made] by the mind. [According to Sāyana, the last words mean, 'let it be received by you with a favourable mind']."

ii. 19, 8. *Evā te Gṛtsamadāḥ śūra manma avasyavo na rayunāni takshuḥ* |

"Thus, o hero, have the Gṛtsamadas, desiring succour, *fashioned* for thee a hymn, as men make works." (Sāyana explains *rayuna* by "road.")

ii. 35, 2. *Imāṃ su asmai hridaḥ ā sutashṭam mantraṃ vochema kavid asya vedat* |

"Let us address to him this *well-fashioned* hymn proceeding from the heart; will he not be aware of it?"

v. 2, 11. *Etaṃ te stomaṃ tuvi-jāta vipro rathaṃ na dhīraḥ svapāḥ ataksham* |

"I, a sage, have *fabricated* this hymn for thee, o powerful [deity], as a skilful workman fashions a car."

v. 29, 15. *Indra brahma kriyamānā jushasva yā te śvishṭha navyā akarma* | *vastreva bhadrā sukṛitā vasūyuh rathuṃ na dhīraḥ svapāḥ ataksham* |

¹⁷ See also v. 29, 15, and x. 39, 14, which will be quoted a little further on; and in which the verbs *kri* and *taksh* are both employed.

“O mighty Indra, regard with favour the prayers which are *made*, the new [prayers] which we have *made* for thee. Desirous of wealth, I have *fabricated* them like beautiful well-fashioned garments, as a skilful workman [constructs] a car.” (Compare R.V. iii. 39, 2; above, p. 226.)

v. 73, 10. *Imā brahmāṇi vardhanā Aśvibhyāṃ santu santamā | yā takshāma rathān iva avochāma bṛihad namaḥ |*

“May these magnifying prayers which we have *fashioned*, like cars, be pleasing to the Aśvins: we have uttered great adoration.”

vi. 32, 1 (=S.V. i. 322). *Apūrvyā purutamāni asmaī make vīrūya tavase turūya | vīrapāsine vajrine santamāni vachāṃsi āsā¹⁸ sthavirūya taksham |*

“To this great hero, vigorous, energetic, the adorable, unshaken thunderer, I have with my mouth *fabricated* copious and pleasing prayers, which have never before existed.”

vi. 16, 47. *Ā te Agne řichā havir hṛidā tashṭam bhārūmasi |*

“In this verse, Agni, we bring to thee an oblation *fabricated* by the heart.” (Comp. R.V. iii. 39, 1, in p. 226.)

vii. 7, 6. *Ete dyumnebhīr viśvam ātiranta mantram ye vā aram naryāḥ atakshan |*

“These manly (Vasishthas), who have skilfully *fabricated* the hymn, have by their energy accomplished all things (?).”

vii. 64, 4. *Yo vām garttam manasū takshad etam ūrddhvām dhitiṃ kṛiṇavad dhārayach cha |*

“May he who with his mind *fashioned* for you (Mitra and Varuṇa) this car, make and sustain the lofty hymn.” (The same expression *ūrddhvā dhitiḥ* occurs in R.V. i. 119, 2.)

viii. 6, 33. *Uta brahmanyū vayam tubhyam pravṛiddha vajrivo viprāḥ atakshma jīvase |*

“O mighty thunderer, we, who are sage, have *fabricated* prayers for thee, that we may live.”

x. 39, 14. *Etam vām stomam Aśvināv akarma atakshāma Bṛigavo na ratham | nī amṛikshāma yoshanām na maryye nityam na sūnuṃ tanayam dadhānāḥ |*

“This hymn, Aśvins, we have *made* for you; we have *fabricated* it

¹⁸ On the sense of *āsā* see Prof. Müller's article in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, p. 232 f.; and Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v.

as the Bhrigus [constructed] a car; we have decorated it, as a bride for her husband, continuing the series [of our praises] like an unbroken line of descendants." (See iv. 16, 20, above, p. 233.)

(The following is Sāyana's comment on this passage, for a copy of which I am indebted to Professor Müller: *He Aśvinau vām yuvayor etañ yathoktañ stomañ stotram akarma akurma | Tad etad āha | Bhrigavo na Bhrigavaḥ iva ratham atakshāma vayañ stotram saṁskṛitavantaḥ | karma-yogād Rībhavo Bhrigavaḥ uchyante | athavā rathakārāḥ Bhrigavaḥ | kincha vayañ nityaṁ śūsvataṁ tanayaṁ yāyādīnām karmanām tanitāraṁ sūnuṁ na aurasam putram iva stotraṁ dadhānāḥ dhārayanto martye manushye nyamṛikshāma yuvayoh stutiṁ nitarām saṁskṛitavantaḥ |* "Aśvins, we have made this preceding hymn or praise of you. He means to say this. Like the Bhrigus, we have made a car, we have carefully constructed a hymn. The Ribhus are, in this passage, . . . styled Bhrigus; or Bhrigus are chariot-makers. Moreover, maintaining praise as a constant perpetuator (like a legitimate son) of sacrifice and other rites, we have polished, *i.e.* carefully composed a celebration of you among men [?]." In this comment the word *yoshanā* is left unexplained. In verse 12 of this hymn the Aśvins are supplicated to come in a car fleetier than thought, constructed for them by the Ribhus—*ā tena yātam manaso javīyusā rathaṁ yañ vām Rībhavaś chakrur Aśvinā |*.)

x. 80, 7. *Agnaye brahma Rībhavas tatakshuḥ |*

"The Ribhus [or the wise] *fabricated* a hymn for Agni.

III. I next quote some texts in which the hymns are spoken of as being *generated* by the rishis. (Comp. R.V. vii. 93, 1, in p. 228.)

iii. 2, 1. *Vaiśvānarāya dhishaṇām ritāvṛidhe ghrītañ na pūtam Agnaye janāmasi |*

"We *generate* a hymn, like pure butter, for Agni Vaiśvānara, who promotes our sacred rites."

vii. 15, 4. *Navam nu stomam Agnaye divaḥ śyenāya jjanam | vasvaḥ kuvīd vanāti naḥ |*

"I have *generated* a new hymn to Agni, the falcon of the sky; will he not bestow on us wealth in abundance?"

vii. 22, 9. *Ye cha pūrve rishayo ye cha nūtnāḥ Indra brahmāṇi janayanta viprāḥ |*

"Indra, the wise rishis, both ancient and modern, have *generated* prayers."

vii. 26, 1. *Na somaḥ Indram asuḥo mamāda na abrahmāno maghavānaḥ sutāsaḥ | tasmai ukthāḥ janayo yaj jujoshad nṛivad navīyāḥ śrinavad yathā naḥ |*

“The soma exhilarates not Indra unless it be poured out; nor do libations [gratify] Maghavan when offered without a prayer. To him I generate a hymn such as may please him, that, after the manner of men, he may hear our new [production].”

vii. 31, 11. . . . *Suṛiktīm Indrāya brahma janayanta viprāḥ |*

“The sages generated an efficacious production and a prayer for Indra.”

vii. 94, 1, 2 (=S.V. ii. 266). *Iyaṁ vām asya manmanaḥ Indrāgnī pūrva-stutir abhrād vṛiṣṭir iva ajani | śrinutaḥ jaritur havam ityādi |*

“This excellent praise has been generated for you, Indra and Agni, from the soul of this [your worshipper], like rain from a cloud. Hear the invocation of your encomiast.” (Benfey thinks *manman*, “spirit,” is to be understood of Soma, whose hymn, *i.e.* the sound of his dropping, resembles the falling of rain. The scholiast of the S.V. makes *manman* = *stotṛi*, “worshipper”.)

viii. 43, 2. *Asmai te pratiharyate Jātavedo vicharshane Agne janāmi sushṭutim |*

“Wise Agni Jātavedas, I generate a hymn for thee, who receivest it with favour.”

viii. 77, 4. *Ā tvā ayam arkaḥ ūtaye vavarttati yaṁ Gotamāḥ ajījanan |*

“This hymn which the Gotamas have generated, incites thee to succour us.”

viii. 84, 4, 5. *S’rudhi havaḥ Tiraśchyāḥ Indra yas tvā saparyati suṛīyasya gomato rāyāḥ pūrdhi mahān asi | Indra yas te navīyasīm giram mandrām ajījanat chikitvin-manasaḥ dhīyam pratnām ṛitasya pipyushīm |*

“Hear, Indra, the invocation of Tiraśchī, thy worshipper; replenish him with wealth in strong men and in cattle, for thou art great. Indra (do this for him) who has generated for thee the newest exhilarating hymn, springing from an intelligent mind, an ancient mental product, full of sacred truth.”

(These verses occur also in the Sāma-veda ii. 233, 234, and are translated by Professor Benfey, at pp. 230 and 250 of his edition. The hymn referred to in this passage is apparently designated as both

new and old. How can it be both? It may have been an old hymn re-written and embellished; ancient in substance, though new in expression.¹⁹ Compare St. John's Gospel, xiii. 34, and the First Epistle of St. John, ii. 7, 8, and iii. 11.)

ix. 73, 2. . . . *madhor dhārābhīr janayanto arkam it priyām Indrasya tanvam avīṛidhan |*

"Generating the hymn, they have augmented the beloved body of Indra with the honied streams."

ix. 95, 1 (= S.V. i. 530). . . . *ato matir janayata svadhābhīḥ |*

"Wherefore generate hymns with the oblations." (Professor Benfey makes *janayata* the 3rd person singular of the imperfect middle, and applies it to Soma.)

x. 7, 2. *Imāḥ Agne matayas tubhyaṃ jātāḥ gobhīr āsvair abhi grīnanti rādhaḥ |*

"These hymns, Agni, generated for thee, celebrate thy bounty in cows and horses."

x. 23, 5, 6, 7. *Yo vāchā vivācho mṛidhravāchaḥ purū sahasrā āsivū jaghāna | Tat tad id asya pauṃsyaṃ grīnīmasi pitā iva yas tavishīm vāvṛidhe śavah | 6. Stomaṃ te Indra Vimadāḥ ajījanann apūrvyam purutamaṃ sudānave | Vidma hi asya bhōjanam inasya yad ā paśuṃ na gopāḥ karāmahe | 7. Mā kir naḥ eṇā sakhyū vijayushus tava oha Indra Vimadasya oha rīsheḥ | Vidma hi te pramatīm deva jāmi-vad asme te santu sakhyā śivāni |*

"5. Who (Indra) with his voice slew many thousands of the wicked uttering confused and hostile cries. We laud his several acts of valour, who, like a father, grew in vigour and strength. 6. For thee, o Indra, who art bountiful, the Vimadas have generated a copious hymn, which never before existed (*apūrvya*); for we know that it is gratifying to this mighty god, when we attract him hither as a cowherd drives his cattle. 7. Indra, may that friendship of ours never be dissolved, which exists between thee and the rishi Vimada: for we know thy wisdom, o god; may thy friendship be favourable to us, like that of a kinsman."

x. 67, 1. *Imām dhiyaṃ sapta-śīrṣhṇīm pitā naḥ rītaprajātām bṛihatīm avindat | turīyaṃ svīj janayad viśvajanyo Ayāsyaḥ uktham Indrāya sansan |*

¹⁹ As Prof. Aufrecht expresses it: "Gīr is opposed to *dhī*, as form to substance a new utterance, but a primordial homage."

“Our father hath discovered [or invented] this great, seven-headed hymn, born of sacred truth; Ayāsyā, friend of all men, celebrating Indra, has *generated* the fourth song of praise.” (In his Lexicon, Roth gives Ayāsyā as a proper name; but says it may also be an adjective with the sense of “unwearied.”)

x. 91, 14. *Kīlāla-pe soma-prishṭāya vedhase hṛidā matiṁ janaye chārum Agnaye |*

“With my heart I *generate* a beautiful hymn for Agni, the drinker of nectar, the soma-sprinkled, the wise.” (See also R.V. i. 109, 1, 2, which will be quoted below.)

IV. In the following texts the verbal root *ri*, “to move, send forth,” etc., used with or without a preposition, is applied to the utterance or (it may even mean) the production of hymns.

i. 116, 1. *Nāsatyābhyām barhīr iva pravṛiṅje stōmān iyarmi abhriyā iva vātah | yāv arbhagāya Vimadāya jāyām senājuvā ni ūhatuḥ rathena |*

“In like manner as I spread the sacrificial grass to the Nāsatyas (Aśvins), so do I *send forth* to them hymns, as the wind [drives] the clouds; to them (I say), who bore off to the youthful Vimada his bride in a chariot swift as an arrow.”

vii. 61, 2. *Pra vām sa Mitṛā-Varuṇau ṛitāvā vipro manmāni dīrghaśrud iyartti | Yasya brahmāni sukratū avāthah ā yat kratvā na śaradaḥ pṛinaithe |*

“The devout sage, heard afar off, *sends forth* his hymns to you, o Mitra and Varuna. Do you, mighty gods, receive his prayers with favour, so that for (many) autumns ye may not be satiated with his fervour.” (See Bühtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, s.v. ā + *pri*.)

viii. 12, 31. *Imām te Indra susṭutim viprah iyartti dhātibhiḥ | jāmim padā iva pipratim pra adhvaṛe |*

“In the sacrifice the sage, with praises, *sends forth* to thee this hymn, which is of kin to thee, and, as it were, supplies the places (of others?)

viii. 13, 26. . . . *Ṛitād iyarmi te dhiyam manoyujam |*

“. . . From the sacred ceremony I *send forth* a prayer which will attract thy heart.”

x. 116, 9. *Pra Indrāgnibhyām suvachasyām iyarmi sindhāv iva prerayām nāvam arkatiḥ |*

“I *send forth* a [hymn] with beautiful words to Indra and Agni; with my praises I have, as it were, launched a ship on the sea.”

(Compare R.V. ii. 42, 1, spoken of Indra in the form of the bird called Kapinjala, a sort of partridge: *Iyartti vācham ariteva nāvam* | “It sends forth a voice, as a rower propels a boat.” See also R.V. x. 101, 2, quoted above, p. 234.)

x. 4, 1. *Pra te yakshi pra te iyarmi manma bhuvo yathā vandyo no haveshu* | *dhanvann iva prapā asi tvam Agne iyakshave pūrave pratna rājan* |

“I offer thee worship, I send forth to thee a meditation, that thou mayest be accessible to adoration in our invocations. For thou, Agni, ancient king, art like a trough of water in the desert to the man who longs for thee.”

V. In the following passages other verbs are employed to denote the composition or presentation of hymns :

i. 61. 2. *Indrāya hṛidā manasā manīshū pratnāya patye dhiyo marjayaṅta* |

“To Indra, the ancient lord, they prepared [or polished] hymns [or ceremonies] with the heart, mind, and understanding.”

i. 61, 4. *Asmai id u stomañ sañhinomi rathañ na tashṭū iva ityādi* |

“To him (Indra) I send forth a hymn, as a carpenter a car,” etc.

i. 94, 1 (= S.V. i. 66). *Imañ stomañ arhate Jātavedase ratham iva sam mahema manīshayā* | *bhadrā hi naḥ pramatir asya sañsadi Agne sakhye mā rishāma vayañ tava* |

“Let us with our intellect construct (or, send forth) this hymn for the adorable Jātavedas like a car, for his wisdom is favourable to us in the assembly. Agni, in thy friendship may we never suffer.” (The root *mah* means to honour or worship.²⁰ The reader may compare Benfey’s translation.)

There is to be found in the hymns a great multitude of passages in which the rishi speaks of presenting his hymns and prayers to the various deities who are the objects of his worship, without directly claiming for himself the authorship of those compositions. The natural inference to be drawn from the expressions which we shall find to be employed in most of the cases to which I refer, would, I think, be that the personality of the rishi himself was uppermost in his mind, and that he was not conscious that the praises which he was uttering to

²⁰ See, however, the various reading suggested by Böthlingk and Roth *s.v. mah + sam* and *ah + sam*.

the gods proceeded from any other source than his own unaided faculties. Of this description are the following texts, which represent a manner of thinking and speaking very prevalent in the hymns:

i. 60, 5. *Tam tvā vāyam patim Agne rayīnām prasamsāmo matibhir Gotamāsah* |

“We, the Gotamas, praise with hymns thee, Agni, the lord of riches.”

i. 77, 5. *Eva Agnir Gotamebhir ritāvū viprebhir astoshṭa jātavedah* |

“Thus has the holy Agni Jātavedas been celebrated by the sage Gotamas.”

i. 78, 5. *Avochāma Rahūgaṇūḥ Agnaye madhumad vachah* | *dyumnair abhi pra nonumah* |

“We, the Rahūgaṇas, have uttered to Agni honied speech; we incessantly laud him with eulogies.”

i. 91, 11. *Soma gīrbhis tvā vāyaṁ vardhayāmo vacho-vidah* | *sumṛiṅko nah āviśa* |

“Soma, we who are skilled in speech magnify thee with praises; do thou enter into us, full of kindness.”

i. 102, 1. *Imām te dhīyam prabhare maho mahim*

“I present to thee joyfully this great hymn

i. 183, 6. *Atārishma tamasas pāram asya prati vām stoma Aśvinūv adhāyi* |

“We have crossed over this darkness; a hymn, o Aśvins, has been addressed to you.”

iii. 53, 2. *Pitur na putraḥ sicham ā rabhe te Indra svādishṭhayā girā śachīvah* |

“Powerful Indra, I lay hold of thy skirt (as a son does that of his father), with a very sweet hymn.”

iv. 3, 16. *Etā viśvā vidushe tubhyaṁ vedho nīthāni Agne niṅyā vacchāmsi* | *nivachanā kavaye kāvyāni āsaṁsisham matibhir viprah ukthaiḥ* |

“Intelligent Agni, to thee, who knowest, [have I uttered] all these songs and mysterious words; to thee, who art a bard, have I, a sage, uttered these hymns, these poems, with meditations and praises.”

iv. 32, 12. *Avīṛidhanta Gotamāḥ Indra tve stoma-vāhasah* |

“The Gotamas, Indra, bringing hymns to thee, have magnified thee.”

v. 11, 5. *Tubhya idam Agne madhumattamaṁ vachas tubhyam manīshā iyam astu sām hṛide* | *Tvām giraḥ sindhum iva avanir mahir ā prinanti savasā vardhayanti cha* |

“Agni, may this sweetest of prayers, may this mental production be pleasant to thy heart. As great rivers fill the ocean, so do the words of praise fill thee, and augment thee with strength.”

v. 22, 4. *Agne chikiddhi asya naḥ idaṁ vachaḥ sahasya | Taṁ tvā susūpra dampate stomair vardhanti Atrayo gīrbhīḥ śumbhanti Atrayaḥ |*

“Vigorous Agni, observe these our words; thee, with the beautiful nose, the lord of the house, the Atris magnify with praises, the Atris decorate with hymns.”

v. 45, 4. *Sūktebhir vo vachobhir deva-jushtair Indrā nu Agnī avase huvadhyaḥ |*

“Let me invoke you for help, o Indra and Agni, with well-spoken words, such as are acceptable to the gods.

vi. 38, 3. *Taṁ vo dhīyā paramayā purājām ajaram Indram abhi anūshi arkaiḥ ityādi |*

“I adore thee, the ancient, imperishable Indra with an excellent hymn and with praises.”

vii. 67, 5. *Prāchīm ū devā Aśvinā dhīyam me amṛidhrāṁ sātaye kṛitaṁ vasūyum |*

“O divine Aśvins, bring to fulfilment my unwearied prayer which supplicates wealth.”

vii. 85, 1. *Punīṣhe vām arakshasam manīshām somam Indrāya Varuṇāya juhvat | ghṛita-pratikām Ushasāṁ na devīm ityādi |*

“Offering soma to Indra and Varuna, I prepare for you twain the sincere hymn, like the goddess Ushas, with glittering face.”²¹

viii. 5, 18. *Asmākam adya vām ayaṁ stomo vāhishṭho antamaḥ | yuvābhyaṁ bhātu Aśvinā |*

“May this hymn of ours approach near to you, to-day, o Aśvins, and be effectual in bearing you hither.”

viii. 8, 8. *Kim anye paryāsate asmat stomebhir Aśvinā | putraḥ Kaṇvasya vām ṛishir gīrbhir Vatso avīṛidhat |*

“Aśvins, do others than we sit round you with songs? Vatsa, the son of Kaṇva, has magnified you by his hymns.”

viii. 27, 8. *Ā pra yāta Maruto Vishṇo Aśvinā Pūshan mākinayā dhīyā | 11. Idā hi vaḥ upastutim idā vāmasya bhaktaye upa vo viśva-vedaso namasyur āsṛikṣhi |*

²¹ Compare vi. 8, 1. *Vaiśvānarāya matir navyasī śūcīḥ somaḥ iva pavate chāru Agnaye |* “A new and bright hymn is purified, like beautiful soma, for Agni Vaiśvānara.”

“8. Come, o Maruts, Vishṇu, Aśvins, Pūshan, at my hymn. 11. For now, possessors of all riches, now, in order to obtain wealth, have I, full of reverence, sent forth to you a hymn.”

viii. 44, 2. *Agne stomañ jushasva me vardhasva anena manmanā | prati sūktāni harya naḥ |* 22. *Uta tvā dhītayo mama giro varddhantu viśvahā | Agne sakhyasya bodhi naḥ |* 26. *Yuvānañ viśpatim kaviñ viśvādam puru-vepasām | Agniñ śumbhāmi manmabhiḥ |*

“2. Agni, receive my hymn : grow by this product of my thought : rejoice in our beautiful words. 22. And may my thoughts and words always augment thee ; Agni, think of our friendship. 26. With my mental productions I adorn Agni, the young, the lord of the people, the sage, the all-devouring, the very restless.”

x. 42, 1. *Astā iva supratarañ lāyam asyan bhūshann iva prabhara stomam asmai | vāchā viprās tarata vācham aryo nīramaya jaritaḥ some Indram |*

“Like an archer discharging his far-shooting arrow, with zeal present the hymn to Indra. Sages, by your song, overcome the song of the enemy ; worshipper, arrest Indra at the soma.”

x. 63, 17. *Eva Plateḥ sūnur avīridhad vo viśve Ādityāḥ Adite manīshī | īsānāso naro amartyena astāvi jano diryo Gayena |*

“Thus, all ye Ādityas, Aditi, and ye ruling powers, has the wise son of Plati magnified you. The celestial race has been lauded by the immortal Gaya.”

x. 111, 1. *Manīshinaḥ prabharadhvam manīshām yathā yathā matayah santi nṛṇam | Indram satyair ā irayāma kṛitebhiḥ sa hi vīro girvanasyur vidānaḥ |*

“Sages, present the prayer, according as are the various thoughts of men. Let us by our sincere rites stimulate Indra, for he is a hero, he is wise and loves our songs.”

In the following verse, from a hymn in praise of liberality, it is said, though no doubt only figuratively, that the *true rishi* is the prince who is bountiful to the priesthood.

x. 107, 6. *Tam eva rishiñ tam ū brahmānam āhur yajñanyañ sāmāgām ukthasasam | sa śukrasya tanvo veda tisro yaḥ prathamō dakṣiṇayā rarādha |*

“He it is whom they call a rishi, a priest, a pious sacrificer, a chaunter of prayers, a reciter of hymns ; he it is who knows the three bodies of the brilliant (Agni),—the man who is most prominent in bestowing gifts.”

SECT. IV.—*Passages of the Rig-veda in which a supernatural character is ascribed to the rishis or the hymns.*

In the present section I propose to collect the most distinct indications which I have noticed in the Vedic hymns of any supernatural attributes attaching, in the opinion of the authors, either to the rishis themselves, or to their compositions. We shall see in the course of this enquiry (1) that a certain superhuman character was ascribed by the later rishis, who composed the hymns, to some of their predecessors; (2) that expressions are occasionally employed by the rishis which appear to ascribe their compositions to a divine influence generally; while there is a still more numerous set of texts in which the hymns are attributed in various forms of phraseology to the agency of one or more particular and specified deities; and (3) that there is a considerable number of passages in which a mysterious or magical power is ascribed to the hymns or metres.

I proceed to furnish specimens of these several classes of quotations.

I. I adduce some passages which ascribe a superhuman character or supernatural faculties to the earlier rishis.²² These are the following:

R.V. i. 179, 2. *Ye ohid hi pūrve ṛitasāpaḥ āsan sākāṁ devebhir awadann ṛitāni | te chid avāsura ityādi |*

“The pious sages who lived of old, and who conversed about sacred truths with the gods, led a conjugal life,” etc.

vii. 76, 4. *Te id devānām sadhamādaḥ āsann ṛitāvānaḥ kavayaḥ pūrvyāsaḥ | gūḥmāṁ jyotiḥ pitara anuvandan satyamantrāḥ ajanayann ushāsam |*

“They were the associates of the gods, those ancient pious sages. The fathers found out the hidden light; with true hymns they generated the dawn.”

x. 14, 15. *Yamāya madhumattamaṁ rājne havyaṁ juhātana | idam namaḥ ṛishibhyaḥ pūrvajebhyaḥ pūrvēbhyaḥ pathikriḍbhyaḥ |*

“Offer to king Yama a most sweet oblation. (Let) this reverence (be paid) to the rishis born of old, who were the earliest guides.”

²² Compare A.V. x. 7, 14, quoted above in p. 3.

The sixty-second hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala contains the following passage regarding the Angirases (see above, p. 223) :

1. *The Angirases.*—x. 62, 1, 3. *Ye yajñena dakṣiṇayā samaktāḥ Indrasya sakhyam amṛitatvam ānaśa | tobhyo bhādrām Angīraso vaḥ astu prati grībhñīta mānavaṁ sumedhasaḥ | 3. Ye ṛitena sūryam arohayan divi aprathayan pṛithivīm mātaram vi ityādi |*

“1. Blessings be on you, Angirases, who, sanctified by sacrifice and liberality, attained the friendship of Indra and immortality. Do ye, o sages, graciously receive the man (who addresses you). 3. Ye who by sacrifice caused the sun to ascend the sky; and spread out our mother earth,” etc.

This is succeeded by the following verses :

x. 62, 4. *Ayaṁ Nābhā vadati valguvo grīhe deva-putrāḥ ṛishayas tat śṛiṇotana . . . | 5. Virūpāsaḥ id ṛishayas te id gambhīra-vepasaḥ | Angīrasaḥ sūnavas te Agneḥ pari jajñire |*

“This Nābhan addresses you, brilliant beings, within the house. Hear this, ye rishis, sons of the gods. . . . 5. The Virūpas are rishis, profound in emotion; they are the sons of Angiras; they have been born from Agni.”

(The fifth verse is quoted in the Nirukta, xi. 17. See Roth's illustrations of the passage.)²³

2. *Vasishṭha.*—A supernatural character is attributed to Vasishṭha also in the following passage (which has been already quoted and illustrated in Vol. I. pp. 318 ff.).

vii. 33, 7 ff. *Trayaḥ kṛiṇvanti bhuvanasya retas tīrasaḥ prajāḥ āryāḥ jyotir-agrāḥ | trayo gharmāsaḥ ushasāṁ sachante sarvān it tān anu vidur Vasishṭhāḥ | 8. Sūryasyeva vakshatho jyotir eṣhām samudrasyeva mahimā gabhīraḥ | vātasyeva prajāvo na anyena sōmo Vasishṭhāḥ anu ctave vaḥ |*

²³ The next verse (which, with the sequel, is quoted in my article “On the relations of the priests to the other classes of Indian society in the Vedic age,” Journ. Rōy. As. Soc. for 1866, p. 276) is as follows: 6. *Ye Agneḥ pari jajñire Virūpāso divas pari | Navagvo nu Dasagvo Angīrastamaḥ sachū deveshu māṁhate |* “The Virūpas who were produced from Agni, from Dyaus,—the Navagva, the Dasagva, who is a most eminent Angiras, lavishes gifts along with the gods.” Here the Virūpas would seem rather to be princes than rishis: and the same is the case in the following passage also: iii. 53, 6. *Ime bhōjāḥ Angīraso Virūpūḥ divas putrāso asurasya virūḥ | Viśvāmītrāya dadato maghāni sahasrasāves pra tiranta āyuh |* “These liberal Virūpas of the race of Angiras, heroic sons of the divine Dyaus (the sky), bestowing gifts on Viśvāmītra at the ceremony with a thousand libations, have prolonged their lives.” (See Vol. I. p. 341 f.)

9. *Te id ninyam hridayasya praketaiḥ sahasra-valśam abhi sancharanti | yamena tatam pariḍhiṁ vayantaḥ apsarasaḥ upa sedur Vasishṭhāḥ | 10. Vidyuto jyotiḥ parisanjihānam Mitrā-Varuṇā yad apaśyatām tvā | tat te jānma uta ekaṁ Vasishṭha Agastyo yat tvā viśaḥ ājabhāra | 11. Utāsi Mairāvaruṇo Vasishṭha Urvaśyāḥ brahman manaso 'dhi jātaḥ | drapsaṁ skannam brahmanā daivyena viśve devāḥ pushkare tvā adadanta | 12. Sa praketaḥ ubhayasya pravīdvān sahasra-dānaḥ uta vā sadānaḥ | yamena tatam pariḍhiṁ vayishyan apsarasaḥ pari jāne Vasishṭhaḥ | 13. Satre ha jūtāv ishitā namobhiḥ kumbhe retaḥ sisichituḥ samānam | tato ha Mānaḥ udiyāya madhyāt tato jātam rishim āhur Vasishṭham |*

“7. Three [gods] create the fecundating principle in (all) existences; [there exist] three excellent productions of which light is the first: three fires attend upon the dawn: all these the Vasishṭhas know. 8. The splendour of these [sages] is like the full glory of the sun; their grandeur is profound as that of the ocean; like the swiftness of the wind, your hymns, o Vasishṭhas, cannot be followed by any other bard. 9. Through the intuitions of their hearts they seek out the mystery with a thousand branches. Weaving the envelopment extended by Yama [Agni? see R.V. i. 66, 4] the Vasishṭhas sat near the Apsaras. 10. When Mitra and Varuṇa saw thee quitting the gleam of the lightning, that was thy birth, Vasishṭha, and [thou hadst] one [other], when Agastya brought thee to the people. 11. And, Vasishṭha, thou art the son of Mitra and Varuṇa, born, o priest, from the mind of Urvaśi; all the gods placed thee—the drop fallen through divine contemplation—in the vessel. 12. He the wise, knowing both [worlds?], with a thousand gifts, or with gifts, Vasishṭha, being about to weave the envelopment extended by Yama, was produced from the Apsaras. 13. Born at the sacrifice, and impelled by adorations, they [Mitra and Varuṇa] let the same equal procreative energy fall into the jar; from the midst of this Māna (Agastya) issued forth; from this men say the rishi Vasishṭha was produced.”

Two of these verses are quoted in the Nirukta, verse 8, in xi. 20, and verse 11, in v. 14. See also Prof. Roth's Illustrations of that work, p. 64, where he states his opinion that the foregoing verses which describe the miraculous birth of Vasishṭha in the style of the epic mythology, are a later addition to an older hymn. See the note in p. 321 of the First Volume of this work.

The two following passages also have reference to knowledge supernaturally communicated, or favours divinely conferred on Vasishṭha. See Vol. I. p. 325 ff.

vii. 87, 4. *Uvācha me Varuṇo medhirāya triḥ sapta nāma aghnyā bibhartti | vidvān padasya guhyā na vohad yugāya viprah uparāya śikshan |*

“Varuṇa said to me, the intelligent, ‘the cow has thrice seven names.’ The wise [god], though he knows them, has not declared the mysteries of the word, which he desires to reveal to a later generation.”

vii. 88, 4. *Vasishṭham ha Varuṇo nāvi ā adhād ṛishim chakāra svapāḥ mahobhikḥ | stotāram viprah sudinatve ahnām yād nu dyāvas tatanan yād ushasaḥ |*

“Varuṇa took Vasishṭha into the boat; by his mighty acts, working skilfully he (Varuṇa) has made him a rishi; the wise (god) has made him to utter praises in an auspicious time, that his days and dawns may be prolonged.”¹ (See Vol. I. p. 325 f.; and compare R. V. x. 101, 2, and x. 116, 9, in pp. 234 and 240, above.)

3. *Viśvāmitra*.—In one or more of the texts which I shall next produce, a superhuman character is ascribed to Viśvāmitra, if not to the Kuśikas.

iii. 29, 15. *Amitrāyudho marutām iva prayāḥ prathamajāḥ brahmaṇo viśvam id viduḥ | dyumnavad brahma Kuśikāsaḥ erire okaḥ oko dame Agniṁ samidhīre |*

“Combating their foes, like hosts of Maruts, (the sages) the first-born of prayer are masters of all knowledge; the Kuśikas have uttered an enthusiastic prayer; each of them has kindled Agni in his house.” (See Vol. I. p. 347.)

iii. 43, 5. *Kuvid mā gopāṁ karaso janaṣya kuvid rājānam Maghavan riḡishan | kuvid mā ṛishim papivāmaṁ sutasya kuvid me vasvaḥ amṛitasya śikshāḥ |*

“Dost thou not make me a shepherd of the people? dost thou not make me a king, o impetuous Maghavan? dost thou not make me a rishi, a drinker of the soma? wilt thou not bestow upon me imperishable wealth?” (See Vol. I. p. 344.)

iii. 53, 9. *Māhan riḡhir devajāḥ devajūtaḥ astabhāt sindhum arṇavaṁ ṛichakshāḥ | Viśvāmitro yad avahat Sudāsam apriyāyata Kuśikebhīr Indrah !*

“The great rishi (Viśvāmitra), leader of men, god-born, god-impelled, stemmed the watery current. When Viśvāmitra conducted Sudās, Indra was propitiated through the Kuśikas.” (See Vol. I. pp. 342. Indra himself is called a Kauśika in R.V. i. 10, 11. See Vol. I. p. 347.)

According to ix. 87, 3, of which Uśanas is the traditional rishi, certain mysterious knowledge is said to have been possessed by that personage:

*Ṛishir vipraḥ pura-etā janānām ṛibhur dhīraḥ Uśanā kāvyena | sa
chid viveda nihitaṁ yad āsām apichyaṁ guhyaṁ nāma gonām |*

“A wise rishi, a leader of men, skilful, and prudent, is Uśanas, through his insight as a seer; he has known the hidden mysterious name applied to these cows.”

Again in ix. 97, 7, it is said: *Pra kāvyam Uśaneva bruvāno devo
devānām janimā vivakti |*

“Uttering, like Uśanas, the wisdom of a sage, the god (Soma) declares the births of the gods.”

In a hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala, the rishis are spoken of as “seeing” the objects of their contemplation in a way which seems to imply a supernatural insight (see above, pp. 116, 118, 125 ff.); in this hymn, x. 72, 1, 2, it is said:

*Devānām nu vayaṁ jānā pravochāma vipanyayā | uktheshu śasyamā-
neshu yaḥ paśyād uttare yuge | Brahmaṇaspatir etā saṁ karmāraḥ iva
adhamat | devānām pūrvye yuge asataḥ sad ajāyata |*

“Let us, from the love of praise, celebrate in recited hymns the births of the gods,—any one of us who in this later age may see them. Brahmaṇaspati has kindled these births, as a blacksmith [blows a flame]: in the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent.”²⁴ (See Vol. I. p. 46.)

Another not less decided instance of this use of the verb *to see*, in the sense of supernatural insight, may be found in the verse of the Vālakhilya already quoted in Vol. II. p. 220, which will be cited below. See also x. 130, 6, which will be quoted further on.

The next two passages speak of the *radiance* of the rishis.

viii. 3, 3 (= S.V. i. 250, and Vāj. S. 33, 81). *Imāḥ u tvā purūvāso*

²⁴ The first of these verses is translated by Prof. Benfey in his Glossary to the Śāma-veda, p. 154.

*giro vardhantu yāh mama | pāvaka-varnūh śuchayo vipaschitah abhi sto-
mair anūshata |*

“Lord of abundant wealth, may these prayers of mine magnify thee! Pure sages of radiant appearance have celebrated thee with hymns.”

viii. 6, 10. *Aham id hi pituh pari medhām ṛitasya jagrabha | aham sūryah iva ajani |*

“I have acquired knowledge of the ceremonial from [my] father; I have become like the sun.” (Is Indra the father here referred to?)

The following texts, which occur in the last book of the Rig-veda, speak of *tapas* (“fervour” or “austerity”) being practised by the rishis much in the same way as the later epic literature does. This use of the word is not known in the earlier books of the R.V. (See Boehtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon, under the word *tapas*.)

x. 109, 4. *Devāh elasyām avadanta pūrve sapta ṛishayas tapase ye nisheduh |*

“The ancient gods spoke of her, the seven rishis who sat down for austere-fervour.” (See my article “On the priests of the Vedic age” in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, p. 270.)

x. 154, 2. *Tapasā ye anūdhṛīyās tapasā ye svar yayuh | tapo ye cha-
krīre mahas tāms chid eva api gachhatāt |* 5. *Sahasra-nīthāh kavayo ye
gopāyanti sūryam ṛishīms tapasvato Yama tapojān api gachhatāt |*

“Let him (the deceased) go to those who through austere-fervour are invincible, who by austere-fervour have gone to heaven, who have performed great austerity. 5. Let him go, Yama, to the sages of a thousand songs who guard the sun (see Wilson, Vish. Pur. vol. ii. pp. 284 ff.), to the devout rishis, born from fervour.” (See my article “On Yama” in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc.)

x. 190, 1. *Ṛitam cha satyam cha abhīddhāt tapaso adhyajayatu | tato
rātrī ajāyata tatah samudrah arṇavaḥ |*

“Right and truth sprang from kindled austerity; thence sprang night, thence the watery ocean.”

In x. 167, 1, it is even said that Indra attained heaven by austerity: *Tvaṁ tapaḥ paritapya ajayah svah |*

“By performing austerity thou didst conquer heaven.”

In some places the gods are said to possess in the most eminent degree the qualities of *rishis*, or *kavis*. This may possibly imply, *o con-
verso*, that the rishis were conscious of a certain affinity with the divine

nature, and conceived themselves to participate in some degree in the superior wisdom and knowledge of the deities.

R. V. i. 31; 1. *Tvam Agne prathamō Angirāḥ rishir devo devānām abhavaḥ śivaḥ sakhā ityādi* | 2. *Tvam Agne prathamō Angirastamaḥ kavir devānām paribhūshasi vratam* |

“1. Thou, Agni, the earliest *rishi* Angiras, a god, hast been the auspicious friend of the gods. . . . 2. Thou, Agni, the earliest and most Angiras-like sage, administerest the ceremonial of the gods.”

i. 66, 2. . . . *Ṛishir na stubhū vikshu praśastaḥ ityādi* |

“Like a *rishi*, who praises [the gods], he (Agni) is famous among the people,” etc.

iii. 21, 3. . . . *Ṛishiḥ śreṣṭhaḥ samidhyase yajnasya pra avitā bhava* |

“Thou, Agni, the most eminent *rishi*, art kindled; be the protector of the sacrifice.”

v. 29, 1. . . . *Archanti tvā marutaḥ pūta-dakshās tvam eshām rishir Indra asi dhīraḥ* |

“The Maruts, endowed with pure dispositions, worship thee; thou, Indra, art their wise *rishi*.” (Sāyaṇa, however, here renders *rishi* by *drashṭā*, “beholder.”)

vi. 14, 2. *Agnir id hi prachetāḥ Agnir vedhastamaḥ rishiḥ* |

“Agni is wise; Agni is a most sage *rishi*.”

viii. 6, 41. *Ṛishir hi pūrvajā asi ekaḥ śanaḥ ojasā* | *Indra choshkūyase vasu* |

“Thou art an anciently-born *rishi*, who alone rulest by thy might; Indra thou lavishest riches.”

viii. 16, 7. *Indro brahmā Indrah rishir Indrah puru puru-hūtaḥ* | *mahān mahābhiḥ śachībhiḥ* |

“Indra is a priest, Indra is a *rishi*, Indra is much invoked; he is great through his great powers.”

ix. 96, 18 (= S. V. ii. 526). *Ṛishi-manā yaḥ rishi-kṛit svarshāḥ sahasranāthaḥ padavīḥ kavīnām* |

“Soma, *rishi-minded*, *rishi-maker*, bestower of good, master of a thousand songs, the leader of sages,” etc.

ix. 107, 7. . . . *Ṛishir vipro vichakshanaḥ* | *tvāṅ ca avo devavṛtamaḥ ityādi* |

“A *rishi*, a sage, intelligent, thou (Soma) wast a et, most agreeable to the gods,” etc.

x. 27, 22. . . . *Indrāya sunvad ṛishaya cha śikshat |*

“ . . . Let [men] present libations to Indra, and offerings to the *rishi*.”

x. 112. 9. *Ni shu sīda gaṇapate gaṇeshu tvām āhur vipratamaṁ kavī-
nām | na ṛite tvat kriyate kinchana āre mahām arkam Maghavanś chitram
archā |*

“Sit, lord of multitudes, among our multitudes; they call thee the greatest of sages [or poets]; nothing is done without, or apart from, thee; sing, Maghavan, a great and beautiful hymn.”

x. 115, 5. *Agniḥ kaṇvatamaḥ kaṇva-sakhā ityādi |*

“Agni is the greatest of the Kaṇvas, the friend of Kaṇva,” etc.

II. The Vedic rishis, as we have seen, expected to receive from their gods every variety of temporal blessings, strength, long life, offspring, riches, cattle, rain, food, and victory, and they also looked for forgiveness of their offences, and sometimes for exaltation to paradise, to the same benefactors. Hence it would be nothing more than we might have anticipated, if we should further find them asking their different deities to enlighten their minds, to direct their ceremonies, to stimulate their devotion, to augment their powers of poetical expression, and to inspire them with religious fervour for the composition of their hymns. I think the following passages will justify this expectation by showing that the rishis (though, as we have seen, they frequently speak of the hymns as their own work) did also sometimes entertain the idea that their prayers, praises, and ceremonies generally, were supernaturally suggested and directed. One of the modes (if not the most important) in which this idea is expressed is, as we shall discover, the personification of speech under different appellations. The following are the passages to which I refer: they are—

First, such as refer to the gods generally:

R.V. i. 37, 4. *Pra vaḥ śardhūya ghrīshvaye tvosha-dyumnāya śushmine |
brahma devattaṁ gāyata |*

“To your vigorous, overpowering, energetic, host [of Maruts] sing the *god-given* prayer.”

S.V. i. 299. *Tvashtā no daivyaṁ vachaḥ Parjanya Brahmanaspatiḥ |
putrair bhrātrībhīr Aditir nu pātu no dushtarum brāmaṇaṁ vachaḥ |*

“May Tvashtri, Parjanya, and Brahmanaspati [prosper] our *divine* utterance: may Aditi with her [?] sons and brothers prosper our *in-*vincible and protective utterance.”

In the next passage, the hymn or prayer is spoken of as *inconceivable*.

R.V. i. 152, 5. *Achittam brahma jujushur yuvānaḥ ityādi* |

“The youths received with joy the incomprehensible prayer,” etc.

In R.V. x. 20, 10, Vimada, a rishi, is connected with the immortals:

Agne Vimado manīshām ūrjonāpād amṛitebhiḥ saḥśāḥ girāḥ āvakshat sumatir iyānaḥ ityādi |

“O Agni, son of strength, Vimada, united with the immortals, hastening, has brought to thee a product of thought, and beautiful hymns.”

In the two following texts the gods are said to have *generated* the hymn or prayer:

x. 61, 7. . . . *Svādhyo ajanayan brahma devāḥ Vāstoshpatiṁ vratapūṁ niratakshan* |

“The thoughtful gods *generated* prayer: they fashioned Vastoshpati the protector of sacred rites.”

x. 88, 8. *Sūkta-vākam prathamam ād id Agnim ād id havir ajanayanta devāḥ* | *sa eshām yajno abhavat tanūpūḥ tam dyaur veda tam pṛithivī tam āpaḥ* |

“The gods first *generated* the hymn, then Agni, then the oblation. He was their sacrifice, the protector of their life. Him the Sky, the Earth, and the Waters know.”

In the latter of the two following verses, *Vāch* (speech) is said to be divine, and to have been *generated* by the gods. Though speech is here spoken of generally, and nothing is said of the hymns, still these may have already come to be connected with her in the minds of the Vedic bards, as they were afterwards regarded as her most solemn and important expression.

R.V. viii. 89, 10. *Fad vāg vadantī avichetanāni rāshṭrī devānām nishāsāda mandrā* | *chatasraḥ ūrjaṁ duduhe payāṁsi kva svid asyāḥ paramaṁ jagāma* | 11. *Devīm vāc' am ajanayanta devās tāṁ viśvarūpāḥ paśavo vadanti* | *sā no mandrā isham ūrjaṁ duhānā dhenur vāg asmān upa susṭutā ā etu* |

“When *Vāch*, speaking unintelligible things, queen of the gods, sat down, melodious, she milked forth sustenance and waters towards the four quarters: whither has her highest element departed? The gods *generated* the divine *Vāch*; animals of all kinds utter her; may this melodious cow *Vāch*, who yields us nourishment and sustenance,—approach us, when we celebrate her praises.

The last verse (as well as R.V. viii. 90, 16, which will be quoted below), derives some illustration from the following passage of the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 982 (p. 251 English transl.), in which also Vāch is designated as a cow :

Vāchañ dhenum upāsita | tasyās'chalvārah stanāḥ svāhā-kāro vashaṭ-kāro hanta-kārah svadhā-kārah | tasyāḥ dvau stanau devāḥ upajivanti svāhā-kāram cha vashaṭ-kāram cha hanta-kāram manushyāḥ svadhā-kāram pītarah | tasyāḥ prāṇaḥ ṛishabho mano vatsaḥ |

“Let a man worship the cow Vāch. She has four udders, the formulæ *svāhā*, *vashaṭ*, *hanta*, and *svadhā*. The gods live upon her two udders, *svāhā* and *vashaṭ*; men upon *hanta*; and the fathers upon *svadhā*. Breath is her bull; the mind, her calf.”

The two verses, R.V. viii. 89, 10, and 11, occur in the Nirukta, xi. 28, 29. Roth (in his Illustrations of that work), p. 152, says the unintelligible utterance of Vāch in verse 10, means thunder. Whether this be the case, or not, the word appears to have a more general signification in the next verse, and to refer to speech in general, personified as a divine being. The speech which all the animals utter cannot of course be thunder.

In some of the preceding verses of this hymn there is a curious reference made to some sceptical doubts regarding the existence of Indra; which I quote here, though unconnected with the present subject.

R.V. viii. 89, 3, 4. *Pra su stomam bharata vājayantam Indrāya satyam yadi satyam asti | na Indro asti iti nemaḥ u traḥ āha kaḥ im dadarśa kam abhi stavāma | Ayam asmi jaritaḥ paśya mā iha viśvā jātāni abhi asmi mahā | ṛitasya mā pradiśo varddhayanti ādurdiro bhuvanū dardarīmi |*

“Present to Indra a hymn soliciting food, a true [hymn] if he truly exists. ‘Indra does not exist,’ says some one: ‘who has seen him? whom shall we praise?’ ‘I am here, worshipper’ [answers Indra]; ‘behold me, I surpass all creatures in greatness; the directors of the sacrifice augment me; crushing, I destroy the worlds.’”

Second: the next set of passages which I shall bring forward either refer to Sarasvatī, Vāch, etc. (various names of the goddess of speech, or different personifications of speech, or of prayer), or at least speak of prayer as *divine*.

R.V. i. 3, 11, 12. *Chodayitrī sūṇṛitānām chelantī sumatinām | yajnañ dadhe Sarasvatī | . . . dhiyo viśvā virājati |*

“Sarasvatī, who furthers our hymns, and who is cognizant of our prayers, has sustained our sacrifice. . . . She enlightens all intellects.”

i. 22, 10. *Ā gnāḥ Agne iha avase Hotrām yavishṭha Bhāratim | Varūtrīm Dhishaṇām vaha |*

“Bring here, youthful Agni, to our help, the wives [of the gods], Hotrā, Bhāratī, Varūtrī, and Dhishaṇā.”

(Varūtrī, “the eligible,” may be merely an epithet of Dhishaṇā which, according to Sāyaṇa, at least, is = *vāg-devī*, “the goddess of speech.”)

i. 31, 11. *Ilām akṛiṅvan manushasya śāsanīm ityādi |*

“The gods made Ilā to be the instructress of men.” (See Professor Wilson’s note on this passage, p. 82 of his translation of the R.V. vol. i.)

ii. 3, 8. *Sarasvatī sādhyantī dhiyaṁ naḥ Ilā devī Bhāratī viśvatūrttiḥ | Tisro devīḥ svadhayā barhir edam achhidram pūntū śaraṇām niśhadya |*

“May Sarasvatī, perfecting our hymn, may the divine Ilā, and the all-pervading Bhāratī; may these three goddesses, seated on the place of sacrifice, preserve by their power the sacrificial grass uninjured.” (See Prof. Müller’s translation of part of the verse in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, vol. iii. p. 224.)

iii. 18, 3. . . . *Yāvad īse brahmaṇā vandamāṇaḥ imām dhiyaṁ śata-seyāya devīm |*

“Worshipping thee with a prayer according to the best of my power, in this divine hymn, to obtain unbounded wealth.”

iv. 43, 1. *Ka u śravat katamo yajniyānām vandāru devaḥ katamo jushāte | kasya imām devīm amṛiteshu preshṭhām hṛidi śreshyāma sushṭutiṁ suhavyām |*

“Who will hear us? which of all the objects of adoration? which of all the gods will be gratified by our praises? In the heart of whom among the immortals can we lodge this our divine and dearest hymn of praise and invocation?”

vii. 34, 1. *Pra śukrā etu devī manīshā amat sutasṭho ratho na vājī |*

“May prayer, brilliant and divine, proceed from us, like a well-fabricated chariot drawn by steeds.”

vii. 34, 9. *Abhi vo devīm dhiyaṁ²⁵ dudidhvam pra vo devatrā vāchaṁ kṛiṇudhvam |*

²⁵ Compare the same phrase *dhiyam devīm* in A.V. iii. 15, 3, and *diviyā vāchū* in A.V. viii. 1, 3.

“Receive towards you the *divine* hymn; proclaim the song for yourselves among the gods.”

viii. 27, 13. *Devañ devaṃ huvema vājasātaye grīṇanto devyā dhīyā |*

“Let us invoke each of the gods to bestow riches, praising them with a *divine* hymn.”

viii. 90, 16. *Vācho-vidaṃ vācham udīrayantiṃ viśvābhir dhībhir upa-
tishṭhamānām | devīm devebhyaḥ pari eyuṣhīm gām ā mā avṛikta marttyo
dabhrachetūḥ |*

“Let not any mortal of little intelligence do violence to the cow, the *divine* Vāch, who is skilled in praise, who utters her voice aloud, who arrives with all the hymns, and who has come from the gods.”

ix. 33, 5. *Abhi brahmīr anūshata yalwīr ṛitasya mātaro marmṛijyante
divaḥ śīsum |*

“The great and sacred mothers of the sacrifice have uttered praise: they decorate the child of the sky.”

x. 71, 1. *Bṛihaspaṭe prathamam vācho agram yat prairata nāmadhe-
yam dadhānūḥ | yad eshām śreshṭham yad aripram āsit preṇā tad eshām
nihitam guhā āviḥ | 2. Saktum iva tilanū punanto yatra dhūrāḥ manasā
vācham akrata | atra sakhāyaḥ sakhyaṇi jānate bhadrā eshām lakṣmīr
nihitā adhi vāchi | 3. Yajñena vāchaḥ padavīyam āyan tām anavindann
rishishu pravishṭam | tām abhṛitya vyadadhuh purutrā tām sapta rebhāḥ
abhi sannavante | 4. Uta tvaḥ paśyan na dadarśa vācham uta tvaḥ śṛiṇvan
na śṛinoti enām | uto tvasmai tanvaṃ viśasre jāyeva patyo usatī suvāsāḥ |
5. Uta tvaṃ sakhye sthirapītam āhur nainām hinvanty api vājīneshu |
adhenvā charati māyayā esha vācham susruvān aphaḷam apuṣpām | 6.
Yas tityāja sachi-vidaṃ sakhāyam na tasya vāchi api bhāgo asti | yad im
śṛinoti alakaṃ śṛinoti na hi pravoda sukrītasya panthūm |*

“1. When, o Bṛihaspati, men sent forth the first and earliest utterance of Vāch (speech), giving a name (to things), then all which was treasured within them, the most excellent and spotless, was disclosed through love. 2. Wherever the wise,—cleansing, as it were, meal with a sieve,—have uttered speech with intelligence, there friends recognize [their] friendly acts; an auspicious fortune is impressed upon their speech. 3. Through sacrifice they followed the track of Vāch, and found her entered into the rishis: ²⁶ taking, they divided her into many portions: her the seven poets celebrate. 4. One man, seeing, sees not

²⁶ See the use made by S'ankara of this text, above, p. 105.

Vāch; another, hearing, hears her not; to another she discloses her form, as an elegantly attired and loving wife displays her person to her husband. 5. They say that one man has a sure defence in [her] friendship; men cannot overwhelm him even in the conflicts (of discussion); but that man consorts with an unprofitable delusion who has [only] heard speech [Vāch] which is [to him] without fruit or flower. 6. He who has abandoned his discerning friend, has no portion in Vāch; whatever he hears he hears in vain; he knows not the path of virtue."

The second, fourth, and fifth verses of this obscure hymn are quoted in the Nirukta, iv. 10; i. 19, 20; and are explained in Professor Roth's Illustrations. Verses 2 and 4 are also quoted and interpreted in the Mahābhāshya; see pp. 30 and 31 of Dr. Ballantyne's edition. The verse which is of most importance for my present purpose, is, however, the third, which speaks of Vāch having "entered into the rishis." See the First Volume of this work, pp. 254 f. The idea of Vāch being divided into many portions will be found again below in R.V. x. 125, 3.

x. 110, 8 (=Vāj. S. 29, 33). *Ā no yajnam Bhāratī tūyam etu Iḷā manushvad iha chetayanti | tisro devīr barhīr ā idam syonaṁ Sarasvatī svapasah sadantu |*

"Let Bhāratī come quickly here to our sacrifice, with Iḷā, who instructs us like Manush [or like a man], and with Sarasvatī: let these three goddesses, skilful in rites, sit down upon this beautiful sacrificial grass."

x. 125, 3. *Ahuṁ rāshṭrī sangamanī vasūnām chikitushī prathamā yajniyānām | tām mā devū vyadadhuh purutrā bhūrishātrām bhūri āvesayanti | 4. Mayā so annam atti yo vipāśyati yaḥ prāṇiti ya im śrīnoti uktam | amantavo mām te upa kshiyanti śrudhī śruta śraddhivān te vadāmi | 5. Aham eva svayam idam vadāmi jushṭam dercchir uta mānushabhīḥ | yaṁ kāmaye taṁ tam ugraṁ kṛṇomi tam brahmānām tam rīshīm taṁ sumedhām |*

"3. I am the queen, the centre of riches, intelligent, the first of the objects of adoration: the gods have separated me into many portions, have assigned me many abodes, and made me widely pervading. 4. He who has insight, he who lives, he who hears [my] sayings, eats food through me. These men dwell in my vicinity, devoid of understanding. Listen, thou who art learned, I declare to thee what is worthy of belief. 5. It is even I myself who make known this which is agreeable

both to gods and men. Him whom I love I make terrible, [I make] him a priest, [I make] *him a rishi*, [I make] him intelligent." ²⁷

x. 176, 2. *Pra devaṃ devyā dhīyā bhārata Jātavedasam havyā no vakṣhaḍ ānushak |*

"By *divine prayer* bring hither Jātavedas: may he present our oblations in order."

x. 177, 1. *Patangam aktam asurasya māyayā hriḍā paśyanti manasā vipaśchitaḥ | samudre antaḥ kavayo vichakshate marīchīnām padam ichhanti vedhasaḥ | 2. Patango vācham manasā bibhartti tāṃ Gandharvo avadaḍ garbhe antaḥ | tāṃ dyotamānām svaryam manīṣhām ṛitasya pade kavayo nīpānti |*

"1. Sages behold with the heart and mind the Bird illuminated by the wisdom of the Asura: the wise perceive him in the (aerial) ocean: the intelligent seek after the abode of his rays. 2. The Bird cherishes speech with his mind: the Gandharva hath uttered her in the womb: the bards preserve in the place of sacred rites this shining and celestial intellect." (See also x. 189, 3, *vāk patangūyā dhīyate*.)

Third: I shall now adduce the passages in which other Vedic deities, whether singly or in concert, are spoken of as concerned in the production of the hymns:

Aditi.—In R.V. viii. 12, 14, Aditi is mentioned as fulfilling this function:

Yad uta svarāje Aditiḥ stomam Indrāya jījanat puru-prasastam ūtaye ityādi |

"When Aditi *generated* for the self-resplendent Indra a hymn abounding in praises, to supplicate succour," etc.

Agni.—R.V. i. 18, 6, 7.—*Sadasaspatim adbhutam priyam Indrasya kāmyam | sanim medhām ayāsisham | yasmād ṛite na siddhyati yajno vipaśchitaś chana | sa dhīnām yogam invati |*

"6. I have resorted, for wisdom, to Sadasaspati (Agni), the wonderful, the dear, the beloved of Indra, the beneficent; (7) without whom

²⁷ This passage, which is commonly understood of Vāch, occurs also in the Atharva-veda, iv. 30, 2 ff., but with some various readings, as *āveśayanāḥ* for *āveśayanīm*, and *śraḍdheyam* for *śraḍdhivam*, etc. The hymn is translated by Mr. Colebrooke, Ess. i. 32, or p. 16 of Williams and Norgate's edition. Professor Whitney, as I learn from a private communication with which he has favoured me, is of opinion that there is nothing in the language of the hymn which is especially appropriate to Vāch, so as to justify the ascription of it to her as the supposed utterer.

the sacrifice of the wise does not succeed : he promotes the course of our hymns."

iv. 5, 8. *Sāma dvi-barhāḥ mahi tigma-bhṛishṭiḥ sahasra-retāḥ vṛishabhas tuviśmān | padañ na gor apagūlhañ vividvān Agnir mahyañ pra id u vochat manishām | 6. Idam me Agne kiyate pāvaka aminate gurum bhārañ na manma | Bṛihad dadhātha dhrishatā gabhīrañ yadvam pṛishṭham prayasā saptadhātu |*

"Agni occupying two positions, the fierce-flaming, the infinitely prolific, the vigorous, the powerful, who knows the great hymn, mysterious as the track of a [missing] cow, has declared to me the knowledge [of it]. 6. To me who am feeble, though innoxious, thou, o Agni, the luminous, hast given, as a heavy load, this great, profound, and extensive Pṛishṭha hymn, of seven elements, with efficacious oblations."

iv. 6, 1. *Tvañ hi viśvam abhi asi manma pra vedhasāś chit tirasi manishām |*

"Thou presidest over all thoughts [or prayers]; thou augmentest the intelligence of the sage."

iv. 11, 3. *Tvad Agne kāvyā tvad manishās tvad ukthā jāyante rādhyāni |*

"From thee, Agni, are generated poetic thoughts; from thee the products of the mind; from thee effective hymns."

x. 21, 5. *Agnir jāto Atharvaṇā vidad viśvāni kāvyā |*

"Agni, generated by Atharvan, is acquainted with all wisdom."

x. 91, 8. . . . *Medhākārañ vidathasya prasāadhanam Agnim ityādi |*

"Agni, the giver of understanding, the accomplisher of sacrifice."

x. 4, 5. *Yad vo vayam pramināmo vratāni vidushām devāḥ avidustarūsaḥ | Agnis tad viśvam āprināti vidvān yebhir devān ritubhiḥ kalpayāti | Yat pākatrā manasā dāna-dakshāḥ na yajnasya manvate martyāsaḥ | Agnis tad hotā kratuvid vijānan yajishṭho devān rituso yajāti |*

"When, o [ye] gods, we, the most unwise among the wise, transgress the ordinances of your worship, the wise Agni completes them all, at the stated seasons which he assigns to the gods. When men, devoted to sacrifice, do not, from their ignorance, rightly comprehend the mode of worship, Agni, the skilful sacrificer, and most eminent of priests, knowing the ceremonial, worships the gods at the proper seasons."

(As rites and hymns were closely united in the practice of the early Indians, the latter finding their application at the former; if Agni was

supposed to be the director of the one, viz., the oblations, he might easily come to be also regarded as aiding in the production of the other—the hymns. Verse 4 occurs also in the A.V. xix. 59, 1, 2, where, however, *āprīnātu* is read instead of *āprīnāti*, and in place of the words *yebhir devān*, etc., at the close of the verse, we have, *somaś cha yo brāhmaṇān ā viveśa* ! “and Soma, who entered into the priests.”)

Brahmaṇaspati.—R.V. i. 40, 5, 6. *Pra nūnam Brahmaṇaspatir mantraṃ vadati ukthyaṃ | yasminn Indro Varuṇo Mitraḥ Aryamā devāḥ okāṃsi chakrīre | Tam id vochema vidatheshu śambhuvam mantraṃ devāḥ anehasam ityādi |*

“*Brahmaṇaspati* (abiding in the worshipper’s mouth, according to the scholiast) utters the hymn accompanied with praise, in which the gods, Indra, Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, have made their abode. Let us utter, gods, at sacrifices, that spotless hymn, conferring felicity.” (Roth in his Lexicon considers *okas* to mean “good pleasure,” “satisfaction.” See also his Essay on Brahma and the Brāhmins, Journal of the Germ. Or. Soc. i. 74.)

Bṛihaspati.—R.V. ii. 23, 2. *Usrāḥ iva sūryo jyotishā maḥo viśveshām ijjanitā brahmaṇām asi |*

“As the sun by his lustre instantly generates rays, so art thou (*Bṛihaspati*) the generator of all prayers.”

x. 36, 5. *Ā Indro barhiḥ sīdatu pīvatām Iḷā Bṛihaspatih sāmabhir rikvo archatu |*

“Let Indra sit upon the sacred grass; let Iḷā abound in her gifts; let the bard *Bṛihaspati* offer praise with hymns.”

Gandharva.—According to Professor Roth (see under the word in his Lexicon) the Gandharva is represented in the Veda as a deity who knows and reveals the secrets of heaven, and divine truths in general; in proof of which he quotes the following texts:

R.V. x. 139, 5. *Viśvāvasur abhi tad no grīnātu divyo Gandharvo rajaso vimānaḥ | Yad vā ghā satyam uta yad na vidma dhiyo hinvāno dhīyah id naḥ avyāḥ*

“May the celestial Gandharva Viśvāvasu, who is the measurer of the atmosphere, declare to us that which is true, or which we know not. May he stimulate our hymns, and may he prosper our hymns.

A.V. ii. 1, 2. *Pra tad voched amṛitasya vidvān Gandharvo dhāma paramaṃ guhā yat |*

“May the Gandharva, who knows the (secret of) immortality, declare to us that supreme and mysterious abode.”

Indra.—R. V. iii. 54, 17. *Mahat tad vah kavayaś chāru nāma yad ha devāḥ bhavatha viśve Indre | sakhā Ribhubhiḥ puruhūta priyebhir imān dhīyaṁ sātayo takshata nah |*

“Great, o sage deities, is that cherished distinction of yours, that ye are all associated with Indra. Do thou, much invoked (Indra), our friend, with the beloved Ribhus, fabricate (or dispose) this hymn for our welfare.” (This may merely mean that Indra was asked to give a favourable issue to the prayer of the worshipper, not to compose his hymn for him. See Roth’s Lexicon, under the word *taksh*, 3.)

vi. 62, 3. *Tvaṁ kavīm chodayaḥ arkasātāv ityādi |*

“Thou (Indra) didst stimulate the poet in the composition of his hymns,” etc. (Sāyana renders *arkasātāv*, “for the sake of finding food.”)

vi. 18, 15. *Kṛishva kṛitno akṛitaṁ yat te asti ukthaṁ navāyo janayasa yajnaiḥ |*

“Energetic (Indra), do what thou hast never yet done; generate a new hymn with the sacrifices.”

vi. 34, 1. *Sam̐ cha tve jagmur girah Indra pūrvīr vi cha tvad yanti vibhvo manīshāḥ |*

“Many hymns are congregated in thee, o Indra, and numerous products of the mind issue from thee.” (This half-verse has been already quoted in p. 227.)

vi. 47, 10. *Indra mṛīḷa mahyaṁ jīvātum ichcha chodaya dhīyam ayaso na dhārām | Yat kincha ahaṁ tvāyur idam vadāmi taj jushasva kṛidhi mā devavantam |*

“O Indra, gladden me, decree life for me, sharpen my intellect like the edge of an iron instrument. Whatever I, longing for thee, now utter, do thou accept; give me divine protection.” (Compare with the word *chodaya* the use of the word *prachodayāt* in the Gāyatrī, R. V. iii. 62, 10, which will be given below.)

vii. 97, 3. *Tam u namasā havīrbhiḥ suśevam Brahmaṇaspatiṁ grīṇīshe | Indraṁ śloko mahi daivyaḥ sishaktu yo brahmaṇo devakṛitasya rūjā | 5. Tam ā no arkam amṛitāya jushṭam ime dhāsūr amṛitasaḥ purājāḥ ityādi |*

“3. I invoke with reverence and with offerings the beneficent Brahmaṇaspati. Let a great and divine song celebrate Indra, who is king

of the prayer *made by the gods*. 5. May these ancient immortals make this our hymn acceptable to the immortal," etc.

viii. 13, 7. *Pratna-vaj janaya girah sṛinudhi jaritur havam |*

"As of old, generate hymns; hear the invocation of thy worshipper."

viii. 52, 4. *Sa pratnathā kavi-ṛidhaḥ Indro vākasya vakshantiḥ |*

"Indra was of old the promoter of the poet, and the augments of the song."

viii. 78, 6. *Yaj jāyathā apūrvya Maghavan Vṛittra-hatyāya | tat pṛithivīm aprathayas tad astabhnāḥ uta dyām | 7. Tat te yajno ajāyata tad arkaḥ uta haskrītiḥ | tad visvam abhībūr asi yaj jātaṁ yach cha jantvam |*

"When, o unparalleled Maghavan, thou wast born to slay Vṛittra, thou didst then spread out the earth (the broad one) and sustain the sky: then thy sacrifice was produced, *then the hymn*, and the haskrīti: (since) then thou surpassest everything that has been, or shall be, born."

Here therefore the hymn is asserted to be as old as Indra; though nothing more need be meant than that hymns then began to be produced. The hymn in which this verse occurs is not necessarily meant.

x. 112, 9. *Ni shu sīda gaṇapate gaṇeshu tvām āhur vipratamaṁ kavīnām | na ṛite tvat kriyate kinchana ūre mahām arkam Maghavan chitram archa |*

"Lord of assemblies, sit amid our multitudes; they call thee the wisest of poets. *Nothing is done without, or apart from thee*; sing, o Maghavan, a great and beautiful hymn." (Already quoted in p. 252.)

Indra and Vishṇu.—R.V. vi. 69, 2. *Yā visvāsām janitārā matinām Indrā-Vishṇū kalaśā soma-dhānā | Pra vām girah śasyamānāḥ avantu pra stomāso gīyamānāsaḥ arkaiḥ |*

"Indra and Vishṇu, ye who are the *generators* of all hymns, who are the vessels into which soma is poured, may the praises which are now recited gratify you, and the songs which are chaunted with encomiums."

Indra and Varuṇa.—The following passage is not, properly speaking, a portion of the Rig-veda, as it is part of one of the Vālakhilyas or apocryphal additions (described in Vol. II. p. 210), which are found inserted between the 48th and 49th hymns of the 8th Maṇḍala. From its style, however, it appears to be nearly as old as some parts of the R.V.

xi. 6. *Indravaruṇā yad ṛishibhyo manishām vācho matiṁ śrutam adattum agre | yāni sthānāny asṛijanta dhīrāḥ yajnaṁ tanvānās tapasā bhyaṣyam |*

“Indra and Varuṇa, I have *seen* through austere-fervour that which *ye formerly gave* to the rishis, wisdom, understanding of speech, sacred lore, and all the places which the sages created, when performing sacrifice.” (See Vol. II. p. 220.)

The Maruts.—R.V. viii. 78, 3. *Pra vaḥ Indrāya bṛihate Maruto brahma archata |*

“Sing, Maruts, your hymn to the great Indra.” (Compare verse 1, of the same hymn, and the words *brahmakṛitā Mūrutena ganena* in iii. 32, 2.)

Pūshan.—R.V. x. 26, 4. *Mañsīmahi tvā vayam asmākañ deva Pūshan matinām cha sādhanam viprāṇām cha ādhavam |*

“We have called thee to mind, divine Pūshan, the accomplisher of our hymns, and the stimulator of sages.” (The first clause of this, however, may merely mean that the god gives effect to the wishes expressed in the hymns. Compare vi. 56, 4: *Yad adya tvā puruṣhūta bravūma dasra mantumah | tat su no manma sādhyaya |* “Accomplish for us the (objects of the) hymn, which we utter to thee to-day, o powerful and wise god.”

Savitṛi.—R.V. iii. 62 (= S.V. ii. 812, and Vāj. S. iii. 35). *Tat Savitur varenyam bhargo devasya dhīmahi | dhiyo yo naḥ prachodayāt |*

“We have received that excellent glory of the divine Savitṛi; may he stimulate our understandings [or hymns, or rites].”

(This is the celebrated Gāyatrī, the most sacred of all the texts in the Veda. See Colebrooke’s Misc. Ess. i. pp. 29, 30, 127, and 175; or pp. 14, 15, 78, and 109 of Williams and Norgate’s ed. Benfey (S.V. p. 277) translates the Gāyatrī thus: “May we receive the glorious brightness of this, the generator, of the god who shall prosper our works.” On the root from which the word *dhīmahi* is derived, and its sense, see also Böhtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon, *s.vv.* *dhā* and *dhī*; and compare my article “On the Interpretation of the Veda,” Journ. Roy. As. Soc. p. 372.

The Linga Purāṇa (Part II. sec. 48, 5 ff., Bombay lithographed ed.) gives the following “varieties” of the Gāyatrī, adapted to modern Śaiva worship :

Gāyatrī-bhedāḥ | Tatpuruṣhāya vidmahe vāg-viśuddhāya dhīmahi | Tan naḥ Ś’ivāḥ prachodayāt | Gaṇāmbikāyai vidmahe karma-siddhīyai cha dhīmahi | Tan no Gaurī prachodayāt | Tatpuruṣhāya vidmahe Mahā-

*devāya dhīmahi | Tan no Rudraḥ prachodayāt | Tatpurushāya vidmahe
Vakratuṇḍāya dhīmahi | Tan no Dantiḥ prachodayāt | Mahāsenāya vid-
mahe vāg-vīsuddhāya dhīmahi | Tan naḥ Skandaḥ prachodayāt | Tīkshna-
śringāya vidmahe Vedapādāya dhīmahi | Tan no Vṛishuḥ prachodayād
ityādi |*

“1. We contemplate That Purusha, we meditate ²⁸ him who is pure in speech; may That Siva stimulate us. 2. We contemplate Gaṇāmbikā, and we meditate Karmasiddhi (the accomplishment of works); may That Gaurī stimulate us. 3. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Mahādeva; may that Rudra stimulate us. 4. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Vakratuṇḍa (Ganeśa); may That Danti (the elephant) stimulate us. 5. We contemplate Mahāsena (Kārtikeya, and we meditate him who is pure in speech; may That Skanda stimulate us. 6. We contemplate Tīkshnaśringa (the sharp-horned), and we meditate the Veda-footed; may Vṛisha (the bull) stimulate us.”

Soma.—R.V. vi. 47, 3. *Ayam me pītaḥ udiyartti vācham ayam manī-
shām usatīm ajīgaḥ |*

“This [soma], when drunk, stimulates my speech [or hymn]; this called forth the ardent thought.”

It may be said that this and the other following texts relating to Soma, should not be quoted as proofs that any idea of divine inspiration was entertained by the ancient Indian bards, as they can mean nothing more than that the rishis were sensible of a stimulating effect on their thoughts and powers of expression, produced by the exhilarating draughts of the juice of that plant in which they indulged. But the rishis had come to regard Soma as a god, and apparently to be passionately devoted to his worship. See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 470 ff., and especially pp. 474, 475; and my account of this deity in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1865, pp. 135 ff. .

Compare what is said of the god Dionysus (or Bacchus) in the Bacchæ of Euripides, 294 :

*Μάντις δ'ὁ δαίμων ὄδεν' τὸ γὰρ βακχεύσιμον
Καὶ τὸ μανιῶδες μαντικὴν πολλὴν ἔχει.
Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἔις τὸ σῶμ' ἔλθῃ πολὺς,
Λέγειν τὸ μέλλον τοῖς μεμνηότας ποιεῖ.*

²⁸ I retain here this sense of the word, which is probably the most commonly received.

“And this deity is a prophet. For Bacchic excitement and raving have in them much prophetic power. For when this god enters in force into the body, he causes those who rave to foretell the future.”

R.V. viii. 48, 3. *Apāma somam amṛitāḥ abhūma aganma jyotir avi-dāma devān | kiṁ nūnam asmān kṛiṇavad arātīḥ kim u dhūrttir amṛita martyasya |*

“We have drunk the soma, we have become immortal, we have entered into light, we have known the gods; what can an enemy now do to us? what can the malice of any mortal effect, o immortal god?”²⁹

(This passage is quoted in the commentary of Gauḍapāda on the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 2, and is translated (incorrectly as regards the last clause), by Prof. Wilson, in p. 13 of his English version.)

A curious parallel to this last Vedic text is to be found in the satirical drama of Euripides, the Cyclops, 578 ff.; though there, of course, the object is merely to depict the drunken elevation of the monster Polyphemus:

‘Ο δ’ οὐρανός μοι συμμεμιγμένος δοκεῖ
Τῆ γῆ φέρεσθαι, τοῦ Διὸς τε τὸν θρόνον
Λεύσσω τὸ πᾶν τε δαιμόνων ἄγρον σέβας.

“The sky, commingled with the earth, appears
To whirl around; I see the throne of Jove,
And all the awful glory of the gods.”

R.V. ix. 25, 5. *Arusho janayan girah Somaḥ pravate āyushag Indraṁ gachchan kavikratuh |*

“The ruddy Soma, *generating hymns*, with the powers of a poet (or with the understanding of a sage), united with men, is purified, resorting to Indra.”

ix. 76, 4. . . . *Pitā matīnām asamashṭa-kāryah |*

“[Soma] father of our hymns, of incomparable wisdom.”

ix. 95, 2. *Harīḥ srijānuḥ pathyām ṛitasya iyartti vācham aritrva nāvam | devo devānām guhyāni nāma āviśkṛiṇoti barkhishi pravāche |*

²⁹ This text may be versified as follows:

We've quaffed the soma bright,
And are immortal grown;
We've entered into light,
And all the gods have known.
What foeman now can harm,
Or mortal vex us, more?
Through thee, beyond alarm,
Immortal god, we soar.

“The golden [Soma] when poured out along the path of the ceremony, sends forth his voice, as a rower propels a boat. A god, he reveals the mysterious natures of the gods to the bard upon the sacred grass.” (See R.V. ii. 42, 1, and x. 116, 9, quoted in p. 240.)

ix. 96, 5 (= S.V. ii. 293-5). *Somaḥ pavate janitā matnām janitā divo janitā prithivyāḥ | janitā Agner janitā sūryasya janitā Indrasya janitā uta Viśvaḥ | 6. Brahmā devānām padaviḥ kavīnām ṛṣir viprānām mahiṣo mṛigānām | śyeno grīdhṛnām svadhitr vanānām Somaḥ pavitram ati eti rebhan | 7. Prāvīpad vāchaḥ ūrmiṁ na sindhur girah somaḥ pavamāno manīṣāḥ ityādi |*

“Soma is purified, he who is the generator of hymns, of Dyaus, of Pṛithivī, of Agni, of Sūrya, of Indra, and of Viśnu. 6. Soma, who is a brāhmān-priest among the gods (or priests),³⁰ a leader among the poets, a rishi among sages, a buffalo among wild beasts, a falcon among vultures, an axe amid the forests, advances to the filter with a sound. The purified Soma, like the sea rolling its waves, has poured forth songs, hymns, and thoughts,” etc. (See Benfey’s translation of this passage in his Sāma-veda, pp. 238 and 253; and Nirukta-parīśiṣṭa, ii. 12, 13.)

Varuṇa.—R.V. viii. 41, 5, 6. *Yo dhartā bhuvanānām yaḥ usrānām apīchyā voda nāmāni guhyā | sa kavīḥ kāvyā puru rūpam dyaur iva pushyati . . . | Yasmin viśvāni kāryā cakre nābhīr vi śritā ityādi |*

“He who is the upholder of the worlds (Varuṇa), who knows the secret and mysterious natures of the cows, he, a sage [or poet], manifests sage [or poetical] works, as the sky does many forms. . . . In him all sage works abide, as the nave within a wheel,” etc. (See R.V. vii. 87, 4, in p. 248, and ix. 95, 2, above, in this page.)

Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman.—R.V. vii. 66, 11. *Vi ye dadhuḥ śara-dam māsam ād ahar yajnam aktuṁ cha ād ṛicham | anāpyam Varuṇo Mitrah Aryamā kshatram rājānaḥ āsata |*

“The kings, Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, who made the autumn, the month, and then the day, the sacrifice, night, and then the Rich, possess an unrivalled power.”³¹

³⁰ It appears from Prof. Benfey’s note on S.V. ii. 294 (= R.V. ix. 96, 6, quoted here), that the scholiast on that passage makes *devānām* = *ṛitvijām*, “priests.”

³¹ As this verse ascribes the formation of the Rich to the gods who are named in it, my remark, in p. 3 above, that the Puruṣa Sūkta contains “the only passage in

The following passage of the Rig-veda has (as we have seen above, p. 69, note 79, and p. 75) been quoted by Indian commentators and aphorists to prove the eternity of the Veda, on its own authority :

R.V. viii. 64, 6. *Tasmai nūnam abhidyave vāchā Virūpa nityayā | vṛishne chodasva sushṛtūtim |*

“Send forth praises, Virūpa, to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, with perpetual voice.” (See i. 45, 3, etc., quoted above, p. 220.)

There is, however, no reason whatever to suppose that the words *nityayā vāchā* mean anything more than *perpetual voice*. There is no ground for imagining that the rishi entertained any such conception as became current among the systematic theologians of later times, that his words were eternal. The word *nitya* is used in the same sense “perpetual” in R.V. ix. 12, 7 (= S.V. ii. 55, 2), where it is said of Soma: *nitya-stotro vanaspatir dhīnām antar ityādi |* “The monarch of the woods, continually-praised, among the hymns,” etc., as well as in the two following texts :

R.V. ix. 92, 3.—*Somaḥ punānaḥ sadaḥ eti nityam ityādi |*

“The pure Soma comes to his perpetual abode [or to his abode continually], etc.

x. 39, 14 (quoted above, p. 236). *Nityām na sūnuṃ tanayaṃ dadhānāḥ |*

“Continuing the series like an unbroken line of descendants.”

The tenor of the numerous texts adduced in this Section seems clearly to establish the fact that some at least of the ancient Indian rishis conceived themselves to be prompted and directed, in the composition of their hymns and prayers, by supernatural aid, derived from various deities of their pantheon. It may add force to the proof derived from these texts, and show that I am the less likely to have misunderstood their purport and spirit, if I adduce some evidence that a similar conception was not unknown in another region of the ancient Indo-European world, and that the expressions in which the early Grecian bards laid claim to an inspiration emanating from the Muses, or from Apollo, were not mere figures of speech, but significant, originally, of a popular belief. Most of the following passages, from Hesiod the hymns of the R.V. in which the creation of the Vedas is described,” requires some qualification.

and Homer, in which this idea is enunciated, are referred to in Mr. Grote's History of Greece, i. 478.

Hesiod, Theogony, 22 :

Ἄϊ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδῆν
 Ἄργας ποιμαίνονθ' Ἑλικῶνος ὑποζαθέοιο.
 Τόνδε δέ με πρότιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπαν,
 Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς ἀγιόχοιο.
 Ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κῆκ' ἐλέγχρα, γαστέρες διον,
 Ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
 Ἴδμεν δ', ἔντ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθεία μυθήσασθαι.
 ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι·
 Καὶ μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον, δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον,
 Δρέψασαι θηγτόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι ἀυδῆν
 θεῖην, ὡς κλείοιμι τὰ τ' ἐσόμενα, πρό τ' ἐόντα,
 Καὶ με κέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἔόντων,
 Σφᾶσι τ' ἀντὰς παρώτων τε καὶ ὕστερον αἰὲν αἰδεῖν.

"The Muses once conferred the dower
 On Hesiod of poetic power,
 As underneath the sacred steep
 Of Helicon he fed his sheep.
 And thus they spake, 'Inglorious race
 Of rustic shepherds, gluttons base,
 Full many fictions we can weave
 Which by their truthlike air deceive ;
 But, know, we also have the skill
 True tales to tell, whene'er we will.'
 They spake, and gave into my hand
 A fair luxuriant laurel wand ;
 And breathed into me speech divine,
 That two-fold science might be mine ;
 That future scenes I might unvail,
 And of the past unfold the tale.
 They bade me hymn the race on high
 Of blessed gods who never die ;
 And evermore begin my lays,
 And end them, with the Muses' praise."

Hesiod, Theogony, 94 :

Ἐκ γὰρ Μουσῶν καὶ ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος
 Ἄνδρες ἀοῖδοι ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κισθαρίστα,
 Ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες.

"The bards who strike the lyre and sing,
 From Phœbus and the Muses spring :
 From Jove's high race descends the king."

The following are the words in which the author of the Iliad invokes the aid of the Muses, to qualify him for enumerating the generals of the Grecian host (Iliad, ii. 484) :

Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ολύμπια δαματ' ἔχουσαι,
 Ἵμεῖς γὰρ θεαὶ ἐστε πάρεστε τε ἴστε τε πάντα,
 Ἴμεῖς δὲ κλέος διὸν ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν.

“Tell me the truth, ye Muses, tell,
 Ye who on high Olympus dwell;
 For, omnipresent, ye can scan
 Whate'er on earth is done by man,
 Whilst we vague rumours only learn
 And nothing certain can discern.”

But the Muses could also take away, as well as impart, the gift of song, as appears from Iliad, ii. 594 ff. :

Ἔνθα τε Μοῦσαι
 Ἀνθόμεναι Θάμυριν τῶν Θρήϊκα παῖσαν ἀοιδῆς
 Στεῦτο γὰρ ἐυχόμενος νικησέμεν, ἔπειρ ἂν αὐτὰ
 Μοῦσαι ἀείδοιεν, κοῦραι Διὸς ἀιγιόχοιο.
 Αἰ δὲ χολωσάμεναι πηρὸν θέσαν, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὴν
 Θεσπεσίην ἀφέλοντο, καὶ ἐκέλευον κιθαριστῶν.

“’Twas there the Muses, we are told,
 Encountered Thamyris of old.
 He boasted that the minstrel throng
 To him must yield the prize of song;
 Yes, even although, among the rest,
 The Muses should the palm contest.
 Aware of his presumption, they
 Both took his skill in song away,
 And power to wake the tuneful lyre;—
 And struck him blind, in vengeful ire.”

The following passages from the Odyssey refer to Demodocus, the bard who sang at the court of Alcinoüs, King of the Phæacians (Odyssey, viii. 43 ff.) :

Καλέσασθε δε θεῶν ἀοιδόν,
 Δημόδοκον· τῷ γὰρ ῥα θεὸς πέρι δῶκεν ἀοιδήν,
 Τέρπειν, ὅππῃ θυμὸς ἐποτρύνῃσιν ἀείδειν.

“And go, the bard divine invite :—
 The god hath given him skill
 By song all others to delight,
 Whenever he may will.”

Odyssey, viii. 62 ff. :

Κῆρυξ δ' ἐγγύθεν ἦλθεν ἔγων ἐρήϊρον ἀοιδόν·
 Τὸν πέρι Μοῦσ' ἐφίλησε δίδου δ' ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε,
 Ὅφθαλμῶν μὲν ἔμερσε δίδου δ' ἠδ᾽ αἶαν ἀοιδήν.

“The herald came, and within him brought
 The bard whom all with longing sought.
 The Muse's darling, he had good
 As well as ill from her received;
 With power of dulcet song endued,
 But of his eyesight too bereaved.”

Here the Muse is described as the arbitress of the bard's destiny in other points besides the gift and withdrawal of song.

Odyssey, viii. 73 :

Μοῦσ' ἔρ' αἰδοῦν ἀνῆκεν δειδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν κ.τ.λ.

"Stirr'd by the Muse the bard extoll'd
In song the deeds of warriors bold."

A little further on, Ulysses says of Demodocus (Odyssey, viii. 479 ff.) :

Πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισιν αἰδοῖ
Τιμῆς ἔμμοροί εἰσι καὶ αἰδοῦς, οὐνεκ' ἔρα σφέας
Ἵοιμας Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, φίλησε δὲ φύλον αἰοιδῶν.

"All mortal men with awe regard,
And honourably treat, the bard ;
Because the Muse has taught him lays,
And dearly loves his tuneful race."

And again he addresses him thus (Odyssey, viii. 487) :

Δημόδοκ', ἔξοχα δὴ σε βροτῶν ἀνίζομαι ἀπάντων.
Ἴη σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε Διὸς παῖς, ἡ σέ γ' Ἀπόλλων.
Λίγην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν ὄντον αἰεῖεις, κ.τ.λ.

"Demodocus, beyond the rest
Of mortals I esteem thee blest.
For thee, the Muse, Jove's child, has taught,
Or Phœbus in thee skill has wrought ;
So perfectly thou dost relate
The story of the Argives' fate." ³²

Phemius, the Ithacan minstrel, thus supplicates Ulysses to spare his life (Odyssey, xxii. 345 ff.) :

Ἄντῳ τοι μετόπισθ' ἄχος ἔσσειται, εἵκεν αἰοιδόν
Πέφυγης, ὅς τε θεῶσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν αἰεῖδω.
Ἄυτοδιδάκτος δ' εἰμι, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν δίμας
Παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν.

"Thou soon wilt grieve, if thou the bard shouldst slay,
To gods as well as men who pours his lay.
Self-taught I am ; and yet within my mind
A god hath gendered strains of every kind."

³² "That is," says Mr. Grote, "Demodocus has either been inspired as a poet by the muse, or as a prophet by Apollo, for the Homeric Apollo is not the god of song. Kalchas, the prophet, receives his inspiration from Apollo, who confers upon him the same knowledge, both of past and future, as the Muses give to Hesiod." But does not this passage (Odyssey viii. 488) rather show that the Homeric Apollo was the god of song, as well as the bestower of prophetic intuition ; and do we not learn the same from Iliad, i. 603 ? In any case, it is quite clear from Theog. 94, quoted above, that Hesiod regarded Apollo in this character.

The early Greeks believed that the gift of prophecy also, as well as that of song, was imparted by the gods to mortals. This appears both from Hesiod, as already quoted, and from the following passage of Homer (*Iliad*, i. 69) :

Κάλχας Θεστορίδης, διωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος,
 Ὃς ἤδη τὰ τ' ἐόντα τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα, πρὸ τ' ἐόντα,
 Καὶ νήεσσ' ἠγήσατ' Ἀχαιῶν Ἴλιον ἔισω,
 Ἐν δὲ μαντοσύνην, τήν δι κόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

“Of augurs wisest, Calchas knew
 Things present, past, and future too.
 By force of that divining skill,
 Vouchsafed to him by Phœbus' will,
 The Grecian fleet he safely bore
 From Aulis' bay to Ilion's shore.”

It is thus argued by Mr. Grote that the early Greeks really believed in the inspiration of their bards by the Muses (*History of Greece*, i. 477 ff.) :

“His [the early Greek's] faith is ready, literal and uninquiring, apart from all thought of discriminating fact from fiction, or of detecting hidden and symbolized meaning : it is enough that what he hears be intrinsically plausible and seductive, and that there be no special cause to provoke doubt. And if indeed there were, the poet overrules such doubts by the holy and all-sufficient authority of the Muse, whose omniscience is the warrant for his recital, as her inspiration is the cause of his success. The state of mind, and the relation of speaker to hearers, thus depicted, stand clearly marked in the terms and tenor of the ancient epic, if we only put a plain meaning upon what we read. The poet—like the prophet, whom he so much resembles—sings under heavenly guidance, inspired by the goddess to whom he has prayed for her assisting impulse. She puts the words into his mouth and the incidents into his mind ; he is a privileged man, chosen as her organ, and speaking from her revelations. As the Muse grants the gift of song to whom she will, so she sometimes in her anger snatches it away, and the most consummate human genius is then left silent and helpless. It is true that these expressions, of the Muse inspiring and the poet singing a tale of past times, have passed from the ancient epic to compositions produced under very different circumstances, and have now degenerated into unmeaning forms of speech ; but they gained currency originally in their genuine and literal acceptation. If poets had from

the beginning written or recited, the predicate of singing would never have been ascribed to them; nor would it ever have become customary to employ the name of the Muse as a die to be stamped on licensed fiction, unless the practice had begun when her agency was invoked and hailed in perfect good faith. Belief, the fruit of deliberate inquiry, and a rational scrutiny of evidence, is in such an age unknown; the simple faith of the time slides in unconsciously, when the imagination and feeling are exalted; and inspired authority is at once understood, easily admitted, and implicitly confided in."

If we extend our researches over the pages of Homer, we shall speedily discover numerous other instances of a belief in divine interference in human affairs, not merely (1) in the general government of the world, in the distribution of good and evil, and the allotment of the diversified gifts, intellectual, moral, and physical, which constitute the innumerable varieties of human condition, but also (2) in the way of special suggestion, guidance, encouragement, and protection, afforded to individuals.

Illustrations of the general control exercised by the gods over the fortunes of mankind may be found in the following passages of the Iliad,—xiii. 730 ff., and of the Odyssey,—i. 347 f.; iv. 236 f.; vi. 188 f.; viii. 167–175; xvii. 218, 485 ff.

The following are illustrations of the special interference of the gods on behalf of their favourites: Iliad, i. 194 ff., 218; iii. 380 ff.; v. 1 ff.; vii. 272; xiii. 60 f., 435; xvi. 788 ff.:—Odyssey, i. 319 ff.; iii. 26 ff.; xiv. 216 f., 227; xvi. 159 ff.³³ Of the latter class of passages, I quote two specimens.

Odyssey, i. 319 ff.:

Ἡ μὲν ἔρ ὡς εἰποῖσ' ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,
 Ὀρνις δ' ὡς ἀνοπῆα διέπτατο· τῷ δ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ
 Θῆκε μένος καὶ θάρσος, ὑπέμνησέν τε ἰ πατρός
 Μᾶλλον ἔτ' ἢ τὸ πάροιθεν· ὁ δὲ φρεσὶν ἦσι νοήσας
 ὄμβησεν κατὰ θυμόν, δίστατο γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι.

"As thus she spake, Athene flew
 Aloft, and soared beyond his view.
 His soul she filled with force and fire,
 And stronger memory of his sire.
 Amazed, he felt the inward force,
 And deemed a god must be its source."

³³ Compare Prof. Blackie's dissertation on the theology of Homer in the "Classical Museum," vol. vii. pp. 414 ff.

When Telemachus urges his youth and inexperience as a reason for diffidence in approaching Nestor, Minerva says to him (*Odyssey*, iii. 26):

Τηλέμαχ', ἄλλα μὲν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σῆσι νοήσεις,
 *Ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαίμων ὑποθήσεται· ὃν γὰρ οἶω
 *Οὐ σε θεῶν δέκητι γενέσθαι τε τραφέμεν τε.

"Some things thy mind itself shall reach,
 And other things a god shall teach;
 For born and bred thou ne'er hadst been
 Unless they gods had will'd, I ween.

These passages, however, afford only one exemplification of the idea which runs through, and in fact created, the entire mythology of the Greeks, viz. that all the departments of life and of nature were animated, controlled, and governed by particular deities, by whom they were represented, and in whom they were personified.

The Indian mythology,—as is evident to every reader of the Vedas, as well as (to some extent) to the student of the Purānas,—is distinguished by the same tendency as the Grecian. Indra, Agni, Vāyu, Savitṛi, Sūrya, and many other gods are nothing else than personifications of the elements, while Vāch or Sarasvatī and some other deities, represent either the divine reason by which the more gifted men were supposed to be inspired, or some mental function, or ceremonial abstraction.

In the later religious history, however, of the two races, the Hellenic and the Indian, there is in one respect a remarkable divergence. Though the priestesses of the different oracles, and perhaps some other pretenders to prophetic intuition, were popularly regarded as speaking under a divine impulse,³⁴ the idea of inspiration as attaching to poems or other compositions of a religious, didactic, or philosophical character, very soon became extinct. The Greeks had no sacred Scriptures. Although a supernatural character was popularly ascribed to Pythagoras, Epimenides, and Empedocles, the Hellenic philosophers in general spoke and wrote in dependance on their own reason alone. They rarely professed to be guided by any supernatural assistance, or claimed any divine authority for their dogmas.³⁵ Nor (unless such

³⁴ See Nägelsbach's *Nachhomerische Theologie*, pp. 173 ff., and Dr. Karl Köhler's *Prophetismus der Hebräer und die Mantik der Griechen in ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältnis*, (Darmstadt, 1860), pp. 39 ff.

³⁵ I express myself cautiously here, as a learned friend profoundly versed in the study of Plato is of opinion that there are traces in the writings of that author of a

may have been the case at a very late period) was any infallibility claimed for any of them by their successors.

In India, on the other hand, the indistinct, and perhaps hesitating, belief which some of the ancient rishis seem to have entertained in their own inspiration was not suffered to die out in the minds of later generations. On the contrary this belief grew up (as we have seen above, pp. 57-138, and 207 ff.) by degrees into a fixed persuasion that all the literary productions of those early sages had not only resulted from a supernatural impulse, but were infallible, divine, and even eternal. These works have become the sacred Scriptures of India. And in the popular opinion, if not in the estimation of the learned, most Indian works of any importance, of a religious, scientific, or philosophical kind, which were produced at a later period, have come to be regarded as inspired, as soon as the lapse of ages had removed the writers beyond familiar or traditional knowledge, and invested their names with a halo of reverence.

To return from this digression to the inquiry which was being pursued regarding the opinions of the ancient Vedic rishis on the subject of their own inspiration :

How, it will be asked, are we to reconcile this impression which the rishis manifest of being prompted by supernatural aid, with the circumstance, which seems to be no less distinctly proved by the citations made in the preceding section (pp. 232 ff.), that they frequently speak of themselves as having *made, fabricated, or generated* the hymns, without apparently betraying any consciousness that in this process they were inspired or guided by any extraneous assistance?

In reply to this I will only suggest (1) that possibly the idea of inspiration may not have been held by the earliest rishis, but may have grown up among their successors; or (2) that it may have been entertained by some rishis, and not by others; or again (3), if both ideas

claim to supernatural guidance, though by no means to infallibility. See also the mention made of the inspiration ascribed to Pythagoras, in Mr. Grote's *Greece*, iv. 528, 530; and the notices of Epimenides and Empedocles given by the same author, vol. iii. 112 ff., vol. vii. p. 174, and vol. viii. 465 f.; and compare on the same subjects Bp. Thirlwall's *Hist. of Greece*, ii. 32 ff., and 155 ff.; and Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 642. See also Prof. Geddes's *Phædo*, note P. p. 251, and the passages there referred to; and the Tract of Dr. Köhler, above cited, pp. 60 and 64.

can be traced to the same author, we may suppose that the one notion was uppermost in his mind at one moment, and the other at another; or (4) that he had no very clearly defined ideas of inspiration, and might conceive that the divine assistance of which he was conscious, or which at least he implored, did not render his hymn the less truly the production of his own mind; that, in short, the existence of a human, was not incompatible with that of a superhuman, element in its composition.

The first of these suppositions is, however, attended with this difficulty, that both conceptions, viz., that of independent unassisted composition, and that of inspiration, appear to be discoverable in all parts of the Rig-veda. As regards the second supposition, it might not be easy (in the uncertainty attaching to the Vedic tradition contained in the Anukramaṇī or Vedic index) to show that such and such hymns were written by such and such rishis, rather than by any others. It may, however, become possible by continued and careful comparison of the Vedic hymns, to arrive at some probable conclusions in regard to their authorship, so far at least as to determine that particular hymns should probably be assigned to particular eras, or families, rather than to others. I must, however, leave such investigations to be worked out, and the results applied to the present subject, by more competent scholars than myself.

III. While in many passages of the Veda, an efficacy is ascribed to the hymns, which is perhaps nothing greater than natural religion teaches all men to attribute to their devotions, in other texts a mystical, magical, or supernatural power is represented as residing in the prayers and metres. (See Weber's Vājasaneyi-Saṁhitā specimen, p. 61; and Vol. I. of this work, p. 242.) Some of the following texts are of the latter kind.

Thus in R. V. i. 67, 3, it is said :

Ajo na kshām dadhāra pṛithivīm tastambha dyām mantrebhiḥ satyaiḥ |

“(Agni) who like the unborn, supported the broad earth, and upheld the sky by true prayers.”

The following is part of Sāyaṇa's annotation on this verse :

*Mantrair divo dhāraṇam Taittirīye samānnātām | “dovāḥ vai ādit-
yasya svarga-lokasya parācho 'tipātād abibhayaḥ | tam chhandobhir adri-
han dhṛityā” iti | yadvā satyair mantraiḥ stāyamāno 'gnir dyām tas-
tambha iti |*

“The supporting of the sky by mantras is thus recorded in the Taittirīya: ‘The gods feared lest the sun should fall down from the heaven; they propped it up by metres.’* Or the verse may mean that Agni, being lauded by true mantras, upheld the sky.”

See also R. V. i. 96, 2, quoted above, in p. 225, and Ait. Br. ii. 33, cited in the First Volume of this work, p. 180.

i. 164, 25. *Jagatī sindhuṃ divi astabhāyad rathantare sūryam pari apāśyat | gāyatrasya samidhas tisraḥ āhus tato mahnā pra ririche mahitvā |*

“By the Jagatī metre he fixed the waters in the sky; he beheld the sun in the Rathantara (a portion of the Sāma-veda): there are said to be three divisions of the Gāyatra; hence it surpasses [all others] in power and grandeur.”

iii. 53, 12. *Viśvāmītrasya rakshati brahma idam Bhārataṃ janam |*

“The prayer of Viśvāmītra protects this tribe of the Bharatas.” (See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 342.)

v. 31, 4. *Brahmāṇaḥ Indram mahayanto arkair avardhayan Ahaye hantavai u |*

“The priests magnifying Indra by their praises, have fortified him for slaying Agni.”

Compare the following texts already quoted, iii. 32, 13, p. 226; vi. 44, 13, p. 227; viii. 6, 11, p. 228; viii. 8, 8, p. 243; viii. 44, 12, p. 230; viii. 63, 8, p. 230; x. 67, 13, p. 244; and also i. 10, 5; ii. 11, 2; ii. 12, 14; iii. 34, 1, 2; v. 31, 10; viii. 6, 1, 21, 31, 35; viii. 13, 16; viii. 14, 5, 11; viii. 82, 27; and viii. 87, 8, where a similar power of augmenting, or strengthening, the gods is attributed to the hymns.

v. 40, 6. . . . *Gūlham sūryaṃ tamasā apavratena turīyena brahmaṇā avindad Atriḥ |* 8. . . . *Atriḥ sūryasya divi chakshur ādhāt svarbhānōr apa mōyāḥ aghukshat |* 9. *Yam vai sūryaṃ svarbhānus tamasā avidhyad āsurah | Atrayas tam anvavindan na hi anye āsaknuvan |*

“Atri, by his fourth prayer, discovered the sun which had been concealed by the hostile darkness. 8. . . . Atri placed the eye of the sun in the sky, and dispelled the illusions of Svarbhānu. 9. The Atri discovered the sun, which Svarbhānu, of the Asura race, had pierced with darkness; no other could [effect this].” (See Vol. I. of this work, pp. 242 and 469.)

vi. 75, 19. . . . *Devās tañ sarve dhūrvantu brahma varma mamāntaram* |

“May all the gods destroy him; the prayer is my protecting armour.”

vii. 19, 11. *Nu Indra śūra stavamānaḥ uti brahma-jūtas tanvā vapri-dhasva ityādi* |

“Heroic Indra, lauded, and impelled by our prayers, grow in body through (our) aid [or longing],” etc. (Compare viii. 13, 17, 25.)

vii. 33, 3. . . . *Even nu kañ dāśarājne Sudāsam prāvad Indro brahmanū vo Vasishthāḥ* | 5. . . . *Vasishthasya stuvataḥ Indrah āsrod uruṃ Tritsubhyah akrinod u lokam* |

“Indra has delivered Sūdas in the combat of the ten kings through your prayer, o Vasishthas. 5. Indra heard Vasishtha when he praised, and opened a wide place for the Tritsus.” (See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 319.)

viii. 49, 9. *Pāhi naḥ Agne ekayā pāhi uta dvitīyayā* | *pāhi gīrbhis tīrībhīr ūrjūmpate pāhi chatasrībhīr vaso* |

“Protect us, Agni, through the first, protect us through the second, protect us, lord of power, through three hymns, protect us through four, thou bright god.”

The following passage celebrates the numbers of the metres :

x. 114, 8, 9. *Sahasradhā panchadaśāni ukthā yāvad dyāvā-prithivī tūvad it tat* | *Sahasradhā mahimānaḥ sahasraṃ yāvad brahma viśhṭhitān tūvatī vāk* | 9. *Kaś chhandasām yogam āveda dhīraḥ ko dhishnyām prati vācham papāda* | *kam ṛitvijām aśṭamañ śūram āhur harī Indrasya nī chikāya kaḥ svit* |

8. “There are a thousand times fifteen *ukthas*; that extends as far as heaven and earth. A thousand times a thousand are their glorious manifestations; speech is commensurate with devotion. 9. What sage knows the [whole] series [or application] of the metres? Who has attained devotional speech? Whom do they call the eighth hero among priests? Who has perceived the two steeds of Indra?”

(The word *dhishnya* is said by Yāska, Nirukta, viii. 3, to be = *dhishanya*, and that again to be = *dhishanā-bhava*, “springing” from *dhishanā*, “speech,” or “sacred speech.”)

I conclude the series of texts relating to the power of the mantras by quoting the whole of the 130th hymn of the 10th Maṇḍala of the Rig-veda :

1. *Yo yajno viśvatas tantubhis tataḥ ekaśatañ deva-karmebhir āyataḥ* |

ime vayanti pitaro ye āyayuh pra vaya apa vaya āsate tate | 2. Pumān enam tanute utkṛiṇatti pumān vi tatne adhi nāke asmin | ime mayūkhāḥ upa shedur ū sadaḥ sāmāni chakrus tasarāṇi otave | 3. Kā āsit pramā pratimā kiṁ nidānam ājyam kim āsit paridhikḥ kaḥ āsit | chhandah kim āsit prūgaṁ kim uktham yad devāḥ devam ayajanta viśve | 4. Agner gāyatrī abhavat sayugvā ushṇihayā Savitā sambabhūva | anuṣṭubhā Somaḥ ukthair mahasvān Bṛihaspater bṛihatī vācham āvat | 5. Virāj Mitrāvaruṇayor abhīsrīr Indrasya trisṭub iha bhāgah ahaḥ | Viśvān devān jagatī āviveśa tena chākṛipre rishayo manushyāḥ | 6. Chākṛipre tena rishayo manushyāḥ yajno jāte pitarah nah purāne | paśyan manye manasā chakshasā tūn ye imāṁ yajnam ayajanta pūrve | 7. Saha-stomāḥ saha-chhandasaḥ āvṛitah saha-pramāḥ rishayah sapta daivyāḥ | pūrveshām panthām anudriśya dhīrūḥ anvālebhire rathyo na rasmin |

“ 1. The [web of] sacrifice which is stretched on every side with threads,³⁶ which is extended with one hundred [threads], the work of the gods,—these fathers who have arrived weave it; they sit where it is extended, [saying] ‘weave forwards, weave backwards.’ 2. The Man stretches it out and spins it, the Man has extended it over this sky. These rays approached the place of sacrifice; they made the Sāma verses the shuttles for the woof. 3. What was the measure [of the ceremonial], what the form, what the type, what the oblation, what the enclosing fuel, what the metre, what the *prūga*, and what the *uktha*, when all the gods sacrificed to the god? 4. The *gāyatrī* was associated with *Āgni*; *Savitṛi* was conjoined with the *ushṇihā*; and *Soma*, gladdening (us) through hymns (*ukthas*), with the *anuṣṭubh*; the *bṛihatī* attached itself to the speech of *Bṛihaspati*. 5. The *virāj* adhered to *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*; the *trisṭubh*, a portion of the day (?), [accompanied] *Indra*. The *jagatī* entered into the *Viśvedevas*. By this means human rishis were successful. 6. By this means our human fathers the rishis were successful, when this ancient sacrifice

³⁶ In R. V. x. 57, 2, we find the same word *tantu* occurring: *Yo yajnasya prasādhanas tantur deveshu ātatas tam āhutaṁ naśimahi |* “May we obtain him [*Āgni*] who is offered, who is the fulfiller of sacrifice, who is the thread stretched to the gods.” (Comp. the versions given by Prof. Müller in the *Journ. R. A. S.* for 1866, pp. 449, and 457.) Prof. Roth quotes under the word *tantu* the following text from the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, ii. 4, 2, 6: *Ā tantum Agnir divyaṁ tatāna | tvaṁ nas tantur uta setur Agne tvam panthāḥ bhavasi deva-yīnāḥ |* “*Āgni* has stretched the divine thread. Thou, *Āgni*, art our thread and bridge; thou art the path leading to the gods.”

was celebrated. I believe that I behold with my mind, [as] with an eye, those ancients who performed this sacrifice. 7. The seven wise and divine rishis, with hymns, with metres, [with] ritual forms, and according to the prescribed measures, contemplating the path of the ancients, have followed it, like charioteers seizing the reins."

I shall not attempt to explain the meaning and purport of this obscure and mystical hymn, which has been translated by Mr. Colebrooke (Essays, i. 34, 35, or p. 18 of Williams and Norgate's ed.). My object in quoting the verses is to show how the various metres are associated with the different deities, in this primeval and mysterious rite, and how a certain sanctity is thus imparted to them. In verse 7, it will be observed, the rishis are spoken of as seven in number, and as divine. The Atharva-veda (x. 7, 43, 44) gives the second verse somewhat differently from the Rig-veda, as follows: *Pumān enad vāyati udgrīṇatti pumān enad vi jābhāra adhi nāke | ime mayūkhāḥ upa tastabhur divam sāmāni chakrus tāsārāni vātave |* "The Man weaves and spins this: the Man has spread this over the sky. These rays have propped up the sky; they have made the Sāma-verses shuttles for the woof."

IV. But whatever may have been the nature or the source of the supernal illumination to which the rishis laid claim, it is quite clear that some among them at least made no pretensions to anything like a perfect knowledge of all subjects, human and divine, as they occasionally confess their ignorance of matters in which they felt a deep interest and curiosity. This is shown in the following texts:

R. V. i. 164, 5. *Pākaḥ pṛichchhāmi manasā avijānan devānām enā nihitā padāni | vatse baskhaye adhi sapta tantūn vi tatnīre kavayaḥ otavai ū |* 6. *Achikitoān chikitasas chid atra kavīn pṛichchhāmi vidmane na vidvān | vi yas tastambha shaḥ imā rajānsi ajasya rūpe kim api svid ekam |* 37. *Na vi jānāmi yad iva idam asmi ninyah sannaddho manasā charāmi | yadā mā āgan prathamajāḥ rītasya ād id vāchaḥ asnuve bhāgam asyāḥ |*

"5. Ignorant, not knowing in my mind, I enquire after these hidden abodes of the gods; the sages have stretched out seven threads for a woof over the yearling calf [or over the sun, the abode of all things]. 6. Not comprehending, I ask those sages who comprehend this matter; unknowing, [I ask] that I may know; what is the one thing, in the form of the uncreated one, who has upheld these six

worlds? 37. I do not recognize if I am like this; I go on perplexed and bound in mind. When the first-born sons of sacrifice [or truth] come to me, then I enjoy a share of that word."

I do not attempt to explain the proper sense of these dark and mystical verses. It is sufficient for my purpose that they clearly express ignorance on the part of the speaker. Prof. Wilson's translation of the passages may be compared. Prof. Müller, *Anc. Ind. Lit.* p. 567, renders verse 37 as follows: "I know not what this is that I am like; turned inward I walk, chained in my mind. When the first-born of time comes near me, then I obtain the portion of this speech."

x. 31, 7. *Kiñ svid vanañ kaḥ u sa vrikshaḥ āsa yato dyāvā-prithivī nishṭatakshuḥ | santasthūne ajare itaūtī ahūni pūrvīr ushaso jaranta |*

"What was the forest, what the tree, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth, which continue to exist undecaying, whilst days, and many dawns have passed away?"

Compare x. 81, 4, where the first of these lines is repeated and is followed by the words: *Manīshīno manasū prichhata id u tad yad adhyatishṭhad bhuvanāni dhārayan |* "Ask in your minds, ye intelligent, what that was on which he took his stand when upholding the worlds;" and see verse 2 of the same hymn.

i. 185, 1. *Katarā pūrvā katarā aparā ayoh kathā jāte kavayo ko vi veda |*
 "Which of these two (Heaven and Earth) is the first? which is the last? How were they produced? Who, o sages, knows?"

x. 88, 18. *Kati agnayah kati sūryasah kati ushasah kati u svid āpah | na upaspijam vah pitaro vadāmi prichchhāmi vah kavayo vidmane kam |*

"How many fires are there? how many suns? how many dawns? how many waters? I do not, fathers, say this to you in jest; I really ask you, sages, in order that I may know."

Compare x. 114, 9, above, p. 227.

x. 129, 5. *Tiraśchīno vitato raśmir eśhām adhaḥ svid āsīd upari svid āsīt | rotodhāḥ āsan mahimānaḥ āsan svadhū avastat prayatiḥ parastāt |*
 6. *Kaḥ addha veda kaḥ iha pruvochat kutaḥ ūjātā kutaḥ iyañ visriṣhtiḥ | arvāg devāḥ asya visarjanena atha ko veda yataḥ ābabhūva |* 7. *Iyañ visriṣṭīr yataḥ ābabhūva yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na | yah asya adhyakshaḥ parama vyoman sa anga veda yadi vā na veda |*

5. "Their ray [or cord], obliquely extended, was it below, or was it above? There were generative sources, and there were great powers,

svadhā (a self-supporting principle) below, and effort above. 6. Who knows, who hath here declared, whence this creation was produced, whence [it came]? The gods were subsequent to the creation of this universe; who then knows whence it sprang? 7. Whence this creation sprang, whether any one formed it or not,—he who, in the highest heavens, is the overseer of this universe,—he indeed knows, or he does not know.”

See the translation of the whole hymn by Mr. Colebrooke in his *Essays*, i. 33, 34, or p. 17 of Williams and Norgate's ed. See also Prof. Müller's version and comment in pp. 559–564 of his *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*; and my own rendering in the article on the “progress of the Vedic religion towards abstract conceptions of the Deity,” in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for 1865, pp. 345 f.

We have seen (above, p. 62) that a claim is set up (by some unspecified writer quoted by Sāyaṇa) on behalf of the Veda that it can impart an understanding of all things, past and future, subtle, proximate, and remote; and that according to Sankara Āchāryya (on the *Brahma-sūtras*, i. 1, 3) as cited above, p. 106, the knowledge which it manifests, approaches to omniscience. All such proud pretensions are, however, plainly enough disavowed by the rishis who uttered the complaints of ignorance which I have just adduced. It is indeed urged by Sāyaṇa (see above, p. 64) in answer to the objection, that passages like R.V. x. 129, 5, 6, can possess no authority as sources of knowledge, since they express doubt,—that this is not their object, but that their intention is to intimate by a figure of speech the extreme profundity of the divine essence, and the great difficulty which any persons not well versed in the sacred writings must experience in comprehending it. There can, however, be little doubt that the authors of the passages I have cited did feel their own ignorance, and intended to give utterance to this feeling. As, however, such confessions of ignorance on the part of the rishis, if admitted, would have been incompatible with the doctrine that the Veda was an infallible source of divine knowledge, it became necessary for the later theologians who held that doctrine to explain away the plain sense of those expressions.

It should, however, be noticed that these confessions of ignorance and fallibility are by no means inconsistent with the supposition that the rishis may have conceived themselves to be animated and directed in

the composition of their hymns by a divine impulse. But although the two rivals, Vasishṭha and Viśvāmitra, whether in the belief of their own superhuman insight, or to enhance their own importance, and recommend themselves to their royal patrons, talk proudly about the wide range of their knowledge (see above, pp. 246 ff.), it is not necessary to imagine that, either in their idea or in that of the other ancient Indian sages, inspiration and infallibility were convertible or co-extensive terms. The rishis may have believed that the supernatural aid which they had received enabled them to perform what they must otherwise have left unattempted, but that after all it communicated only a partial illumination, and left them still liable to mistake and doubt.

I must also remark that this belief in their own inspiration which I imagine some of the rishis to have held, falls very far short of the conceptions which most of the later writers, whether Vaiśeshika, Mīmāṃsaka, or Vedāntist, entertain in regard to the supernatural origin and authority of the Veda. The gods from whom the rishis supposed that they derived their illumination, at least Agni, Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Soma, Pūshan, etc., would all fall under the category of productions, or divinities created in time. This is clearly shown by the comments of Śaṅkara on the Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 28, (above, pp. 101 ff.); and is otherwise notorious (see my "Contributions to a knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology" in the *Jl. R. A. S.* for 1864, p. 63). But if these gods were themselves created, and even (as we are told in the Rig-veda itself, x. 129, 6, cited in p. 280) produced subsequently to some other parts of the creation, the hymns with which they inspired the rishis, could not have been eternal. The only one of the deities referred to in the Rig-veda as sources of illumination, to whom this remark would perhaps not apply, is Vāch or Sarasvatī, who is identified with the supreme Brahma in the passage of the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad quoted above (p. 208, note 179); though this idea no doubt originated subsequently to the era of the hymns. But it is not to created gods, like Agni, Indra, and others of the same class, that the origin of the Veda is referred by the Vaiśeshikas, Mīmāṃsakas, or Vedāntists. The Vaiśeshikas represent the eternal Īśvara as the author of the Veda (see the passages which I have quoted in pp. 118 ff. and 209). The Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntists, as we have seen (pp. 70 ff., 99 ff. and 208),

either affirm that it is uncreated, or derive it from the eternal Brahma. And even those writers who may attribute the composition of the Veda to the personal and created Brahmā (see pp. 69, 105 f. and 208), with the Naiyāyikas who merely describe it as the work of a competent author (see pp. 116 f. and 209), and the Sāṅkhyas (see pp. 135 and 208), concur with the other schools in affirming its absolute infallibility. Their view, consequently (unless we admit an exception in reference to Vāch), differs from that of the Vedic rishis themselves, who do not seem to have had any idea, either of their hymns being uncreated, or derived from the eternal Brahma, or of their being infallible.

As regards the relation of the rishis to deities like Indra, it is also deserving of notice that later mythologists represent the former, not only as quite independent of the latter, and as gifted with an inherent capacity of raising themselves by their own austerities to the enjoyment of various superhuman faculties, but even as possessing the power of rivalling the gods themselves, and taking possession of their thrones. See the stories of Nahusha and Viśvāmitra in the First Volume of this work, particularly pp. 310 ff. and 404. Compare also the passages from the Rig-veda, x. 154, 2, and x. 167, 1, quoted above, p. 250, where the rishis are said to have attained to heaven, and Indra to have conquered it, by austere-fervour (*tapas*).

SECT. V.—*Texts from the Upanishads, showing the opinions of the authors regarding their own inspiration, or that of their predecessors.*

I shall now adduce some passages from different Upanishads, to show what opinions their authors entertained either in regard to their own inspiration, or that of the earlier sages, from whom they assert that their doctrine was derived by tradition.

I. S'vetāśvatara Up. v. 2 (already quoted above, p. 184). *Yo yoniṃ yonim adhitishṭhaty eko viśvāni rūpāni yonīs cha sarvāḥ | rishim prasūtaṃ Kāpilaṃ yas tam agre jñānair bibharti jāyamānaṃ cha paśyati |*

“He who alone presides over every place of production, over all forms, and all sources of birth, who formerly nourished with various knowledge that rishi Kapila, who had been born, and beheld him at his birth.”

II. Svetāśvatara Up. vi. 21. *Tapah-prabhāvād veda-prasādāch cha Brahma ha Svetāśvataro'tha vidvān | atyūśramibhyaḥ paramam pavitram provācha samyag rishi-sangha-jushṭam |*

“By the power of austere-ferveur, and by the grace of the Veda, the wise Svetāśvatara declared perfectly to the men in the highest of the four orders, the supreme and holy Brahma, who is sought after by the company of rishis.” (Dr. Röer's translation, p. 68, follows the commentator in rendering the first words of the verse thus: “By the power of his austerity, and the grace of God.” This, however, is not the proper meaning of the words *veda-prasādāch cha*, if the correctness of that reading, which is given both in the text and commentary (Bibl. Ind. p. 372), be maintained. Sankara interprets the words thus: “*Veda-prasādāch cha*” | *kakalyam uddīśya tad-adhikāra-siddhaye bahu-
janmasu samyag ūrādhitā-parameśvarasya prasādāch cha* | “By the grace of the Veda:’ by the grace of the supreme God who had been perfectly adored by him during many births in order to acquire the prerogative of (studying) it (the Veda) in reference to *kaivalya* (isolation from mundane existence);” and thus appears to recognize this reading.

In the 18th verse of the same section of this Upanishad the Vedas are said to have been given by the supreme God to Brahmā :

*Yo Brahmānam vidadhāti pūrvaṁ yo vai vedāms cha prahinoti tasmāi |
taṁ ha devam ātma-buddhi-prakāśam mumukshur vai śaraṇam aham pra-
padye |*

“Seeking after final liberation, I take refuge with that God, the manifestor of the knowledge of himself, who at first created Brahmā and gave him the Vedas.”

III. Muṇḍaka Up. i. 1 ff. (quoted above, p. 30, more at length). *Brahmā devānām prathamah sambabhūva viśvasya karttā bhuvanasya goptā | Sa brahma-vidyām sarva-vidyā-pratiśṭhām Atharvāya jyeshṭha-
putrāya prāha |*

“Brahmā was born the first of the gods, he who is the maker of the universe and the supporter of the world. Ho declared the science of Brahma, the foundation of all the sciences, to Atharva, his eldest son.”

IV. The Chhāndogya Up. viii. 15, 1, p. 625 ff. concludes as follows :

*Tad ha etad Brahmā Prajāpataye wācha Prajāpatir Manave Manuḥ
prajābhyaḥ | āchāryya-kulād vedam adhitya yathā vidhānam guroḥ kar-
mātiśeṣheṇa abhisamāvṛitya kuṭumbe suchau deśe svādhyāyam adhīyāno*

dhārmikān vidadhāḍ ūtmani sarvendriyāni sampratishṭhāpya ahimsan sarva-bhūtāni anyatra tirthebhyaḥ sa khalv evaṁ varttayan yavad-āyusham Brahma-lokam abhisampadyate na cha punar ūvarttate na cha punar ūvarttate |

“This [doctrine] Brahmā declared to Prajāpati, Prajāpati declared it to Manu, and Manu to his descendants. Having received instruction in the Veda from the family of his religious teacher in the prescribed manner, and in the time which remains after performing his duty to his preceptor; and when he has ceased from this, continuing his Vedic studies-at home, in his family, in a pure spot, communicating a knowledge of duty [to his pupils], withdrawing all his senses into himself, doing injury to no living creature, away from holy places,—thus passing all his days, a man attains to the world of Brahma, and does not return again, and does not return again [*i.e.* is not subjected to any future births].”

I quote the commencement of Sankara's comment on this passage :

Tad ha etad ūtma-jnānaṁ sopakaraṇam om ity etad aksharam ity-ādyaṁ saha upāsanaṁ tad-vāchakena granthena aḥṭādhyāya-lakṣaṇena saha Brahmā Hiranyagarbhaḥ Paramēśvaro vā tad-dvāreṇa Prajāpataye Kaśyapāya uvācha | asāv api Manave sva-putrāya | Manuḥ prajābhyaḥ | ity evam śrutya-artha-sampradāya-paramparayā āgatam upanishad-rijnānam adyāpi vidvatsv avagamyato |

“This knowledge of soul, with its instruments, with the sacred monosyllable *Om* and other formulæ of devotion, and with the book distinguished as containing eight chapters, which sets forth all these topics, [*viz.* the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* itself] was declared by Brahmā Hiranyagarbha, or by Paramēśvara (the supreme God), through his agency, to the Prajāpati Kaśyapa. The latter in his turn declared it to his son Manu, and Manu to his descendants. In this manner the sacred knowledge contained in the Upanishads, having been received through successive transmission of the sense of the Veda from generation to generation, is to this day understood among learned men.”

In an earlier passage of the same Upanishad iii. 11, 3 f. (partly quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 195), we find a similar statement in reference to a particular branch of sacred knowledge (the *madhu-jnāna*):

3. *Nā ha vai asmai udoti na nimlochati sakṛid divā ha eva asmai bha-*

vati yañi etām evam brahmopanishadañ veda | 4. Tad ha etad Brahmā Prajāpatāye, uvācha Prajāpatir Mānave Manuḥ prajābhyaḥ | tad etad Uddālakāya Ārunāye jyeshthāya putrāya pitā brahma uvācha | 5. Idañ vāva taj-jyeshthāya putrāya pitā brahma prabrūyāt prāṇāyāya vā antavāsine (6) na anyasmāi kasmaichana | yadyapy asmai imām adbhīḥ parigrīhītām dhanasya purnām dadyāt etad eva tato bhūyaḥ ity etad eva tato bhūyaḥ iti |

!! "3. For him who thus knows this sacred mystery, the sun neither rises nor sets, but one day perpetually lasts. 4. This (*Madhu-juāna*) was declared by Brahmā to Prajāpati, by Prajāpati to Manu, and by Manu to his descendants. This sacred knowledge was further declared to Uddālaka Āruṇi by his father. 5. Let a father expound it to his eldest son, or to a capable pupil, but to no one else. 6. If any one were to give him this entire earth, which is surrounded by water, full of wealth, this sacred knowledge would be more than that, yes, would be more than that."

Compare Manu, xi. 243, where that Code is said to have been created by Prajāpati (First Volume of this work, p. 394); and Bhagavad Gītā iv. 1, where the doctrine of that treatise is said to have been declared by Kṛishṇa to Vivasvat (the Sun), by Vivasvat to Manu, by him to Ikshvāku, and then handed down by tradition from one royal rishi to another (Vol. I. p. 508).



APPENDIX.

Page 4, line 5.

I have omitted here the verse from the Atharva-veda, xi. 7, 24 (quoted by Professor Goldstücker in his Panini, p. 70): *Ṛichāḥ sāmāni chhandāmsi purāṇaṁ yajushā saha | uchchhishṭāj jājnire sarve divi devāḥ divīśritāḥ* | “From the leavings of the sacrifice sprang the Rich- and Sāman-verses, the metres, the Purāṇa with the Yajush, and all the gods who dwell in tho’ sky.”

Professor Aufrecht has favoured me with the following amendments in my translations in pp. 7 and 8 :

Page 7, line 13.

For “the text called *sāvitrī* [or *gāyatrī*]” he would substitute “the verse dedicated to Savitrī.”

Page 7, line 16.

For “the mouth of Brahma” he proposes “the beginning of the Veda.” (Sir W. Jones translates “the mouth, or *principal part* of the *Veda*.”)

Page 8, line 8.

For “from Vāch (speech) as their world” he proposes “out of the sphere (or compass) of speech.”

Page 8, line 8.

For “Vāch was his: she was created” he proposes “For in creating the Vedas, he had also created Vāch.”

Page 8, line 13.

For “He gave it an impulse” he proposes “He touched it.”

Page 8, line 16.

For "Moreover it was sacred knowledge, which was created from that Male in front" he proposes "For even from that Male (not only from the waters) Brahma was created first."

Page 9, line 16.

This passage of the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad corresponds to Śatapatha Brahmana x. 6, 5, 5.

Page 10, line 2.

"May the brilliant deity," etc., Professor Aufrecht would prefer to translate the second line of the verse, beginning *sudevaḥ* (p. 9, l. 6 from the foot), "Goodness (the good god) only knows where they put the earth which was thrown up (*nirvapaṇa*)."

Page 20, line 17.

See Āśvalāyanas Gṛihya Sūtras, pp. 155, and 157 ff.

Page 22, line 13, note 25.

I quote two verses from Manu, of which the second confirms the correctness of the rendering I have given of the words *ā ha eva sa nakhāgrebhyas tapyate*, and the first illustrates the text of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka cited in the note: Manu ii. 166. *Vedaṃ eva sadā 'bhyasyet tapas tapsyan dvijottamaḥ | vedābhyāso hi viprasya tapaḥ param ihochyate |* 167. "*Ā haiva sa nakhāgrebhyas*" *paramaṃ "tapyate" tapaḥ | yaḥ sragvy api drijo 'dhite svādhyāyaṃ śaktito 'nvaham |* "Let a good Brāhman who desires to perform tapas constantly study the Veda; for such study is a Brāhman's highest tapas. 167. That twice-born man who daily studies the Veda to the utmost of his power, even though (luxuriously) wearing a garland of flowers (really) performs the highest tapas to the very extremities of his nails." This verse, it will be observed, quotes verbatim one of the phrases of the Brāhmana, and gives definiteness to its sense by adding the words *paramaṃ tapaḥ*. Verses 165 ff. of the same book of Manu prescribe the abstemious mode of life which the student (*brahmachārin*) is to follow whilst living in his teacher's house. The Mahābhārata, Udyoga-parvan, 1537, thus states the conditions of successful study in general; *Sukhārthinaḥ kuto vilyā nāsti rilyārthinaḥ sukham |*

sukhārthi vā tyajē vidyām vidyārthi vā tyajet sukham | “How can one who seeks ease acquire science? Ease does not belong to him who pursues science. Either let the seeker of ease abandon science, or the seeker of science abandon ease.”

Page 30, line 17.

Compare the lines quoted by the Commentator on Sāṅḍilya's Bhakti-sūtra, 83, p. 60, from the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, Moksha-dharma, verses 13,551 ff. : *Sahopanishado vedān ye viprah̄ḥ samyag āsthitāḥ | pa-
ṭhanti vidhim āsthāya ye chāpi yati-dharmināḥ | tato viśiṣṭām jānāmi
gatim ekāntinām nṛinām* | “I regard the destination of Ekāntins (persons devoted to the One as their end) as superior to that of Brāhmins who perfectly study the Vedas, including the Upanishads, according to rule, as well as to that of those who follow the practices of ascetics (*yatis*).”

Page 34, line 1.

Perhaps this was scarcely a suitable passage to be quoted as depreciatory of the Veda, as in such a stage of transcendental absorption as is here described all the ordinary standards of estimation have ceased to be recognized.

Page 43, line 10.

With the expression *hrīd-ākāśa*, “the æther of the heart,” compare the passage quoted from the Veda in Śankara's commentary on Brahma Sūtra iii. 2, 35 (p. 873) : “*Yo 'yam vahirāḥ puruṣhād ākāśo yo 'yam antaḥ-puruṣhe ākāśo yo 'yam antar-hrīdaye ākāśaḥ* | “This æther which is external to a man, this æther which is within a man, and this æther which is within the heart.” See also the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad ii. 5, 10 and iii. 7, 12.

Page 44, line 1.

See the Yoga aphorisms i. 2 ff. as cited and explained by Dr. Ballantyne.¹ The second aphorism defines *yoga* to be “a stoppage of the functions of the mind” (*Yogaś chitta-vṛitti-nirodhaḥ*). “The mind then abides in the state of the spectator, i.e. the Soul” (*tadā drashtuḥ svarūpe'vasthānam*—Aph. 3). “At other times it takes the form of the

¹ Two fasciculi only, containing two Pīlas and 106 Sūtras, were published at Allahabad in 1852 and 1853; but a continuation of Dr. B.'s work has been commenced in the “Pandit” for Sept. 1868.

functions" (*vr̥itti-sārūpyam itaratra*—Aph. 4). These functions, or modifications (as Dr. Ballantyne translates) are fivefold, and either painful, or devoid of pain, viz. proof, or right notion (*pramāna*), mistake (*viparyyaya*), groundless imagination (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidrā*), recollection (*smṛiti*)—Aphorisms 5–11. See also Dr. Ballantyne's Sāṅkhya Aphorisms, iii. 31 ff.

Page 57, note 61.

With the subject of this note compare the remarks in p. 108, and the quotations from Dr. Roer and Professor Müller in pp. 173, 175, and 193.

Page 62, note 65.

Professor Cowell does not think that the text is corrupt. He would translate it, "the other *pramānas*, beside *śabda*, (scil. perception and inference), cannot be even supposed in a case like this" (which refers to such a transcendental object as the existence of an eternal Veda). Sāyana, in his reply to the objector, recapitulates the applicable proofs as *śruti*, *smṛiti*, and *loka-prasiddhi*,—all three only different kinds of testimony, *śabda*.

Page 63, lines 11 f., and note 68.

Compare pp. 322 f., 329 f., 334 f., and 337 of my article "On the Interpretation of the Veda," in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1866.

Page 84, note 89, and page 180, line 7.

I have been favoured by Professor Cowell with the following note on *kālātyayāpadishṭa*:

"My Calcutta Pandit considered this fallacy to be the same as that more usually called *bādha* (cf. too *Bhāshāparichcheda*, śl. 70, 77, and the Bengali translation, p. 65). Its definition is *pakṣhe sādhyā-bhāvaḥ*. The Tarka-sangraha defines a *hetu* as *bādhitā*, 'when the absence of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof,' as in the argument *vahnir anushṅo dravyatvāt*. The essence of this fallacy is that you deny the *major*, and therefore it does not matter whether you accept the middle term in itself or not. It is involved in the overthrow of the major term. I should translate it the 'precluded argument,'—it might have been plausible if it had not been put out of court by something which settles

the point,—it is advanced too late (the *pre* in ‘precluded’ expresses the *kālātita* of the old name). This corresponds to the account in the Nyāya-sūtra-vṛitti: *Kālasya sādhanā-kālasyātyaye ’bhāve ’padishṭaḥ prayukto hetur | etena sādhyābhāvapramālakshaṇārtha itī sūchitam | sādhyābhāvanirṇaye sādhanāsambhavāt | Ayam eva bādhitāsādhyaka itī gīyate.* The Vṛitti goes on to say that you need not prove *vyabhichāra* (i.e. that your opponent’s *hetu* or middle term goes too far, as in *parvato dhumavān vahneḥ* where *vahni* is a *savyabhichāro hetuḥ*) in order to establish the *bādha*. I should therefore prefer to translate the passage from the Vedārtha-prakāśa, p. 84, ‘your alleged middle-term *vākyatva*, the possessing the properties of a common sentence, is liable to two objections,—(1) it is opposed by the fact that no author was ever perceived, and (2) it also is precluded by weighty evidence (which proves that your proposed major term is irrelevant).’ Sāyaṇa then adds his reasons for each objection,—for the *first*, in the words from *yathā Vyāsa* down to *upalabdhaḥ*; for the *second*, in the fact that *smṛiti* and *śruti* agree in the eternity of the Veda (the *pūrvam* I suppose refers to p. 3 of the Calcutta printed text), and that even if the Supreme Spirit be the author he is not *puruṣaḥ* in the sense in which the objector uses the term. Either way, the major term of the objector’s syllogism *pauruṣheya* is precluded, *bādhitā*; or, in the technical language of the Nyāya, Sāyaṇa establishes an absence from the minor term (*pakṣa*) of the alleged major term (*sādhyā*); and hence no conclusion can be drawn from the proposed syllogism. I may add that I have also looked into Vātsyāyaṇa, but his explanation seems to me an instance of what my Pandit used so often to impress on me, that the modern logic (which such a late mediæval writer as Sāyaṇa follows) is not always that of the Nyāyabhāṣya. He makes the error lie in the example, i.e. in the induction; and it is therefore, as Professor Goldstücker says, a ‘vicious generalization.’”

Page 88, note 95.

Professor Cowell disagrees with the explanation I have hazarded of the object of the sentence in the text to which this note refers. He thinks that its purport, as shewn by the word *vyabhichārāt*, is to intimate that the former of the two alternative suppositions would prove too much, as it would also apply to such detached stanzas as the one

referred to, of which the author, although unknown to some persons, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries no doubt knew who wrote it, and his descendants, as well as others, might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin, but which nevertheless was not superhuman (*apaurusheya*). This is no doubt the correct explanation.

Page 99, line 1.

The argument in proof of the incompetence of the Sūdras for the acquisition of the highest divine knowledge is contained in Brahma Sūtras i. 3, 34-38. As the subject may possess an interest for any educated persons of this class into whose hands this book may fall in India, I extract the entire discussion of the question :

34. " *S'ug asya tad-anādara-sravaṇāt tad-ādravaṇāt sūchyate hi* " | *yathā manushyādhikāra-niyamam apodya devādīnām api vīdyāsv adhikāraḥ uktas tathāiva dvijāty-adhikāra-niyamāpavādena sūdrasya apy adhikāraḥ syād ity etām āsankāṁ nivarttayitum idam adhikāraṇam ārabhyate* | *tattra sūdrasya apy adhikāraḥ syād iti tāvat prāptum arthitva-sāmarthyayoḥ sambhavāt* | *tasmāch " chhūdro yajne 'navakṛiptaḥ "* *itirach chhūdro vidyāyām anavakṛiptaḥ iti nishedhāsravaṇāt* | *yach cha karmasv anadhikāra-kūraṇaṁ sūdrasya anagnitvaṁ na tad vidyāsv adhikārasya apavādakam* | *na hy āhavanīyādi-rahitena vidyā vedituṁ na śakyate* | *bhavati cha lingaṁ sūdrādhikārasya upodbalakam* [*saṁvarga-vidyāyām hi Jānaśrutim Pautrāyanaṁ suśrūṣhuṁ sūdra-śabdena parāmrīṣati " aha hāre tvā sūdra tava eva saha gobhir astv "* *iti* | *Vidura-prabhritayaś cha sūdra-yoni-prabhavāḥ api viśiṣṭa-vijnāna-sampannāḥ smaryante* | *tasmād adhikriyate sūdro vidyāsu* | *ity evam prāpte brūmaḥ* | *na sūdrasya adhikāro vedādhyayanābhāvāt* | *adhīta-vedo hi vidīta-vedārtho vedārtheshv adhikriyate* | *na cha sūdrasya vedādhyayanam asty upanayana-pūrvakatvād vedādhyayanasya upanayanasya cha varṇa-traya-vishayavāt* | *yat tv arthitvaṁ na tad asati sāmārthyē 'dhikāra-kāraṇam bhavati* | *sāmārthyam api na laukikāṁ kevalam adhikāra-kūraṇam bhavati śāstrīyē 'rthe śāstrīyasya sāmārthyasya apekṣhitatvāt śāstrīyasya cha sāmārthyasya adhyayana-nirākāraṇena nirākṛitatvāt* | *yach cha idam sūdro yajne 'navakṛiptaḥ iti tad nyāya-pūrvakatvād vidyāyām apy anavakṛiptatvaṁ dyotayati nyāyasya sādharanatvāt* | *yat punaḥ saṁvarga-vidyāyām sūdra-*

śabda-śravaṇaṁ lingam manyase na tal lingam nyūyābhāvāt | nyūyokter hi linga-darśanaṁ dyotakam bhavati na cha attra nyāyo 'sti | kāmaṁ cha ayaṁ śūdra-śabdaḥ saṁvarga-vidyāyām eva ekasyāṁ śūdrām adhikuryyāt tad-viśhayatvād na sarvāsu vidyāsu | arthavāda-sthatoāt na tu kvachid apy ayaṁ śūdrām adhikarttum utsahate | śakyate cha ayaṁ śūdra-śabdo 'dhi-kṛīta-viśkaye yojayitum | katham iti | uchyate | " 'kam u are enam etat santaṁ sayugvānam iva Rainkam āttha' (Chāndogya Upanishad, iv. 1, 3.) ity asmād haṁsa-vākyaḍ ātmano 'nādaraṁ śrutavato Jānaśruteḥ Pautrā-yaṇasya śug utpede tām riśhī Rainkaḥ śūdra-śabdena anena sūchayāmba- bhūva ātmanaḥ paroksha-jnānasya khyāpanāya iti gamyate jāti-śūdrasya anadhikārāt | katham punaḥ śūdra-śabdena śug utpannā sūchyate iti | uchyate | tad-ādravaṇāt śucham abhidudrāva śuchā vā 'bhidudruve śuchā vā Rainkam abhidudrāva iti śūdrāvayavārtha-sambhavād rūḍhārthasya cha asaṁbhavāt | driśyate cha ayam artho 'syām ākhyāyikāyām |

35. "*Kshattriyatva-gateś cha uttarattra Chaitrarathena lingāt*" | *Itaś cha na jāti-śūdro Jānaśrutir yat-kūraṇam prakaraṇa-nirūpaneṇa kshat- triyatvam asya uttarattra Chaitrarathena Abhipratāriṇā kshattriyēna samabhivyāhārāl lingād gamyate | uttarattra hi saṁvarga-vidyā-vākya- śeṣe Chaitrarathir Abhipratārī kshattriyāḥ sankīrttyate | " attha ha S'aunakāṁ cha Kāpeyam Abhipratāriṇāṁ cha Kākshaseniṁ sūdena pari- viśyamānau brahmachārī bibhikṣhe" (Chh. Up. iv. 3, 5) iti | Chaitra- rathitvaṁ cha Abhipratāriṇāḥ Kāpeya-yogād avagantavyam | Kāpeya- yogo hi Chaitrarathasya avagataḥ | " etena vai Chaitrarathaṁ Kāpeyāḥ ayājayan" iti samānānvaya-yājināṁ cha prāyeṇa samānānvayāḥ yāja- kūḥ bhavanti | tasmāch "Chaitrarathir nāma ekaḥ kshattra-patir ajāyata" iti cha kshattra-jātivāvagamāt kshattriyatvam asya avagantavyam | tena kshattriyēna Abhipratāriṇā saha samānāyaṁ vidyāyāṁ sankīrttanāṁ Jānaśruter api kshattriyatvaṁ sūchayati | samānānām eva hi prāyeṇa samabhivyāhārāḥ bhavanti | kshattri-preshanādy-aiśvāryya-yogāch cha Jānaśruteḥ kshattriyatvāvagatiḥ | ato na śūdrasya adhikāraḥ |*

36. "*Saṁskāra-parāmarśūt tad-abhāvābhilāpāch cha*" | *itaś cha na śūdrasyā adhikāro yad vidyā-pradeśeṣhu upanayanādayāḥ saṁskārāḥ parāmriśyante " tāṁ ha upanīnye" | " 'adhīḥ bhagavaḥ' iti ha upasa- sāda" | " brahma-parāḥ brahma-niśṭhāḥ param Brahma anveṣhamānāḥ ' esha ha vai tat sarvaṁ vakṣhyati' iti te ha samit-pāṇayo bhagavantam Pippalādam upasannāḥ" iti cha " tāṁ ha anupanīya eva" ity api pra- darśitā eva upanayana-prāptir bhavati | śūdrasya cha saṁskārābhūvo*

'bhilapyate "sūdras̄ chaturtho varnaḥ ekajātir" ity ekajātītva-smaraṇena
 "na sūdre pūtaḥ kinchid na cha śaṁskāram arhati" ity-ādibhiḥ cha |

37. "Tad-abhāva-nīrdhāraṇe cha pravṛtiteḥ" | Itas̄ cha na sūdrasya
 adhikāro yat satya-vachanena sūdratvābhāve nīrdhārite Jābālaḥ Gauta-
 maḥ upanetum anuśāsītum cha pravavṛite "na etad abrah̄maṇo vivaktum
 arhati | samīdham sōmya āhara upa tvā neshye na satyād agāḥ" (Chh.
 Up. iv. 4, 5) iti śruti-lingāt |

38. "Śravaṇādhyayanārtha-pratishedhāt smṛiteḥ cha" | Itas̄ cha na
 sūdrasya adhikāro yad asya smṛiteḥ śravaṇādhyayanārtha-pratishedho bha-
 vati | veda-śravaṇa-pratishedho vedādhyayana-pratishedhas tad-artha-jñā-
 nānushṭhānayoḥ cha pratishedhaḥ sūdrasya smaryyate | śravaṇa-pratise-
 dhas tāvad atha asya "vedam upaśṛiṇvatas trapu-jatubhyāṁ śrotra-prati-
 pūranam" iti "padyu ha bhi etat śmasūnaṁ yat sūdras̄ tasmāt sūdra-
 samīpe na adhyetavyam" iti cha | atah̄ eva adhyayana-pratishedhaḥ |
 yasya hi samīpe 'pi na adhyetavyam bhavati sa kathaṁ śrutim adhiyiyata |
 bhavati cha uchchāraṇe jivā-chedo dhāraṇe śarīra-bhedaḥ iti | atah̄ eva
 cha arthād artha-jñānānushṭhānayoḥ pratishedho bhavati | "na sūdrāya
 matim̄ dadyāt" iti "dvijātīnām adhyayanaṁ ijjā dānam" iti cha |
 yeshāṁ punaḥ pūrva-kṛita-saṁskāra-vaśūd Vidura-dharma-vyādha-pṛa-
 bhṛitīnām jñānotpattis̄ teshāṁ na śakyate phala-prūptiḥ pratibaddhuṁ
 jñānasya ekāntika-phalatvāt | "śrāvayech̄ chaturo varnān" iti cha iti-
 hāsa-purānādhiḡame chāturvarnyādhiḡāra-smaraṇāt | veda-pūrvakas̄ tu
 nāsty adhikārah̄ sūdrūṇām iti sthitam |

34. "In the word 'Sūdra' reference is made to his vocation on
 hearing that disrespectful expression, and to his running up."

"This section is commenced to silence the doubt whether in the same
 way as it had been denied (above) that the prerogative of acquiring
 divine knowledge is restricted to men, and affirmed that it extends to
 the gods, etc., also, the limitation of the same prerogative to twice-
 born men may not also be questioned, and its extension to Sūdras̄
 maintained. The grounds alleged in-favour of the Sūdra having this
 prerogative are that he may reasonably be supposed to have both (a)
 the desire and (b) the power of acquiring knowledge, and that accord-
 ingly (c) the Veda contains no text affirming his incapacity for know-
 ledge, as it confessedly has texts directing his exclusion from sacrifice :
 and further (d) that the fact of the Sūdra's not keeping up any sacred
 fire, which is the cause of his incapacity for sacrifice, affords no reason

for denying to him the prerogative of gaining knowledge; since it cannot be maintained that it is impossible for a man who is destitute of the āhavanīya and other fires to acquire knowledge. There is also (c) in a Vedic text a sign which confirms the Sūdra's prerogative. For in the passage which treats of the knowledge of the Saṁvarga (Chhândogya Upanishad, chapter iv. section 1-3) a speaker designates Jānaśruti, descendant of Janaśruta in the third generation, who was desirous of performing service, by the term Sūdra: 'Keep to thyself, o Sūdra, thy necklace and chariot² with thy cattle.' (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2.) And further (f) Vidura and others are spoken of in the Smṛiti as possessed of distinguished knowledge, although they were of Sūdra descent. Consequently the Sūdra enjoys the prerogative of acquiring various sorts of divine knowledge. To this we reply: The Sūdra has no such prerogative, because he cannot study the Veda. For it is the man that studies the Veda, and obtains a knowledge of its contents, who enjoys the prerogative of [access to] those contents. But a Sūdra does not study the Veda, for such study must be preceded by initiation, which again is confined to the three upper castes. As regards (a) the desire of knowledge,—that, in the absence of power, confers no prerogative. And (b) mere secular power does not suffice for the purpose; since scriptural power is necessary in a matter connected with Scripture; and such scriptural power is debarred by the debarring of study. And (c) the passage which declares that a 'Sūdra is incapacitated for sacrifice,' demonstrates his incapacity for knowledge also; since that follows

² Such is the sense given to *hāretvā* by the Commentators, who make it out to be a compound of the words *hāra*, "necklace," and *itvā*, "a chariot;" but although *itvā* might be the nominative of *itvan*, "going," no such word appears in the lexicons with the sense of "chariot." Besides, the compound seems a very awkward one. Perhaps the word should be separated into *ha are tvā*; but then there would be no nominative to *astu*, and it would be difficult to construe *tvā*, "thee."—Since the above was written, I have been favoured with a note on the passage by Professor Goldstücker. He conjectures that the words should be divided as follows: *āhaha are tvā Sūdra tava eva saha gobhir astu*; that *tvā* may be the nominative singular feminine of the Vedic pronoun *tva*, meaning "some one," and then the sense might be as follows: "O, friend, some woman belongs to thee, Sūdra! Let her be (*i.e.* come) along with the cows." And Jānaśruti would appear to have understood the word *tvā* in this sense here supposed, for we find that on hearing the reply of Raikva, he took his daughter to the latter, along with four hundred additional cows and the other gifts; and that on seeing the damsel, Raikva expressed his satisfaction and acceded to the request of her father.—The author of these puzzling words, it seems, intended a pun; and Sankara perhaps gave only one solution of it.

from the rule, which is of general application. As regards the circumstance that in the Vedic text regarding the knowledge of the Sañvarga, the word Sūdra occurs, which you regard as a sign in favour of your view; it is (*d*) no sign; because in that passage no rule is laid down. For the discovery of a sign indicates that a rule has been laid down; but in the passage in question there is no such rule. And although it were conceded that [if it were found in a precept regarding the Sañvarga] the word Sūdra would confer on a man of that caste a prerogative in regard to that particular knowledge alone, (from its being intended for him), although not to all sorts of knowledge, yet as the word occurs [not in precept, but] in an illustrative narrative (*arthavāda*) it cannot confer on him a prerogative in regard to any knowledge whatever. And in fact this word Sūdra can be applied to a person [of a higher caste] who possessed the prerogative. How? I explain: Vexation (*śuk*) arose in the mind of Jānaśruti when he heard himself disrespectfully spoken of in these words of the swan: 'Who is this that thou speakest of as if he were Rainka yoked to the chariot?'³ (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 3). And since a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge, we conclude that it is to this vexation (*śuk*) that the rishi Rainka referred, for the purpose of shewing his own knowledge of things imperceptible by sense, when he made use of this word Sūdra (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2, see above). But again, how is it indicated by the word Sūdra that vexation (*śuk*) arose in his mind? We reply: by 'the running to it [or him]' (*tad-ūdravanāt*); *i.e.* either 'he ran to vexation,' or 'he was assailed by vexation,' or 'in his vexation he resorted to Rainka.' We conclude thus because the sense afforded by the component parts of the word Sūdra is the probable one,⁴ whilst the conventional sense of the word Sūdra is here inapplicable. And this is seen to be the meaning in this story.

³ This appears to allude to the person referred to being found sitting under a chariot (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 8). See p. 67 of Babu Rājendralāl Mitra's translation. This story is alluded to by Professor Weber in his *Ind. Stud.* ix. 45, note, where he treats Sayugvan as a proper name, and remarks "The Vedānta Sūtras (i. 3, 34, 35), indeed, try to explain away this" (the circumstance of Jānaśruti being called a Sūdra) and of course S'ankara in his commentary on them does the same, as well in his explanation of the Chhāndogya Upanishad." I am not, however, by any means certain that the epithet "Sūdra," applied to Jānaśruti by Rainka, is not merely meant as a term of abuse.

⁴ The meaning of this is that the word Sūdra is derived from *śuk*, "vexation,"

Sūtra 35. "And that Jānaśruti was a Kshattriya is afterwards indicated by what is said of Abhipratārin of the race of Chaitraratha."

"That Jānaśruti was not a Sūdra appears also from this, that by examining the context he is afterwards found to be a Kshattriya by the sign that he is mentioned along with Abhipratārin of the family of Chaitraratha. For in the sequel of the passage regarding the knowledge of the Saṁvarga mention is made in these words of Abhipratārin Chaitrarathi, a Kshattriya: 'Now a Brahmachārin asked alms of Saunaka of the race of Kapi, and Abhipratārin the son of Kakshasena who were being served at a meal' (Chh. Up. iv. 3, 5). And that Abhipratārin belonged to the family of Chaitraratha is to be gathered from his connection with the Kāpeyas; for the connection of Chaitraratha with the latter has been ascertained by the text: 'The Kāpeyas performed sacrifice for Chaitraratha.' Priests of the same family in general officiate for worshippers belonging to the same family. From this, as well as from the text: 'From him a lord of Kshat-

and *dru*, "to run." (See the First Volume of this work, p. 97, note 192.) Even the great S'ankara, it seems, was unable to perceive the absurdity of such etymologies. In his commentary on the Chhāndogya Upanishad the same writer tells us that various explanations had been given of the employment of the word S'ūdra in this passage: *Nanu rājā 'sau kshattri-sambandhāt | "Sa ha kshattāram uvācha" (iv. 1, 5) ity uktam | vidyā-grahaṇāya cha brāhmaṇa-samīpopaganūt | sūdrasya cha anadhikārāt | katham idam ananurūpāṁ Raikveṇa uchyate "sūdra" iti | taitra āhur āchāryyāḥ | haṁsa-vachana-śravaṇāt śug enam āviveśa | tena asau śuchū śrutvā Raikvasya mahimūnaṁ vā dravati iti | ṛishir ātmanaḥ parokshajnatūṁ darśayan "sūdra" ity āha | sūdra-vad bādhanena eva enam vidyā-grahaṇāya upajagāma na śiśrūshayā | na tu jātyā eva sūdraḥ iti | apare punar āhur alpaṁ dhanam āhṛitam iti rishā eva enam uktavān "sūdra" iti |* "But is not Jānaśruti shewn to have been a king, (a) from his name being connected with a charioteer in the passage 'He said to his charioteer,' (b) from his resorting to a Brāhman to obtain knowledge, and (c) from a S'ūdra possessing no such prerogative? How then did Raikva address to him an appellation inconsistent with this in the words 'o S'ūdra?' Learned teachers reply: 'Vexation (*śuk*) took possession of him on hearing the words of the swan: in consequence of which, or of hearing (*śrutvā*) of the greatness of Raikva, he ran up [S'ūdra is here derived either from *śuchū + dravati*, or from *śrutvā + dravati*]; and the rishi, to shew his knowledge of things beyond the reach of the senses, called him S'ūdra. He had approached to obtain knowledge from the rishi by annoying him like a S'ūdra, and not by rendering him service; while yet he was not by birth a S'ūdra. Others again say that the rishi angrily called him a S'ūdra because he had brought him so little property." This passage is also translated by Bābu Rājendralāl (Chh. Up. p. 68, note), who renders *bādhanena* (which I have taken to mean "annoying") by "paying" for instruction; but I cannot find any authority for this sense of the word.

triyas named Chaitrarathi was descended,' which proves that his family were Kshattriyas, we may gather that Abhipratārin belonged to this class. And the circumstance that Jānaśruti is mentioned in connection with the same branch of knowledge as Abhipratārin, the Kshattriya, shews that the former also was a Kshattriya. For it is in general men of the same class who are mentioned together. And from the fact of Jānaśruti sending a charioteer (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 5-7), and his other acts of sovereignty also, we learn that he was a Kshattriya. Hence (we conclude that) a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of divine knowledge.

Sūtra 36. "From reference being made to initiation, and from a Sūdra being declared to be excluded from it."

"And that a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, may be further inferred from the fact that investiture with the sacred cord and other rites are referred to in passages where science is the subject in question. For the fact that the seekers after such knowledge obtained initiation, is shewn by such passages as the following: 'He invested him;' 'He came to him, saying, teach me, Sir' (Chh. Up. vii. 1, 1?); 'Devoted to Brahma, resting in Brahma, seeking after the highest Brahma, they approached the venerable Pippalāda with firewood in their hands, (saying) 'he will declare all this' (Prašna Up. i. 1); and 'having invested them,' etc. And that a Sūdra receives no initiation is shewn by the text of the Smṛiti which pronounces him to be but once-born, viz. 'the Sūdra is the fourth class, and once-born;' and by such other passages as this: 'There is no sin in a Sūdra, and he is not entitled to initiation.'"⁶

Sūtra 37. "And because he acted after ascertaining that it was not a Sūdra [who had come to him]."

"That a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge appears also from this that [according to the Chhāndogya Upanishad] Gautama proceeded to invest and instruct Jābāla after ascertaining by his truth-speaking that he was not a Sūdra: 'None but a Brāhman could distinctly declare this: bring, o fair youth, a piece of fuel; I will invest thee; thou hast not departed from the truth' (Chh. Up. iv. 4, 5).⁶

This last verse has been already quoted in Vol. I. p. 138, note 244.

⁶ I shall quote in full the earlier part of the passage from which these words are

Sūtra 38. "And because, according to the Smṛiti, a Sūdra is forbidden to hear, or read, or learn the sense."

"And that a Sūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, appears from this that, according to the Smṛiti, he is forbidden to hear it, or read it, or learn its sense: *i.e.* it is declared in the Smṛiti that he is forbidden either to hear the Veda, or read the Veda, or to learn its contents, or to practise its injunctions. Hearing is forbidden to him in these texts: 'If he listens to the reading of the Veda, his ears are to be filled with [melted] lead and lac;' and 'The Sūdra is a walking cemetery; therefore no one must read in his vicinity.' And consequently the reading of it is prohibited to him: for

taken, both for the sake of explaining the allusion, and for the illustration which it affords of ancient Indian manners: Chh. Up. iv. 4, 1. *Satyakāmo ha Jābālo Jabālām mātarām āmantrayānchakre* "brahmacharyyam bhavati vivatsyāmi kīm-gotro nv aham asmi" iti | 2. *Sā ha enam uvācha* "na aham etad vedz tāta yad-gotras tvam asi | bahv aham charantī parichārinī yauvano tvām alabhe | sā 'ham etad na veda yad-gotras tvam asi | Jabālā tu nāma aham asmi Satyakāmo nīma tvam asi | sa Satyakāmaḥ eva Jābālo 'bravīthāḥ" iti | "Satyakāma, the son of Jabālā, addressed his mother Jabālā, saying, 'I wish, mother, to enter on the life of a religious student. To what family (*gotra*): see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 378 ff.) do I belong?' 2. She answered, 'I do not know, my son, to what family thou belongest. Much consorting [with lovers] and roving (or serving), in my youth, I got thee. I know not of what family thou art. But my name is Jabālā, and thine Satyakāma. Say, 'I am Satyakāma son of Jabālā.'" He accordingly goes to Hāridrumata of the race of Gotama, and asks to be received as a student. The teacher enquires to what family he belongs and the youth repeats verbatim the answer he had received from his mother, and says he is Satyakāma the son of Jabālā. The teacher replies in the words quoted by S'ankara "No one other than a Brāhman could distinctly declare this," etc. The interpretation of paragraph 2, above given, seems to convey its correct sense. Jabālā apparently means to confess that her son was *nullius filius*: and that he must be content to call himself her son, as she did not know who his father was. The explanation of the words *bahv aham charantī parichārinī yauvano tvām alabhe* given by the Commentators and followed by Bābu Rājendralāl Mittra, that she was so much occupied with attending to guests in her husband's house, and so modest that she never thought of enquiring about her son's *gotra*, and that her husband died early, is founded mainly on the word *parichārinī*, and would not account for Jabālā's ignorance of her husband's name (which she does not mention) or even of her husband's lineage. In regard to the sense of *charantī* see the passage from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, ii. 5, 2, 20, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 136, note 242. S'ankara was either ignorant of the laxity of ancient morals, or wished to throw a veil over the spurious origin of a sage like Satyakāma who had attained divine knowledge and become a teacher of it (see Chh. Up. iv. 10, 1). In his preface, however, p. 30, as I observe, Bābu Rājendralāl speaks of Satyakāma as a natural son in these words: "Although a natural born son whose father was unknown, and recognized by the contemptuous soubriquet of Jabālā from the designation of his mother Jabālā," etc.

how can he, in whose neighbourhood even the Veda is forbidden to be read, read it himself? And if he utters it, his tongue is to be cut; and if he retains it in his memory, his body is to be slit. And it results from the meaning of the terms that he is prohibited from learning its contents, or practising its injunctions, according to the texts, 'Let no one impart intelligence to a Sūdra;' and 'reading, sacrifice, and liberality are the duties of twice-born men.' As regards (f) Vidura, Dharma, Vyādha, and others in whom knowledge was produced in consequence of their recollection of acts performed in a former birth, their enjoyment of its results cannot be prevented, from the transcendent character of the effects of knowledge; and because in the text 'Let the four castes be made to hear them,' the Smṛiti declares that the four castes possess the prerogative of learning the Itihāsas and Purāṇas [by means of which Sūdras may attain perfection]. But it has been established that Sūdras do not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge derived [directly] from [the study of] the Veda."

The Bhagavad Gītā affirms a different doctrine in the following verses, x. 32 f., where Kṛishṇa says:

*Mān hi Pārtha vyapāsṛitya ye 'pi syuḥ pāpa-yonayaḥ | striyo vaiśyāḥ
tathā sūdras te 'pi yānti parām gatim | 33. Kim punar brāhmaṇāḥ puṅ-
yāḥ bhaktāḥ rājarshayaḥ tathā |*

"Those who have faith in me, even though they be of base origin, women, Vaiśyas, and Sūdras, attain to the most transcendent state. How much more pure Brāhmans and devout royal rishis."

Sankara could scarcely have been ignorant that his principle was not in harmony with this text; but he has thought proper to ignore this discrepance of views, as he probably shrank from directly contradicting a work held in such high estimation.

See also the account of the views entertained on the same subject by Sāṅḍilya which I have stated above, p. 178.

Page 105, line 24.

The following quotation continues the discussion of this subject; and will also serve to illustrate pp. 6 and 16, above, as well as p. 60 of the First Volume:

Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 30. "*Samāna-nāma-rūpatvāch cha āvṛittāv apy*

avirodho darśanāt smṛiteś cha”¹ | *athūpi syāt | yadi paśv-ādi-vād deva-
 vyaktayo 'pi santatyā eva utpādyerān nirudhyerāmś cha tato 'bhidhānā-
 bhidheyābhidhātri - vyavahārāvichhedāt sambandha - nityatvena virodhaḥ
 śabde parihriyeta | yadā tu khaṭu sakalaṁ trailokyam parityakta-nāma-
 rūpaṁ nirlepam pralīyate prabhavati cha abhinavam iti śruti-smṛiti-vādāḥ
 vadanti tadā katham avirodhaḥ iti | tatra idam abhidhīyate “ samāna-
 nāma-rūpatvād ” iti | tadā 'pi saṁsārasya anāditvaṁ tāvad abhyupagan-
 tavyam | pratipādayiṣhyati cha ūchāryyaḥ saṁsārasya anāditvam “ upa-
 pādyate cha apy upalabhyate cha ” iti (Brahma Sūtra ii. 1, 36) | anādau
 cha saṁsāre yathā svāpa-prabodhayoḥ pralaya-prabhava-śravaṇe 'pi pūrva-
 prabodha-vād uttara-prabodhe 'pi vyavahārād na kaśchid virodhaḥ | evaṁ
 kalpāntara-prabhava-pralayayoḥ api iti drashtavyam | svāpa-prabodhayoś
 cha pralaya-prabhavau śrūyete | “ yadā sūptaḥ svapnaṁ na kanchana
 paśyaty aīha asmin prāṇaḥ eva ekadhā bhavati tadā enaṁ vāk sarvair
 nāmaभिः saha apyēti chakṣuḥ sarvaiḥ rūpaiḥ saha apyēti śrotraṁ sar-
 vaiḥ śabdaiḥ saha apyēti manāḥ sarvair dhyānaiḥ saha apyēti | sa yadā
 pratibudhyate yathā 'gner jvalataḥ sarvāḥ diśo viṣphulingāḥ vipratish-
 ṭherann evam eva etasmād ātmanaḥ sarve prāṇūḥ yathāyatanaṁ vipratish-
 ṭhante prāṇebhyo devāḥ devebhyo lokāḥ (Kaush. Br. Utt. A. 3, 3) iti | syād
 etat | svāpe puruṣāntara-vyavahārāvichhedāt svayāṁ cha sushupta-pra-
 buddhasya pūrva-prabodha-vyavahārānusandhānu-sambhavād aviruddham |
 mahāpralaye tu sarva-vyavahārochhedāj janmāntara-vyavahāra-vach cha
 kalpāntara-vyavahārasya anusandhātum āśakyatvād vaiṣhamyam iti | na
 eṣha doṣaḥ | saty api sarva-vyavahārochhedini mahāpralaye Parameśva-
 rānugrahād īśvarāṇāṁ Hiraṇyagarbhādīnāṁ kalpāntara-vyavahārānu-
 sandhānopapattēḥ | yadyapi prākṛitāḥ prāṇīno na janmāntara-vyava-
 hāram anusandhānāḥ dṛiṣyante iti na tat prākṛita-vād īśvarāṇāṁ bhavi-
 tavyam | yathā hi prāṇitvāviśeṣe 'pi manushyādi-stamba-paryyanteshu
 jñānaiśvaryyādi-pratibandhaḥ pareṇa pareṇa bhūyān bhavan dṛiṣyate
 tathā manushyādīshv eva Hiraṇyagarbha-paryyanteshu jñānaiśvaryyādy-
 abhivyaktir api pareṇa pareṇa bhūyasi bhavati ity etat śruti-smṛiti-
 vādeshv asakṛid eva anukalpādau prādurbhavatām paramaiśvaryyam śrū-
 yamāṇaṁ na śakyāṁ nāsti iti vaditum | tataś cha atīta-kalpānusṭhīta-
 prakṛiṣṭa-jñāna-karmanāṁ īśvarāṇāṁ Hiraṇyagarbhādīnāṁ varttamāna-
 kalpādau prādurbhavatām Parameśvarānugṛihītānāṁ sūpta-pratibuddha-
 vat kalpāntara-vyavahārānusandhānopapattiḥ | tathā cha śrutir “ yo
 Brahmāṇaṁ vidadhāti pūrvaṁ yo vai vedāṁś cha prahīnoti tasmai | taṁ*

ha devam ātma-buddhi-prakāśam mumukshur vai śaraṇam aham prapadyo"
 (Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, vi. 18) *iti | smaranti cha Śaunakādayo Ma-*
dhuchhandah-prabhṛtibhir dāsatathyo dṛishṭāḥ iti | prativedaṃ cha evam
eva kāṇḍarshy-ādayaḥ smaryyante | śrutir apy ṛishi-jñāna-pūrvakam
eva māntreṇa anuśṭhānaṃ darśayati "yo ha vai aviditārsheya-chhando-
daivata-brāhmaṇena māntreṇa yājayati vā adhyūpayati vā sthānuṃ cha
richhati garttaṃ vā prapadyate" *ity upakramya "tasmād etāni māntre*
vidyād," iti | prāṇināṃ cha sukha-prāptaye dharmo vidhīyate duḥkha-
parihārāya adharmaḥ pratishidhyate | dṛishṭānuśravika-duḥkha-sukha-
vishayaḥ cha rūga-dveshaḥ bhavato na vilakṣaṇa-vishayāv ity ato dhar-
mādharma-phala-bhūttarottarā ṛishṭir 'nishpadyamānū pūrva-ṛishṭi-
sadrīṣy eva nishpadyate | smṛitiś cha bhavati "toshāṃ ye yāni karmāni
prak-ṛishṭyām pratipedire | tāny eva te prapadyante srijyamānāḥ punaḥ
punaḥ | hiṃsrāhiṃsre mṛidu-krūre dharmādharmaḥ ṛitāṅṛite | tad-bhā-
vitāḥ prapadyante tasmāt tat tasya rochate" *iti | pralīyamānam api cha*
idaṃ jagat śakty-avaśeṣam eva pralīyate śakti-mūlam eva cha prabhavati
itarathā ākasmikatva-prasangāt | na cha mekākārāḥ śaktayaḥ śakyāḥ
kalpayitum | tataś cha vichhīdya vichhīdya apy udbhavatām bhūr-ādī-
loka-pravāhānāṃ deva-tiryāṇ-manushya-lakṣhaṇānāṃ cha prāṇi-ni-
kāya-pravāhānāṃ varṇāśrama-dharma-phala-vyavasthānāṃ cha anādaḥ
saṃsāre niyatatvam indraya-vishaya-sambandha-niyatatva-vat pratyeta-
vyam | na hi indriya-vishaya-sambandhāḍor vyavahārasya prati sargam
anyathātvaṃ shashṭhendriya-vishaya-kalpaṃ śakyam utprekshitum | ataś
cha sarva-kalpānāṃ tulya-vyavahāratvāt kalpāntara-vyavahāranusan-
dhūna-kshamatvāch cha īśvarāṇāṃ samāna-nāma-rūpāḥ eva pratisargaṃ
viśeṣāḥ prādurbhavanti samāna-nāma-rūpatvāch cha āvṛittāv api mahā-
sarga-mahāpralaya-lakṣhaṇāyām jagato 'bhyupagamyamānāyām na kaś-
chich chhābda-prāmānyādi-virodhaḥ | samāna-nāma-rūpatām cha-śruti-
smṛiti darśayatuḥ "sūryā-chandramasau dhātā yathā-pūrvam akalpayat |
divaṃ cha pṛithivīm chāntarīksham alho evaḥ" | iti | yathā pūrvasmīn
kalpe sūryā-chandramah-prabhṛiti jagat klṛiptaṃ tathā 'smīn api kalpe
Parameśvaro 'kalpayad ity arthaḥ | tathā "Agnir vai akāmayata 'an-
nādo devānāṃ syām' iti sa evam agnaye krittikābhyāḥ puroḍāsam aṣṭa-
kapālāṃ niravapat" iti nakshatreshṭi-vidhau yo 'gnir niravapat yasmāi
vā 'gnaye niravapat tayoh samāna-nāma-rūpatām darśayati ity-evam-
jātyikā śrutir udāhartavyā | smṛitir api "ṛishināṃ nāmadheyāni yūś
cha vedeshu dṛishṭayaḥ | sarvāryy-ante prasūtānāṃ tāny evaibhyo dadāty

ajah | yathartāv ṛitu-lingāni nānā-rūpāni paryyayo | drīsyante tāni tāny eva tathā bhāvāḥ yugādīshu | yathā 'bhīmānino' tītās tulyās te sāmpratāir iha | devāḥ devair atītair hi rūpāir nāmabhir eva cha" ity evaṃ-jatīyākā drashṭavyā |

“Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 30. ‘And though there be a recurrence of creation, yet as (the new creation) has the same name and form’ (as the old) there will be no contradiction in regard to the words of the Veda; since this is proved both by the intuition of rishis and by the Smṛiti.’ And further, let it be so that if a series of individual gods, as of animals, etc., is born and disappears in unbroken continuity, the alleged contradiction in regard to the words of the Veda (viz. that as they are connected with objects which are not eternal, they cannot themselves be eternal) will be removed by the perpetuity of connection arising from the continuity of practice regarding the designation of things, the things to be designated, and the designator. But when, as texts of the Śruti and Smṛiti inform us, the entire three worlds, losing name and form,⁶ are utterly annihilated and afterwards produced anew, how can the contradiction be avoided? [The meaning of this is: How can there be an eternal connection between the words of the Veda and objects which how long soever they may have existed, must yet have come into being at the new creation following after the total (not merely the partial) destruction of the universe? and if such a connection does not exist, how can the words of the Veda be eternal, when before this new creation they represented nothing existent? see above, p. 102.] A reply to this is given in the words, ‘Yet as (the new creation) has the same name and form as the old,’ etc. Even then the world must be admitted to have been without a beginning. This eternity of the world will be declared by our teacher in the words (of

⁷ Professor Goldstücker is of opinion that here, as elsewhere, these words (*nānā-rūpa*) should be rendered “substance and form.” See the note on the subject furnished by him in M. Burnouf’s Introduction à l’histoire du Buddhisme Indien, p. 502.

⁸ Govinda Ānanda remarks on the Sūtra before us, and S’ankara’s comment: *Nanu mahā-pralaye jāter apy asattvāt śabdārtha-sambandhānīyatvam ity āśankya āha “samāna” iti | sūtrāṃ nirasya āśankūm āha “athūpi” iti | vyahṭi-santatyū jātinām avāntava-pralaye sattvāt sambandhas tishṭhātī vyavahārāvichhedūj jñāyate cha iti vedasya anapekshatvena pramāṇyo na kaśchid virodhaḥ syūt | nirlepa-pralaye tu sambandhānāsūt punḥ śrīṣṭau kenachit puṃsā sanketaḥ kartavyaḥ iti puruṣa-hrudhī-sāpekshatvena vedasya aprāmāṇyam adhyāpakasya ūstrayasya nūśūd āśritasya anīyatvaṃ cha prāptam ity arthaḥ | mahāpralaye ‘pi nirlepa-layo’ siddhaḥ sat-kāryya-vūddiḥ |*

Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 36), 'It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.' And the world being eternal, although the Veda declares that its dissolution and reproduction take place during the sleep, and at the waking (of the creator), still as the practice continues the same in the later, as in the previous, waking condition, there is no contradiction (of the sort pretended). And it is to be considered that the same must be the case in regard to the dissolutions and creations of another Kalpa (see Vol. I. p. 43 f.). Now dissolutions and creations are said in the Veda to take place during (the creator's) sleep, and at his waking. 'When the sleeper does not see any vision, and when his breath is concentrated in him, then the voice with all names enters into him, the eye with all forms enters into him, the ear with all sounds enters into him, the mind with all thoughts enters into him. When he wakes, just as sparks shoot out in all directions from blazing fire, so do all breaths according to their several seats issue from this Soul; from the breaths spring deities; and from the deities worlds' (Kaushītakī Brāhmaṇa, latter part, 3, 3). But be it so, that [in the circumstances referred to] there is no contradiction of the kind alleged, because during the

tathā cha saṁskārātmanā śabdārtha-tat-sambandhānām satām eva punaḥ sṛiḥṣṭāv abhivyukter na anityatvam | abhivyaktānām pūrva-kalpīya-nāma-rūpa-samānatvād na sanketaḥ kenachit kūrīyāḥ | vishama-sṛiḥṣṭau hi sanketāpekṣhū na tulya-sṛiḥṣṭāv iti pariharati "tatra idam" ity-ādinā | "But since in a great dissolution even species cease to exist, will it not result that the connection of words with the objects they denote is not eternal? In reference to this doubt the aphorist says, 'as the name and form are the same,' etc. Waving the authority of the Sūtra, the Commentator expresses a doubt in the words 'And further,' etc. It is true that the connection subsists in consequence of the continuity of individuals owing to the existence of species during the intermediate dissolutions, and this connection will be known because the previous practice continues uninterrupted. And so from the independence of the Veda, there will be no contradiction in regard to its authority. But since in a total dissolution all such connection is lost, and some intimation (of what had existed before) must be given by some person at the new creation, the Veda will be dependent on the understanding of such person, and consequently its unauthoritativeness, as well as the non-eternity of the dependent object, owing to the extinction of the instructor on whom it depended, will result. But even in a great dissolution an absolute annihilation is unproved, according to the doctrine that effects exist in their causes. And so, as words, the objects which they denote, and the connection between both, (all of which things previously existed), are manifested at the new creation as reminiscences of a previous existence, they are not non-eternal. As the objects thus manifested have the same names and forms as in the previous Kalpa, there is no necessity for any intimation (of what had existed before) being given by any person. For such an intimation would, indeed, be required in a dissimilar creation, but not in one which is similar. It is thus that the commentator removes the objection in the words 'a reply to this is given,' etc."

sleep (of one person) the practice of others continues uninterruptedly, and even the person who has been in a deep sleep can ascertain the action which took place in his former waking state. But this is inapplicable to a great dissolution, because then there is an absolute annihilation of all practice, and because the practice which prevailed in another Kalpa, like that of another birth, cannot be ascertained. This objection, however, does not hold; for although all practice is annihilated by a great dissolution, still it is proved that through the favour of the supreme Lord, the lords Hiranyagarbha (Brahmā), etc., can ascertain the practice of the preceding Kalpa. Although ordinary creatures are not observed to evince the power of discovering the practice of a former birth, the limitation which is true of them will not attach to the great lords in question. For just as in the series of beings commencing with men, and ending with posts, although all the creatures included in it without distinction possess the attribute of life, yet, as we descend the scale, the obstructions to knowledge and to power are perceived to go on gradually increasing; so too, in the series beginning with men and culminating in Hiranyagarbha, there is an ever greater and greater manifestation of knowledge and of power, etc.; and thus the transcendent faculties which are declared in texts of the Śruti and Smṛiti to belong to the beings who again and again come into existence at the beginning of the successive Kalpas cannot be denied to be real. And consequently it is established that the lords Hiranyagarbha and others who during the past Kalpa had manifested distinguished knowledge and powers of action, and who again came into existence at the beginning of the present Kalpa, and enjoyed the favour of the supreme Lord, were able, like a person who has been asleep and awakes again, to ascertain the practice of the previous Kalpa. And accordingly the Śruti says: 'Seeking final liberation, I take refuge with that God, shining by the light of his own intellect, who in the beginning creates Brahmā and reveals to him the Vedas' (Śvetāśv. Upan. vi. 18). And Saunāka and others record in their Smṛitis that the hymns in the ten Maṇḍalas of the Rig-veda were seen by Madhuchhandas and other rishis. In the same way the Kāṇḍarshis, etc., of each of the Vedas are specified in the Smṛitis. The Śruti, too, in the passage commencing 'Any priest who in sacrificing for another person, or in teaching a pupil, employs a text of which he does not know the rishi, metre, deity,

and proper application, is turned into a post, or falls into a pit,' and ending, 'Wherefore let him ascertain all these points regarding every text;'—declares that a knowledge of the rishi by whom it was seen should precede the ceremonial use of every text.⁹ Further, righteousness is prescribed and unrighteousness is forbidden, with a view to promote the happiness and obviate the misery of living beings: and love and dislike have for their objects nothing but the happiness and misery which are perceptible by sense or are scripturally revealed. Consequently each succeeding creation which is effected, forming, as it does, the recompense of righteousness and unrighteousness, is constituted perfectly similar to each of those which preceded it. And the Smṛiti, too, declares: 'These creatures, as they are reproduced time after time, perform, respectively, the very same actions as they had performed in the previous creation.¹⁰ They so act under the influence of (their previous tendencies) whether noxious or innoxious, mild or cruel, righteous or unrighteous, to truth or to falsehood; and it is from this cause that they are disposed to one or another course of conduct.' Besides, even when this world is destroyed, a residuum of its force (*śakti*) continues, and it is reproduced only because it has this force for its basis: for any other supposition would involve the difficulty of the world having no cause. And as we cannot conceive that there are many forms of force (*śakti*), we must believe that, as the relations between the senses and their objects are invariable, so too, in a world which had no commencement, the successions of earths and other worlds, and of different classes of living beings distinguished as gods, animals, and men, (although separated from each other in the period of their production,) as well as the ordinations of castes, orders, duties, and recompences are invariable. For we cannot imagine that such conditions as the re-

⁹ The object of these remarks of S'ankara regarding the rishis is thus explained by Govinda Ānanda: *Kincha mantrāṇām rishy-ādi-jñānavuśyakatva-jñāpikā śrutir mantra-dṛig-riśhīṇām jñānātisayam darsayati ity ūha | . . . tathū cha jñānūdhikair kalpāntaritam vedaṁ smṛitvū vyavahārasya pravartitvatvād vedasya anāditvam anapekshatvaṁ cha aviruddham iti bhāvaḥ |* "In these words S'ankara intimates that the S'ruti which declares the necessity of knowing the rishis, etc., thereby manifests the transcendent knowledge of the rishis who saw the mantras. . . . And so from the fact that these rishis, distinguished by eminent knowledge, recollected the Veda which had existed in a different Kalpa, and [again] gave currency to the [ancient] practice [of its precepts], it is shown that the eternity and independence of the Veda is not in contradiction [to any fact]—such is the purport."

¹⁰ See the First Volume of this work, p. 60.

lations between the senses and their objects, etc., should vary in every creation, in such a way, for example, as that there should exist objects for a sixth sense. Hence, as all Kalpas exist under the same conditions, and as the lords (Hiranyagarbha, etc.) are able to ascertain the conditions which existed in another Kalpa, varieties (of beings) having the same name and form are produced in every creation; and in consequence of this sameness of name and form, even though a revolution of the world in the form of a great creation and a great dissolution is admitted, no contradiction arises affecting the authority of the words of the Veda, etc. Both Śruti and Smṛiti shew us this sameness of name and form. Here such texts of the Śruti as these may be adduced: 'The creator formed as before the sun and moon, the sky and the earth, the air and the heaven.' This means that in this Kalpa the supreme Lord fashioned the sun, the moon, and the rest of the world in the same way as they had been fashioned in the former Kalpa.' Again: Agni desired, 'May I be the food-eater of the gods.' He offered to Agni [as the deity presiding over] the Kṛittikās¹¹ (the Pleiades) a cake in eight platters.' In this passage the Śruti shews that the two Agnis, he who in the ceremony of sacrifice to the constellation offered the oblation, and he to whom it was offered, had the same name and form. And such Smṛitis, too, as the following should be examined: 'The Unborn Being gives to those born at the end of the night (*i.e.* of the dissolution¹²) the names of the rishis and their intuitions into the Vedas.¹³ Just as on the recurrence of each of the seasons of the year its various characteristics are perceived to be the very same (as they had been before), so too are the things produced at the beginning of the yugas;¹⁴ and the past gods presiding over different objects resemble those who exist at present, and the present (resemble the) past in their names and forms.' "

I shall quote a part of Sāṅkara's remarks on the Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 36, referred to in the earlier part of the preceding quotation, in which the eternity of the world is affirmed:

¹¹ *Kṛittikā-nakshatrābhīmāni-devāya Agnaye*—Govinda Ānanda.

¹² *S'arvary-anto pralayānte*—Govinda Ānanda.

¹³ The sense of the last words, which I translate literally, is not very clear. Govinda Ānanda says that in the word *vedeshu* the locative case denotes the object (*vedeshu iti vishaya-saptamī*). Compare the passages quoted above in p. 16 from the Vishṇu P. and M. Bh. which partially correspond with this verse.

¹⁴ Already quoted from the Vishṇu P. in the First Volume of this work, p. 60.

ii. 1, 36. “*Upapadyate cha upalabhyate cha*” | “*upapadyate cha*”
saṃsarasya anādityam | *ādimatve hi saṃsarasya akasmād udbhūter muk-*
tānām api punaḥ saṃsārodhbhūti-prasangaḥ | *akritābhyaḡama-prasangaś*
cha sukha-duḡḡhādi-vaishamyasya nirnimittatvāt | *na cha īśvaro vaisha-*
mya-hetur ity uktam | *na cha avidyā kevalā vaishamyasya kāraṇam eka-*
rūpatvāt | *rāḡādi-kleśa-vāsanākshipta-karmāpekshā tv avidyā vaishamyā-*
karī syāt | *na cha karma antareṇa sarīraṃ sambhavati na cha sarīram*
antareṇa karma sambhavati iti itaretarāśraya-dosha-prasangaḥ | *anāditve*
tu vijānkura-nyāyena upapatter na kaśchid dosho bhavati |

“‘It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.’ The eternity of the world is agreeable to reason. For on the supposition that it had a beginning, as it came into existence without a cause, the difficulty would arise (1) that those who had obtained liberation from mundane existence might become again involved in it;¹⁶ and (2) that men would enjoy or suffer the recompense of what they had never done, as the inequalities occasioned by happiness and misery, etc., would be causeless. But God is not the cause of this inequality, as we have said (see the comment on Sūtra ii. 1, 34). Nor can ignorance alone be its cause, since ignorance is uniform (whilst conditions are varied). But ignorance, when connected with works induced by the surviving memory of desire and other sources of disquiet, may be the cause of inequality. Further, corporeal existence does not originate without works, nor works without bodily existence: so that (this hypothesis of the world having had a beginning) involves the fallacy of making each of two things depend upon the other. But on the supposition that the world had no beginning, there is no difficulty, as the two things in question may be conceived to have succeeded each other like seed and sprout from all eternity.” (See Ballantyne’s Aphorisms of the Sāṅkhya, Book i. pp. 60 and 126.)

Page 111, line 2 from the foot; and Page 113, line 11.

In the first edition, p. 78, I had translated the word *samayādhyu-*
shite “in the morning twilight.” When revising the translation for the new edition I became uncertain about the sense, and did not advert

¹⁶ *i.e.* as Professor Cowell suggests, if there is no cause for the production of the world, it comes into existence at hap-hazard, and by some chance the liberated may be born again as well as the unliberated.

to the fact that the term is explained in Professor Wilson's Dictionary as denoting "a time at which neither stars nor sun are visible." Professor Cowell has since pointed out that the word occurs in the second of the following verses of Manu, where a rule is given for the interpretation of the Veda in cases such as that referred to by the commentator on the Nyāya Sūtras: ii. 14: *S'ruti-dvaidhañ tu yattra syāt tatra dharmāv ubhau smṛitau | ubhāv api hi tau dharmau samyag uktau manishibhiḥ |* 15. *Udite 'nudite chaiva samayādhyushite tathā | sarvathā varttate yajnaḥ itīyañ vaidikī śrutih |* "14. In cases where there is a twofold Vedic prescription, both the rites are declared in the Smṛiti to be binding; since they have been distinctly pronounced by sages to be of equal authority. 15. The Vedic rule is that sacrifice may be performed in all the three ways [indicated in a particular text], viz. when the sun has risen, when it has not risen, and when neither stars nor sun appear, i.e. in the morning twilight." Kullūka says: *Sūrya-nakshatra-varjitaḥ kālah samayādhyushita-śabdēna uchyate |* "a time devoid of sun and stars is denoted by the word *samayādhyushita*."

Page 142, lines 14 and 16.

The first of these quotations is from the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, i. 4, 10; and the second from the Chhandogya Upanishad, viii. 7, 2.

Page 149, line 6.

For *śabdādīkshiter* read *śabdād īkshiter*.

Page 154, note 140.

Professor Cowell observes on the close of this note that the Sāṅkhya opponent maintains that the metaphor is in every case a real one.

Page 157, line 18.

Professor Cowell remarks that the meaning of the phrase *śabda-pramāṇake 'rthe* is not correctly rendered by the translation here given, viz. "where the (proper sense) is established by the words." The author is laying down the general rule that in cases where there is nothing in the purport of any passage in which a particular word occurs to lead the reader to suppose that it is figuratively used, and where consequently the word itself is the only index to the sense, it must be understood in its primary signification. The proper rendering, therefore, is: "Where the sense can only be determined by the word itself."

Page 160, line 18.

For *punar-utpattir* read *punar-anutpattir*.

Page 181, lines 7 and 11 from the foot.

I learn from Professors Cowell and Goldstücker that *vimatā smṛitih* should be rendered not "the variously understood Smṛiti" but "the Smṛiti which is here the subject of dispute."

Page 183, note 160, line 1.

With R.V. i. 179, 2, compare R.V. vii. 76, 4, quoted in p. 245.

Page 201, line 21.

The commentator thus explains this verse of the Vishṇu Purāṇa (I am indebted to Dr. Hall for a collation of the best MSS. in the India Office Library): *Ete cha dveshopasama-prakārāḥ madhyamādhi-kāriṇām ... uktāḥ na tu uttamādhi-kāriṇām ity āha "ete" | "bhinna-dṛiṣā" bheda-dṛiṣṭyā | "bhinna-dṛiṣām" iti vā pāṭhaḥ | tatra bhinnadarśane "abhyupagamam" angikāraṁ kṛitvā dveshopasamopāya-bhedāḥ kathitāḥ | uktānām upāyānām paramārtha-sankshepo mama mattaḥ srūyātām |* "In the words 'these notions,' etc.' he tells us that the methods of repressing hatred which have been hitherto declared are those which are followed by the persons who have attained only to the secondary, not to the highest, stage of knowledge. *Bhinna-dṛiṣā* is the same as *bheda-dṛiṣṭyā*, 'with a view which distinguishes [the Deity from themselves],' or the reading is *bhinna-dṛiṣām*, 'of persons who look [on Him] as distinct.' 'Accepting' (*abhyupagamam kṛitvā*), i.e. admitting, this opinion regarding a distinctness, 'I (the speaker in the V.P.) have declared these methods of repressing hatred. Now hear from me a summary' of the highest truth in regard to these methods."

Page 225, line 21.

There is a verse in the Vājasaneyi Sāṃhitā, xiii. 45, in which also Agni is connected with the creation: *Yo Agnir Agner adhi ajāyata śokāt pṛithivyāḥ uta vā divas pari | yena prajāḥ Viśvakarmā jajāna tam Agne hedāḥ pari te vṛinaktu |* "Agni, may thy wrath avoid that Agni who sprang from Agni, from the flame of the earth or from that of the sky, by whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures." This verse is quoted and after its fashion explained in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 21: *Atha dakṣhiṇato 'jam | "Yo Agnir Agner adhi ajāyata" ity*

Agñir vai esha | Agner adhyajāyata | “śokāt prithivyāḥ uta vā divas pari” iti yad vai Prajāpateḥ śokāt ajāyata tad divas cha prithivyai cha śokāt ajāyata | “Yena prajāḥ Viśvakarmā jajāna” iti vāg vai ajo vācho vai prajāḥ Viśvakarmā jajāna ityādi | “Then [he places] a goat (aja) on the southern side, (saying): ‘That Agni who sprang from Agni:’ this goat is Agni and sprang from Agni. ‘From the flame of the earth or from that of the sky:’ that which sprang from the flame of Prajāpati sprang from the flame of the earth and of the sky. ‘By whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures:’ The goat, [or the Unborn], is Vāch (Speech): Viśvakarman generated living creatures from Vāch,” etc. Compare R.V. i. 67, 5, quoted above in p. 275.

Page 235, line 9.

Add after this the following texts, in which the verbs *takṣh* and *jan* are applied to the composition of the hymns:

R.V. i. 67, 4. *Vindanti im attra naro dhiyaṁ-dhāḥ hṛidā yat tashṭān mantrān asaṁsan | “Meditative men find him (Agni) here, when they have uttered hymns of praise fashioned by the heart.”*

i. 109, 1. *Vi hy akhyam manasā vasyaḥ ichhann Indrāgnī jñasaḥ uta vā sajātān | nānyū yuvat pramatir asti mahyaṁ sa vām dhiyaṁ vājayantim ataksham | 2. Āsraṁ he bhūri-dāvattarā vām vijāmatur uta vā syālāt | atha somasya prayatī yuvabhyām Indrāgnī stomaṁ janayāmi navyam | “1. Seeking that which is desirable, I beheld [in you], o Indra and Agni, relations or kinsmen. I have no other counsellor than you,—I who have fabricated for you a hymn supplicating food. 2. For I have heard that you are more bountiful than an ineligible son-in-law (who has to purchase his bride), or than a bride’s brother; so now, while presenting a libation of Soma, I generate for you a new hymn.”*

Page 253, line 15.

Insert after this the following verse: R.V. x. 66, 5. *Sarasvān dhībhir Varuno dhṛita-vrataḥ Pūshā Vishṇur mahimā Vāyur Āśvinā | brahma-kṛito amṛitāḥ viśva-vedasaḥ śarma no yaṁsan trivarūtham aṁhasaḥ | “May Sarasvat with thoughts, may Varuṇa whose laws are fixed, may Pūshan, Vishṇu the mighty, Vāyu, the Āśvins,—may these makers of prayers, immortal, possessing all resources, afford us a triple-cased protection from calamity.”*

Supplementary Note on Kālātyayāpadishṭa.—See page 84, note 89, and page 290.

I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for the following additional remarks on this expression :

The Tarkasangraha, quoted by Professor Cowell in his interesting note which you kindly communicated to me, differs materially from the Bhāshāparichchheda in its interpretation of the fallacy called by them *bādha*; and I might add that the Tarkasangraha-dīpikāprakāśa offers even a third explanation of the same Vaiśeshika term. But I do not think that the *bādha* of the Vaiśeshikas is the same as the *kālātīta* of the Naiyāyikas. For when we find that the Bhāshāparichchheda in its enumeration at v. 70 applies to the fifth *hetvābhāsa* the epithet *kālātyayopadishṭa* (probably the same as the *kālātyayūpadishṭa* of the Nyāya-sūtra i. 50) yet in its explanation of v. 77 does not call it *kālātīta*, as the Nyāya does, but *bādha*, such a variation in terms seems pointed; and when we find moreover that its interpretation of *bādha* differs from Vātsyāyana's interpretation of *kālātīta*, there seems to be a still greater probability that the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika disagree on the question of the fifth *hetvābhāsa*.

For that there is *no* real difference between the Nyāyabhāshya and the Nyāyavṛitti is still my opinion. Both commentaries, I hold, agree in stating that the fallacy *kālātīta* arises when a reason assigned exceeds its proper sphere (*sādhanakāla*), and neither, I think, can have taken *kāla* in its literal sense of "time." This might have been the case if, as Professor Cowell seems to suggest, "plausibility" of an argument were the subject of the Sūtra; but as, in my opinion, the *hetu* is always intended to be a valid and good *hetu*, I do not see how such a *hetu* can become a bad one simply by being advanced too late. It would, however, become bad by being applied to a time, *i.e.* to a case to which it properly does not belong.

The circumstance that the Vṛitti and Bhāshāparichchheda are probably works of the same author, does not invalidate my opinion; it would seem on the contrary to confirm it, since the object of both these works is a different one: the former being intended as an exposition of the Nyāya, and the latter as one of the Vaiśeshika.

INDEX TO PRINCIPAL NAMES AND MATTERS.

A

Abbipratārin, 297
 Abhyupagama-vāda, 201
 Accentuation, 31
 Achāryya, 92
 Achyuta, 14, 45
 Aditi, 225, 252, 258
 Ādityas, 102, 234
 Adharārāṇi, 47
 Adhokshaja, 43, 47
 Adhvaryu, 5, 53, 54 f.
 Ādhvaryava (Yajur) Veda,
 212
 Adrishṭa, 132, 135
 Æther, whether eternal or
 not, 70, 106, 164
 Agastya, 247
 Agni, 5 f., 46 f., 219 and
 passim
 Agni a source of inspira-
 tion, 258 f.
 Agni Sāvitra, 17
 Agnishtoma, 11
 Ahankāra, 195
 Āila (Purūravas), 47
 Āitareya Brāhmana, 5, 225
 Āitareya Upanishad, i. 1,
 —65
 Ajā, 166
 Akshapāda (Gotama), 199
 Akshara, 164
 Alcinous, 269
 Ānanda Giri, 157
 Anga, 53
 Angis, 31
 Angiras, 31, 34, 219 f.
 Angirases, 246
 Anukramāṇī, 85, 275
 Anushṭubh, 11, 278

Ānuryākhyānas, 205
 Āpaḥ (waters), 8
 Āpāntaratamas, 40
 Āpastamba, 62, 179
 Apollo, 267, 270
 Apsaras, 247
 Āpta, 114 ff., 124, 128
 Aptoryāman, 11
 Āraṇyakas, 1, 26
 — superior to rest of
 Veda, 31
 Argives, 270
 Arka, 224
 Arthavūdas, 64
 Aryaman, 266
 Āsmaka, 53
 Asridh, 225
 Astronomy, 31
 Asura, the, 258
 Asuras, 49
 Āsuri, 192
 Āśvalāyana, 179
 Āśvalāyana's Gṛihya Sū-
 tras, 288
 Āśvattha, 46
 Āsvius, 228, 236
 Atirātra, 11
 Atharvan, priest, 55
 Atharvan, sage, 31, 220,
 259, 284
 Atharvan (the Veda), 11
 Atharvāngirases, 3, 9, 21,
 42, 205
 Atharva Parisiṣṭa, 54 f.
 Ātharvaṇas, 54
 Atharva-veda, quoted—
 ii. 1, 2,—260
 iv. 35, 6,—4
 vii. 54,—1
 x. 7, 14, 20,—3

Atharva-veda *continued*—
 x. 7, 43, 44,—279
 xi. 7, 24,—287
 xiii. 4, 38,—4
 xix. 54, 3,—4
 — 59, 1, 2,—260
 Athene, 272
 Ātri, 34, 220, 276
 Atris, 243
 Auddālaki, 77
 Aufrecht, Prof., Cat. of
 Bodl. Sansk. MSS., 27 f.,
 30, 39
 — aid from him ac-
 knowledged. 9, 15, 20,
 54, 219, 221, 287 f.
 Āupamanyava, 213
 Avyakta, 161, 173
 Āyāsa, 240
 Āyātayāma, 51
 Āyu, 222, 225
 Āyur-veda, 114 f., 116 f.,
 132, 135

B

Babara Pravāhīni, 77 ff.
 Bacchus, 264
 Bādarāyaṇa, 64, 69, 141,
 and passim
 — controverts opi-
 nions of Jaimini. 141 ff.
 — of the Sankhyas,
 150 ff.
 Badari, 145
 Bahvrichas, 54
 Ballantyne's Aphorisms of
 the Mīmāṃsā, 70 ff.
 — Aphorisms of the
 Nyāya, 110 ff., 261

- Ballantyne's Aphorisms of the Sāṅkhya, 133, 168
 — Aphorisms of the Vedānta, 107
 — Aphorisms of the Yoga, 201, 289
 — Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy, 104, 214
 — Mahābhāshya, 104
 — Siddhānta-muktāvai, 133
 — Synopsis of Science, 203
 Banerjee, Rev. Prof. K.M., 12
 — his Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, 31, 93 f., 115, 118, 133
 Bauddhas, 181
 Baudhāyana, 179
 Benfey, Prof., his Sāmaveda, 103, 221, 231, 238, 266
 Bhadrascena, 156, 170
 Bhāga, 225
 Bhāgavad-gītā, quoted—
 ii. 42 ff.,—37
 x. 32,—300
 xv. 15,—97
 — referred to, 193
 Bhāgavata Purāna, equal to the Veda, 30
 — why composed, 42
 — quoted—
 i. 3, 10,—192
 — 4, 14 ff.,—41
 — 7, 6 ff.—42
 ii. 8, 28,—80
 iii. 12, 34, and 37 ff.—11
 — 39,—207
 iv. 29, 42 ff.,—34
 ix. 8, 12 f.,—192
 ix. 14, 43 ff.,—46
 xii. 6, 37 ff.,—43
 Bhāgavatas, doctrine of the, 177
 Bhākta, or figurative sense of words, 108
 Bhakti Sūtras, 177
 Bharadvāja, 17, 31
 Bharadvājas, 221
 Bharatas, 276
 Bhārati, 255, 257
 Bhārgava, 55
 Bhāshā-parichheda, 133, 150, 230
 Bhoja-rāja, 201
 Bhūh, 5, 7, 14, 104
 Bhuvah, 5, 7, 14, 104
 Bhrigu, 34, 219
 Bhrigus, 233, 237
 Bird, the, 258
 Blackie, on the Theology of Homer, 272
 Boehlingk and Roth, Sanskrit Dictionary, 20, 152, 201, 236, 240 f., 263
 Brahmā, 8, 21, 24, 33, 43, and passim
 Brahmā, 3, 10, 12 f., 28, 31, 34, 45, and passim
 Brahmā composed of the Rig-veda, 27
 Brahma-kānda, 65
 Brahma-mīmāṃsā, its object, 139 (see Vedānta)
 Brahman (prayer) 224
 Brahmanaspati, 234, 249, 260 f.
 Brahmarūta, 50, 52
 Brahma Sūtras, 69, 93, and passim
 Brahma-vādis, 195
 Brahma-veda, 55
 Brahma-vaivartta-purāna, i. 48, quoted, 30
 — corrector of Veda, 30
 Brihad Āranyaka Upanishad, quoted—
 i. 2, 4,—104
 — 2, 5,—9
 — 4, 10,—142
 — 5, 5,—9
 ii. 2, 3,—166
 — 4, 10,—8, 204
 iii. 8, 11,—164
 iv. 1, 2,—208
 — 3, 22,—33
 v. 8,—254
 Brihaspati, 221, 256, 260
 Brihati, 15, 278
 Buddha, 202
 Butler (Bp.), his sermons on the love of God, 107
- C
- Calchas, 271
 Caste, originally but one, 47 f.
 Chaitra, 92
 Chaitraratha and Chaitrarathi, 297
 Chāndāla, 34, 178
 Chhāndoga Brāhmāna, 103
 Charaṇa, 53
 Charaṇavyūha, 56
 Charakas, 52 ff.
 Charakāchāryya, 53
 Charakādhvaryya, 51
 Chārvākas, 202
 Chhandas, 206
 Chhandogas, 54
 Chhāndogya Brāhmaṇa, 181
 Chhāndogya Upanishad, quoted—
 iv. 1, 3,—294
 — 2, 2,—293
 — 3, 5,—296
 — 17, 1,—5
 vi. 2, 1, 3 f.,—151, 154
 — 3, 2,—155
 — 4, 1,—167
 — 8, 6 f.,—155, 176
 — 14, 6,—156
 — 16, 2,—157
 vii. 1, 1-5,—32, 143, 207, 298
 — 25, 2,—178
 viii. 7, 2,—142
 — 15, 1,—284
 Colebrooke, Miscellaneous Essays, 6, 67, 74, and passim
 Commentary, 31
 Commentators on the Veda, their proofs of its authority, 57 ff.
 Cowell, Prof. E. B., his translation of the Kūsumānjali, 128
 — his aid acknowledged, 201, 290 f., 308
- D
- Dadhyanah, 220
 Daityas, 201
 Daksha, 34, 225
 Danti, 264
 Dasagva, 246
 Demodocus, 269 f.
 Dharma, 300
 Dhī, 224
 Dhishana, 202
 Dhishana, 255

Dhiti, 224
 Dhruvā, 20
 Dionysus, 264
 Dissolution of the Universe, 96, 303
 Dushkrīta, 53
 Dvaipāyana, see Krishna
 Dvāpara age, 37, 41, 45, 48 f.
 Dyaus, 246, 266

E

Egyptians, 183 f.
 Ekāntins, 289
 Ekaviṃśa, 11
 Empedocles, 273
 Epimenides, 273
 Euripides, 264 f.

F

Freedom of Speculation in India in early times, 67

G

Gāthā, 23
 Gaṇāmbikā, 264
 Gandharva, 258, 260 f.
 Gandharvas, 46 f.
 Gaṇeśa, 264
 Gargī, 164
 Gaudapāda, 265
 Gauṇa, or figurative sense of words, 108
 Gaurī, 264
 Gaya, 244
 Gayatra, 11, 276
 Gāyatrī, 7, 11, 13 f., 263
 ——— varieties of, 263
 ——— mother of the Vedas, 12
 Girīśa, 34
 Gir, 224
 Gods, capable of acquiring divine knowledge, 99, 141
 Goldstücker, Prof., his Dictionary referred to, 201
 ——— Mānava-kalpa-sūtra quoted, 95 ff.
 ——— his aid acknowledged, 84, 93, 97, 295, 303, etc.
 Gotama, author of Nyāya Sūtras, 111, 113

Gotama, rishi, 235
 Gotamas, 232, 238, 241
 Grammar, 31
 Gṛtsamadas, 233, 235
 Grote's History of Greece, 268, 270 ff.
 Guṇas, 12, 32, 44, 150, 165, 195
 Guru, 91, 180
 Govinda Ananda quoted, 103, 165, 167, 164, 190, and passim

H

Hall, Dr., aid from him acknowledged, 12, 52
 ——— Sāṅkhya Sāra, 185, 193
 Hanta, 254
 Haridāsa Bhaṭṭāchāryya, 128
 Haridrumata, 299
 Harivāṃśa quoted—
 47,—12
 11,516,—12
 11,665 ff.—13
 12,425 ff.—14
 Haug, Prof., on the signification of the word *brahma*, 233 f.
 Hellenic race, its difference from the Indian, 273
 Herodotus quoted, 183, 210
 Hesiod quoted, 183, 268
 Hiranyagarbha, 13, 136, 163, 285, 305
 Homer, 269 ff.
 Hoṭrā, 255
 Hymns, distinguished as new and old, 224 ff., see Mantras

I

Ignorance, 164
 Ikshvāku, 286
 Inferior science, 31, 206
 Ilā, 255
 Indra, 4, 99, 103, 142, 220, and passim
 ——— sceptical doubts, regarding Indra, 254
 ——— source of inspiration, 261 f.

Inspiration, its nature, 125
 Intuition of rishis, 125 ff., 183
 Īśā, 45
 Isaiah referred to, 224
 Itihāsas, 2, 9, and passim, see Smṛiti

J

Jabālā, 299
 Jābala, 298 f.
 Jagatī metre, 11, 276, 278
 Jaimini, 39, 40, 42, 45, 93, 98, 141
 ——— controverts opinions of Bādarāyana, 141 ff.
 Jaladā, 55
 Jan (to generate), 232, 237
 Janaka, 56
 Janamejaya, 53
 Janasruta, 295
 Jānasruti, 295 ff.
 Jaradgava, 80
 Jātavedas, 237, 241
 Jayanārāyana Tarkapanchānana, 120, 175
 John (St.), his First Epistle, 239
 ——— his Gospel, 239
 Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society referred to, 2, 57, 118, 264, 290
 Juhū, 20

K

Kaiyyata, 95 ff.
 Kakshasena, 297
 Kalanja, 68
 Kalāpa, 91, 132
 Kalāpas, 96
 Kālāpa, 91
 Kalāpaka, 79, 132
 Kālātyāyapudishṭa, 84, 290, 312
 Kalchas, 270 f.
 Kali-yuga, 49
 Kālidāsa, 69 f., 83 f., 89
 Kalpa sūtras, 180, 206
 Kanāda, 106 and passim
 Kūṇḍarabhis, 304
 Kaṇva, 220
 Kaṇvas, 229
 Kāpeyas, 297

Kapi, 297
 Kapila, 37, and passim
 ——— how treated by
 S'ankara, 184 ff.
 Kapinjala, 241
 Karmakāṇḍa, 64
 Karma-mīmāṃsū, see Pūrva-mīmāṃsā
 Karmasiddhi, 264
 Kārttikeya, 264
 Kāśyapa, 285
 Kātha (sage), 77, 83, 91, 132
 Kāthas, 96
 Kātha Upanishad quoted,
 i. 3, 3, and 10—162
 — 3, 11,—161
 ii. 23,—36
 iii. 3, 10 f.—158 ff.
 Kāthaka, 76 f., 79, 83, 91, 132
 Kātyayana, 179
 Kātyayana's Śrauta Sūtras, 47
 Kaurma-purāṇa, 200
 Kausika, 249
 Kaushitaki Br., 5, 304
 Kaushitakins, 56
 Kauthuma, 76 f., 83
 Kavi, 218
 Kes'ava, 28
 Kikāṣas, 79, 215
 Köhler, Prophetismus der Hebræer, 173 f.
 Kratu, 34
 Kri, (to make), 232
 Krishna, 29, 42, 286
 Krishna Dvaipāyana, 38 f.
 Krita-yuga, 37, 40, 47 ff.
 Kṛittikās, 307
 Kullūka on Manu, 6, 14, 23, 26, 180
 Kumārila, 95
 Kumūvyā, 23
 Kuśikas, 233, 247
 Kusumāñjali quoted, 128 ff.
 Kusurubinda, 77
 Kuthumi, 77, 83
 Kutsa, 213

L

Lassen, In. Ant., 33
 Laukāyatikas, 199
 Linga-purāṇa, 263
 Lokāyata, 95
 Lomaharṣhaṇa, 41

M

Mādhava, author of Nyūya-mūla-vistara, 82
 ——— author of the Sarva-darsana-sangraha, 86
 ——— author of the Vedārtha-prakāsa, on T.S., quoted, 66 ff.
 Madbuchhandas, 305
 Madhuvidyā, 141, 286
 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, 194
 Madras, 81
 Mahābhārata, origin of the name, 29
 ——— is a Veda relating to Krishna, 29
 ——— equal to the Veda, 29
 ——— composed by Nārāyaṇa, 39
 ——— why composed, 42
 ——— quoted—
 Ādi-parvan—
 258,—31
 261, 264 f.—29
 645,—29
 2298,—29
 2314,—29
 2417,—38
 4236,—38
 Vana-parvan—
 13432,—12
 Udyoga-parvan—
 1537,—288
 Bhishma-parvan—
 3019,—14
 S'ānti-parvan—
 7660,—85, 101
 8505,—49
 8533 ff.—16, 69
 12920,—14
 13088 ff.—48
 13432,—12
 13476,—49
 13551,—289
 13678,—40
 Svargārohanika-parvan
 200 ff.—29
 Mahābhāshya, 96
 Mahāsūla Śaunaka, 31
 Mahāsena (Kārttikeya), 264
 Mahat, 164, 172 f.
 Mahesvara, 16

Mahidhara on the Vāj. San. quoted, 39
 Maitreya, 37
 Maitri Upanishad—
 vi. 22,—176
 Mālati Mādhava, 90
 Māna (Agastya), 247
 Mānas, 233
 Mānava - dharmā - śāstra quoted—
 i. 21 ff.—6
 — 85 f.—48
 ii. 10 ff.—24
 — 76 ff.—7
 — 97,—25
 — 166 f.—288
 iv. 123 f.—25
 vi. 82 ff.—24
 xi. 243,—85
 xii. 91,—190
 — 94 ff.—23
 — 106,—24, 181
 Māndhātṛi, 229
 Mānava-kalpa-sūtra, 95
 Manishā, 224
 Manman, 224
 Mantras, 1, 33, 62 ff., 115, 224
 ——— magical power ascribed to, 275 ff.
 Manu, 181 f., 190, 220, 285
 Manvantaras, 38
 Marichi, 34
 Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, 102, 1 ff., quoted, 11
 Maruts, 102, 226, 263
 Mati, 224
 Matsya Purāṇa, iii. 2 ff. quoted, 28
 Mauda, 65
 Māyā, 164, 195, 202
 Medhātithi, 6
 Medhāvi, 218
 Meru, 50, 52
 Mitra, 225, 227
 Mīmāṃsū, see Pūrva-mīmāṃsū, 28
 Mīmāṃsakas, their alleged atheism, 94 f.
 Mīmāṃsa-vārttika, 95
 Minerva, 273
 Moksha-dharma quoted, 199 f.
 Mudakas, 96
 Mukhya, or proper senses of words, 107

Müller, M., Profr. aid received from 237

— Ancient Sanskrit Lit., 1, 2, 36, 53, 56 f., 175, 280 f.

— Chips, etc., 48

— Jour. R. A. S., 230, 236, 255

— Jour. of Ger. Or. Soc., 20, 104, 127, 183

Mundaka Upanishad—

i. 1, 1-5,—30, 204, 284

ii. 1, 4, and 6,—30

iii. 1, 1,—176

Muni, 219

Muses, 267 ff.

N

Nābhāka, 230

Nābhāka, 229

Nābhan, 246

Nägelsbach's Nachbomerische Theologie, 273

Nāgojibhatta, 95 ff.

Nahusha, 283

Naichasākha, 79

Nāka Maudgalya, 22

Name and Form, 152, 155, 163, 167, 302, etc.

Nāsatyas (Asvins), 240

Nārada, 32, 34

Nārāyana, 47.

Nārāyana-tīrtha, 128

Nārāsansis, 215

Navagva, 221, 246

Nestor, 273

Nigada, 45

Nigama, 180

Nirukta, quoted—

i. 20,—118, 213

iii. 11,—213

iv. 6,—212

vii. 1, 3,—211

— 16,—219

viii. 3,—277

x. 32,—213

— 42,—212

— referred to, 180, 206, 247

Nītha, 224

Nivid, 224

Nodhas, 235

Nrīmedha, a rishi, 213

Nyāya, whether theistic or not, 133

Nyāya Sūtras quoted, 108 ff.

Nyāya-mūla-vistara, quoted, 82, 179, 181

Nyāya-sūtra-vrittī, 108

O

Odana oblation, 4

Odyssey, 269 f., 272 f.

Omkāra, 44

Oracles, 273

P

Padma-purāna quoted, 27

Paila, 39, 41 f., 45

Paingins, 56

Paippalāda, 55

Panchadāsa-stoma, 11

Panchajanāh, 168

Pāṇiṇi, 56, 91

Pāṅkta, 15

Parāśara, 38, 40 f., 45, 199 f.

Parāśara Upapurāna, 199

Parjanya, 252

Paruchhepa, a rishi, 212

Pāsupati system, 202

Pāsūpatas, 195

Pātanjalas, 195

Patanjali, Mahābhāshya, 56, 95 f.

— Yoga, 198

Paukasa, 34

Paurushya, 9, 90, 134

Paurushyatva, 90

Pavana, 5

Pertsch, alphabetical list of initial words of *rich-verses*, 103

Pemius, 270

Phæacians, 269

Philosophical systems, their mutual relations, 194 ff.

Pippalāda, 208

Pippalādakas, 96

Pitāmaha, 28

Plati, 244

Plato quoted, 183

— his ideas on inspiration, 273

Polyphemus, 265

Prabhākara, 91, 180

Pradhāna, 150, etc.

Prakṛiti, 164, 166

Pramaganda, 79

Praskaṇva, 220

Prasna Upanishad, Comm. on, 191

— i. 1,—297

Prasthāna-bheda, 194 ff.

Praudhi-vada, 201

Praūga, 278

Prithivī, 266

Priyamedha, 220

Prosody, 31

Psalms, 224

Pulastya, 34

Pulaha, 34

Puṇḍarikāksha, 89

Purānas, 2, 27, and passim, see Smṛiti

— created before the Vedas, 27 f.

— eternal, 28

— form with the Itihāsas a fifth Veda, 33, 42

Purūravas, 45 ff., 205

Purusha, 3, 4, and passim

Purusha-medha, 35

Purusha-sūkta (R. V. x.

90, 1, 9), 3, 61, 69, 89

Pūrva - mīmānsā Sūtras quoted, 70 ff.

Pūrva-mīmānsā, its object, 139

Pushan, 226, 263

Pythagoras, 273

R

Raghunandana, 68

Raghuvansa, 77

Rahūganas, 241

Raikva and Rainka, 296 f.

Rājās, 12, 32, 48, 150

Rājāsūya sacrifice, 184

Rajendra lal Mitra, his translation of the Upanishad, 167, 296 f., 299

Rakshases, 55

Rāmānujas, 195

Rāmāyana, i. 1, 94 quoted 29

— equal to the Veda, 30

Rathantara, 276

Rationalistic treatises, 24

Ri (to move, send forth), 240

libhuś, 237, 261

rich, 224

rich-verses, 11, 12, 15

Rig-veda, quotations from,

First Mandala—

- 1, 2,—219
 3, 11, 12,—254
 12, 11,—224
 18, 6, 7,—258
 20, 1,—232
 22, 10,—255
 27, 4,—225
 31, 1, 2,—251
 — 11,—255
 — 18,—232
 32, 1,—212
 37, 4,—252
 40, 5, 6,—260
 45, 3, 4,—220
 47, 2,—232
 48, 14,—220
 60, 3,—225
 — 5,—242
 61, 2,—241
 — 4,—241
 — 16,—232
 62, 13,—235
 66, 2,—251
 67, 3,—275
 — 4,—311
 77, 5,—242
 78, 5,—242
 80, 16,—220
 89, 3,—225
 91, 11,—242
 94, 1,—241
 96, 2,—225
 102, 1,—242
 109, 1, 2, 4,—311
 116, 1,—240
 117, 25,—233
 118, 3,—220
 130, 6,—235
 — 10,—225
 131, 6,—220
 139, 9,—220
 143, 1,—225
 152, 5,—253
 164, 5, 6,—279
 — 20,—176
 — 25,—276
 — 37,—279
 169, 3,— 59
 171, 2,—235
 175, 6,—220
 179, 2,—183, 245
 183, 6,—188

Rig-veda continued—

First Mandala—

184, 5,—233

185, 1,—280

Second Mandala—

3, 8,—255

17, 1,—225

18, 3,—225

19, 8,—235

23, 2,—260

24, 1,—226

35, 2,—235

39, 8,—233

Third Mandala—

1, 20,—226

2, 1,—237

18, 3,—255

21, 3,—251

29, 15,—248

30, 20,—233

32, 13,—226

39, 1, 2,—226

43, 5,—248

53, 9,—248

— 12,—276

— 14,—215

54, 17,—261

58, 3,—220

62, 7,—226

— 10,—263

Fourth Mandala—

3, 16,—242

5, 3,—259

— 6,—259

6, 1,—259

— 11,—233

11, 8,—259

16, 20, 2,—233

20, 5,—220

32, 12,—242

43, 1, 2,—255

50, 1,—221

Fifth Mandala—

2, 11,—235

11, 5,—242

22, 4,—243

29, 1,—251

29, 15,—235

31, 4,—276

40, 6,—276

42, 6,—220

— 13,—226

44, 8,— 59

45, 4,—243

55, 8,—227

73, 10,—236

Rig-veda continued—

Sixth Mandala—

14, 2,—251

16, 47,—236

17, 13,—227

18, 15,—261

19, 4,—221

21, 5,—221

— 8,—221

22, 2,—221

— 7,—227

26, 3,—261

32, 1,—236

34, 1,—227, 261

38, 3,—243

44, 13,—227

47, 3,—264

— 10,—261

48, 11,—227

49, 1,—227

50, 6,—227

— 15,—221

52, 2,—233

62, 4,—228

69, 2,—262

75, 19,—277

Seventh Mandala—

7, 6,—236

15, 4,—237

18, 1,—222

19, 11,—277

22, 9,—237

26, 1,—238

29, 4,—222

31, 11,—238

33, 3,—277

— 7-13,—246

34, 1,—256

— 9,—255

35, 14,—234

37, 4,—234

53, 1,—222

— 2,—228

56, 23,—228

59, 4,—228

61, 2,—240

— 6,—228

64, 4,—236

66, 11,—266

67, 5,—243

76, 4,—222

85, 1,—243

87, 4,—248

88, 4,—248

91, 1,—222

93, 1,—228

94, 1, 2,—238

Rig-veda continued—
Seventh Mandala—

97, 3, 5,—261

— 9,—234

104, 15,—212

Eighth Mandala—

3, 3,—249

5, 18,—243

5, 24,—228

6, 10,—250

— 11,—228

— 33,—236

— 41,—251

— 43,—229

8, 8,—243

12, 10,—229

— 14,—258

— 31,—240

13, 7,—262

— 26,—240

16, 7,—251

19, 5, 6,—3

20, 19,—229

23, 14,—229

26, 24,—229

27, 11,—243

— 13,—256

36, 7,—222

39, 6,—229

40, 4, 5,—230

— 12,—229

41, 2,—229

— 5, 6,—266

43, 2,—238

44, 12,—230

48, 3,—265

49, 9,—277

51, 4,—234

52, 4,—262

55, 11,—230

63, 7, 8,—230

64, 6,—69, 267

65, 5, 6, 12,—230

77, 4,—238

78, 3,—263

— 6, 7,—262

79, 3,—234

84, 4, 5,—238

88, 4,—253

89, 3, 4,—254

— 10, 11,—253

90, 16,—256

Ninth Mandala—

9, 8,—231

12, 7,—267

25, 5,—265

33, 5,—256

Rig-veda continued—
Ninth Mandala—

42, 2,—231

62, 1,—103

73, 2,—239

76, 4,—265

87, 3,—249

91, 5,—231

92, 3,—267

95, 1,—239

— 2,—265

96, 5-7,—266

— 11,—222

— 18,—251

99, 4,—231

107, 7,—251

110, 7,—223

114, 2,—234

Tenth Mandala—

4, 5,—259

4, 6,—231

7, 2,—239

14, 15,—223

20, 10,—253

21, 5,—259

23, 5-7,—239

26, 4,—263

27, 22,—252

31, 7,—280

34, 13,—212

36, 5,—260

39, 14,—236, 267

42, 1,—244

54, 3,—221

— 6,—234

57, 2,—278

— 3,—229

61, 7,—253

62, 1, 3,—246

— 4, 5,—246

63, 17,—244

66, 5,—311

66, 14,—223

67, 1,—239

71, 1-6,—256

71, 3,—105

72, 1, 2,—249

80, 7,—237

81, 4,—230

88, 8,—253

— 18,—280

89, 3,—231

— 5,—59

90, 1,—61

— 9,—3, 61, 89

91, 8,—259

— 13,—231

Rig-veda continued—
Tenth Mandala—

— 14,—240

95, 14,—212

96, 5,—223

— 11,—231

98, 9,—223

101, 2,—234

106, 6,—59

107, 6,—244

109, 4,—250

110, 8,—257

111, 1,—244

112, 9,—252, 262

114, 8, 9,—277

115, 5,—252

116, 9,—240

117, 6,—212

125, 3-5,—257

129, 2,—212

— 5,—59

— 5-7,—280

— 6,—60

130, 1-7,—277 f.

139, 5,—260

154, 2, 5,—250

160, 5,—231

167, 1,—250

176, 2,—258

177, 1,—258

190, 1,—250

Rishis, nature of their inspiration, 125, 183

— "seers" of the hymns, 211

— distinguished as new and old, 218 ff.

— speak of themselves as authors of hymns, 232 ff.

— supernatural character ascribed to, 245 ff.

— conscious of divine inspiration, 252 ff.

— their opposite views how reconcilable, 274 f.

— their confession of ignorance, 279 ff.

— their idea of inspiration different from that of later writers, 281 f.

— rival the gods, 283

Ritual, 31

- Röer, Dr. E., his translations and introductions to the Upanishads, 36, 185, 193, 254, 284
 — his Bhāshā-parichheda, 133
 — his German translation of the Vaiśeṣhika aphorisms, 118, 120
 — his remarks on the doctrine of the Upanishads, 173
 — his remarks on the Sāṅkhya, 193
 Romaharṣhaṇa, 39
 Roth, Illustrations of Nirukta, 47, 230, 246 f.
 Rudra, 64, 234
 — composed of the Sāma-veda, 27
 Rudras, 102, 234

S

- S'abara, Svāmin, 70, 80
 Sacrifices, the five great, 20
 Sacrifice eternal, 6
 Sadasaspati, 258
 Sādhyas, 6, 12
 Sagara, sons of, 190, 192
 S'ākhās of the Veda, 37, 42, 56
 S'akti, 164, 173, 306
 Sāma-rathantara, 11
 Sāma-veda, impurity of its sound, 28 f.
 — i. 299 quoted, 252
 Sāman, 224
 Sāman-verses, 11
 S'amī wood, 46
 Sāmīdhenis, 213
 S'ānūsa, 224
 Sāuvarga-vidyā, 295 ff.
 Sanaka, 34
 Sanatkumāra, 32 f.
 • S'āṇḍilya, an ancient sage, 178
 — author of the Dhakti Sūtras quoted, 177 f.
 S'āṅkāra Āchārya's commentary on the Brahma Sūtras quoted, 62, 98 ff., 106, 108, 140 ff., 177, 182, 185 ff., 203, 289, 291 ff.

- S'āṅkāra Āchārya's commentary on the Br. Ar. Up. quoted, 34, 294
 — his comm. on the Chhāndogya Up., 296
 — his comm. on the Pras'na Up. quoted, 191
 — on the Taitt. Up. quoted, 191
 S'āṅkāra Mīśra comm. on Vaiśeṣhika, 120, 125
 Sāṅkhya aphorisms, 133, 168
 Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 138, 166
 Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāshya, 196 ff.
 S'antanu, 45
 Saptadasa-stoma, 11
 Sarasvatī, goddess, 14, 254 f., 257, 282
 — mother of the Vedas, 14
 — the river, 41
 S'ārīraka - mīmāṃsā - bhāshya, 98 See S'āṅkāra Āchārya
 S'ārīraka sūtras, 98
 Sarva-darsana-sangraha-86 ff.
 S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, quoted—
 iii. 4, 1, 22,—47
 iv. 1, 2, 19,—53
 vi. 1, 1, 8,—7
 — 1, 2, 19,—5
 vii. 5, 2, 52,—9
 ix. 4, 4, 4,—223
 x. 3, 5, 12,—31
 — 4, 2, 21,—14
 — 6, 5, 4,—104
 xi. 5, 1, 1,—48
 — 5, 6, 1-7, 10,—18
 — 5, 8, 1,—4
 xiv. 4, 3, 12,—9
 — 5, 4, 10,—8
 — 7, 1, 22,—33
 Sattva guna, 12, 32, 160
 Sātvata-sāṃhitā (the Bhā-gavata Pur.) 42
 Satyakāma, 299
 Satyavāha, 31
 Satyavati, 45
 S'aunaka, 297, 305
 S'aunakas, 65
 Savitri, 263
 Sāvitrī, 7, 14

- Sāyaṇa, his Vedārtha-prakāśa, or commentary on R.V. quoted, 58 ff., 76, 78, 80, 105, 206, 215, 219
 Sayugvan, 296
 Siddhānta-muktāvali, 133
 S'ikshā, 206
 Skambha, 3
 Skanda, 264
 S'lokas, 9, 205
 Smṛiti, 24, 181, and passim
 Smritis, extent and conditions of their authority, 181 ff.
 Sobhari, 229
 Soma, god, 8, 223
 — source of inspiration, 264 ff.
 Somaśarman, 92
 Soul, unity of, 190, 203
 Souls, diversity of, 169, 175
 Sound, eternity of, affirmed, 71 ff., 90 ff.
 — denied, 89, 109, 137
 Species or Genera eternal, 102
 Sphoṭa, 44, 104 f., 136 f.
 S'rāmaṇa, 34
 S'ruti, 24
 Sruva, 20
 Stoma, 224
 Stuti, 224
 Sudās, 277
 S'ūdras, unfit for study of Veda, 42, 68, 99, 292 ff.
 — may attain the highest bliss, 178
 S'uka, 43
 Sumati, 224
 Sumantu, 39, 40, 42, 45
 Superior science, 31, 206
 Susrututi, 224
 Sūrya, 5 f., 266
 Nūta, 39, 43
 Svadhā, 20, 254
 Svāhā, 254
 Svar, 5, 7, 14
 Svarbhānu, 276
 Svāyambhuva manvantara, 39 f.
 S'vetaketu, 155
 S'vetāsatara, sage, 284

S'vetāśvatara Upanishad
quoted—
iv. 5,—165
— 10,—164
v. 2,—184, 188 ff., 283
vi. 6,—176
— 11,—171
— 18,—304
— 21,—284
S'yāvāśva, 222

T

Taittirīyas, 51
Taittirīya Aranyaka, vii.
8,—22
Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa [?],
275
——— quoted—
ii. 3, 10, 1,—8
— 4, 2, 6,—278
— 8, 8, 5,—10, 234
iii. 3, 9, 1,—10
— 10, 11, 3,—16
— 12, 9, 1,—15
Taittirīya Saṁhita quoted,
i. 2, 1, 1,—69f.
ii. 5, 8, 3,—212
vii. 3, 1, 4,—17
Taittirīya Upanishad, 65
——— comm. on, 191
Tamas, 12, 32, 150, 202
Tāmasa works, 202
Tapas, 250
Tarka-sangraha, 127, 133,
150
Taksh (to fabricate), 232,
235
Telemachus, 273
Thamyris, 269
Thirlwall, Bp., his history
of Greece, 274
Tikshṇasringa, 264
Time, 4
Tiraśchī, 238
Tittiri, 77, 83
Treta-yuga, 37, 45, 47
Triple science, 8
Trisarvī, 53
Trishtubh, 278
Trita, 212
Tritsus, 277
Trivrit, 11
Tvashṭri, 252

U

Udayana Āchāryya, 128
Uddālaka Āruni, 286
Uktha, 224, 278
Ukthya, 11
Ulysses, 270
Unborn Female, 165, 171
Unborn Male, 165
Upabṛhit, 20
Upanishads, 1, 2, 138, and
passim
——— superior to other
parts of the Veda, 31
——— their doctrines uni-
form according to S'an-
kara, but really various,
108, 175
Upapurānas, 30
Urvāsī, 45 ff., 205, 247
Uśanas, 249
Ushas, 243
Ushmas, 44
Ushnih metre, 11, 278
Uttarārani, 47

V

Vāch, 8, 10, 104f., 253f.,
256 f., 282
Vachas, 224
Vajasaneyins, 53
Vajasneyi ritual, 53
——— Saṁhita quoted—
iii. 53,—229
v. 2,—46
xiii. 53,—9
xvi. 53,—60
xviii. 52,—223
xxx. 18,—53
Vājins, 51 f.
Vairūpa, 11
Vaisampāyana, 39, 40, 42,
45, 50 ff.
Vaiseshikā, 106, 175
Vaishnavas, 195
Vaisvānara (Agni), 237
Vaivasvata Manvantara,
31 f., 45
Vakratunda (Ganośa), 264
Vālakhilya xi. 6,—262
Vālmiki, 77
Varuṇa, 227, 243, 247 f.,
262
——— source of inspira-
tion, 262, 266

Varūtri, 256
Vasavyā, 41
Vashat, 254
Vashatkāra, 14, 21
Vasishṭha, 34, 246 ff.
Vasishṭhas, 223, 246
Vastoshpati, 253
Vasus, 102, 226, 234
Vatsa, 243
Vātsyāyana quoted, 115
Vāyu, 5 f., 222
Vāyu Purāna, 27 f., 39,
51
Vedāntas, 1, see Upani-
shads
Vedānta Sūtras, 98 ff.
Vedārtha-prakāśa on R.V.
quoted, 58 ff., 80
——— on T.S., 83 ff.
Vedas, general account of,
1 f.
——— division into Man-
tra and Brāhmaṇa, 1, 62
——— sprang from sacri-
fice of Purusha, 3
——— from Skambha, 3
——— from Indra, 4
——— from Time, 4
——— from the Odana-
oblation, 4
——— objects of worship
and supplication, 4
——— sprang from Agni,
Vāyu, and Sūrya, 4f., 61
——— their eternity af-
firmed, 6, 18, 71, 76, 78,
106, 303
——— their eternity de-
nied, 109, 117, 119, 130
134
——— their superhuman
character (*apauruṣheya-
tva*), 6
——— sources of the
names, forms, and func-
tions of creatures, 6, 16,
104
——— created by Prajā-
pati and from the waters,
8, 14
——— the breathing of
the great Being, 8, 135,
205
——— created by means
of speech and soul, 9
——— one with speech,
mind, and breath, 9

Vedas dug from the mind-ocean, 10
 — are the hair of Prajāpati's beard, 10
 — the offspring of Vāch, 10
 — created separately from Brahmā's mouths, 10 f.
 — characterized severally by the different gunas, 12
 — created by Brahmā, 12
 — the Gāyatrī their mother, 12 f.
 — created from different parts of Brahma's body, 13
 — created by Achyuta, 14
 — Sarasvatī their mother, 14
 — all things comprehended in them, 15
 — sources respectively of form, motion, and heat, 15
 — breathings of Mahesvara, 16
 — infinite in extent, 17
 — Vishnu composed of them, 18, 27
 — study of, a sacrifice, 20
 — study of, its benefits, 21
 — encomiums on study of, 21 ff.
 — useless to the depraved, 25
 — recollecting and repeating them removes sin, 25
 — the energy and body of Vishnu, and severally the substance of Brahmā, Vishnu, and Rudra, 27
 — created after the Purānas, 27
 — insufficient without the Itihāsas and the Purānas, 29
 — corrected by Brahma-vaivartta Purāna, 30

Vedas voice of Brahmā, 30
 — their hymns form the inferior science, 31
 — classed with minor sāstras, 31, 33
 — their ceremonial part decried in the Bhagavad Gīta, Chhāndogya Upanishad, and Bhāgavata Purāna, 32 ff.
 — in the state of profound sleep are no Vedas, 34
 — Soul not known through them, 36
 — originally one, 37 ff., 47
 — division of 37 ff.
 — their original extent, 38, 40
 — necessity for their division, 40 f.
 — cannot be heard by women, S'ūdras, etc., 42, 299
 — discrepant account of their division, 47
 — carried off by two Asuras but recovered by Brahmā, 49
 — form the eye of Brahmā, 49
 — their periodical disappearance, 49
 — mutual hostility of adherents of different Vedas, 49 ff.
 — schism among adherents of Yajur-veda, and its separation into white and black, 50 ff.
 — vindication of them against objections, and defence of their authority, by their commentators, 57 ff.
 — arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas in favour of their eternity and authority, 70 ff.
 — "æon" by the rishis, 85, 212
 — reasonings of the Vedantists on their eternity and authority, 98 ff.
 — sprang from Brahma, 106

Vedas, Low interpreted by theologians, 107
 — arguments of the adherents of the Nyāya, Vaiśeshika, and Sāṅkhya in support of their authority, but against their eternity, 108 ff.
 — texts of, interpreted variously by different philosophers, 138 ff.
 — distinguished from all other S'āstras by being independent and infallible, 179 ff.
 — recapitulation of arguments in support of their authority, with remarks, 207 ff.
 — ideas of the rishis regarding the origin of their hymns, 217 ff.
 — hymns of, distinguished as old and new, 224 ff.
 — hymns of, made, fabricated, or generated, by the rishis, 232 ff.
 — hymns of, ascribed to the inspiration of the gods, 252 ff.
 — hymns of, a magical power attributed to, 275 ff.
 — sprang from the leavings of the sacrifice, 287
 Vedhas, 219
 Verbal brahma, 35
 Videha, 56
 Vidhi, 64
 Vidura, 295, 300
 Vidvan - moda - taranginī, 208
 Vijnāna Bhikshu, 133, 172, 196, and passim
 Vidyā, 205
 Vinada, 239 f., 253
 Vinadas, 239
 Vipaschit, 219
 Vipra, 218
 Viraj metre, 11, 278
 Virochana, 142
 Virūpa, 69, 75, 220, 246, 267
 Vishnu, 37, 40, 63, 244, 262, 266

ishnu, composed of the
Veda, 18, 127
ishnu Purāna quoted—
i. 2, 13,—4
— 5, 48 ff.,—10
— 5, 58,—16
— 17, 54,—201
ii. 11, 5 ff.,—26
iii. 2, 12,—49
— 2, 18 ff.,—37
— 3, 4 ff.,—37
— 3, 19 ff.,—13
— 4, 1 ff.,—38
— 5, 2 ff.,—49
— 6, 22 ff.,—18
— 18, 22,—123
iv. 6,—47
Viśvāmitra, 247 f., 276,
283
Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭāchārya,
108, 217
Viśvāvasu, 260
Viśvodevas, 162
Vivasvat, 286
Viyukta, 126

Vyādhuktha, 234
Vyāhat-sāma, 11
Vyāhaspati, heretical
teacher, 202
Vyāhaspati, author of a
smṛiti, 181
Vyāsha, 264
Vyāpitra, 228
Vyābṛitis, 44
Vyādha, 300
Vyākhyānas, 205
Vyāsa, 37, 77, 89

W

Weber, Prof., Ind. Lit.,
53
— Ind. Stud., 22, 47,
53 ff., 193 f., 296, and
passim
— Vāj. San. Spec.,
275
Whitney, Prof., his opin-
ion referred to, 258

Wilson, Prof. H. H., 2
— translation of Vish-
nu Purāna, 11, 52, 193,
and passim
— translation of Rig-
veda, 2
— Sūkhyā kārikā, 44
Women unfit for the study
of the Veda, 42, 68

Y

Yajnadatta, 102
Yājña-paribhāshū, 62
Yājñavalkya, 50 ff.
Yājush, 224
Yājush-verses, 11
Yama (Agni?), 247
Yama, 245, 250
Yāska, see Nirukta
Yoga aphorisms, 184, 201
Yogas, 137
Yogins, 126
Yukta, 126

THE END.



00048370

Digitized with financial assistance from



on 07 January, 2017

