HISTORICAL DIVISION ? jt / y /

(HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPT F,_LE)<f^C^ FILE NO. s-5 ^ ACC. NO. 8^56 _r/_gffr- .// />?

TITLE The Palau Operations *">7 /

Japanese Studies in World War II

AGENCY OF OR.GIN „_Istorleal ^ ^ _fflQ ^ '+f RETURN TO ROOM 5E889

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0002423

Central PACIFIC Area Operation Reoord - Vol. II

Compiled by the First Demobilisation Bureau - September 1946

851-A.

Mote: - This raoord vat dram up by the former ohlef of staff of the lath Division, Colonel TADA, with the asalstanee of former staff offloor. Colonel NAKAQAWA. Oiariea and memorandums of both offloers plus other materials were used as references for the drafting of this reoord.

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Volume XX - Outline of the Battle in the PALAU Area.

Chapter I. Detail■ Concerning the Di■patching of the

14th Division to PALAU. Chapter II. Disposition of Croups in the PALAU Area.

A. Plana for the Debarkation of the 14th Division et PALAU.

B. Defense and Fortification Plans of the Army Croup in the PALAU Area.

0. Defense Plans of ths FSLSLIU Island

Sector Units. D. Defense Plans of the AMOAUR Island

Sector Unite.

Chapter III. The Situation from the Latter Fart of April to the Beginning of September.

A. Employment of the Taotios of Annihilating the Bnemy on the Shores.

B. The Organising of the 53rd and 49th Independent Mixed Brigades and the Fleeing of Both These Brigades Under the Command of the Army Croup in the PALAU Area.

0. The Transfering of"the Military Strength of the Various Units in PALAU to the Army Croup.

D. The Confirmation of the Special Plans for Deoisive Battle, and Orders for its Execution.

B. The Change of Troop Disposition During the

Latter Part of July. F. The Enemy Air Raids During July. Chapter IV. The PALAU Campaign with PELELIU and AMOAUR as its Center.

A. The General Situation Prior to the Battle. t

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B. The let Period of the Battle (From 11 Sopt. to 80 Sopt.)

0* The 2nd Period of the Battle (Proa 81 Sept. to 30 Sopt.)

D. The 3rd Period of the Battle (From 1 Oct. to

10 QOt.)

I. The 4th Period of the Battle (From 11 Oct. to

to^Oot.)

F. The 3th Period of the Battle (From 21 Oot. to 30 Oot.)

0. The 6th Petlod of the Battle (From 1 Mot. to 10 Mot.)

H. The 7th Period of the Battle (From 11 Mot. to 80 Mot.)

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Outline of tho Battle in the PALAU Area Chapter i_T Details Concerning the Dispstshlng of the 14th

Division to PALAU* _ (fit* The 14th Division had been stationed in MAMCHURIA since September 1939, and'had exerted *te efforts In aoldissg itself into a well-trained unit at TSITSIHAR. On 31 January 1944, it received a confidential order concerning the reorganisation of the division* after returning come units to their original units* and the departure of the division to the West HEW GUIMBA area* They started preparations on 1 Maroh and* with the exception of some units, completed these preparations on 5 Maroh as oxpeoted. Following this, the division, after 10 Maroh, gradually advanced to PORT ARTHUR for its final training before going to the front. On 8b Maroh, the 31st Army Commander decided the disposition of troops, aeoording to the plan of the Imperial General H.Q., which is as follows:

In the vicinity of SAIPAM - the 14th Division and part of

the 89th Division.

in the vicinity of GUAM and PAOAM - the main force of the

89th Divleion and the Bth and 6th Expeditionary Units.

At PALAU - the 35th Division.

At XAP - the 4th Expeditionary Unit.

On 88 March, the 14th Div. left the port of DAIRSM for SAIPAM, aboard the transports, ASOSAM MARU, MOTO MARU and TO2AM MARU, under the protection of several ooaat defense vessels, and following the route along the weat coast of KOREA and the SETO Inland Sea, firet headed for YOKOHAMA. During the latter part of Maroh, when the above convoy waa still sailing for YOKOHAMA, PALAU was attached by an enemy teak force oonsisting of ten aircraft carriers end eight battleships, and the Important supply base of the JAPAMESE flew thorn Army^was severely damaged. Consequently, the Imperial General Headquarters and the 31st Army redlsposed its units ss follows:

The 14th Div., thloh was sailing for SAIPAM, was transferred "

to the PALAU area. The 35th Div. which was sailing for PALAU was

transferred to MABOKWARI, BIAK end MOBMFOOR in the MS* GUINEA •TOO*

On ft April* after the 14th Division had loft TATRYAMA for PALAU and were off the ooaat of IHOJIMA, there were indieations that PALAU and TRUE wore being attaokod by the AMERICA! Teak Foroe. Therefore* in order to avoid the enemy teak foroe* the Commander of the escort vessels deoided to take refuge at the OHIOHIJIMA port and changed the course of the convoy. The oonvoy stayed in the OHIQHUIMA port for about ten daye from 10 April* However* after leaving the CHICHIJ IMA port* and with perfcot protection against enemy submarine and air attacks, the convoy finally reached PALAU on 24 April*

Prior to this, in ooraplianoe with the Army order issued on U April* the 4th and 9th Expeditionary Foroes* the lot Sea Mobile Brigade and the Sea Transport Units were plaoed under the command of the 14th Division. The 14th Division Commander, as the Army Croup Commander, was hold responsible for the firm maintenance of strategio points on the PALAU and YAP Islands.

The gist of the Army order Is as followsi

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The Blot Army Order - 11 April, 1800 hours (SAIPAM).

a* The order of battle will be changed as follows:

(1)* The following units will bo included in the order of battle of the Slat Army: the 14th Division (excluding the Sea Transport Units)j the 9th Expeditionary Unit*

(8)* The following units will be excluded from the order of battle of the 31st Army: the 33th Division; the 14th Division See Transport Units, the 83th Anti-Aireraft Anti-Tank Machine-Cannon Company*

The time that the above units will be ineluded or excluded from the order of battle of the 31st Army will depend upon the departure of these units from the ports in MANCHURIA, KOREA and CHINA. However, the 14th Division Sea Transport Units will be excluded from the order of battle of

the 31st Army on 1 April. The 33th Division will be exoluded from the order of battle of the 31st Army upon the departure

of its first transport units frost TOKYO Bay.

b. Tho amy will quiokly oonpXoto the defense preparations in the PALAU area.

o. The 14th Division Conmander is appointed Commander of the Amy Group in the PALAU area aa of this date and will be responsible for the firm maintenance of the strateglo points on the PALAU Islands (including ANQftUR) and on YAP Island.

(1). The air baees on PKLBLIU, AAQtiaft, PALAU and YAP Islands will be firmly secured at all costs.

For this purpose, within one month of the arrival of the aforementioned units, the field positions will be completed within the two months after this, the field positions will be strengthened with fortified points.

(8). The 14th Div. Commander will establish close communications with tho units of the 35th Div. in the ST. AHDOLO (TM. T) Islands and unite of the 2nd Area Amy (commanded by MaJor-General YAMAOUCHI) in PALAU.

(3) . Tho 14th Div. Commander will cooperate with the Navy in defending ULTHI and PAIS Islands which are included in the group of islands surrounding YAP, and obstruct the enemy*s utilisation of those islands.

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(4) . The 14th Div. Commander will immediately make preparations against the enemy⁽s sea maneuvers by disposing one infantry battalion at strateglo points on PALAU Island.

Tho following units will be plsocd under the command of the 14th Division:

The 4th Expeditionary Unit (including one company

of the 52nd Anti-Airoraft Battalion)• The 9th Bxpedltonary Unit.

(This will beoomo offeotivo upon the arrival of these unite at YAP)• The 1st Boa Mobile Brigade and the main foroo of the

.Sea Transport Units which were stationed at PALAU.

(This Will beoomo effective upon the arrival of the

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Division Ob—ndor at PALAU). d. The 4th Expeditionary Unit (including one oompany of tho 52nd Anti-Airoraft Battalion) and tho 9th Expeditionary Unit will be placed under the command of the 14th Division upon their arrival at YAP.

The movements of the units upon their arrival at XAP will be as follows:

(1) . Part of the 4th Expeditionary Unit will he disposed near the airfields and at the vulnerable points along the eest eoest of XAP Island and the meat ooaat of LIKUAK (TM T). The main foroe of the 4th Expeditionary Unit will oooupy the port of YAP and be prepared to maneuver whenever the oiroum-stances neoessitate it**'' Also Jb* control the entrance to the port in order to cover the landing of the 9th Expeditionary Unit.

.Should the enemy attack the port of XAP before the 9th Expeditionary Unit arrives, the main strength of the 4th Expeditionary Unit will annihilate the enemy on the shores*

In the event that the aforementioned movements cannot be oarrled out, due to unavoidable circumstances, the 4th Expeditionary Unit will fiirmly secure the airfields and the port of XAP and hold out against the enemy until the arrival of tho 9th Expeditionary Unit*

(2) . Upon the arrival of the 9th Expeditionary Unit at XAP, it will take over the defense tasks of the 4th Expeditionary Unit the Eastern XAP area* Consequently, the 4th Expeditionary Unit will be plaeed under the command of the 9th Expeditionary Unit.

(3) * The debarkation of both these Expeditionary Units

will be completed as soon as possible and also, the unloaded

materials will bo promptly disposed and concealed aa a precaution

against enemy bombardments* In tho event that the 9th Expedition ary Unit arrives at XAP before the 4th Expeditionary Unit, the

9th Expeditionary Unit will bo responsible for oarrylng out the Movements of the 4th Expeditionary Unit*

0. The Qowndir of the 31st Army will be at the Army Headquarters at SAIPAH.

Chapter II - The Disposition of Groups in the PALAU Area*

A* Plana for the Debar kati on of the 14th Division at PALAU.

1. Outline,

a. Upon its arrival at the anchorage, the Division with the oooperatlon of the looal administration, will em—nee debarkation. Troops and munitions will first disembark at the main Island of PALAU and then the ships will proceed to the various units to unload other war materials.

b. The Division will exert its utmost to try and complete the debarkation within fifty hours.

The 14th Division Commander will confer with the head of the PALAU branch office of the 4th Shipping Transport Unit and decide what to do in case the debarkation is not completed within fifty hours. In the event that there 1s an enemy air or naval attack while debarking troops, countermeasures will be taken to force the debarkation. However* in the event that there 1s an enemy air or naval attack while debarking munitions, lt will be deolded according to the situation. In the event that there ere signs of enemy leadings simultaneously with the landing of the JAPANESE Forces, lt will be dsclded on that oooassion.

2. The lending points and the allotment of space.

The landing points and the alloted space 1s as shown in the appended chart.

3. Outline of debarkation*

a. The order of debarkation is as follows:

(1) . Cargo crafts.

(2) * Troops (equlped with complete pack and

four days ration).

(3) . Gannons (including reserve ammunition),

tanks and trunks.

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4).Important oomaunloatlon materials, madioal supplies, and watar-proof coverings.

(6) .imminil tlon and fual.

(b).Important salf-supporting materials*

(7) .Portifloation materials.

(8) .Provisions and forago*

(9) .Other materials.

The above order of debarkation will be determined according to the order in which the oargo was loaded* Minute details will be decided by the Commanding Offleer of the landing unite or by the Commander of tho transport vessels in a conference with the Commanding Offleer of tho debarkstlon working party.

4. Protection against enemy air and submarine attaoks during debarkation.

a. Protection agalnat air attaoks will be as follows: (1). After the convoy arrives at tho anohorage,

tho anti-aircraft units on each ship will be responsible for tho protection against air attaoks. ,

$8)• Mash chip will be equiped with light machine-guns as protection agalnat air attaoks but definite orders will be given in accordance with the situation. Tho above protection unite will bo drawn from the landing units and plaood under the

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command of the debarkation working party Commander.

(3) . Tho landing unite in tho staging area will quickly dispose anti-aircraft units and watching parties* In tho event of en enemy air attack tho already landed troops will discontinue their work and repulse this attack* In order to keep the losses at a minimum, the troops not engaged in repulsing the air attack will take refuge in slit-trwnoh.es.

(4) * In order to keep losses at a minimum, landed troops and munitions will bo perfectly distributed and concealed*

b. Protection against enemy submarinea (end speedboats) will be as followst

(1). Anti-subourine operations will not bo carried t

on by the transport vessels. Tha transport vessele will firs upon enemy ■ pa ad boats only during tho day upon tho orders of tho transport Commander. However, this must not interrupt the movement a of the escorting fleet*

(2). Some ahips will be equipped with radio firing guns and automatis guns but definite orders will be given in aooordanoe to the situation. The troops manning these guns will be drawn from the lending units. 5. Signal suawsi nl sat lone.

a. The 14th Division Commander will land with the first wave of troops and proooed to the command post on KOROL (TM. f) Island.

b. Tho Division Commander will be responsible for the establishing of wireless communications between tho command poet and tho liaison offioorc of each military billot and also, by utilising boats, establish oommunioations between liaison officers and tho transport vessels.

d. Supplies*

r^h *">^itr *^f ***** +"

a*^c The lending unite will carry two meals (including

celt or two plotted plums) on tho day of debarkation. Prom tho

seoond day of landing, troops still remaining on the chips will

eat on tho ships while the landed troops will eat in their

respective units. Tho 69th Infantry Regiment will be responsible

for the supplying of food to tho debarkation working party.

7. Re sous work.

a. According to tho plans of the debarkation working party, eaeh transport vessel will be equipped with one lifeboat.

b. All patients will bo taken to the relief post on land. Por this purpose, relief posts will be established at the landing point (K0ROs\ - TM t - Pier) by tho YAMADA UMlt of the AMATSUKI Unit and also, relief posts will be established on each ship by its Commanding Officer.

8. Miscellaneous.

a. Commanding Officers of units larger than a battalion f

will, with the aid of their subordinates, strictly supervise the

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One officer with the rank of Battalion Commander will bo loft aboard oaoh ship to govern affairs within tho ship until the landing 1s completed. Tho position of tho debarication officer will bo alearly narked.

b. when unloading inportant munitions, a director will bo alloted to oaoh cargo craft in order to prevent mixture or loos of munitions*

Appended, nan. The lending point and the alloted apace:

The anchorage will bo OARBTSU Strelt (TH T). The TERU Unit 1s aboard Ships A. B and 0. After munitions have been unloaded and accumulated at Points A, B and C_# they will bo distributed and concealed on PALAU Island and KORO* (TM ?) Is.

1. Troops.

a. The Division Cmsmsnilsr will dobert aboard the craft (HAXABUSA).

b. The Infantry Regiments. Regimental colors and the

Regimental headquarters will land in the first wave and rest <&* f

the YAMADA Unit, stationed in the vioinity of the pier. They will than prooaad on foot to their Oillota eaoorted by tho ooapany in charge of tho colora.

0. Billot oonatruetion troopa and message couriers will also land in the flrct wave.

3* Trucks and Tanks.

Trucks and tanks will be unloaded on large landing bsrges and landed on KOROfc t«B-t) Islend*^They will then -be immediately ^« put into use.

1. Gannons, ammunition and other material.

Gannons, ammunition and other material will quiokly be distributed, ooneealed end covered with water-proof coverings after being unloaded.

4. Five hundred men from oaoh ship, totaling one thousand five hundred men, will engage in the debarkation work while another five hundred men will be left on each chip to work aboard the chips until debarkation is completed.

5. The troops engaged in debarkation work will be equipped with picks, shovels, saws, hatchets, sickles, etc.

to. Tho plans for the execution of the landing is aa shown on Separate Sheet Mo. 1.

B. / Defense and Fortification Plans of the Army Group in the PALAU Area at the Time of tho 14th Division's Arrival at PALAU.

1. Outline.

a. Anticipating an enemy attack, tho Army Group will

complete the deployment of troops as quickly aa possible. Furthermore, the Army and Naval Unite, excluding air units, responsible

for the defensive preparations in the PALAU area (inoluding the

other islands of the PALAU group end YAP Island) will lnformaly

be commanded by the Army Group and the basic preparations will be

completed es soon as possible. The Army Group will establish close

communications and cooperation with the units under the command of

tho 2nd and 8th Area Armies.

b. After -tho gradual deployment of the units, defence end fortification works will bo established in order to annihilate any enemy landing forte at the beaches. These defence end

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fortification works will be gradually strengthened and the group of air basaa firmly secured. For this purpose , the units will oomplete their field positions, with established key points, not lster than one month after their deployment. Following this, the field positions will be strengthened and the key positions will be heavily fortified. The field positions will be completely fort if ield within two months after the debarkation of the main force•

e. Concerning the basic defense preparations, tho Army Croup will have to oonaider the Navy's situation and establish olose communication with there in order to bring about the full utilisation of the combined fighting power.

2. Disposition and Preparation of Operations.

a. Tho disposition of troops in tho PALAU area will be as followsl

Army Croup Commander - the 14th Div. Commander.

Tho ANQAUR Detachment - two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion of the 14th Division, and the 42nd Independent Anti-Aircraft Regiment.

The PKL8LIU Detachment - three or four infantry battalions, one artillery battalion of the 14th Division, and the 43rd Anti-Alroraft Regiment.

The main island of PALAU and KOROB. (fJH^) Island -Division Headquarters, three or four infantry battalions of the 14th Division, one company of the 52nd Anti-Alroraf t Regiment, the let Sea Mobile Brigade, and the Sea Transport Units.

The ZAP Detachment - the 4th Heavy Artillery Regiment, the 9th Heavy Artillery Regiment end one oompany of the 52nd Anti-Aircraft Regt.

b. The advanced troops will closely cooperate with the Army and Naval Units*¹ already stationed on the various islands,

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and the officer* cad aen of these advanced unite will do their utmost to complete tho distribution, oonooslment end protection of the ships and netoris Is as a precaution against enemy air-raids

The Commanding Offleer of each island will be specially responsible for the carrying out of this work. .>>

o. after debarkation, tho various units will occupy positions at strategic points and make preparations for the annihilation of the enemy on the beaches.

In the event that the above positions oannot bo occupied, duo to a shortage of troops, these unite will make preparations for the final positions et strateglo points in the Interior of the islands. Swan if part of tho enemy foree succeeds in lending, these units will firmly secure the eir bases and prevent then from being utilised by tho enemy. They will also itect the lending operations of the rear unite.

d* These advanced units will establish fortifications, communications, munition dumps and shelters for cargo crafts.

Tho units will utilise local houses ee billets since new billets will not bo constructed for awhile. In constructing the military installations, the most Important feetors to be taken into consideration are the selection of safe positions and the strength of such installations agalnet the intenae enemy bombardments. Also the thorough pleoement, camouflage and concealment of such installation are vitally Important. In regard to the storing of munitions, special care will bo given to prevent retting due to tropical climate, or—be coning ^unueehlo*

e. The various units will receive training for island operationa and quickly form a strong unifloatlon of spirit. All Commanding Offleers will Improve their commanding ability and fully cultivate the fighting power in order to be reedy for any enemy attack. The 15th Regimental Command will cooperate with the let See Mobile Brigade, the Sea Transport Units end, if necessary, the PALAU branch of the 4th Shipping Transport Head-

quarters for the training- in counter-landing operations.. One

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infantry battalion will ba trained for this operation and a meane of Maneuvering among the strategic points in tho PALAU Islands will be prepared.

In regard to other military education and training, instructions will be given according to the situation.

f • The various units will olosely cooperate with tho Naval Units already stationed on the islands, in making preparations for the operations and especially* in regard to the establishment of air baaea, give whole-hearted assistance, oven at the sacrifice of discontinuing part of their own construction works*

Tho unite will utilise local materials and labor in — *»**g preparations for tho operations.

g. Tho Army and levy will smoothly- cooperate in all matters, but the unification of defence preparatlone will be decided by the Central PACIFIC Area Fleet as shown on Separate Sheet No* 1 (Instructions for the defense unification for tho lend group operations of the Central PACIFIC Area Fleet). 3* Outline of Further Battle Instructions*

a* Strategic points in the PALAU area and eepeclally the group of air bases, will be firmly secured in order to allow the air force to easily annihilate the enemy forces et sea. Tho

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most important factor is to prevent the enemy's occupation of the air baeec end to annihilate them on the beaches.

b* In regard to the firm securing of air bases, already constructed airfields and sights of future airfields will be strongly defended, and occupation of these airfields by the enemy will be prevented as much as possible*

o* The combined forces of the Army and Naval garrison units will annihilate the enemy landing foroe on the beaches.

For this purpose, the defence positions on each 1eland will be strongly fortified and the Army Croup on oaoh

island will independently carry out tholr sea maneuvers* Part of

tho force will launch a? surprise attack on the enemy landing

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preparation off the islands. Thus in this way, the defensive oampaign will be brought to a positive conclusion. Against at* tacking an—ly planes, the unite will utilise all effeotlve weapons in their already prepared anti-aaroraft positions and repulse the air attack.

d. The outline of battle instructions is as follows t

(1) . The PALAU Islands -

The PALAU Islands will be firmly scoured aa the final position against the enemy's PACIFIC penetrations operations. PSLSLIU and AJCAUR Islands will be strongly fortified aa important air bases. The strateglo points and especially tho airfields on the main island of PALAU will bo firmly scoured while et the came time, sea movements will be prepared for the PBLKLIU, AMOAUR and XAP areas.

(2) . XAP Island, included in the group of air basse in the PALAU area, will be the second difenaive line for MKLBYON (TM T) and will be firmly seoured. ULITril Islands and PAIS Islands which ere Included in the groups of islands surrounding XAP Island, will bs carefully guarded with the aid of the Navy to prevent tho enemy's utilisation of these islands.

a. The Carrisen Commander (or Detachment Commander) of each island will make an investigation of all lalande where no

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troops are disposed for the purpose of uncovering any enemy airfields or eecret installations. In tho event that there ere islands which might be utilised by the enemy in such a way, the Commander will dispose a unit on these islands as a precautionary measure.

f. The minute details of the Army Croup'a plan of operations following the completion of the basic defense measures will be decided later.

4. Fortifications.

a. In regard to the establishment of fortifioetlone,

positions (including anti-aircraft positions) for the purpose of

annihilating the enemy ^n the beaohes and installations for keeping

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iMtllj inflisted by the iBt«M tammy bombardmente, of materials, at a -fwill flrat ba constructed. Tbaac positions will then be quickly strengthened and deepened* In this way the islands will gradually be strengthened Into impregnable fortresses. Minute plans for fortIfioations will be decided separately*

6* Air Defense Measures.

a* The Oommander of the Naval Unit atatloned on oaeh island will be responsible for the issuance of air raid warnings. The Army Units will respond to the air raid orders of the Naval Unit Oommanders. In order to transmit the air raid warnings as quickly aa possible, the Army and Naval Units on eeoh island will

make necessary arrangements.

The Oommanderof the Naval Unit stationed on oaeh

island will be responsible for tho improvement of civil air defense*

b. The Navy will be responsible for the air defense of the entire area of the islands and especially the airfields. However* tho air defense of the islands on whioh Army air defenss units are disposed* will be conduoted by both Army and Naval air defense units working in oloce cooperation.

e* Dugouts will be constructed for the Headquarters end main signal units in order that they may carry out their duties even under the severest bombardments. Slit-trenches will bo constructed for tho individual troops*

d* Classification of precautionary measures will be

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jr«* be in readineea at their positions whUe ether important position*- will he guarded by the other units, although the defence precautions ersTdeolded^ae shown above, tho Garrison

Oossaander (or Deteehawnt Commander) on oaoh island will take into consideration the precent defense regulations of the stationed

■aval Units and minute regulations will be decided according to tho situation on the islands. The Amy and Navy Commanding Officers in charge of^defense of the islands (including atolls) will be responsible for the issuance of the precautionary measures. Minute details will be decided separately. The general antiaircraft preparations will be completed one hour before dawn on

eeoh oeoaalon.

O. Intelligence and Counter-intelligence.

a. The most Important items in collecting information is the knowledge of the enemya¹ counter-attack plana, especially the time, direction and scale of the counter-attack. Also, the obtaining of exeat information concerning geographical conditions in order that the Army may facilitate its operations and preparations without difficulty.

b. In collecting Information for the operations, the units will eloccly cooperate with the Navy and always watoh the situations in the southeastern areas. They will, especially, give great consideration to the reports received from the air signal unite concerning the activities of the enemy fleet.

0. The Army units will summarise and complete the data concerning geographical conditions and quickly clarify the situation of the islands on which no troops are stationed, especially, those islanda which possess a great possibility of being

utilised by tho enemy. Furthermore, the strategic value and situations of the beaches and atolls will be thoroughly

lnveetlgated.

d. The chief principles of countor-intelligence ere to keep information, concerning the deployment of troopa end

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preparation* of operation*, fro* the enemy and also to prevent end una over ell enemy spy activities. Per this purpose, the Army

will keep close contact with the levy in order to plan thorough oounter-intelligence activities in each unit and prevent any enemy activities on the island* uninhabited by cither natives or troops.

c. The intelligence service regulations, information

collecting plana (including investigation of geographical condition*) and the counter-intelligence regulation* of the Army Group in the PALAU area will be "separately, decided.

7. Supply Ships end Sanitation.

a. Since it 1c difficult to continue tranaporting suppliea from tho homeland over a long period of tine, the Army unite will conserve munition* and materiel a and perfeot e means of self-supporting.

b. In regard to supply and demand, the Army units, to

^4$9nh of the chipping difficulties will anticipate future situations (atleaat two month* in advanee) and make e requeat for the necessary amount of suppliea. The 30th level Munitions Department will be reaponsiola for supplying the PALAU main ialanda, the other . islands of the PALAU group (including AMOAUR) end XAP Island.

o. Directions for accumulating Important munitions will bo aa follows i

(1). The units responsible for beach defence will not only completely equip themselves but will also retain ammunition for one engagement (for three engagement a in case of ammunition for anti-aircraft guns and machine cannons), three months

..supply of motor fuel and about one year a supply of provisions and forage (at present, only six months supply). However, garrison troops on 1 saaaiatl islands will accumulate as much munitions as

possible in addition to the above mentioned supplies.

(8). The distribution in depth of materials will bo baaed upon the axeoution of beach engagementa and with consideration to its protection. The following accumulation ratio will be conaidered ea standard:

►~l»A»" Ml*. 1 )

MAMT).

(a). Infantry ammunition (including AM? and t

flimpsny snmnaltlon - do*.

Battalion and Regiment ammunition - 40%. (to). Artillery ammunition.

Bmergenoy ■■munition - Light guns (approx. 800 rounds). Heavy guns (approx. 100 rounds). The rest of the ammunition will be accumulated at convenient and safe places.

(3) . Three or four days supply of provisions will ho stored at the beach positions while a veeke supply of provisions will be stored at the place of readiness of oaeh company and platoon or near the anti-aircraft positions. Tho remainder of the provisions will be distributed end stored at safe places in the interior of the islands.

(4) . In storing munitlone, especially in lta distribution, concealment and prevention from-dotting, one kind of

munitions will not be stored all in one spot but will be nixed with other munitions and stored in various places. Tho position of tho dumps containing explosives and inflammables will be decided with great care.

(•)• Thorough Instructions concerning the protection and conservation of munitions will be given to oaeh soldier.

d. All units will try to obtain and utilize, not only prowlalone for self support but alsoweapwns and other general materials, from looal sources. The unite will develop end cultivate the raw materialc and produce their own goods. In carrying out such work, the unite will closely cooperate with the level plants and work in unison with them.

e. The Bevy will be responsible for ell shipping

(including looal chipping) end the loading and unloading of

munitions but the Army Commander of oaoh 1aland must cooperate

with tho Navy in order to complete the work at the earlieat

possible tine. Upon the unloading of munitions, tho Army units

will immediately distribute and conceal them, in order to keep

the locees from air attaoks at a minimum.

f • Lending craft shelters and landing craft

maneuver baaea will be temporarily constructed. •Aftaw that,

Upon

tho arrival of a supply of landing orafts, tho units will sossjls<isly> •quip tihow and raoalva aduoatlon and training oonosrning thoso

orafts. to suoh an extent that the saa maneuvers will be executed smoothly.

g. Oonooming sanitation, emphasis will ba plaeed on

maintaining healthy soldiers and preventing epidemics and looal diseases from spreading. As a result, the unite will be able to

maintain their fighting power and vigorously participate in the operations.

h. fatlente will, aa much as possible, be treated on

the islands but patients whoso ailments will take a long perlad of time, 1to oure^aooording to its degree, will be sent to the nearest level hospital as soon as possible*

1* Tho evaouation of patients will be conducted by level hospital (patient) ships and the movements of these ships will be decided on eeoh occasion.

8. Signal Communications. _c

a* Tho Amy, baaed upon the communication regulations of the Central PACIFIC Fleet, will keep in dose contact with tho SOUTH SKA Governments and other concerning organisations and will immediately establish a temporary wireless network.

b. Communication installations will be constructed in such a way that, even under the severest bombardments, communications be carried onto^the^^st^moment.

e. lire communications will bo established with the present communication wires and from materials possessed by the unite*

d* The regulations for the communication system of the Army Group will be separately decided*

Separate Shoot lo* j, ^Inetruet^^ ^JflSUMmJgnfcr tho_#L«*

1* The Oommander of the 31st Army will be responsible for tho unification of defense plans and preparations for tho land operations (excluding anti-aircraft and air operations) of the level

f

Army Omits on the various Islands maintained by ths Slat Army. 8. Ths Oommandar of tho Area Army Group will bo responsible for the uniflostion of defense plans and preparations for the land operations of tho Amy and Naval Units in the eastern pert of ths MARIANAS Islands end the CAROLINE Islands (including islands oaat of MRLEYON (TM T} and west of PONAPE, the Vest CAROLINE Islands (including XAP and ANQAUR Islands) and the 00A8AMARA Islands. 5* The Army and Navy Commander on oaoh island (excluding Air Units Commanders) will be responsible for the unity of control in relation to defense preparations for the land operations on oaoh ieland.

4. Defence preparations for the land operations aa mentioned

above Include the eatabliahing of point-blank firing and the

following elementa: diaposition, fortifioatlona, eetabllahment of

obataoles, observation end communication* The movements of air

unite and anti-aircraft matters for air opcrationa will be ex*

eluded from tho above mentioned defense preparations.

Transpor^gtlon and Supples

1* The Army will be chiefly responsible for the transportation

tn the *:!ewwtehdcg of the 51st Army, including munitions and

materials (at leaat three months supply) carried by the 31at Army on that occasion. After the 31st Army arrives at its

destination, the Navy will be responsible for the transportation

of further supplies (and replacements), the transportation of

munitions and materials from the homeland, and the evacuation of

patients*

8* The Navy will be responsible for the loading and unloading of Amy munitions and also local transportation but the Army will render necessary mesns in cooperating with this work such as: traneportlng motor boats and shipping troops from the Army transport vessels convoy and disposing anchorage headquarters et main ports end beys* The loading end unloading work will be carried on by the combined of forte of the Amy and Navy.

The Mevy will be responsible for the supplying of necessary

munitions and meterlet.s to the Army Units but the Army will be

t

responsible for equlping its units with weapons {excluding fuel), alothing end other speelal Amy Munitions. Furthermore, the Army will be responsible tor supplying materials to the Slat Amy and the QGASAWARA Area Amy Group.

In addition to the above mentioned factors, islands which cannot be supplied by the Amy will be supplied by the levy. 3. The fundamental prlnelplea of tho supply system for tho 51st Amy is aa shown in the appended table.

aianal Ooiwaiml cations 1. Communications, within tho Amy Units, and between the 31st Army Headquarters, the Army Department of the Imperial (toneral Headquarter a, end other neighboring Amy Units will be established not only by utilising Amy communication facilities but also Naval communication facilities. In the event that communications are

suspended, the Army and levy will mutually accommodate oaeh other. They may also utilise preferentially, the communication faoilitiec Of tho SOUTH SKA Government.

8. Tho oontrol of communications in the Combined Fleet area will be determined by the Fleet Commander.

3. The Army units will mutually exchange ell information, 4* In commanding and contacting Army units, signal equipment and airplanes will be utilised when necessary and the Navy will render assistance in such matters.

5. The Army signal code will be utilised in communications

between end within tho Amy units. The Navy signal code will bo

ueed in communication between the Amy and Navy. The Amy signal

code will be ueed only upon tho direct instructions of the Amy

Department of the Imperial General Headquarters.

3. The postal servioe of the Amy units will bs handled by the

Navy postal facilities.

Billets. Fortifications and Sanitation

1. The Navy will render assistance in supplying ths Amy units

with billets end billeting materials (these materials will not be

sent from the homeland) end also fortification materials.

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1. Tt» plana for too transportation of Swpsllsi vara prepared by tbo Wary Tranaportatlan Haadquartart at tbo Transportation Coaf aroaao which lt

2. Requests for supplies 1a toe oaaSHTABA area wore wade by the 31st Amy Coaaander directly te the Aray TUprlsasa of the Iapsrial MsaOOwarteTS, The Aray took the responsibility for lie fulfillaent.

)

2. In the event that Amy sanitation faoilitiea ara laoking and lta establishments ara insufficient, Amy patlanta will be traatad by Havel facilitiea. In this ease, the Amy units will* aa nuah as possible, diapatoh madiaal worssnasl to aaaiat the Bevy. UtUlsatlon of Loaal Matarlala Looal labor and on oaoh island will ba controlled

by an offioor appointed by the lawy end Amy Commanders or by the senior oommanding offleer.

Requisitions, for the present, will be serried out aooording to the regulations of the requisition order and also with the olose cooperation of the officials and the people.

Separate Volume Instructions for the Betabllahment of Fortifioatlone 1. Outline of the organisation and establishment of positions, a. Beach defense positions.

(1). The vulnerable points on the beaches will be guarded by one company or platoon of infantry troops disposed in independent posts established at intervals of several hundred meters to one kilometer apart. Tho majority of heavy weapons will be ueed to oonoentrate fire to the front and in the area between the posts. Light maohine-guna, heavy grenade launchers and rifles will be ueed ohicXly for concentrated frontal end flanking fire. Although intense enemy pressure la. pieced upon these posts, they will continue their concentrated flreJ*'4aY the strong flank defence points laid with heavy weapons will become the bads for the oounter-attaok. These positions will, by taking advantage of topographical conditions, be strongly constructed to withstand the enemy bombardment a. In order to be prepared for a audden change of situations, several positions will be construeted. Antitank trenches will be dug around the strong points to further strengthen them.

(8). Might defense positions, strong key points for counter-attacks, and iliisny atrong points to mislead the enemy,

will if necessary, be constructed in the area between the poctc.

(3). In the rear ^fot the beeoh positions, the second

^ it

line intermediate position will* by olercrly topographioal

oonditione, ba oonetrueted to prevent the complete deetruotion

of the beach positions end e&woHkb- will serve ea the basis of the counter-attack of the reserve.troops. Instructions for the

organisation and establishment of the intermediate positions are the same aa those of the beeoh defence positions. However, many positions and firm gun (and rifle) shelters will be established between the intermediate positions end the beeoh fn order to be eble to ley e sudden concentrated fire. Maneuvering routes for counter-etteekc will also be completed.

Many dummy positions end installations will be constructed in the gaps of the poeltions for the purpose of misleading the enemy and drawing the enemys' fire on the dummies,

(4). At beaohes where landing would be difficult, due to cliffs, ravines and mountainous waves, one platoon or squad of infantry troops will-eidbi bs disposed et the constructed pocte along the length of the beech in order to prevent any enemy landings. At tines, according to the situation, only observation tro >ps will be diapoaed while the main troops will bo placed in readiness for maneuvering* At the same time, many dummy positions wl 11 be constructed to mislead ths enemy into thinking that they-era firmly defended.

(&)• The artillery will be used chiefly to oonocntrete oblique end flanking fire near the beaches and to destroy enemy chip end tanks. Also, in the event that a beaoh position is on the verge of being ooeupled by the enemy, the artillery will be ueed to concentrate fire upon that position. It will bo necessary to dispose fire power et the key points on the atolls in order to prevent the advance of tho enemy landing orafts. The majority

of the weapons will be pieced in the strong flank defence points which will, by taking advantage of the topographioal conditions,

bo constructed in well concealed plaeee of the beeoh positions and the intermediate positions. The rest of the weapons will bo pieced in the many pocitionc conveniently located near the gun (and rifle) -halter and many other position, will be preper.d in — - *..P the damage f*o.^ _tlr. _m% . ^

m \

At the a*JM time, many dummy poeitlons and dummy ports will be oonetrueted to draw the enemy fire.

Gannons for frontal fire will be ueed for short end sudden firing end they will often change their poeitlons In order to prevent detection.

(0). The Maval flat trajectory guns will, due to their Ineffective range, be pieced In flank defence positions for use only In beech battles. Per this purpose these guns will be well concealed to evold destruction by the enemy bombardments end also,

many flank defence positions will be-prepared cannons used for the destruction of enemy transport vessels will be pieced in wide range arc firing frontal positions end will be well camouflaged

and protected against enemy bombardments. Already oonetrueted * forte which ere vulnerable to enemy bombardments will be gradually strengthened according to the above mentioned instructions.

(7). The beaohes will be temporarily laid with small mines and lend mines but with the progress in the construction of the positions, various other types of obstacles will be laid on the beaohes end in the water. Furthermore, anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles will be constructed around the posts and in the gape of the poeitlons. These will then be gradually strengthened. Much consideration should be given in the oon-

4

struotion of these obstaolec lcet they be destroyed by enemy air raids.

b. Air defence positions.

Anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft machine cannons end

guns will be ohiefly disposed et airfields, ports and harbors,

end strategic positions. The poeitlons of these guns will be

oonetrueted In suoh e way that the guns will be able to not only

send up a perfect protecting screen, but will be able to also

participate in the see and land engagementa.

Many positions for the motorized artillery will be oonetrueted end frequent changes of poeitlons will be made in

11

to avoid destruction by enemy fire*

The light and heavy machine-guns, which ere ueed chiefly for land battiee, will be ueed against low swooping enemy plane e. Boneequently, eeveral anti-aircraft ehelters will be oonstruoted near the positions.

o. Reer positions (find positions).

The seotor unite, by firmly scouring the strategic points within the area, will prevent the enemy utilisation of the

rflelde et dl oosts. If tine permits, the ceetor unite will prepare rear poeitlons in order to join the oountar-attaok of the rear smjmjsjjBsssA bring about t quick annihilation of the enemy. The independent nature of the reer positions will be especially strengthened and the preparations for counter-attacks will be completed.

8. Outline of temporary installations for keeping losses et a mlnlnusu

Counter measures will be taken against the lntenee enemy bombardments in order to keep losses of troops, weapons, ammunition and provisions at a minimum and also to maintain the fighting power* For this purpose, the following measures will be quickly carried out*

(1) . In addition to individual dr raid trenches for ell troops, air raid shelters will be oonstruoted near assembling pieces end will be clearly marked.

(2) . Men end motorized weapons on the beaches end in positions expoecd to the enemy, will be placed in protective shelters by utilising terrain features. Observation and communication Installations will be completed in order to fcolliteto immediate movements of men end motorized guns In the event of

an enemy landing*

(3) * To avoid enemy tfire, shelters end covers for

weapons, oarts, machinery end tools will bo oonetrueted*

(4) * Two thirds of the ammunition, provisions, fuel, clothing and other munitions will bo distributed end stored in protective shelters near the main positions while the remaining one third will be pleeed il the reer position.

(•)• The amount of material, aooumulatad in ona spot will not exoaed Chen oublo meters, tho diatanoa botwoon ammuni-tlon dumps and fuel dumps will too at least one hundred motors. Tho distanoea between storing plaees of other materials will bo fifty motors.

(6) . As wooden buildings are easily destroyed end burned by the bombardments, it will bo advisable not to use auoh etruotures. Soon after landing, wooden buildings may be used as shelters against the rain but the materials must be tranaferred to better shelters as soon as possible.

(7) . In the distribution and storing of materials, dampness and ventilation will bo greatly considered in order to prevent lessee.

9. Degree of the establishment of fortifioations and the quality of the fortifications.

(1). Concerning the establishment of fortifications, many installations will bo prepared to moat tho change of situation brought about by damages inflicted by enemy fire and with consideration to the putting up of stubborn resistance from tho positions in depth. For this purpose, the number of fortifications will bo several times greater than the number of units in oompsrisn to atandard fortifications. Furthermore, the quality of gun shelters will exceed normal standards. In addition, to these, many dummy positions and installations will bo constructed.

(8) . At first, tho temporary beach defense positions will be simple and will be well plaeod and ooneeeled in order to keep losses at a minimum but tho framework of tho positions which are the shelters for tho flank defense weapons, gun (and rifle) shelters, end the commanding posts, will bo greatly strengthened.

(5). Tho quality of the fortifications will bo based

upon tho field fortification manual but "the- oaves* cliffs and steep hills on the islands will be utilised to greatest extent.

In this way* materials and labor will be greatly economized. f

(4). When material• for permanent positions are ob-

tained, the shelters for important weapon*, gun sheltera, command posts end signal stations will be greatly strengthened end constituted into permanent fortlfleations. Furthermore, if the terrain permits it, many cere shelters will quickly be oonstruoted by bloving out holes in the mountains vlth explosives. The quality of permanent fortlflections will be indioeted separately. 4. Instructions for the establishment of installations*

(1) . The garrison units von eeoh area will, upon landing immediately begin their work. Within one veek, they wlll^Aalmoet

complete the beech defence pocitionc and the protective installations. Within one month, they will complete the field pocitionc

and within two months, will complete the firm field pocitionc containing strong points* These pocitionc will then be further strengthened and fortified* For this purpose, the unite will bivouac in the field end whole heartedly engage in the construction of these pocitionc* Billets will not bo oonetrueted until the work lc completed*

(2) . Concerning the establishment of fortifications, the offlecrc end sen in charge of fortlfleationa in eeoh area will be responsible for itc general plans end control and also for the supplying and distribution of materials.

(3) . The degree of importance' of the positions will bs decided in constructing fortifications in order to be prepared for any enemy attaok.

(4) * Installations will be well eonoceled from i ir and ace obcervationc and trccc will not be out down unnecessarily. Furthermore, transportation routes, concentrations of materials end freeh earth will be perfectly camouflaged.

3* Materials for fortlfieatlone.

Materials for temporary fortifications will be obtained from local sourees while cpcolel materials will be supplied separately. The distribution of materials for permanent fortlfioations will be indicated separately.

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30

*7

e. The results of ths fortlfioatIons will bo occasionally inveetigated by sir sad s«a observations to determine their perfection.

Fortification Plans of ths Armor Oroun In ths PALAU Ares 1. Instructions.

a. Tho Amy Croup will, first of all, complete Important

Installations for tho prevention of any enemy landings and for the protection of men end materials from the intense enemy bombardments. In strengthening thece pocitionc, looal materials will be clewerly utilised end the islands will bs developed into invulnerable fortressee by the middle of October of this year et the letest.

8* Outline of the organisation and establishment of fortlflections.

a. The instructions for the organisation and eetabilehment of fortlflections will be beeed upon the inetruetlonc for the establishment of fortlflostlone contained in the Separate Volume, "Defense Plans of the Army Group in the PALAU Area."

3. Chief factors concerning the organisation and establishment of fortlflootlone.

a. In order to greatly strengthen the fortlflection on PSL&LIU end AHOAUR Islands, reinforced concrete and rooks will bo ueed to increase the quality of the pocitionc. Furthermore, underground installations will bs eons trusted to withstand the

4

intense enemy bombardmentc end also beeoh obeteclec will be lnoreaeed.

b. Tho Amy Croup will utilise local material a and the terrain ec much ee possible on PALAU Island and XAP ireas end will

inorease the degree of strength of the fortlfioations. The degree

<*■*-«-

of strength of the fortlf lections in eeoh area -will—be- Illustrated in appended Telle Ho. 1.

4. Degree of the establishment offortlfioatlons,

a. The degree of the eetabilehment of fortifications will

differ aeoording to tho main factors ofthe fortifications, the organisation and equipment of the garrison unit, the terrain

and the nature of soil, However, the degree will be Increased

ac much aa possible by mailing the most of whet materials, military

■...... 3, *

strength and time 1a available. The degree of the establishment of fortifcations wtH^be. illustrated in Appended Table Ho. 2. 6. Quality for fortifloations.

a. Tho degree of quality will be determined by the importanoe

of tho fortifloations.

(1). Tho degree of quality of the fortifioations containing protective shelters 1s classified as follows: (a). Contended after ohart.

Tho application of tho contents of tho table is as followst

(a). Special "A* and Special "B" fortifications.

Shelters and gun shelters in cliffs, raoks and stoop hills will bo constructed in cave types (gallery types) of at least Special *B" quality. Specially Important installations (Command posta, observation statlona and wireless communication stations) will be constructed of Special "A" quality. On pebble beaches, the especially Important gun shelter and oommand posts that ars exposed to concentrated enemy fire will be constructed of Special *B^N quality with reinforced concrete.

f

\ ' ■ ¹ ). '

(b). "A" Fortification.

Important gun shelters, commend posts and observatione posts for oommsndlng officers, important wireless oommunioation etatione and shelters aaeomnodating more than twenty troops end other important weepons end ammunition, will be oonstruoted of "A" quality.

(a). "B" fortlfieations.

dun sheltare, eheltere for troope, weepons

and ammunition, oommand posts end observation posts endstrueted in relatively favorable terrain will be of "B" quality, (d). "0" end "D" fortifioatlone.

Heavy weapon shelters, reserve positions, front line meehine gun poeitlons, weteh poete, shelters accommodating several men end email quantities of weapona and ammunition, shelters for prowlsions and water, and semi-underground living quarters will bo oonetrueted of "0" end "D" quality.

(8). Anti-tank and anti-landing eraft obstacles.

(a) . Anti-tank obataoles. Anti-tank obataoles will be classified in the

following eategorlee:

1). For destroying tanks.

8) . For preventing the advance of enemy tanks.

9) . For slowing up the advance of enemy tanks. Anti-tank trenches for resisting medium

tanks will be strengthened with dirt, oonorete end rooks (see Teble six on Page 821 of fortlflootion manual Part 1) and the depth of the trenoh will b e more then 1.6 me tore for "B" trenches end more then 50 centimeters for "0" trenohee.

(b) . Beach obstacles.

"A" obstacles used for deetruotion purposes will inolude small mines end aea mines. "B" obeteolee ueed for preventive purposes will Inolude small landing orafts and amphibious tanks. "0" obataolea ueed for forestalling purposes will be constructed to prevent direct enemy advances. However, they will be constructed with, the lwaat materlale and labor necessary.

Beam

That* obstacle* will* **~m*oto^a-^o**4*le»~ be placed about ana no tor below tho eurfeoe of tho aaa. In constructing beach obetaolce, numoroue dummy obstacles will* first of all* bo constructed to mislead any enemy air ar submarine rcoonnai a canoe •

b. Quality of field fortifications.

The quality of field pocitionc will bo baaed upon the field fortification manual. However, in order to retain lte dura-billty, fortification materials will be perfectly protected against rain, dampness and heat*

a* Permanent fortifioatlone.

The quality of permanent poeitlons will be designed end eotabllched with tho following considerations!

(1)* In constructing permanent fortifications, looal durable materials will be utilised as much as possible* For this purpose, cava typo fortifications will bo oonstruoted in cliffs, rooks and steep hills will be ueed to strengthen the flank positions. Dome type shelters will Hso be oonetrueted from rooks. In areas, where euoh durable wood such aa T1AK, RAM AH and MAMOROVK are easily obtained, theae will be used to reinforce the inside of the fortlf lection* Rook barriera will be constructed around the fortlf1-octione*

4

(8)* In areas where durable materials are aoaroe, concrete or reinforced oonorete will be ueed to inoreaee the neoeeeary degree of strength of tho fortifications. However, even in such bases, local materials, eepecially rook (coral) will bo ueed aa much ae poesible to economise on reinforced oonorete.

(3) . Local terrain end nature of coil will bo thoroughly investigated in order that installations may be oleverly adjueted to them* Terrain will be utilised to the extent where the hlghoet quality of fortifications can be attained with the leact amount of materials and labor*

(4) * Trees on the lelende will be ueed in constructing

anti-peraonnel obctaalec such ec tree barriers, abatleec and vine

f

end wire entaglemente* Various kind* of simple obetaolce will bo

ins tailed aa cliffa and in the water end jungles. Strong obetaolea will be ereeted end established bj utilising looal materials. Mow-able obetaolee will be oonetrueted on the beaohes in order to pro-went them from being destroyed and washed away by large waves. (6). anti-tank obetaolee.

If large eoale slowing up obstaolee for landing orafts and amphibious tanks are plaoed on ooral sonea looated about one meter below the surface of the water, the annihilation of the enemy on the beaohes will beoomo muoh eaaier. Therefore, extenslws atudy and planning of the quality of the obeteolea will be amdo and establishment of these obstaoles will be oarried out at ell east a. A means of increasing the quality of anti-tank obstaoles by utilising stones, rooke, cliffs, steep hills and trees will be studied.

(to). Numerous dummy works, positions and installations will bs oonetrueted to mislead end draw the enemy fire. 6. Instructions for the establishing of fortifications.

a. Bach aeetor unit will, at all ooctc, complete its permanent fortifications by 20 August 1944. For this reaeon, a system foreeatabllching fortifications will quickly be fixed. Furthermore, the progress of work and the effective management of men and materials will be baaed upon minute and accurate working plans.

Divisional fortification .technicians will on neooeaery oeoeclonc be attached.to the sector units for eld end guidance in carrying out this work.

b. Fortification work will be divided into three perioda and, according to the gradual progress method, the fortifications will be gradually strengthened in each period. The instructions are aa followsi

(1). First period (about one month Immediately after landing).

(a). Beach defence pocitionc.

Beeoh defence pocitionc will be oonetrueted

similar to field fortlfloatlona. Shelter for heavy weapons, watch

pocta, observation posts end other important areae will be peetooted f

■ 3

3S

by light and medium ooveringe. Natural terrain features, especially oliffs and oaves will be utilised ee anion aa possible to inorease the degree of strength. Ordinary obateoles will be plaoed on beaches and around important strong points while anti-tank obetaolce will be placed on knew WW* areas most spt to bo attaoked

by enemy tanks* Key points (key pocitionc and poets) will be surrounded by obetaolce and heavy guns will be plaoed txtthese points. In the event that this cannot be accomplished, shelterc from which hand grenades can be thrown will be oonctruotcd.

(b). Installations for keeping loccee et a minimum. Utilising the terrain, e email number of simple installations will bo oonctruotcd end concealed in wide areas and when materials and labor are available, large protective shelters will be oonctruotcd. A thorough investigation of the island will be made and natural oaves will be utilised as much as possible, (o). Working order.

In ssshears*,' the core of the most important pocitionc will first of all bs completed. For this reason, fire positions, observation poctc and communication stations will be constructed and materials will be distributed end concealed. Communication obstaoles will then be oonctruotcd. However, the sector units will be always^bprepared for any enemy air raids.

(2). The second period. (Two months following the first perldd).

The installations oonctruotcd during the first period will be cupplimented and strengthened as field and permanent fortifications. Positions will then be deepened, dummy positions will be increased and communication obstacles, water obctaelec and other obeteolec will bo newly established and atrengthend. Important gun shelters, oommand poctc and other shelters which ere oonctruotcd of concrete and rooks will be gradually antabliahed in--the permanent fortlfioationa so aa to be prepared for any enemy attacks. Gave type pocitionc will bo oonctruotcd In rooks and and cliffa wad^Aiaeweeae> the degree of strength of -the- fortifications.

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(3). The third period (till ths middle of October 1944)* Important cooltore cad covere mill be oonstruoted

with reinforced concrete and rooks or la oaves. Important parte of tho pocitionc, cad dummy works (guns, soldiers, obstaolea cad

etrong pointe) will oc^whww^ughly—conetrue ted on e large seels.

Beech obetaolce, anti-tank obetaolee, dummy positions and dummy workc (guns, soldiera, obetaolce, and strong points) will be thoroughly-oonetrueted on a large scale.

The degree of the eetablishment of fortlficatlone in each period la illuetrated in Appended Table Bo. 8.

a. The establishment of fortlflcatlone will be beeed on the engineer training manual, field fortlflection manual, encampment communication manual end the gee protection manual but the following matterc will be taken into consideration. General matters.

(1). The order of works will be based upon the estimation of the enemye* situation and the present situation of men and materlcle. The order of workc will be fixed in cuoh a way that the aeetor unite can alwaya retain its maximum fighting power.

(8). As it is understood that construction work will bo carried on only in the absense of enemy bombardmenta and reconnaissance, the sector unite will adapt themselves to both situatlone

4

(working and fighting) and bo prepared for cay enemy ettaoke. Furthermore, the sector units will pay special attention to camouflage and concealment and the skillful plasemsnt of Installations.

(3) . Established fortlfioations will be examined and tected and all defective parte will be mended or newly oonctruotcd in order to meet necessary battle situations.

(4) . Distribution of fortlfioation materials will be changed according to the eltuetlon but the ceetor unite will endeavor to complete the fortlfioatlona aa quickly aa poacible by

utilising looal materlcle end by changing working positions and methods.

31

(•)• Mach commanding officer, recusing pwiint situation

^ will properly aupervlee the work and eetablish striot working dieoipline. Consequently, tho fortlfloatlon will bo oonplotod quickly and efficiently•

(6) . The field of fire of pocitionc will bo camouflaged egeinet enemy air, lend''sea observation end thecc pocitionc will

bo oonctruotcd in tunnel type.

(7) . A drainage eycten will be installed in all installations and damp-proof systems will be established in ammunition

and provision warehouses.

(8) . Materials for reinforcing oonorete will be produced earlier and the framework of the fortlfleatlona will be completed by the end of September. _t/

(9) . Important communication lines and lines exposed to enemy fire will be established In ditohee to minimise locece. •hen necessary, line maintenance poctc with necessary materials will bs established between the fortlfioatlone.

(10) . Water supplylng facilities are vitally necessary and will be perfeotly established. In the event that springs are loeeted when constructing cave type installations, the water from these springs will be directed into water storages. Water tanks or wells will be established in the shelters to supply weter to the key positions and independent poctc. A water ayetern will bo improvised to facilitate easier eupplylng of water to all pocitionc.

(11) . Lighting eyetmma, anti-gas measurea, sanitary meaaurea, eound-proof systems, ventilation systems and protective measures egeinet accidents and injuries will be established in ell instailat ions•

rgLsLIC and AJCAUK Areas

(1). As the nature of soil in these areas is ohiefly

Corel reefs, herd coral will be utilised in constructing installs* items,

(8). As clcvetcd arch-formed fire positions arc easily-

noticed on flat terrain, they will be ueed only for flank defence. f

3?

i

Strong gun (and rifle) shelters end light shelters will bo used for frontal defense. Flank defense aroh-farmed positions will bo •specially «_#ii camouflaged.

(5). Shallow approach trenches will be gradually deepened end draining will be considered in constructing those trenches.

(4) . When tho drainage system in the installations 1s poor, water will be drained by hand.

(5) . natural oaves will be utilised for storing weapons, ammunition and provisions. However, when natural caves are unavailable, cave type shelters will be constructed with concrete.

(•)• Water tanks will bs full at all times.

(7). Beach obstaeles will be constructed on a large soslo and they will be firmly established especially on coral reefs. On important fronts, obstacles will bo constructed in depth. The following Illustration 1s an example.

(a), an example of fire obstacles disposed in the water off the beeches.

Notes X - • represents floating drums containing benzine end heavy oil mixed at a ratio of four to five* These drums are plaood about fifty motors apart Just before the enemy landing.

8 • "hen the enemy landing craft a approach these drums, the heavy machine guns on the beaches will open fire on thess drums and explode them. The contents of these drum will ignite end spread a sea of flame around the enemy. In this way, the enemy, espeoiellj amphibious tanks, will bo annihilated.

lb), an example of the disposition of landing oraft

obstacles.

Hotel 0 represents woo don polos pounded into the son.

roprosnonts wire entanggements or durable wines, represnets rooks or barriers.

These will be disposed in depth throe hundred meters off the beaoh.

(8). The Commanderof tho soetor units in tho PELELIU area will oonstruct the Army Group oommand post of Special "A" or Spools! *B* quality near tho sector unit oommand post.

Hain Island of PALAU and YAP Island (1). Concrete will bo used in strengthening the flank defense arch-formed gun and rifle shelters in the beaoh positions, however, other protective installations, oommand posts, observation posts, and signal communication stations will bo constructed in cave type.

(8). The water supply will chiefly be obtained from wells which will have boon dug in the early stages of fortification construction.

i

7. Fortification materials.

a. The materials for tho establishment; of fortifications during the first period will be these possessed by each unit besides otherloeal materials. In the event that materials for permanent fortifications cannot bo obtained from local aouroes, materials will be cent from the homeland and distributed.

8. Reports.

a. Hash sector unit Commander will immediately submit maps showing the organisation of posltlono and also tho plans for establishing fortifloations.

b. Reports on present working oonditlona and the degree of progress will be made according to tho fortifloation manual

Ho. 8 of tho THRU Unit Staff Corps. ^

Appended Chart Ha. 1

strength

far tho Construction of »

amp sad si Chart He. t

i

^3

min.

tion wires

t, Def—JW W._M SS? 4C. ■ BBAe. 1m 4km ^-f-

i. Oil

(1) zb antislpatlug the expected enemy Und lag. tho Sector Omit, working 1b oleoo oo-oporation with tho BnWnl nnlto in that area, will deploy ito foroo and eeteblioh dofeneive positions.

(t) The Sootor Units will oonotmot strong dofonoiwo pooitioas 1a ample depth, along tho ohoroo and otratogie point*. Tho enemy will bo mot by" hoary fire and fieree eewnter attnoke whom At'make* the loading.

Far that reason, the Setter Unit will complete the key dsfeneiro poeltleme at etrategle points. After a month, the unite will he deployed. Later, the etrategle pelnte will be permanemtly fortified and within tea months, will he eeaaleted as field poeitione. They will be eontinaeaely strongthemed.

n. m\\m if mi sow^ttsnt

(3) The southern and northern part ef the inland (tool ad tug QaAvWBB Xelamd) will he the key points for the troops deployment te meet the enemy landing.

(4) leorot tad surprise attaaka will he carried eat by email boats, rafts, eta., when the enemy landing crafts approach.

Zn tale ease, tea ebetatlet will be utilised as mash an possible.

(5) When the enemy triee to eetablieh a beaoh head, couator attacks will be earried out during the sight.

4

(4) If the enemy tries te lend 1a a certain area, parts of the unite from the ether eeetero will be deployed te eagage the enemy.

(T) If the enemy tries te lead at all the points simultaneously, oaoh center unit will meet the enemy respectively. Zf the enemy maaagee te sstablish a beach head, the reesrree will carry eat the couator attacks free the western setter te drirt the enemy back late the sea.

(I) Za se-eperetien with the naval land waits, the Sector Units will see guerilla warfare and will iatareept the enemy at all eeet 1a order te prcTomi the ememy from oene true ting an air hate.

ZZZ. SmlWMli tan. HIM ml mat IstliT lawM

(9) Sootor sonet and deployment ef etreagth 1a shown in supplementary chart Ie. 1.

t

(10) The Southern Sootor Unit will eeeupy a strong key point eenth ef the airfield te preteet it and to repuloo the enemy landinc.

If the enemy adraneeo te the airfield, the unit will, in co op era-Uon with the lee term looter Unit, merry out the counter attacks.

The unit mill firmly held this point and will prevent the enemy fren using the airfield. The emit will, by all means, intercept the enemy end wake this point as-the base fo/eeaater attacks⁷.

Constant liaison neat ke maintained between, the Sootor Unit and the naval lend units. Ie order to defend the flanks of the weet and eaet ooaet, a gun will he deployed at KOJIMA and a mountain gun in tho vicinity of "AKASAKI. A part ef the artillery will make preparations te neutralise the airfield.

(11) The weet Sootor Unit will occupy the strong points weet and north of the airfield te preteet it and to repuloo the enemy landing.

then the nanny advances to the airfield, this unit, in ee*opemtiea with the South Sootor Unit, will engage than.

The unit mast maintain the northern strong point of the airfield

e

at all eaet in ordor te prevent the enemy advanee and to use this point as n base for counter attacks.

A part ef the heavy gum unit will ke deployed to defend the flanke of the South and North Sectors.

A position will ke establiehed between the north and the South Sootor Units.

(12) A powerful seetisa of the North Seetor Unit will eavnaee te the etrategle points on OADOBUSU Island and another sec Uon & the vicinity of the harbor te meet the enemy lending.

ab infantry platoon will occupy ANGAUR Island te maintain the island gad to protect a^OSUSU Island. Furthermore, an infantry platoon will be dispatehod te OAM ELI SHU Inland to ^emlko a *slaA,

In order te preteet the airfield at^-GAlKBUSU Island, counter attacks and roinforeomonts by boate will be prepared.

A powerful gun unit will bo deployed te prevent the enemy fren using the airfield in fAllwWII.

A part ef the Artillery Unit will be directed to the weet eeaet

ef the western Sootor. A4 the cans time, _a machine gun -Milan will bn Sent 4* the Eastern 8t«4«r

(13) **• Baeteea Sector Unit will nmnmi tho strategic point* of ICHHOJI poninouU (espssially 1a tho isiddle and ooutharn im). At tho OOJM time, a oootion of tho unit will occupy OAUfPOLOLOKO harbor and tho northern part of tan island.

Za order te prevent the oneay from advancing to the Southern teetar Area and to aako this point a base for oounter-attaok, the unit must, at all ooot, aaiataia the stratogis points 1a the ICHDJOJI peaineula and the rioinity ef SALUTOLOL0K0.

disfeiteW

A oeetioa ef the artillery will benlireoted- to tho oast ooaot of the tenth Seeter and at the sane tine, a section of the naohlne gun unit will he deployed to the eaet ooaot ef the Berth Sootor.

(14) The following strength will bo s&ossd out ef oaoh sector wader the Whole Sector Unit Ccsssanderi

Weet Sector Unit—about 2 ecnwanioo South " " — " 1 eonpany Berth - • — • 1 • Bast « • — • 1 "

(15) The Division Teak Unit will prinarily participate 1a repulsing the oneay landing oa the South and Weet Sector area sad alee te co-oporato with the Whole teetar Unit for the oountor-attaok.

The salt will construct tank positions along the shores ef the Berth seetar and the epasee bshwosn every strong point.

(14) The artillery wait will eeeupy the positions north of ASRTYASU (V t) area te direct their fire against the oneay landing.

Zn order to ee-cperate with the Whole Sootor Unit, this wait will prepare wsnsentratsi -tlm fcr the counter-a I teak.

This snit will also prepare 4c oonotruct 4he> positions for the mobile force in order to'take part 1a the battle for the^GABGBW airfield area.

(IT) 1 pert ef the Engineer Company will train end make preparations for sea guerilla warfare. The main farce will operate together with the aeeter reeerveo. By. the order ef the Sector Unit Gesssnnder, the company

V7

will engage 1a ol— quarter combat when the enemy lands. Tht eompany will be rtnmmi for tho deetruetien of important roads and ^prepere^obsta-ol on,

(11) Tnn rooorvoo will^preparedto roinforoo oaoh sootor nt nay tin* and whoa tho enemy ostabliohos a beaoh hoad, it will, by ordsr of tho Vholo Sootor Unit Commander, carry out tho counter-attack.

the 9th Company of the 15th Regiment will pVeporV a mobile aaa force and a section >m^al**-©c*par* for guerilla warfare.

(19) The Supply Company commander will bc~roopoaolbio fsgjeha supply asT ammunition and provisions to each sector. At the same time, he will aeoist 1a the transfer of troops sad shifting of artillery positions *y trucks.

(20) The Signal Company will -prepare to maintain oomaunioation s«f cf**~. between the Division and each Sector Unit under any oireuastaaces.

(21) The Medical Unit will deploy at any time 1a amy scoter te collect casualties and to oend them to tie rear.

(22) The field Hospital will be reoponaihle-te-attend and treat all caoualtioo.

(23) Oaring sombat, the collection of casualties, will be planned separately.

(24) Reserve units ef each area will prepare raiding foreco (oa land and sampled by an of fleer or a ncn-ccanieoioned ef fleer and "will en-gags in severe guerilla warfare training.

flr^iraU9B If iaTin air aaa flrtsam fgnti

(25) The Sootor Unit will oo-eperate with the Naval Ground Forceo in the construction sad expansion of the air bases and in the maintenance

sf planes. The naval air force will furnish air reconnaissance and air photographic intelligence.

Ter this purpose, our liaison officer will always be with the naval

air force.

(26) The unit will closely co-operate with tho naval ground forces (AA Unit) 1a the defense of the air base*.

Vhea the naval air force ground crew was converted late a ground fight lag unit, army and naval foreco aero combined as one sad every effort

V?

was mads to function amoothly oat to maintain tho has CO. *• MUmmtfT friimnUni

_______ ghiiftw if rgilUtia tM Tfttaf gtgtti Amrllii tt itlitlnff

fiSMmoJuVmmm

(27) 1a accordance with tho change of •ituations, tho following proparationo vara madai

*a tho ooao af-thaantdolnatcd enemy attack, tho wait will ha 1a -their defeaaive pooiUono.

»• Pw SifigBfl fffgafaUm

Za oaoo Of probable onamy attacks, positions will ha ■trietly guarded and tho wait will ha ready te aaa their dofenoivc peoitloas at all times.

e. Tat Tttri rrtswiittai

Za oaoo that the oneay 1a not expected te attack immediately, the AA Salt will ha oa the alert while ether units will he seed-alerted.

The AA preparetione will he generally completed an hour before

(28) If the aaia force ef the enemy trice to lead oa the weet ooaot, the wait will engage the enemy en the sea. If the enemy manages to establish a beach head, the reserves, a ssetion of the Baet teeter Unit, (aaia force if neooeeary) and'the tank unit will meet the enemy at the landing

point.

If the enemy tries te lead an the East Coast, a part ef the Weet Sector Unit sad the teak unit will engage the enemy at the landing point.

(29) If the enemy aaia force tries te lead 1a the lerth Sector, especially st laPgcogO Island, the aaia ferae ef the artillery Unit will engage then on the oca. If the enemy tries to establish a beach head, the reserves and a eeetion ef the last Sector Unit will meet the eaeay 1a co* operation with the Baia force ef the lerth Sootor Unit.

(30) If the enemy main force triss te lead 1a the last Scoter, the aaia force of the artillery unit and the South Sector Artillery Unit will sagssw, the enemy en the sea. If the enemy establishoe a beaoh head, the reeerves will carry eat the seuater-atteeks'.

0

i

If the oneay lands at all point- simultaneously, our unite will

*-w»r of

maintain the'counter-etteek *el**a and with tho oonblasd amy and nary units, will oorry out sounter-nttacks, raids, ourprico attacks aad ambushes.

(31) ^BvisW our low Mobile Foroo sucooodo 1a its countor-landing, tho Sootor Unit will laasdlatoly tarry tat tho counter-attack.

For this soapcoo, eearec narks, land narks, countor-attack points aad other nooooeary dataile will bo prepared, lt the Bane tine, the Stator Unit will olssoiy co-operate with the Sea Mobile Ferte.

Ti. rarttf.aiUgat

(32) *he Fortifications will oenei^of^oelti^a^ (including AA firing arrangaeento) at the leading point and eafety precautions will aloe he taken te niniaiss the leet tf pereonnol and naterial against oneay bea-hsrwaeats. The fortifications will be rapidly constructed sad will be etrengthened continuously 1a depth aad quality.

(33) The following iteaa will be taken in+coneideration of the construction ef shore defensive positionst

(a) Tattgsadtet strong palate will be constructed oa the chores of possibls landing points. Theee points will be Banned by en uaitsnot larger then AA infantry sisspasy end not leas than a platoon.

(h) The majority of the henry guns will defend the freat and flange ef the adjourning peinto. Light sathtne guns, heavy grsaalss aad riflta will be tet ap te fern a final protective lino to cover the spaces act covered by the heavy guns. When the eaeny advanoes, the light weapons will be retpenaiblt for protecting the peinto and to sake tho points a bate fsr counter-attacks.

(e) The pill tease of tho heavy weapons will be shell proof end their positions will be plated so ao to be protected against CM say bombardment. Several substitute positions will be prepared 1a oaoo ef emergency.

(d) Anti-tank obstacles will be oonetrusted around oath point te make lt independent.

(e) Supplementary peettloms for the deployment at night aad haacc for esua ter attack or dummy pill bexec will be constructed 1a the spaces between strong points.

(3f» Making nee ef the aw seed ssail Ueno, a second line will be

SO

oon.tru.-Ud te tho roar of tho ohoro pooltiomo to repuloo tho adTaneo of tho oaoay 1a oaoo of a hraak through. Tho detaile of tho ooooad lino will ho similar to tho.. of tho ohoro defease. Many pooitiono and strong rifle ■holtare will ha oeaotruetod to fera a proteetlTo line In tho opaoo botweea

tho ohoro tad the roar pooitiono. Tho road, for the mobile attack will aloe he constructed.

Dummy pooitiono will ho oeaotruetod between every opaoo and depth.

(35) Oa tho chore whore the oneay landing will ho restricted daa te the ollffe, ground obetaelee and sea conditions, strong points will ha Banned by 1 platoon or 1 squad. According to tho cituation, only a guard will be deployed to this area while the main force will bo on the alert

in the roar. At the same time, many dummy positions will be constructed to foci the enemy.

(36) field guns will primarily be deployed to-attach- the enemy landing crafts and tanks at the lending point. Preparation will he aaia to repulse the enemy when the shore positions arc penetrated. Strategic peinto 1a the atoll reef will bo provided with the nsessnary guns.

The majority of the guns will bo installed in strong pill be mts sonstrusted in the chore positions and the second lino. To avoid damage from the enemy bombardment, many enpplementary positions will be constructed. Dummy pooitiono and batterieo will be constructed to dicpereethe enemy bombardment. ₄

(3T) Tor tho time being, minee will be utilised as chore obetaelee. Ao eeoa as the positions are completed, ohoro and water obetaelee will he installed and gradually reinforced. However, necessary precautions will be prepared against the cleaning eat of theee obetoelee by the omeay.

(38) Positions te the rear will be constructed when eiremnotaneeo

allow.

Independence will be emphasised 1a the construction ef pooitiono. 'Owmpleta Arrangements for counter-attacks will bs prsparH.

(39) Xaergency arrangsmento for minimising ths damage from tho

■

enemy attacks will be in accordance with the following items•

(a) The individual slit trenches will bs dug first and then aa air raid trench (dug cut) will be constructed for all personnel.

(b) Dug outs will be provided for ths>.itions exposed to the enemy aad which era located near the ohoro.

(e) Gun parte aad carriages will be diopcroed aacng the sheltere built to counter the oneay attack, far this purpoee, trenehee cad dug cuts will be eonetruetod.

(d) Two thirds of tho aaaiinltioas, provisions, fuel aad other supplieo will be stored 1a tho vicinity of tho forward pooitiono aad the regaining third will be dispersed in tho rear areas. Shelters aad dag oats will be constructed for this purpooo.

(e) Tho amount of supplieo to bo stored in eae place will be lees than 10 cubic meters and the dispersing distanoc will bo 100 noters for ammunitions aad fuels, 50 meters for others.

(f) The uee of wooden buddings will be generally avoided. (40) The construction work will proceed as followst

(a) Shore defences aad the arrangements for alnlsrtsjng damages will bo completed within a week. After the Sector Unite deploy-and- the field positions will be completed within a month. Pill bones will bo prepared 1a the field positions within two nontho. Those will be reinforced later.

Ter this reason, the Sector Unite will bivouac in order to construct the pooitiono using all personnel. Ro barracks will be built.

(h) The construction work will be concealed as much as possible against sea and air obeervatioa. Ro trees will be cut down unneooeearily. Transportation roads, depots and freshly dug earth will be completely camouflaged.

(c) The method ef construction aad Ito order will be determined according to the genral situation.

(d) A fortification officer will bo appointed in oaoh Scoter Unit te take charge ef the plea and distribution of materials for tho sector pooitloae.

Chief of Fortifications—Chisf Sector Defence Officer Superintendent of Fortifications—Engineer Company Commander Fortification Officer—on officer attached te the Sector Unit headquarters^

t •

fortifioation Of fleer—an engineer company offiear (•) Each Baator (tali will appoint Buitable auberdinataa to aaaift tha fortifioation offioara.

(41) Emergency materials far tha fortifications will ba obtained from local sources but special materials will ba supplied separately.

The allotment of Materials far permanent fortifieationa will ba deeided separately.

(42) Tha progress of tha fortification work* will ba obaerred frequently from tha air and sea to judge its appearance, The Air observation will ba carried ant by tha naval air units which will ba aoeempanied by tha Sector offioara. Tha observations will ba planned by tha entire Baator Unit Headquarters.

(43) Bach week, each Sector Unit will report to the Entire Sector Unit concerning tha progress of tha fortifioation works.

(44) Tha plan of tha fortifications will be decided separately.

TO. atffnaUWi JMHH| Wt figtffltwr-tettalaalBBM

(45) Tha aim of collecting information will ba to obtain an outline of tha enemy attaeks, eapeeially its time, direction, soale, ate. Zt will also ba te clarify the topegraphic data in the defense area eo as to enable the Sector Units to make tha necessary preparations before hand.

(46) Information of tha operation will ba in accordance with tha information collected by the local naval units and -will-bar 0oil00tod --from the superior offioara and sffiowrnlni Sector Unite.aa smc* a* pes stale.

Tha collection of information concerning tha whole Sector Unit will be planned separately.

(47) Tha existing topographic data, will ba rapidly adjusted and prepared to clarify tha conditions of tha islands where our troops have not yet beam deployed. At the same time, the eonditione and the value of shore reefs and atoll reefs will ba throughly investigated.

The investigation of topographic data will be planned separately.

(48) Eaoh Sector Unit will be responsible for its own security. Some patrols, directly attached to the Whole Sector Unit, will ba diapatahed te tha islands where no troops have yet been deployed, or a certain Sector Unit will be ordered to send out patrols if necessary.

S3

(49) Te maintain tentlnuouo eeeurity, obeervation posts, direetly itklM te cash Scoter Unit Qessaandsr, will be established at the strategic points and Islands la eaeh respeetire seeter.

The leeatieas ef the obeervation pests will be determined by the Entire Seeter Unit esemes lor.

Eaoh observation pest will bo prorided with the neoeesary alarm end liaison fasillties.

(50) The aim of our eottnter-intelligenee will be te eonoeal Mr troop movements, eepeeially the strength, equipment and fortifisatione. Zt will a so be to prerent the enemy counter-intelligence aaUon Is tha def en-aiwe seetore.

far this reason, tha eeetor unit will olosely co-opcrate with the leeal naval unite to carry out its eounter-defenae and to continue tha lnveetigation of the Inlands not yet deployed by our troopa.

Tha eounter-intelligenee regulations will be drawn up separately.

(51) Tha naval air unit Osssaamder will be responsible for giving the air raid alarm and tha all-clear eigne}, aooordiag te^whieh the Sector 1*6to**Nk-0mr+ml* nssssaary warniagwy

The method and details will ba explained In a separate sheet.

(52) Tha naval air defenee units will be responsible far tha anti-aircraft defenee of this island, especially the airfields. Tha Seetor

4

Unite will clecely co-operate in order to develop an efficient united system far an ideal defenee.

(53) In case ef lav altitude enemy air attaeks, tha Seetor Units will engage tha enemy but will met fire la oaae ef high altitude attaoko.

(54) *• an anti-airoraft weapon unit, the reserves af tha artillery battalion af each Sector will iiomaiti one maahine gun platoon and the whale mauntatn artillery within ite sector.

ix. InaajiliiIlM lH Mil HI

(55) CsssBunication systems will ba installed so ae te be in working condition deepite heavy enemy bombardments.

(5ft) Mlde free wire end radio ooemamieaticn equipment, each eeetor

will ba provided with doge, carrier pidgeone, eemaphore flags, heliographe

t

t • ■

Si

of the iMUr Units

Leatien and liaison net W dessribed to a separate •hart.

(57) ■*•» NtwP Unit wUl dlapatah a liaiaea affiaar ta tha 6let Air Wait Heedquartere and te tha Amy Group Headquarter*.

hwum in m**m

(58) Considering the difficulty af aatatalalng periehable previ-aleme and their replacements, the euppliea will ba etored and pretested with eare. Therefore, eelf •upport froai loeal sources will ba oarried out ex-

temclvely.

(59) For tha time being, laoal eelf emppart will be taken oare of by the intendanae section attached to tha Whole Sector Unit. However, after tha eompletion af tha fortifieations, eaoh Sector Unit will carry ami ltd tea self-support.

(iO) AssBanition will ba supplied far about 2 engagements aside from tha regular allowance, motor fuel for about 3 nontha, provisions far about a year (six months far tha time being).

(41) The) distribution af issimeltlen to depth will be chiefly far the enemy landing tpscatlsm and will be deployed to the following manner i

A* Infantry Ammunition

Company si.....altlcm—60j(

Regiment ami battalion ammunition—AO% B. Artillery assssmttlsm

Per immediate use—200 reunde Greater part diepereed to the rear

(42) 3 te 4 days provisions will be alloted te the chore positions and one week ef reserve supplies will be stored at the alerted peinte (company or platoon) or anti-aircraft positions to the rear. The greater part ef the provisions will be diepereed end stored to the aheltere. (note. Tha 1 week lossrvo euppliee are te be need only by the treepe in the chore peaiUeae.)

(43) Drinking water will be stored to eaoh position.

(44) The supplies mill be diepereed and stored to eheltered

places te prevent them from spoiling and mixed storage will be oarried eat

t

inetead ef storing a eoMato supply to oae place. However, serious

ss

$2

consideration will be glTWB when expleeivee are to bo stored with oth.r dangerous eupplies.

(45) Intensive preeaution will be carried out by every lndinisnal moorrrtng the protection and eencuaptlea af tha) auppliea.

(44) Xa order to Maintain our fighting ability, Sanitation and health will be given aarieua oonoideration. Ipidenlee and local dioaaae will be provontod at all ooat.

(4T) Caaueltiss will be treated leeally but in tha event ef eerleae woundo, they will be east te the nearby naval hospital.

xz. vmtom

(48) For the tiae being, all offioera and aea will concentrate an tho •oaetruetiea of positions. However, each tester Unit, will givo odueation la aeeerdaase with the following schedule!

a. Olaseee will be held twiee a wokk but thie ■sab if will be gradually Increased.

b. Clactee will be held oa4he defenelve warfare for the front line unite and counter-attack, raids and surprise attaeks for the fee areas.

S. Realistic laeavsrs will be oarried eat*

d. Morals education will be given to every individual te cultivate a fim sonviction ef final victory.

(49) Bash branch unit eeaaanlir will be responsibls for the original and special training ef their rsspsotivc branoh. However, for the

4

tiae being, eaoh teeter Unit will aarry eat these trainings with the acsle-tanse ef the Braneh Unit eonssander.

(TO) The Whole teeter Unit will draw up tho aeathly traiaing

eehedale.

(71) The native policy will ba carried eat after consultation with the local nasal waits sad local administrative agencies.

(72) JAPAHBtB in these islands will eo-operate with the teeter Unite in supplying 1 abort in developing the self-support resourcesj in joining the canstruetion work er to act as "peace ankers" between the teeter Units and the natives. JlPAJOSB reservists will participate in the battlee when the enemy attaeks.

t

* • 5

Si

out of the 8eater Unite, will carry Mt the tine, n ■cotton of the Sootor Unit will carry oa

■

Theee JAPANJU will ho well protected dor ins eneny attache.

(73) hatiwee will ha trained sad directed to supply labor for allltary parpooca.

(T4) Natiroe will not ha eaploycd without the eoneent of the whole Sootor Unit Headquarters.

»• Thf Hfeall HIM If Inf, ■snili IlUse stlttT flh\al

I. Oaft

The Sector Unite will firmly occupy the ANGAUR Island sad will engage the enemy with hoary fire, guerilla attacks and oouater-attaoke whoa they lead.

¹¹ • snaUll lt Still I iHlWialeM

(1) the wait will rapidly occupy the etrategle peinto oa the ooaot aad will ssnasnit'thc- necessary constructions. The field positions will he eonstrasted at the strategic points within a aonth. Fill heats will he completed 1a theee field positions within two months. Theee will ke reinforced continuously.

(2) Xf the enemy establlehss a beach heads the ressrrss, co-opcrating with a farce teaossod out of the Setter Unite, will carry eat the counterattacks. lt the came tins, a section of the Sector Unit will tarry ea Mobile lea warfare.

(3) Double bulkhead peeittenc will act be conetructed, howoTor,

te prorsnt the enemy from construsting aa airfield, the Sector Unit will hold the area north of a lint drawn from the lighthouse, through tho north pead to IWXml point.

KI. lhalHwant ■M Wm% wf awl wswawtl sMIH

(1) The South Sector Unit (lot Infantry Battalion end 1 platoon

of a field artillery battery, 2 field artillery batttrttaT 1/4 of on engineer company with- eae section |T.».> ) will be rsspensibls for tat defense of the area south of a Hat drawn from TOM on point through the north tad ef the swamp te the north tad tf losu beach, ' *V **

(2) The North Sector Unit (3rd Rattalion, (T.I. faded) minus one piatota, 1/4 ef oa engineer s map any minus 1 eoctien) will he roepcatiblt for the defence of the area north of a lino drawn fren TOROTI point through tho

1/4 ef an

57

DiSKRT MAP HO. X

DISPOSITICtJ OP FHULZU DISTRICT COMMAND.

Hl&ERT MAP MQ. 2 DlAORAM OP COMUlBflCATZONS MtTtORK

4

north end of tho swamp to Ifftff beach. Aleo, in order to enable no to saws out at anytime, e company will ba directly attached to the garrison sssssander. Furthermore, can company will prepare to carry oat guerilla attache.

(3) One fiald artillery batteWaadTl plSooTwill occupy tha peeitiane in tha vioinity of NAMSK2RT0 to support the South area with lta ■aim forte eaaV-te oo-operate with tha north eeetor with a part of its ferae, * ftos Kali ar till wry tmUitij ml—■ 1 sialism will prepare to cot up mobile firing positions if necessary.

(4) One half of an engineer company will assist in tha construction af tha foath Setter Unit and will later prepare te carry eat sea guerilla warfare.

(5) The Infantry Regimental Signal Unit will establish clhe communication net work in accordance with the attached separate chart.

(i) Under the delegated command af the Signal Unit Commander, the Dirioion Signal Unit till be responsible for liaison between the tray Group Headquarters and Sector Unit.

(7) For the tiae being, the supply company will dispense^previsions and ammunition but will later be recponciblo for eupplying the front lias troops. The company will alee organise a transportation unit to transport ammunitions, prerieieae and ether eupplies from the main Pilaff Island to this island.

(8) The medical unit will bo stationed at, HAMSHRTO te treat casualties and during the enemy attack, will organise reecuc osaade te sorer the front lias.

(•) The intendance eeetiea will assist eaoh Sector Unit in building up local sslf-supporting resources, W. TsUailBi

(1) The Sector Units will earry out realistic training in order to form a smoothly functioning fighter wait and will Improve its command and control of the troops. It will ales ees te >onsj"»M the conditions of the troepe'beth physically sad mentally.

(2) The ecsontial points ef training will ba as foil owe I

a. The niorale training will be emphasised to overcome the intense heat, disease and starvation in this Related eatpeet.

2. Knsny landing (eopeoially chars defense wnrfars)—(cloee

^^wa^lf^^e? 0Oenfo$lt)

3. Infiltration

4. Surprise attacks by small units at night, dawn aad sarly

svsadag

5. Hight attacks

4. Anti-aircraft defence

7. Za oass staff officers are killed Zn case of heavy casualties

Za oaoo of hoary loos in waapeao

8, Infantry oloso combat training aad engineer training

(t) Farther details ef the training will be given separately.

% snftimttM ifi Isws^Tntllllfsaal

1. Za order te enable the teeter Unit to sake neeessary defense preparations, collection of information ooncoming the enemy attmsks, especially the tins, direction and strength, will bo tho aaia objective.

2. Te gala information for tho coming operation, the general situation of the movements of the enemy air force, o mm mil Patton end ships 1a tho southeastern area will he seriously considered.

3. The following topographic data will bo corrected and adjusted•

(a) ground conditions

(b) traffic (s) o Inman 1 cations (d) natives

(0) weather conditiono

(f) oca oondltiono

(g) sanitation (k) ailitary supply

(1) local reseurcec oelf support

4. The main object of our counter-intelligenoo will bo to conceal

f

cur troop movements and preparations. Zt will also he to prevent the enemy

coaatoe«dntc11U«'M aetlTitlee la ear defenae araa. Far tkla owrpoee, the ltaal giwiranont end the people will ha properly trained and directed te •airy eat aar soaator'Intel llgoaoo.

5. Tha refulatioae af tha AMfiAUl defenee wait intelligence ear* nee, gathering af iafornatlea and counter-intelligence, will ha determined separately.

n. rafitntfiiffj m n>«i Milan

1. Tha fertifieatiene will consist ef pcciUcne (inelading anti-aircraft positions) along tha eeaat and safety precautions'in order to alaialse oar loeo in paroannal and aateriale. Theee will he rapidly ccaccmctcd and later will ho reinfcreed la depth and quality.

2. lontee of aim iiiilcilca will ha prepared firot followed ay the reade far troop aovoaaata, ailitary supply and for^sarrying "casualties.

3. Tha fortifioation plane will ho deoidod separately. Tha details af tho fortifications will ha la accordance with,

"Tha Details af tha fortifications" which ha* been distributed to each Scoter Unit.

vn. miTilnrifl mm

1. Tha air raid alara (all-clear signal) will ba in accordance with tha ardor of tha Defence Cnasaaiir.

2. All headquartore and eossBwnisation contare will be protected nawy , ^

IndiTidual ollt trenches will be dag.

3. Air defenee proparatione will bo as foil owe t

then tha snowy attaek is known beforehand, the treepa will be deployed to naa their defensive pecitionc. »• lai lHaw frtflflltal

Whoa tha enemy attaek is anticipated, the troope will bo alerted and the air defence wait will naa their peeltleaa.

When eneay attaek is net intending, the air defenee wait will be alerted and tho other waite seal-alerted.

XRSttT HAP MO. $ DISPOSITION Of OITMMSX UMTS OM

Ml.

INSIST MfcP WQu 4.-

COMVOMICATIQN NETTORK OH ANGUAR ISLAND.

4. When the enemy attacks, each pUn. will be fired up wo., hewerer, iw order to prerent fWHMMMrr firing, eaoh unit oiamaaiir will oontrol

the fire.

5. Ur-Aaid Alarm (In Chart)

TZZ2, fftr jJcMsl

1. In order if Waintain our fighting foroo againot enemy gao attaoks, tho nmin subjset of gao defenee will bo any gao, especially pereie-tont gao (by moan* of spraying).

a* littUl frMiMtsfii ■iilBrt in mtrnrn

A, Considering tho present eondition ef our antl*e head sal equipsient, gas shelters will be built frow local materials.

I. The anti-ohemioal shelters will be built within the fortifications and frequent inspeotiene will be carried out daring and after the eonctruction.

C. A tccsperary decontaminating coetlon will be organised in each See tor Unit to neutralise the eentandnated areas if neeoeeary. Details of thin unit will be determined separately.

ix. jjiBiimBi ii mum if imiiiim ni i......iim

1* AsBsunition will be economised as muoh as pocsiblo bp ctrict diecipline and thVough training,

Kepeoially, unnecessary firing will be avoided by the anti-nireraft

unite.

4

2. The supply ef ammunition will be shown in the next chart.

3. Tha nae of the preeent ammunition will be in accordance with the following preeautienei

a. Because the allotment of ammunition is lew, type 92 hoary aaohino gun tracer bulletc will be substantially need for night fire.

b. Type 99 light naohine gun bulletc are peeked water-proof, therefore, these will be reserred ae amah as possible, when the ammunition le being need for type 92 henry machine gun, the ammunition bolt must be need.

So **oh See tor Unit will carefully train lta troepe ac te the method of using the dieted —aslUonc, especially, anti-tank mines,

M0L0TOV cocktail and band grenades.

f

4. Ammwnitions and eunpliee will be ctored according to the

I

1.

2*

*.

4.

5. 4.

belletia, Trmuiim tf Handling I ■■■Mini 1» tat Tropical Iona.". Altt₉ tat following itonei

(a) Tan dlstaa.. t.tnstath. taps of tat dispersed ■aaaailHta will not bo looo than 50 motoro aaa tat quantity will bo loot tana 50

tat oa.

(b) If dopoto aaa located 1a client pooitiono and at the feat of tat aceataln, nag eat. will be constructed to store an iiiiltleaa. 1a theat oases, TontilaUca and drainage will be taken late ooneldemtien.

(e) Whoa anatalIIa, it stored near weapons, ttafc.is will be built te separate veenhlather. Also, te avoid fren induttd sxplosions.

(4) Parapets will bo dug around tat dopoto.

6e) The spases between oananiUtat end cororings will be nt least

mm

(f) Eash Sseter Unit Geaaaaiar will knew the .ituatien of tea snaumition and direct ale oubordinate. isaiirnlng tho use and control of the asaasaltisas. During the hottoot period ef oath day, he will Bako regular

(g) Moisture absorbing agents will be used 1a accordanoo with •The Dirootioa for Handling Moisture Absorbing Agent". Conoidoring the weather oondltions, nooeoaary preoautions will be taken to-.gadrd against aoiotare.

5. lash unit (battalion aad sonpany) will repair their tea danaged weapea. end oappliet. However, the Headquarters Ordnance ICatlett will organise a tpeelal aebils repair unit with the neeeoeary parte and

x. Tew) laws tUnu m nmliiswail If ftlffinllM

1. IMiU net be^esntcted-that tupplios will'bt'replattd, there* fore, local oolf-capport will be tarried oat, lt the sane tine feed will he looorvod aa 1a east tf sasrgsnsy.

I, Previsioa. and tnpplitt will be ditperttd 1a the Headquarters area aad sash sector area. (The ratio will he 2 far headquarters and 1 far eash ssotor.) Also, a part of the reserved previ.ioao and sappliet will he sqaeesed eu* ia eaet of ontrgtnty«r'^^'^v

3. The supply dtptt will be built rapidly, however, lnwsdlattly

10

I* The looal eelf-eupport will bo carried Mt as soon a* military preparations are seen? 1s ted. Substitutes will be sultivated end the necessary ceede, fertilisers und lnsestisides will be prepared.

2. fish and salt production will aa aarriad out.

3. The details far XaaaX sslf-suppsrt will b. plaansd separately.

XXX. s—44-44 —

Mala SueJett

Taa prewentioa ef iafsetious diseases, first aid 1a the battlefield, aaa sanitation faeilitiee will be improved te maintain fightlng strsafth. Taa details ef this will be determined separately.

mi. nigHirlrillTi Billfj

1, A well organised administrative system will be necessary far final viotery. far this reason, the administratien will sontlnue te fuat-Usa smoothly despite sasay attacka.

2, Its entails will ha in aeoordanec with, "Taa Unit Idninis-tratlvs Regulation'¹. Howsrsr, sash Iseter Unit semanndsr and Independent Unit soBBsander, will take norning and evening roll calls aad report any unusual happenings te the garrison cosmaander.

3, The daily routine time table will he as follows i

Morning roll Cell....*.................0600

Breakfast..............................0730

Lunch..................................1200

Rest..............2 hours after lunch

Report.................................1500

Supper,..,,,..,.........,.......,,.,,.,1800

Ivening rail sail......................2000

4, Sash Unit isassslir will make a report concerning taa defence aaa ferttfieatiens. (The time will ha advised when neceesary.)

XX? HjUTf, fflssffiV

1. The satires will he trained aad directed te be true JAP AMRS I soldi ere, ssmlaa>sjKardoat self Msassisssnssa^nd^blAaatioer

2, The, J A*AN SSB en this island, excluding young and old, will

a. ADOPTION OF PLANS FOR STRENGTHENING THE SHORE DEFENSE SYSTEM

The (group originally deployed a unit consisting of 3 Infantry Battalions to Peleliu and a unit consisting of 2 Infantry Battalions

to Angaur. The defense of the islands was the responsibility of the coojianders of the 3d Infantry and 59 th Infantry Regiments,respectively. (T.N. In other words, the 3d Inf. went to Peleltn and the 59th Inf went to Angaur.) HaJ. Gen. Yamaguchi, commanding a division and various other

army and navy units inthe area, was responsible for the defease of Koror, Malakal, Arakabesan and Babelthaup. A battalion of he 59th Inf. Regiment and a Sea "transport nait of the 1st Amphibious Brigade were under the command of the 15th Inf. Reg, and constructed operations bases in the Babelthaup - Malakal area. These units were deployed at strategic points to conduct night reconnaissance and repulse the planned enemy landings by effecting counter-landings.

In early May, the Army commander arrifed in Palau ( N Ob ta) and was apprised of the steps taken to strengthen defenses. In accordance with his orders, a battalion of the 15th Inf. was dispatched to reinforce the Peleliu Sector Unit and Abe remaining battalion of tne 59th Inf.

was dispatched to reinforce Angaur. For the time being, the main force remaining of the 15th Inf will cooperate in the construction of fortificatAA

4

ions in the Pelelim sector.

B. ORGANIZATION 0? THE 53d and 49th I IMPENDENT MIXED BRIGADES AND THEIR

INCORPORATION INTO THE PALAU SECBOR GROUP COMMAND

On 30 May, orders were issued to form an Independent Mixed Brigade

and

consisting of 6 Infantry battalions, one artillery battalion,/one engineer company from replacements and casual/ units in Palau. The orga/nization was completed on 13 June. One battalion of the 1MB wad dispatched to reinforce the Peldtu Sector Unit , while the main force wad deployed on Babelthaup. On 2 July, the 4th Yap Detached Unit and the Kozakura Battalion.(sent to Yap from Babelthaup in the latter part of June) were formed into the 49th Independent Mixed Brigade and came under the command of the Palau Sector Grou,p.

t

0. TRANSFER OF VARIOUS PALAU UNIT£ TO THE PALAU SECTOR GROUP On 25 June, by which tine the fate of Saipan was decided and

Palau was in imminent danger, units of the 31st Army, the South Seas Military Police Unit, the 42d Independent Motor Battalion, the Palau Branch of the 3d Shipping and Transportation Headquarters and its attached Ats, the 53d Communication lector unit, the 23d Communication Hospital and soldiers and civilians employed on Palau were alerted and traeferred to the Palau Sector Group. D. (OK as is)

1. CHANGES IN DEPLOYMENT IN LATE JULY

In view of the situation on Saipan and the impending battle for Palau, the group became concerned with the lack of strength. On 19 July, the orders to reinforce the Angaur garrison and transfer the 330 Ind. Inf. Bn.(on Koror I.) to Yap were rescinded. At 1500 20 July, the following orders were issued:

1. The com- andera of the 59th Inf. wilk advance with his main force to the Ailai sector of Babelthaup, leaving one Inf. Bn. (one mtn atty. btty., ni a section of the signal unit, a section of sup ly coy,

a section of the medical unit, a radio qquad of Div. Signal Unit, a section of the intendance unit, l/6 of the field hoopital staff and the majority of spare weapons) to take over the duties of the Angaur Sector Unit.

4*

2. Major Goto, commanding the 1st. Bn of the 58th Inf. will command the above unit. This unit will Decome the new Angaur Sector Unit, taking over the duties of the previous unit.

Lble for the defenee of tho homeland,

They will oo-oporato with the Sector Unit in supplying labor, doraloping looal self-support reeourooe, in participating in tho construction of military projeots «** in partdoepattng Jm^hm-nntrnt^im^i^miXiUr^ prejerte and in participating in tho air defence eerriee. The reoerrieto will not ac the nuoleae among then and will be called upon to take an active part the enemy attacks.

Theee JAPANESE will be protected during enemy attack*.

3. tho nativee will be direoted te supply labor for the air defi end military project*.

4. The natlrec will be treated at the field hospital if necessary.

5. Bo oountcr-intslligoneo action will bo allowed on this island. Chapter 3. jg IHaaalaa tTM JM M it mm% WmU tfll H

a. Igowtian if lit Wm HfaMI iTaiaw

The Amy gronp at first deployed a wait (with 3 infantry battalions no a nucleus) to PKLELIU Island and another unit (with 2 infantry battalions an the anal cue) to AMQAUR Island. These two unite were si aw ended by the oseaiaBlcrc ef the lad and 59th Infantry Regiments reepeeUrely. Major Oeaoral YAlUOUCHI^s reeponciblc for the defenee ef KORQR, MALaAAL, AlAOPaSAB and main PALAU island/ with a regiment and ether army and naval unite under hie direct and delegated eiaaaei) A battalion from the 59th Infantry Begin ant and a eon transport wait of the 1st 8ea habile Brigade were under the Command ef the X5th Infantry Regiment and cere to participate* in the construction of Mobile Basss in the vioinity of tho main PALAUand MALAKAL islands. Theee units were-te earrf^out night guerilla warfare end counter-landings and deplopithoir forooo in tho otrategie points.

In the beginning of Bays ike army ocemmndor arrival at PALAU island and teak further etepo toward strengthening the defenee, A battalion from the I5th Infantry Regiment was deepatehed te reinforce the PKLELIU footer Unite and a battalion from tho 59th Infantry Regiment'to ABBAUR For the tiae being tho main foreo of tho I5th Infantry Regiment was to cooperate with tho PKLELIU Rector Unite in the conetruetion ef fortifications. R. CW.«4-t,Al_aaa of the ttrd «nd 49th Independent Mined Brigade

af fry riMU iHtgr tmt.

72

Ob the 30th of May, an order tat loeued to organise an Independent Mixed Brigade ^wbleh wae completed by the 13th ef June. This Brigade was soapeeod ef 6 infantry battalione, I artillery battalion and I Engineer company with replacement eaite in PILAU, The wain feroe ef this unit wae stetioned in PALAU except for I battalion which wae diepatched te reinforce the PELELIU Beater Unite.

On the 2nd of July, the 49th Independent Mobile Brigade, eonpoeed ef the lot JAP Detached Unit and the KOZAKURA battlaiion ( which vac diepatched to JAP island froa PALAU in the beginning of Juno), was organised. This brigade wae plaeod under the command of the PALAU Sector Group.

«. Tli TriMi'tr f m fUM flBssi abb tat figghnmltr af tht T&sMntor

On the 25th ef June, when the fate of SAIPAN ioland w»e about to

bo decided and the PALAU Seetor wae in danger. Unite of tho 3X«t Amy, the

NveTe*.

South Sea Military Polioo Unit, tho 42nd Independent Mortar Battalion, the PALAU Branch of tho 3rd Shipping and Transportation Headquarters and its attached units, the 53rd Coaeninioption Seetor Unit, the 23rd Goownmleatien hocpital, and eoldiere and civilians employed in PALAU ioland, were alerted and transferred to the PALAU geetor Group.

B. Thf, OTiffiMs IltU9J for PtflllJYB Ptiflfllt-

Considering tho recent experiences ecpecially, these in the SAIPAM

operation, the enemy will probably oarry out fierce air attache before

4

initially landing and will make the landing under the protection of an «ir and sea cover. When tho enemy earryo out ito main attack with berragee from ehlpe, planoe and armored foreoe, eueh a force as ourc, with limited strength in thie leelated island and not expeoting reinforce entc and replete* nento ef supplies, under ordinary circumstances will have a very slim 0hence ef survival.

Therefore the Army Group badw-plc4inee>>4W-ttnueue£- tactical which worn completed on tho beginning of July and which worn ieeued en the Ilth.

The Seetor Unite carried out training and made every preparations in accordance with the plan*.

b. BH mmM In liBlgYitflt Tim at tht bbJ of JgU.

AeearAi«#>^o. the reoulte ef the BA.IPAB operation and oeaeedering the impending battle for'pALAU ioland, the Army Group wae worried about the

la pk of defenoive etrength. On 19 July, tho following orders were oancelledi

(a) Tha ANGAUR garriaan will ba reinforced until it la approxi- ^ aataly tha alia of an infantry battalion .

(b) Tho 330 Independent Infantry Battalion ( new in KOROR ialand) will ba transferred te JAP inland.

Adi«fJ*f

According to the afore mentioned plane, the following ordera ware ioeued by the Amy Omup^IiOO houro on* the 20th of J^ly.

The Outline of the Ordere for the PALAU Seetor Group at 1500 hour re en 20th ef July, at KOROR ioland.

1. The commander ef tha 59th Infantry Regiment with the main feme, will advance te ALLAl eeetor of tno main PALAU ioland, leering X infantry battalion ( a mountain artillery battery, an engineer platoon, a ocetien of tho signal unit, a ceetien of tho supply company, a section of tho medical unit, a radio squad ef the Division eigne! unit, a seetion ef the intendaaoe unit, 1/6 of tho field hoopital staff, and also tho greater part ef the ■mlnferood' weapone to take over the dutiee ef the AMGAUR Seetor Unit.

The dutiee after the trancfer and the transportation for tho transfer will be ordered separately*

2. Major GOTO, the commander of tho let Battalion of the 59th Infantry Regiment, will command tho above mentioned unite which will become the new ANGAUR Seetor Unit and will take over the dutiee of the

former unit*

3* When the firot transportation unit leavss ANGAUR island, the dutiee will change handa.

4* The PALAU Branch Commander of tho 3rd Shipping and Trane-portation Headquart era will be reoponeible for the sea transportation ef the main 59th Infantry Regiment between ANGAUR end PALAU ielande. This transfer wan te be carried out during the impending situation dsopite tho bad Oca conditions. Therefore, there were eleoe cooperation among all the

unite concerned. »f tfte super-human afTorte aftd d-Cepl-te tha 3^dap

attaoke-^ry- enemy carrier-borne planes"beginning -£rom tho 25th of July.

LI

y. ft)«rr I1r limit*! frrtai JmU

X. Mm the beginning of July, tho enemy repeatedly attacked PELKLIU, KOROR ,nd JAP id ends with a email number ef bomb ere.

2. On the 25th of July

a. According to tho naval reporte, an enemy Mobile feree (2 earriere, 2 betdeehipe, aim oruieerc and 10 deetroyere) nee observed 150 nautied cdlee and XtO degree off jap idand. teverd other Mobile foroee were'ttacly- te be operating in that area.

b. fWs^t'lmoc between 1420 and I63O hours, about 25 planee, ( 020 ), in formation from the direction ef OaRASUMaO and tha main PA au ldande, ccntlnloucly dive-bombed AILAI airfield, ualakal port, amyous oca plane aee and ar atm hard Battery.

te From X410 to ZeOO a total of 60 planee in oererd formatione of 4 to 8 planee, attacked PiLBLIU inland and dive-bombed the airfield and lertheaet CCaCt.

d. From 1400 to 1515, 37 planee, in four formatione, attacked JAP idand and bombed the let and 2nd alrfleldc, BARABAT and MAP. Our eoeetd poeitione were also strafed.

3. On the 24th ef Jdy a. PAUU inland

Four times between 0420 and 1X50 heure, about 45 TBD and 8B2C planee bombed and strafed the AXLAX drfield, AMI0N8 ecaplanc base, MALAICAL pier, the Army Oreup Headquartera, the 30th teeter Unit Headquartere, anti-aircraft pocitionc in KOROR, and the ARMATJW Mnval battericc

targete

at 1300 heure, about 35 earrieraeme planee again attacked the

and KORON city. The planee were aejetly 8B2U, vineladinfr TBOTTBF AMD P-38«c

The reedte were 12 enemy planee ahot down (including 2 probables),

3 ef ear efficere, 3 wen ■ mitbHeclcned offioorc and 21 men were killed, whdl,

44 men were wounded. Furthermore, a great part ef KOROR city wae burnt

down. On thin day, the enemy bombed our line ef communication heepitd -with ^d

"Red Crocs >chkrkdncr and two ef the buildinge were deetreyed. pcu-ue Jr. • fwimWfrlllllal

no

From 0400 to 07X0 a total ef ft carrier-borne bombere attacked

from the eact and

our ^airfield i

Five timee between 0850 and 1300 a totd ef XXI bo^bere bombed

and etrafed our irfielde.

At about tho oojbo time, throo enemy eruieere, two deetroyere x*wt-'twe Uoti sysre, and two oubmarineo wore obeerwed about 10 kiloaotore eaot of tho ioland.

0. AHOAUR ioland

foron times between 065* end 0704, 16 carrier-borne bombere bombed and strafed our positions.

From 0850 to HOC and Z2I5 to 1535 houre.lg typo F4F planes \aaeV>35~plan*e~-«*^thw-^^ bombed and strafed our

positions. Throe enemy lanes were shot down. 4, *AP ioland

During tho following houre the enemy bombed and strafed the TOnTR airfield, radio stations in BARARAT and KORONEY, anti-aircraft poeitione and tho let airfield.

0620-0650 hourc 100 carrier-borne bombero and 9

largo typo planes.

0920-1020 hours fO carrier-borne bombero and 9 large type planes.

I120-1205 hours 103 oarrier-borne planes. 1240-1410 hours 104 carrier-borne planes. A total of 6 enemy planes were ehot down. 4. 2T July .

a. PALAU icland

From 0550 to 1455, not lcec than 40 enemy planee bombed and strafed our defensive positions, main buildings loft in the cities, harbor installation and eupply depoto, ^uw~te~thio attack, KOROR city vac alaoct completely demoliehed. Seven enemy planee were shot down,

b. PAL ELI" and ANCAUR islands

Several times between 0530 and O850 houre, a small number of enemy planes attacked but caused little damage

c. JAP icland

From 0955 to III5» HI carrier-borne planee bombed and strafed the lot airfield and our defenoive poeitione. 3 enemy planes were shot down,^

-7/

5* The'anticipated — —y planee due to tho air actione between tho 25th and 27th of July.

o,. It io *o-bw anticipated that tho enemy will try to intercept our air reinforocoente to guam. At the cane time, will eraluate our defeneiro eltuation by carrying out feint attaoke in palay arohc>olago(including angaur inland). Thin will enable the enemy to bene their tiae of attack and their method of attack (ctrcngth to be employed, direction and landing tactics) upon the information obtained.

b. The enemy loeeea during theee 3 daya were not lone than 40 carrier-borne bombsrs. According to tho cuperior air aotlcne oarried out on the 26th and 27th the enemy personnel must hare had a lot of training, for this reaeon the pereonnel ehot down must hare been a severe loee te the enemy.

e. Our artillery, eepeeially the anti-aircraft guna (particularly machine unc) cuceeoded in keeping ap^g poreletent defenee fire which muet hare caught tho enemy unoegjoctodly (with a eonserfative uco of ammunition^ Our leeeee during theee 3 dayo of fighting were only 3 offlcere* 5 non-eoawdaeioned officers and 42 men killed, when the individual elit trenchee were ueed, men and officore were convinced that if offered coralete protection against enemy air raida. despite the fact that our losses ware «e small, the eaemy loee in pereonnel was not less than 100. Therefore our troepe were convinced that the wax*wae progreeeing in our favor,

«. ^oaeidorlag- the uniane value of tho palau arc hope lege as an advance base against the phillipin 8, eepeeially ite location, aneho-cage and air baeee, the enemy will"try to occupy it in the near future, at which time, the foreoe of Admire! nzmitz and General MAC ARTHUR will cooperate oloeely. However, thle operation will depend upon the outcome ef the guam amp TINIan opera tieae.

77

no

CHAPTER 4* The Battle ef BALA* with PELELIU and ANGjtR or tha eentef of Battla.

A. Tha general eltuation prior to battle.

1. Daring tho aiddle part of Jul*, tha eneay had eonti-nuously boobed and boabardod GUAM with planes and Basal gunfire, and on tho 21st of July, tho enemy was finally, able to make a successful landing,

Our forces which vara engaged in the defenee of GUAM, under tho direct command of tho 31st Army vara unsuccessful in tholr defense against tha enemy, even though thoy had put thair dying effort In tho battla. Day by day our forces weakened, and around tho 10th of August, thay ware finally out off from all communications.

OecAtxc of

2. «Biie^te- tho fact that tha 31st Army had boon abruptly cut off froa operations, tha PALAU Area Group was detached from tha 31st Aray doaaand and was ordered by tha Southern Army to take dlraet orders from tha commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet.

3. Tho enemy following <Mb» atrial attaeks of July as tha PALAU Area, had bean asking bombing raldswith on or two planes every nighton PELELIU, KORORjf and ARAKABB8AN. Along with those raids, ten or so larger typo enemy bonbers **a-r* ssn> -out on Q^ombing «is«ionev^c~ the sirfield and warious positions of ZAP IBland during tho day tiae. Froa August 24th, the enemy ^aeV began 4e^eMtke boabing raids on PALAU. "> ith a formation of B-24's, whleh first started with 2 or 3 plAnes, but ended up with approximately $> planes, tholr objective vas mainly tho PBLftLXY sector and the airfields of KOROR/, MALAKAL, ARAKABESAN and A IRA I.

On the third of September, wo received a wire froa tho 6om-mander-in-Chdef ef tho Souther Aray, stating that the enoay would coamance *4s. large scale operation within a fev days. The objective of the operation being HALMSRKRA snd PALAU. The PALAU Group Headquarters notified all the forees under lte command, that the awaited opportunity to annihilate the enemy

wea about to c<

"This is tho only chance te repay our leperiel Benevolence end sere our country from e erltieel situation. Therefore, officers, end men will devote their lives to inning the decisive

the^th j*f-tTept. we removed theX

located on th>-nenter\of PALAU'J I s Knd, *hjere--e~»hii4jMr^^ c^strnct^dV

4. On September 6th, ^l^aeesntd-aa^if- 2 separate powerful eerrler task forcesv-haaV eppesred off the northeastern coast ef PALAU. Then approximately ep 1400 houra^Of September 6th, TAP and Falau areas wane attacked by enemy eerrler planes. Detail ef the attack <ei$e aa follows i

(a) PALAU Area. 1400 - 1500, 6th September, 130 enemy eerrler

planee (f4f) straffed and bombed the various positions in the aree of PALALU Proper Islands such est "AIRAI" airfield, ^NhaLie felOK^ SHIMIZU Village, "AJUsmATlIf (TN-?), dfctihkWme^n^i fiARAMADOOBay" -WJI-t), AIHIRSBKI (TNef) warf, and other seaside villages end beets looeted along those places. On KORORjtf Island, the Anti-Aircraft gun position along the s bp pes of " HODAIYAMA"were the main object ires.

(b) PELELIU Area;. At 1350 on 6th September, the enemy planes consisting of approximately 80 (F4F) end 8 (SB2C) epproeched from

e south end southeast pert of PRLBLIU, straffing and bonb-ing the eirflelds of PKLSLIO end *«fcBWtfStfM*N~^ end areas thereabouts, continuously.

(c) A"GUAR Area. 1440 - 1545 e September, enemy planes approached

from the southeastern eoest of ANGsWR, straffing and bombing our positions and than departing to the aoutheest. These attaeke were repeated constent1 - within this hour.

(d) TAP Apeai

1410 - 1^*7 6 September, approximately 35

7?

carrier planes (F4F) repeatedly straffed our airfields and beach poeitione, tberieeparting to tho southeast.

Rotoi On tho evening of 6 September tho Group Head-quartere established its command posts on Mt. jtUIUOKM) (TN-?) and to tho north of "AIRAI Airfield", ae had bean previously planned.

5. (a) On tha 7th and the 8th of September, tho attack Of tho enemy planes through out PALAU were about as fierce as that of the 6th.

(b| At 0530, the enemy carrier task force consisting of 3 carriers, 1 battleship, 1 large type cruiser, and 11 destroyers, appeared along tho horison surrounding TAP. Between tho hours of 0$11 - 0840, the task for00 fired upon the airfield and the port of YAP. After the Naval attaek, the eneay disappeared to the east.

6. The ostiaates of the situation up to the 8th of Septeaber are as follows1

Judging froa tho situation since the 6th of Septeaber. the eneay's attack on this area Bust be a ffenttng attaek. The Group Headquarters "figures that tha aaln objective of the eneay bus be pointed at other areas, although, Headquarters does not know where the other objectire is as yet. However the entire G oup will prepare for the enemy's stronger attaek, and find a way to break the deadlock or this difficult phase of war, besides waiting for the right tiae to annihilate the eneay

7* Septeaber 9th, our forces did not eneouter any aerial attacks froa tho eneay. However froa 0700 of 10 Septeaber, PALAU Proper Island, asBORfe, MAUJCAL, AHAKABBSA N, PELELIU, and -A*MJAJ?were all assaulted again by eneay carrier planes, and on the 11th PELELIU and aIGo*mr were assaulted by naval gunfire.

In view of sueh a oritleal situation, the flroup Coamander dispatched instructions by wire to the BELELIU garrison and ANGHtR garrision starting the following. "It appears

that the eneay forces at* eJeterained to Bake a landing on PALAU.

A •

TO ¹

tttle any have a part In the decisive turn of tide in breaking tho deadlock of the "Greet ASIATIC War? (JAPANESE rendered naae for the Pacific conflict) the entire "ray and people of JAPAN are expecting us to win this battle. There will never be another chance as theee few existing days for the people living in the empire to repay tho eaperor's benevolence again. Rouse yourselves for the sake of your country! Officers and aen, you will devote your life to the winning of This battle, and attaining of your long cherished desire of annihilating the eneay".

B. Progress of the first ten days of Battle (Septeaber 11-20) . 1. The intelligence report.

a. Situation of tho Eneay dips. (of. appended aap#l)

(1) The main force of the carrier task force located off the coast of palau and yap (Consisting aainly of over 6 alreraft oarrlers, 2 battleship, ten or so erulsors, and about 30 destroyers) steaned westward on the afternoon of September 8th, and approached MINDANAO Island from the east. Froa the morning of the 9th to the afternoon of the lath, approximately 500 earrler planes attacked the various airfields around DAYAO, CAGAYAN, and SURIGAO, returning to tho southeast later. However, on the 12th and 13th they again made attaeks on the TACLOBAN Area (leytb Island). There on the afternoon of the 14th, the task force moved southward. On the 15th, the eneay attaoked MANADO and HALMaHERA, probably for the purpose of helping out the landing operations on MOROTAI Island.

(2) Scouting results about HOLLANDIA on the 11th of Septeaber are as. followst

(a) In HUMBOLDT Bays Aircraft Carrier 2 Battleship 2 Cruiser of destroyer 8 Lorgo transport 40

ediua 4 *>aall transport 70

(b) No eneay ships were eightof in

7/

t

TAIAHMERAH lay nor m»*b* 200 Kilometer to tho oott or 100 Kilometers to tho west of HOLLANDIA.

(3) Considering other reports end that of the scouting report of the SOLOMONIslands, it is quite obvious that the eneay's slsable unit which was eonsldered to have boon laying in anchorage near GUADAL CANAL since the beginning of June, had lifted anchor on the 11th of tho morning of the 12th, and was now headed for MS* GUIIIA.

(4) Eneay ships wore increasing in number ell along the northern ooest of NEW GUINEA. Tho eneay hardly used

wireless for intra-communlcations. Considering the feet that the eneay had changed *ha* method of communication^Ton

our tnirs

wireless,-he began to minimise the usage of wireless for sending out orders ss much as possible, efaeos^na ettomp»ing^te--«eee>-tfcnl ■sawt»<S Sites* i

(5) ^A Scouting results<s#oumeV LORBMGAU observed-

fro*

v%f! 2 Zero type fighter planes/ere as fottttws-t-

Ca) hips in LORENGAU Bay.

Alreraft Carriers 4

Battleships 10

Cruisers 7 Or 8

pestroyors 8

Large a Medium type transports 50

Small transports 30

(b) Outside of LORENGAU Bey

4 Cruisers and 16 large 4 medium type

transports sailing northward.

(o) In the waters 15 alios duo south of

haIN (TN-?) airfield, 4 destroyers wore seem heeding eastward

and 1 large Airoreft Carrier and 3 destroyers heading westward.

HA IN (TN-f) airfield -repotted 60 bombers.

LOS NBGROS airfield - spotted 30 smell planet

(type UMKnown) BNIRO (TN-?) airfield - spotted 20 or

_f 30 small planes.

(6) Aooordlng to redlo Intellegenee, sines the

18th of Bepteaber, enemy ships la tho waters, surrounding the ADMIRAL IT Y Islands were in act Its aoveaent. Also tho enemy ships in tho eaters surrounding tho MARSHALL Islands were ready for aovwaent_t which was expeoted te coaaance froa tho 19th or 20th of Septeaber. After those dates, the previously Mentioned enemy ships ere expeoted to advance towards the PALAU Area together.

(7) The eneay submarines which appeared in the eaters surrounding HALMAHERA and MOROTAI Islands are boldly and persistently atteapting to make reconnaissance in force. Approximately 50 eneay submarines are now storting to concentrate

tvTTif>C

south of FORMOSA, for tho purpose of stteaptfaHp-to^sut off our supply linos.

b. The situation of the eneay airforeos. (of. appended asp # 1)

(1) All of the eneay forces situated due west of HOLLARDIA amounts to approximately 900 planes. However, the probable reason for this Is due to the advance of the 5th and 15th Air Divisions main forces.

N0EMFOOR 50 plenes

BIAK i#9 planes

OUI(TM-T) ©VA) \ 150 plenee

WAKDE 10 planes

4

HOLLANDIA 200 planes

Up to tho 24th of Septeaber ^on the average ^r-300 planes made dally attacks on HALMAHXRA. Bowever, since them,, there^omre*only 20 plenes or so mainly for reconnaissance purposes*

After tho 15th of September their main objective was to tomt CBRAM Island.

The mass bombing of DATAO and MAX ADO became very severe.

SttJmi'J(_r

The enemy air forees were vdoins reconnaissance flights ar> to

SAKDAKAN, the northern point of BORNEO.

(2) Tho enemy's bombing mission ovef the "BABO" (J.

area became frequent end severe, and along with this the enemy!s

reconnaissance flights over the flat area of the BoliBBRAI (TN-?)

f it r—ui/<-

peninsula became precise. Therefore, It uaay■be that the enemy

1

73

fore** are planning to naa airborne troops in this aree.

(3) 8inee the beginning of Septeaber, eneay-&+*m**teu*~ewHL±+X±iii!^t>& 30"fighters and bombers hare been asking extensive attaeks in the CSRAM ant AkTBOIIA areas dally, especisHy on HANOAN airfield, (a JAPANBSB rendered name for an airfield on the southern coast of either CBRAM or AMBOINA) e. Other reports on the eneay.

It has been repotod that the comaander of the landing foreos on M0Rf*AAI was JULIAN SMITH (the Coamander of the 2nd Merino Division that landed on SAIPAN), although it was not confirmed,

Aoeording to the AUSTRALIAN broadcast, general MAC ARTHUR inspected MOReTAl Island after the teneery-landing • d. Tho Group situation on the front.

(1) PELELIU Aree (ef. appended chart # 1 A appended

Hep # 2).

For the past 10 days the eneay has been persistently straffing and bombing our foreos.a After the 12th tho enemy again o commenced Naval gun-fire, and fct/Hkeetr on the 15th began to land.

(a) Situation of 15 Septeaber

1) 50 eneay transports approached up to 13 kieometcrs off tho southeast coast of PBLBMU, and at 0700 houre, approxlaetely 300 landing bages had reached the reefs off the southwestern ooest of PELELIU under wesrbing and shelving-protection. However, so e of theee barges wore blown-up and sunk by nines which were carefully pre-laid. The eneay, nevertheless, readjusted their formations, and ggain attempted the daring task of landing, with the protective aid of tho smoke

«ur o.r-fillt*-"< -Are

shells, vbonhi^g- and >sl»sl44«*>

Tho TO^MITA Battalion had destroyed over 60 of the eneay berges since morning. The CHIAKE Battalion fought desperately with the eneay, standing up against the severe pounding of tho eneay shells and bombs. owever, the artillery units wore

especially successful in inflecting heavy damages to tho eneay

f

7?

11

tanks, and by 1000 hours, our forces successfully put tho onosry

to rout,

2) At 1420 hours, tha onosry again at* tempted to make tha perilous landing on tho southwestern part of our coastline. The unit in that seetor repulsed tho daring counter-attack, and pat the onosry to rout once more. However In another eeetor of the coostline near A YAsB ftwt)eneay position with tho aid of sewerel tanks <aae succe sfulllin landing, although they eere encountering heavy losses Inflicted by our forces * Nevertheless, after receiving reinforcements, the enemy forces were successful in making 'heir landing, and were able to make secure their position. o4ne# put tank unit attaokod tho eneay with such e cat-like spring at dusk, they were eble to inflict heavy damages on the eneay in the northwest snd western aree

of the airfield.

3) The [southwestern] sect or tfult with its main forces made a ooi&er-ettack on the eneay, while the ICHIOKA Bettelion (2 Infantry companies) mode a surprise attsok on the eneay, which had advanced up to 'he ess* end of the air-

JUL.

there, penetrating the eneay bjsesaaiaead a* the south east end of tho alrfelld, they were able to throw the eneay into

confusion with a severe blow. However, our forces vera unable

4

to Bake this the decisive blow.

4) Tho eneay losses

Landing barges ----—— approximately 60.

■ 3 tanks and aaphiblous tank —Approximately 50. Countless nambar of personnel.

b). The stuatlon on 16 Septeaber

1) 1000 hours 1 On the 8outh west coast of the airfield. The eneay began to unload landing relafereewants of personnel and tanks under protection of

t

heavy naval gun fire and bombs. At last with 4 tanks »nd one t

11

Infantry Company thay advanced te the northend of the airfield.

2) The OBI Coapany of the TOMITA Battalion aade a night attack on tho enemy \ which hod advanoed up to tholr aector end held fast the position In "ISHIMATSU"(W~?) against the eneay. However, as yet, dateitsreports had not

3) The southwest seetor unit, hawing readjusted the situation on the hill area around OTAMA, was again engeged in elose quarter and marauding ceabat. Finally;) they were able to throw the eneay into co fusion after damaging 100 of the eneay tanks and rondeflng heavy easualtias to eneay pereonnel.

(e) The situation of 17 Septeaber.

1) 0700 hours - Tho eneay with 2 Infantry Companies and 7 tanMk approached the TEHZAN and NAKAYAMA rone, after severe straffing and boabing on the T3NZAN end OYAMA area, (note: TENZAN, OjtlAMA, NAKAYAMA, are names rendered by the JAPANESE on these respective hills) However, the gerrlslon unit stationed there drove the eneay back, with extensive efforts froa the artillery.

2) The eneay forces who are feeing our west area's front lines ere still in a state ^;of confusion after receiving heavy damages frpa our farces. As yet the eneay has not advanced since last night. As for the south and east doctors, detailed reports have not been^nede- out as yet. However, VINAMie JIMA and HAKAZAKI are still in our hand.

In the meantime, It seems as if the eneay -eee- unloading Its field artillery, end~e*h«r materialsee^f***¹*.

3) Our looses up to the 17th af September: TOMITA Battalion and ICHIOKA Battalion lost about 50* of their strength. The losses for tho CHIAKI Battalion and Tank Unit have not been reported yet. Looses for the other unite were slight.

(d) The situation of 18 Septeaber. ^ A) The eneay began to attack our linos

elong the hills of TENZA.. and NAKAYAMA. At aboet 0900 they

approached tho eaat side of NAKAYAMA, bet vere repulsed by oar timely firing. owewer et 1300 hours, under the protection of hoary Navel gunfire, the enemy* composed of 2 tanks end approxi-aately 2 Infantry Companies, w*s~-eA~lee^-e*te-t«- advanced up to a high spot on the eas* side of NAKA YAMA.

2) 1400 hours — The enemy continued to pound our lines on KAKSOKUYAMA (JAPANESE rendered name for a hill whose e JAPANESB observation unit had been located) with heavy ehe414*g^^©aL;$hA~Nawyv However, the enemies next attaev, composed of 8 - 10 tanks, and epproximately 30 Infantry mdn, was eat-off by our artillery end regimental guns timely stalling.

1»J tW»s _°^h '

^The attack we*>^pulaa>d*rviearing losses -of- 5 tanks. wh4eh---were^/

Hit

loxt

af THCT-

3) Whet may be observed of the surviving enemy forces ere 16 tanks, 30 alligators, 2 Infantry Regiments, and 30 artllle y pleees. However, on the south-west tide of the airfield 50 or 60 small barges were seen unloading.

• 40 The PELELIU sector un't infiltrated, approximately 10 close quarter combat parties (perty consisting of 2 or 3 men) into the enemy lines, os***eh were quite successful in throwing the enemy Into confusion. A petrol of 7 men killed .27 of the today, and other such petrols returned safely efter infllotlng heavy casualtie to the enemy.

(e) The Situation of 19 September.

1) The eneny^consisting of 8 tanks and approximately 1 Infentry Battalion advanced to our lines around TENZAN and NAKAYAMA, attempting to attack HIGASHIYAMA with pert of its strengthJ^k'a4th the other part attacking KANSOK'JYaMA. Howdver, this we? repulsed by our forces, rendering heavy ea ualties to the enemy.

2) The enemy front line stretched from east to west with the following points elong the line:

A publ'c school, IAKAYAMA Radio detector post, end "MOMI weH TN-?)*. In the eree south to the airfield, the enemy be* established a

f

beachhead with artillery and tanks as the aelh body^ reedy for

1*

any eaergeney that say arlaa. Proa this day oa, tho eneay tankd vara more careful In their menuveurs, for slrssdy too many tanks had been destroyed.

On the airfield was an eneay fighter In the midst of landing tests.

3) Although our 10 centlastor Howltser has been put out of action, the PELELIU Sector Units are rendering heavy casualties to the eneay with just their Infantry weapons such as rifles, machine guns, mortars and etc.

(f) The situation of 20 Septeaber.

1) Since dawn, tho enemy hap been ooncen-tretlng their forces on KANSOKUYAMA, vainly trying to approach B1GASHIYAMA and KANSOKUYA'iA with 14 tanks and one infantry battalion under the powerful eld of sbeM4n^. and bombing. However, they were again put to rout receiving heavy losses.

2) Nevertheless, one platoon reached

the northern area of TENZAN aside from this there wereaeK en* real changes on the front.

Tho eoneentrated eneay fire on the area west of the island was extremely severe.

3) The PELELIU Sector Unit Inflected severe blows on t e eneay by attacking with a night close quarters patrol.

4) Naval reconnaissance seaplanes asde * successful night ettack on the eneay.

(2) The ANGAVR Area (ef. appended chart #1, appended nap #3)

For the past 10 days the eneay continuously straffed and bombed our forces with carrier planes. Proa 12 Septeaber the enemy resumed naval gun fire on our positions. Finally on 17 Septeaber, the enen y began>&4silanding operations.

(e) The situation of 17 Septeaber.

1) Under the protection of bonblng, otrafflng, end ^Jsval gun-fire, leneay craft including battleships approached as dost' as 100 asters off the oosst and commenced

ff

firing) wWeh^hee been going on since dawn, tno oneny launched o lending party of 30 bargee at 0800 along our northeaster const lino. However, tho ANGAUR Unit was able to put tho eneay

to rout and start a state of confusion with tho aid of the guns which had boon planted there.

2) However, another landing party froa the Miletion of PKLELIU, ooaposed of landing barges with Navel eecorts approached our coest line. Afjer breaking through our linos -counter attack-, at 0900 hours, part of the eneay party was able to take up its positions on land. The strength of the eneay forces which had- landed bp nasalKg were approxiastely, 2000 pereeanei. acooapsnled ha large group of tanks.

3) All day long the AHSAUR Area Unit fought very close to tho enemy line, In an atteapt to get away froa the enemy shelling straffing and boablng.

4) Confirmed eneay losses up to 1900

hours.

Barges blown up and sunk———--——- 30

Barges destroyed —--------------------- 20

Tanks destroyed -————------—------ 15

(b) Results of tho night attaek on tho 17th, end tho battle on *he lflth have not been reported yet.

(e) The situation of the 19th end 20th of

Septeaber•

1) The enemy following its establishment of a beachhead on the northeastern point of ANGAUR, on the 19th advanced up to approximately 1000 meters southesst of

•AIPAN (?N*%), which was a strategical point in the midwest of ANIAUR. Moreover, they began to move south and north.

2) On the 19th the ANGAUR Area Unit, completing the readjustment of its situation on the northwestern heights erea of the island, made vigorous counter-attacks on tho advanee enemy who ess west of tho light-house hill end put them to routy^kttor tho 20th of Septeaber, the strategic area in the northwestern heights was Ltili in our hands. The enemy, who

ettempted te advance during the daytime under heawy Naval gun-

fire inf boablng protect ion, was repulsed end drive beck with heavy casualties. The close wmarterg ooebat carried out by our forces eech night kept the eneay restless and on edge.

3) The eneay losees for tho night of the 19th end the dey of 20th are as followsi

tanks put out of aotlon---————.—----- 5 or 6

lending barges (large and snail) ——approximately 30

heavy weapons--------—--------------------— 3

aortara —————™—...——-------.---- 3

casualties----------------— approximately 300

4) Our losses amounted to aboat 50* of our strength* Nevertheless, the morale of our garrison Cosuaandor and men la still high.

(3) PALAU Proper Iolend end KOROlf Island area, (ef. fppended chert #1 and #2)

(a) For the past 10 days up to the 15th, the eneay oerrier plenes continued to attack dally. However, froa the 15th, the eneay assault started to slow down.

(a) Since the 13th, the eneny has been mine-sweeping in the "KOSSOL" anchorege north of PALAU Proper Island. On the 20th 1 Battleship, 2 cruisers, 9 cruisers or destroyers, 3 sufc-ehasers, 14 transports, 4 flying boat carriers, 2 unknown type ships, and 30 large flying boats wore observed in anchorage/

(e) Our Heval reconnrisssnee planes have made* night attaeks on PELELIU and K08SOL. The el*u*t4e» of the attadk

WAS

ie- as follows t

(4) The TAP Ares

All If ejn&te', and no changes has baen recognised. 2. Estimation of tha situation concerning tho eneay.

a. estimation of the eneay situation concerning the entire bottle.

We "figure- that the reason for the eneay's rush, in attoaptlng -easy ocenpotioir-e* MOROThI and PaLAU Is in order to make the two islands the advance bases for tho PHILIPPINE operetlon, which is a sort of tho large seele operations preparation.

b. The estimation of the situation concerning the eneay opposing the PALAU Islands Area Unit, imaedietelv following the flrot 10 days of battle.

The landed eneay forces probably eorteleAvef- a division, attacked 1th a powerful foree. It seems as if they hod been planning on taking up their positions In K0R0RU and PALAU Proper Island following tho main foroes oceupation of PELELIU Island. However, the eneay was unable to withdraw its aaln forces roa PELELIU, BecAUSE THE? Bel Ilcllvia heavy looses there. Also, they were constantly harassed by tho danger of being attacked by our aggressive artillery froa ANGAUR, and by the counter-landing on PELELIU which amy be staged by our ANGUAR foroes. vDae-to-vail these fac s the eneay was coapelled to change plan and

4

land its reserve foroes on ANGAUR.

At present the situation of the eneay seems quite week, * due to the loss of a largo part of hie forcoe. However, judging from the streteglo value of the PALAU Proper Islands and KOSSOL anehorege, which the eneay is now atteapting to obtain, it is quite obvious that the eneay is most llkelyjk) reinforce strength *14>h^power-} in order to save PELELIU from the present crisis and establish bases on the PALAU/ Islands.

n&aa^vukP mo* f

tXTlATZON 07 JOUBd SHIPS amd PLaMSS

Ut&SXt map ho. ^

oi notmws or iatzu

01 PSLELIU ISLAND. (11 t« 29 Sept.)

EAST BEACH

XMSHtT'MAP MO. T

PM30USS OF 1ATTLI OM AMOUR I8UMD (11 to 20 Soft.)

9¥

Ship. Sighted ia the Yieinity of PALAU (Middle af ■ ■jteatat)

1111Z 411 14111 11 1411 1I1X11&2